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Abstract 
The People's Republic of China has become a major source country for foreign direct 
investment. The objectives of this research are to identify the determinants of this phenomenon, 
to identify the international investment strategies pursued by Chinese MNEs, and to evaluate the 
effect of the domestic and international institutional environments on the determinants, 
investment strategies and behaviour of Chinese MNEs. Particular emphasis is given to the role 
of cross-border business and social networks. To address these objectives a novel framework, 
termed the Chinese outward direct investment regime (or ODIR), is advanced and tested using 
methodological triangulation techniques. This is done using data obtained from several sources, 
namely interviews with managers at the headquarters of Chinese MNEs and Chinese 
government officials, a survey questionnaire distributed to Chinese affiliates in the UK and 
official FDI data obtained from SAFE and MOFCOM, which are used in two econometric 
models of global Chinese ODI. 
The research makes a number of major contributions. First, the ODIR framework is found to 
have significant explanatory power in a number of key respects, especially in relation to the 
influence of domestic institutional factors on the internationalisation behaviour of Chinese 
MNEs. Second, the importance of domestic capital market imperfections as a driver of Chinese 
ODI is also confirmed. Capital market imperfections as a special application of the 
internalisation theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976) is argued to explain certain idiosyncratic 
investment behaviours observed among Chinese firms, especially in relation to host country risk. 
Third, a number of new proxies for international business research have been developed and 
applied successfully in models. Fourth, New Institutional Theory, the Stages Theory and the 
New International Venture theory have all been tested for the first time in relation to Chinese 
ODI. Of these, New Institutional Theory was found to have greatest explanatory power. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis reports the findings of a thirty two month investigation of the character, distribution 
and determinants of outward foreign direct investment from the People's Republic of China. 
This introductory chapter to the thesis first sets out the rationale for the research, explaining that 
Chinese outward direct investment has accelerated dramatically since 2000, as a number of 
indicators reveal. Then, the objectives and questions that underpin the research are stated, along 
with an introduction to the methods used to answer them. The key thrust to the research is that 
existing work on Chinese outward direct investment underplays the effect that the institutional 
environment within and outside China has on the international decision-taking of Chinese 
multinational enterprises. This is followed by an outline of key terms and definitions used 
throughout this thesis. The chapter concludes with a review of the structure of the thesis, in 
order to help orientate the reader. 
1.1 Rationale of the research 
The People's Republic of China (henceforth: China) is well-known and well-researched as a 
host country for foreign direct investment (FDI) (e. g. Cross and Tan, 2004; Buckley et al., 2002; 
Branstetter and Lardy, 2006; Clegg et al., 1996). ' Little is known and understood, however, 
about China's evolving role as a source country of FDI. Prior to 1979, outbound direct 
investment (ODD from this autarkic economy was modest. But since then, ODI flows have 
steadily increased. A first peak was reached just after the former Chairman of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), Deng Xiaoping, revived the economic liberalisation and reform 
process in 1992, after which outflows jumped to USD 4.4bn (see also Figure 1.1). Outflow 
levels remained at a relatively high level for a developing country and reached another peak of 
nearly USD 12bn in 2005. It is predicted that annual Chinese ODI flows will continue to rise to 
USD 37bn to 60bn by 2010 (ElU and CPII, 2006; Beebe, 2006). These projections are 
reinforced by repeated announcements by high-profile Chinese politicians and accompanying 
policy changes of the intention to create some fifty international competitive Chinese MNEs 
(Buckley et al., 2006; Sauvant, 2005). 
A number of other studies point to China's growing importance as a source country for FDI. 
Annual surveys by the United National Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 
2005a, 2004a) about future FDI source countries reveal that China is predicted to become the 
In this study, the term China is used to refer to the People's Republic of China (PRC). For the 
purposes of this research, the PRC excludes the special autonomous regions (SAR) of Hong 
Kong (SAR) and Macau (SAR), unless specifically stated. The Republic of China (Taiwan) is 
treated as an independent country. Regions with disputed borders (for example the Spratly 
Islands and the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea) are excluded from the definition of the 
PRC, as are associated economic activities. All statistics and figures respect these distinctions. 
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second most important foreign investor in Africa and Asia for the years 2004 to 2008 (behind 
South Africa and the USA). Frost (2005) shows the increased significance of Chinese 
investment for Southeast Asia, listing and describing extensively Chinese investors in this 
region. A similar development is now taking place in Europe. Liu (2004), for example, asserts 
that Chinese firms had become one of the most important foreign investors in the United 
Kingdom. In 2005, China became one of the ten most important developing source countries 
for FDI in terms of absolute global flow and stock figures (UNCTAD, 2007a). UNCTAD 
reports that China's ODI stock was valued at nearly USD 46bn at the end of 2005. This places 
China behind the economically more advanced East Asian countries like Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR), Singapore and Taiwan, Republic of China but ahead of 
developing countries in South America, West Asia and the European transition economies (see 
Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1: ODI stock of major developing economies, 1981 to 2005 (USD billion and % of 
developing economies total) 
1981-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
Developing economies 77.33bn 103.57bn 200.06bn 513.52bn 988.65bn 
China 0.16% 2.07% 4.87% 4.36% 3.61% 
Argentina 7.57% 5.76% 3.67% 3.02% 2.17% 
Brazil 50.61% 38.44% 21.13% 9.01% 5.93% 
Hong Kong SAR 0.69% 5.44% 14.54% 37.38% 38.16% 
Mexico 2.24% 2.21% 1.68% 1.08% 1.69% 
Republic of Korea 0.37% 0.89% 2.30% 3.29% 3.04% 
Singapore 1.14% 1.69% 6.74% 8.61% 8.79% 
Taiwan, Rep. of China 16.97% 16.21% 17.37% 9.98% 8.21% 
Notes: (1) The figures presented here are computed period averages in USD billion for all 
developing countries and respective share of each country. 
(2) The British Virgin Islands and the Russian Federation rank higher than China for the 
period 2000-2005 in terms of ODI stock. 
Source: UNCTAD (2007a). 
Although Chinese ODI flows and stocks are generally modest compared to industrialised 
countries such as the USA or the UK, China's ODI growth since the end 1970s reflects a 
significant departure from the former autarkic and socialistic economic system and this is likely 
to have had important effects on the internationalisation of its firms. 
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Figure 1.1: Chinese outward direct investment stocks and flows in USD billion 
(1981 to 2005) 
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Notes: (1) Left scale (-w-- ) represents Chinese ODI flows; 
Right scale (' ) represents Chinese ODI stock. 
(2) See Section 3.2 for explanations of the phases. 
Source: UNCTAD (2007a). 
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The growth of Chinese ODI is also evident in the area of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
Chinese firms are becoming increasingly internationally active by acquiring (often ailing) 
foreign firms. Not only has the number and total value of acquisitions risen (as Figure 1.2 
illustrates) but so too has the prominence of the target companies. Well publicised purchases 
include the take-over of IBM's (USA) PC business by Lenovo in 2005 and Nanjing 
Automobile's successful bidding war with its domestic rival Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corporation (SAIC) for MG Rover (UK) in 2004/05 (FT, 2005a). Today, Chinese companies 
are often mentioned among the first potential buyers when a company or parts of a company are 
for sale. A point in case is Daimler's divestment of Chrysler (2007). The three Chinese auto 
manufacturers Chery, First Auto Works and SAIC were all separately rumoured to have 
negotiated with Daimler to acquirer the US-American subsidiary (FT, 2007a). The 
consideration of a Chinese firm as a potential buyer of a leading automobile manufacturer 
exemplifies the perceived change in the quality and potential of Chinese ODI. What this 
example fails to identify or to explain, however, are the drivers behind China's FDI outbound 
3 
surge. It also raises the question of why Chinese firms are deemed capable of acquiring and 
managing a large Western multinational enterprise (MNE) when their firm-specific advantages 
and managerial capabilities are generally questioned (e. g. by Nolan, 2002; Shenkar, 2005). 
Figure 1.2: Chinese international acquisitions, total annual USD million and numbers 
Total value of cross-border 
acquisitions (USD mn) 
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7 
Phase 2 
1 
. 
600 
1.400 
1.200 
1.000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
Number of cross-border 
acquisitions 
Phaca 2 Phaca d Phace 5 
Notes: (1) Left scale: total value of cross-border acquisitions by Chinese firms; 
Right scale: number of cross-border acquisitions by Chinese firms. 
(2) Data for the years prior 1987 and post 2004 are not available. 
Source: UNCTAD (2007a). 
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Given this background, the objectives of this research are: (i) to identify the determinants of 
Chinese ODI; (ii) to identify the international investment strategies pursued by Chinese MNEs, 
and (iii) to evaluate the effect of the domestic and international institutional environment on the 
determinants, investment strategies and behaviour of Chinese MNEs. As part of the third 
objective, the role of international business and social networks is given particular emphasis. In 
so doing, theories on FDI and on MNE investment behaviour which were developed from 
research that focuses on industrialised country MNEs are tested for their applicability to a 
developing country context such as China. A positive finding for the applicability of the 
theories is generally expected (UNCTAD, 2006). 
4 
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There are four key strands to this research, each underpinned by a strong theoretical and 
empirical foundation. First, a thorough analysis of the international investment strategies of 
Chinese firms is undertaken with the aim of shedding light on the determinants of Chinese ODI, 
the drivers behind international acquisitions (such as the proposed acquisition of Chrysler), and 
the rise of Chinese ODI globally. Work on Chinese ODI by Deng (2003), Wong and Chan 
(2003) and others tends to scrutinise and draw inferences from highly aggregated data or rely on 
selective case examples drawn from a small pool of familiar Chinese MNEs (e. g. Haier, TCL 
and Lenovo most commonly, at least in English-language sources), or both. These studies 
generally ascribe certain investment strategies to Chinese companies in particular host countries. 
For example, Chinese investment in Africa is said occur to access natural resources while 
improved access to advanced technology is reported to be a driver for investments in 
industrialised countries such as the United Kingdom. This literature would be greatly informed 
by an econometric investigation of cross-sectional, disaggregated data on Chinese ODI. Such an 
analysis is presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
Second, companies are said to undergo a sequence of stages in their internationalisation during 
which they increase their commitment to host markets and invest in more distant countries 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). This may not hold true for Chinese firms. Official Chinese 
statistics presented in Chapter 3 demonstrate that early Chinese ODI was destined to psychically 
distant countries in North America and Oceania. Only since the mid 1990s has this pattern 
turned around and that Chinese ODI in nearby countries has become larger in value than in 
more distant countries. It may therefore be that Chinese firms rather follow a pattern identified 
for international new ventures. Following this approach, firms invest in locations where there is 
a good business opportunity readily available (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994) regardless of 
geographic or psychic distance. This research investigates whether or not such behaviour can 
be observed for the internationalisation activity of Chinese MNEs. 
Third, to account for China's heritage of economic planning (which is still visible in the 
government's involvement today [Scott, 2002]) and continuous changes to China's institutional 
environment since 1979, special emphasis is placed on institutional theory. In this thesis, a 
model is advanced which allows testing the extent to which institutional theory has the power to 
explain the recent evolution of Chinese ODI. As Figures 1.1 and 1.2 demonstrate, Chinese ODI 
is generally described as having evolved in five phases (see for example Ye, 1992; Wong and 
Chan, 2003, Wu and Chen, 2001). Each phase is defined by changes to the nature of Chinese 
ODI that are caused mainly by changes to the institutional environment and the administration 
and regulation concerning outbound FDI. This comprises changes to the outward investment 
approval regime and the capability of firms to pursue international business opportunities, 
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among other things. Capability may, in the Chinese context, not necessarily mean managerial 
capacity and technological advancement over competitors but privileged access to financial 
resources. The possibility to internalise access to abundant funding may help Chinese firms to 
overcome competitive weaknesses and invest abroad to pursue objectives other than purely 
profit-maximising ones. This is not to say that Chinese firms are not profit-maximisers. But 
there exists the likelihood that they may invest in one country to gain access to resources to be 
exploited in a third country. The institutional realm is also of importance from another 
perspective. Not all Chinese firms were allowed at all times to pursue investments abroad. 
Liberalisation of this policy and the consequential rise of a different breed of firms may be 
changing the nature of the determinants of Chinese ODI. The impact of the changes is probably 
best illustrated in Figure 1.2. This shows major ups and downs in the annual value of cross- 
border acquisitions by Chinese firms at the start of each phase. This hints at the possibility that 
the domestic institutional environment may affect the international investment strategies and 
behaviour of Chinese MNEs. To date, academic research has merely skirted around issues 
surrounding the institutional environment and it is generally considered separately from the 
investment behaviour of Chinese firms (e. g. Deng, 2003,2004; Warner et al., 2004; Wu and 
Chen, 2001). Chinese institutions are likely to be an important determinant of Chinese ODI. 
Better account of this in empirical work could help to explain the steady growth and the positive 
prospects of Chinese ODI evidenced in the UNCTAD and other surveys. 
Fourth, a further aspect not fully accounted for in extant research is the influence of the 
Overseas Chinese Diaspora on firm investment decision-making. A large body of research has 
identified that the Overseas Chinese have played an important role in re-integrating China into 
the world economy (e. g. Naughton, 2007; Gao, 2003) and that the Chinese government actively 
tries to retain strong linkages with the Overseas Chinese, which generally have a strong affinity 
towards their ancestral home regions on the mainland (e. g. Liu, 2000). It is therefore pertinent 
to investigate whether or not the Overseas Chinese Diaspora has a moderating effect on the 
overseas investment strategies of Chinese MNEs. 
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
In this thesis, the four research objectives are pursued using a common and specific set of 
research questions. Although the research questions are developed more fully in Chapter 3, it is 
worthwhile to state them clearly at the outset and to link them to the research objectives. Each 
research question is now introduced, along with the Chapters in which they are addressed. 
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Identification of the determinants of Chinese ODI 
The objective of identifying the drivers of Chinese ODI leads to the first and most 
straightforward research question: What are the determinants of Chinese ODI (RQJ)? Later the 
argument is developed that the determinants are not static but have changed over time along 
with changes to the domestic and institutional environment in which Chinese MNEs are 
embedded. Hence, it follows: Have the determinants of Chinese ODI changed over time 
(RQ6)? These two research questions are addressed in Section 6.2 and Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
The international strategies of Chinese firms 
This research objective aims to identify the strategies of Chinese MNEs following the 
classification of generic investment strategies proposed by Dunning (1993). Research questions 
underpinning this objective therefore ask to what extent Chinese ODI is driven by market- 
seeking (RQ2), resource-seeking (RQ3), technology seeking (RQ4), or strategic asset seeking 
(RQ5) motivations. It is again assumed that these strategies are not necessarily static but may 
have changed over time (RQ6). As is made clear in Chapter 3, China has made great strides in 
reforming and liberalising its economy. This has led to a variety of ownership forms being 
demonstrated by its MNEs. Consequently, this research explores whether or not the investment 
strategies of Chinese MNEs differ by ownership type (RQII ). Another aspect to corporate 
strategy concerns the extent of international commitment and the spatial distribution of Chinese 
ODI. These issues are addressed by RQ7 and RQ8 which ask whether the internationalisation of 
Chinese MNEs confirms to the `stages' model or the theory of international new ventures. 
These research questions are all addressed in the two empirical Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
Influence of domestic and international institutions 
The influence of domestic and supranational institutions on ODI is central to modelling the 
international investment decisions of Chinese MNEs done in Chapter 4. This aspect is split into 
two research questions, the first concerning the role of domestic institutions (RQ10a) and the 
second, international institutions (RQ10b). This is done for reasons of simplification and to 
reduce the effect of noise in the data. Since the effect of these institutions may vary by 
ownership type of Chinese MNE, RQ11 is linked to this research objective, too. The effect of 
the domestic institution is investigated in interviews with parent firms in China (Section 6.1) 
and evaluated together with a testing of the determinant effect of supranational institutions on 
patterns of Chinese ODI undertaken in the econometric modelling in Chapter 7. 
Influence of international networks 
There is evidence to suggest that the presence of Overseas Chinese in a target country may 
facilitate the internationalisation of Chinese firms, although, as is made clear in Section 3.3 of 
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this thesis, research findings on this issue are ambiguous. RQ9 is designed to address this 
research objective. The influence of such international networks may vary by ownership type 
and this is tackled in RQ11. The question of the influence of international networks also plays a 
role in assessing whether Chinese firms invest in ways proposed in the Uppsala model (RQ7) or 
as asserted in the theory on international new ventures (RQ8). The influence of international 
networks is examined in interview (Section 6.1) and tested in the econometric modelling in 
Chapter 7. Based on the findings, inferences are drawn that answer RQ7 and RQ8. 
1.3 Definitions and terminology 
It is important at the outset of this research that key terms and concepts used in this study are 
clearly delineated and defined. 
1.3.1 Foreign direct investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a substantial, long-term relationship which an enterprise 
undertakes in a country foreign to its residence (UNCTAD, 2006). It comprises at least one of 
the three following investment options: (i) equity capital (i. e. the purchase of, normally, 10% or 
more of the share of an enterprise in a country other than the home country of the acquirer); 2 (ii) 
reinvested earnings of the foreign affiliate (i. e. earnings of the affiliate which are not paid out as 
dividends or otherwise remitted to the parent company); and (iii) intra-company loans from the 
parent company to the foreign affiliate (UNCTAD, 2006). To distinguish it from portfolio 
investment it is normal to regard FDI as also involving investment that secures managerial 
control over the foreign operation. FDI is often synonymously used for the more precise term 
`inward/inbound foreign direct investment'. Investment originating from a source or home 
country is called `outward/outbound foreign direct investment' (OFDI) or `outward/outbound 
direct investment' (ODD. In this thesis the acronym ODI is preferred. Both inward and 
outward foreign direct investment can be described in terms of flows and stocks, as follows: 
1.3.1.1 Foreign direct investment flows 
FDI flow is the capital provided by the investing enterprise to the foreign invested companies, 
or capital provided by the foreign invested company to the investing enterprise (UNCTAD, 
2006), over a given period of time (normally one calendar year in official statistics). 
2 The internationally recommended threshold figure for the classification of FDI to apply is higher 
in some countries, for example Germany where it is 20% (OECD, 1996). 
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1.3.1.2 Foreign direct investment stock 
FDI stock is the accumulation of yearly foreign direct investment and divestment flows by 
home country companies. Hence, the "FDI stock is the value of the share of their capital and 
reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net 
indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise" (UNCTAD, 2006: 294), normally presented 
as the net aggregated figure for an economy for a calendar year. The term FDI stock therefore 
usually applies to the net value of foreign-owned assets in an economy in a given year. 
1.3.2 Multinational corporation and its affiliates 
A multinational enterprise (MNE) is defined as "an enterprise which owns and controls 
activities in different economies" (Buckley and Casson, 1976: 1). An affiliate is a company that 
is controlled directly or indirectly in another economy by a foreign investor firm. The term 
affiliate comprises (i) subsidiaries in which the investing firm holds 50% or more of the voting 
stock/equity capital, (ii) associate firms in which 10% to 50% of the voting stock/equity capital 
are held by a foreign investor and (iii) branches which are unincorporated and are wholly or 
jointly owned by a foreign investor (OECD, 2005a). In this study, the term affiliate is used to 
embrace each of these ownership forms. 
1.3.3 Country classification 
In international business theorising, when describing FDI flows and when explaining certain 
firm characteristics, it is useful to distinguish between different types of host and home country. 
Country-specific characteristics differ greatly and can exert a significant influence on the 
outward and inward investment behaviour of MNEs, as is revealed in this study. 
To date, there exists no consensus among supranational agencies such as the United Nations 
bodies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (1 VIF) and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as to what defines a developed vs. 
developing, and industrialised vs. emerging (transitional) vs. industrialising country. This 
study therefore follows the classification of developed and developing countries as used by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in their annually published 
World Investment Report. In particular, the classification as presented in the latest version of 
UNCTAD's internet-based FDUTNC database is used (UNCTAD, 2007a). The list of country 
classifications and constituent countries used in this study is provided in Appendix A. 1. 
The terms developed and industrialised country are used synonymously in this study, as are the 
terms developing, industrialising, emerging, and transitional country. Having said that, it 
should be noted that there are differences between countries described by these terms. The 
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terms transitional economy and emerging economy are typically employed to describe countries 
that are changing their economic system towards to an open, market economy and have (almost) 
reached the level of economic development of developed countries, respectively. The former is 
normally applied to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and China. 
The latter is typically associated with the so-called `newly industrialised economies' (NIEs) in 
Asia, namely Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Republic of Korea (or South Korea) and Taiwan, 
Republic of China (Taiwan). Although the NIEs are called `industrialised', they are officially 
not classified as industrialised Asian countries but rather as emerging or developing ones 
(UNCTAD, 2006). 
A further country classification used in this study is the `Triad economies'. This comprises 
North America (Canada and the USA), the European Union countries and Japan. Finally, in this 
research, countries are further classified depending on membership status in the OECD and in 
the WTO/GATT. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, Chinese ODI is placed in 
context of global FDI flows and the international distribution of MNEs. This is followed by a 
review of theories that explain FDI originating from developed countries, along with an 
overview of the research stream that argues that developing country ODI is distinctive from 
developed country FDI. The chapter concludes with a review of empirical studies on the 
determinants of FDI in general. A description of Chinese ODI is then given in Chapter 3. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first introduces the corporate and government actors 
in China. This is done to inform the model of the Chinese outward direct investment regime 
which is advanced later. This is followed by a review of the development of Chinese ODI with 
particular reference to political and administrative changes in China since 1979. Finally, extant 
literature on Chinese ODI is reviewed in this chapter and linked to the theories presented in 
Chapter 2 and the institutional environment presented in the earlier sections of this chapter. 
This final section also develops the specific research questions for this study. Based on the 
research questions, a model is then advanced in Chapter 4 that seeks to explain patterns of 
Chinese ODI. This model combines different theories into a holistic framework within which 
Chinese ODI can be analysed. The model draws heavily on the `new institutional theory' 
approach, since it is argued in this research that the domestic and institutional environment 
shapes to a great degree international investment decision-making of Chinese MNEs. This 
model is tested in subsequent chapters. Chapter 5 describes the research methods used in this 
study and evaluates the merits of quantitative and qualitative business research in the context of 
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China. The primary and secondary data collection methods used in this study are introduced. 
In Chapter 6, the primary data collected in interviews with Chinese parent MNEs and in a 
survey of Chinese affiliates in the UK are analysed and discussed. In Chapter 7, two 
econometric models using two different sets of Chinese ODI data and two different time frames 
are specified in order to test the model of Chinese ODI as advanced in Chapter 4. In Chapter 8, 
the findings of the research are discussed and conclusions are drawn. The main contributions 
made by this study are also highlighted here. The thesis concludes with some suggestions for 
further research on Chinese ODI. 
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2 Internationalisation through foreign direct investment - 
Some stylised facts and theoretical explanations 
This chapter provides the context and analytical frameworks for the investigation of Chinese 
outward direct investment (ODD conducted later. First, an overview is presented of the global 
development of foreign direct investment (FDI) since the 1970s for both developed and 
developing countries to place Chinese ODI and the growth of Chinese multinational enterprises 
into context. Second, theoretical models that explain FDI from developed countries and MNE 
behaviour and strategies are introduced and critically evaluated (Section 2.2). These analytical 
tools are typically used in extant studies on Chinese ODI (see Section 3.4). They also partially 
inform the development of a model to explain Chinese ODI which is advanced in Chapter 4. 
Then, an overview is presented of empirical studies that investigate the determinants of FDI 
from developed and developing countries. In so doing, a foundation for testing the new model 
of Chinese ODI econometrically in Chapter 7 is laid out. 
2.1 Global foreign direct investment pattern and development 
This section reviews patterns of global ODI and the distribution of MNEs with regards to the 
growing position of ODI originating from, and MNEs headquartered in, developing countries. 
This is followed by a similar review of global FDI inflows. In both sections, the position of 
China and its MNEs are highlighted and put into perspective. A more detailed account of the 
development of Chinese ODI since 1979 is provided in Chapter 3. 
2.1.1 The global development of foreign direct investment 
Worldwide FDI flows have increased dramatically since the 1970s when the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) first published data on the subject. While 
the total amount of worldwide FDI outflow during the 1970s stood at an annual average of USD 
28.26bn, it rose continuously during the 1980s to an annual average of USD 93.32bn and 
quadrupled to an annual average of USD 418.97bn in the 1990s (UNCTAD, 2007) (see also 
Table 2.1). Annual flows of outward FDI continued to increase in the new millennium and 
nearly doubled to USD 779.26bn over the period 2000 to 2005 compared with the 1990s 
(UNCTAD, 2007). This outbound FDI generally originates from the industrialised economies, 
notably North America, the European Union (EU15) and Japan. These industrialised economies 
accounted for 98% of world FDI outflows annually during the 1970s. Since then, the share has 
steady declined, standing at a period average of 87% for the years 2000 to 2005 (UNCTAD, 
2007). Because the industrialised economies are the main sources of FDI, it is not surprising 
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that they headquarter the majority of MNEs and the largest MNEs by foreign and total assets. 
Nearly three-quarters of all MNEs originate from the industrialised countries and 85% of the 
worlds' top 100 MNEs (by foreign assets) were headquartered in the Triad economies in 2004 
(UNCTAD, 2006). Accordingly, theories of MNE behaviour, investment motivation and 
strategy mainly derive from observations of companies based in the industrialised countries, 
specifically the USA (see also Section 2.2). 
By contrast, developing and emerging economies represent a much smaller but growing source 
of FDI. While only 1 to 2% of annual global FDI averages originated from the developing 
countries in the 1970s, this figure has risen to 12% in the most recent period, 2000 to 2005. 
This increase is remarkable percentage-wise but even more so in absolute value terms. 
Table 2.1: ODI flows by region during, 1970-2005 (Five year annual average: USD billion 
and % of world total) 
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
World 189.4 376.2 443.0 1,424.4 2,260.6 6,086.9 6,913.3 
Developed 99% 98% 95% 93% 88% 89% 87% 
economies 
Europe 46% 44% 49% 53% 49% 60% 60% 
N. America 50% 48% 34% 20% 26% 24% 22% 
Asia/Oceania 7% 7% 12% 20% 13% 5% 5% 
Developing 1% 2% 5% 7% 12% 10% 12% 
economies 
L. America 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 4% 
Asia/Oceania 0% 0% 3% 5% 9% 7% 8% 
Africa 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Transition 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
economies 
Notes: (1) Some columns do not sum to one hundred due to rounding errors. 
(2) A complete country list and classification is presented in Appendix A. 1. 
Source: UNCTAD (2007a). 
World FDI flows increased more than thirty-six fold from 1970 to 2005 but flows from 
developing countries rose from USD 3.5bn to USD 802.6bn in the same period -a two hundred 
and twenty nine-fold increase. The distribution of developing country source countries was 
spread over all continents in the 1970s but since then has become more concentrated. Since the 
1990s, the Asian Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) and, gradually, China have 
13 
increasingly contributed to developing country ODI and now dominate it with a share of more 
than 60% of the stock value and nearly 50% of the flow value in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2007a). 
Outward FDI from Hong Kong SAR increased significantly during the 1990s when it accounted 
on average for more than 35% of ODI originating from developing countries (see also Table 
1.1). ODI originating from mainland China is reported by UNCTAD from 1982 onwards only. 
Annual ODI from China increased from USD 44mn in 1982 to an annual period average of 
more than USD 2bn from 1991 to 2003 (UNCTAD, 2007a). The stock of Chinese ODI was 
valued in 2005 at USD 46.31bn, the seventh highest amount among developing countries. Since 
2000, China's position as an important source country has been strengthened by significantly 
growing annual ODI flows. Flow levels reached USD 5.50bn in 2004 and rose again to USD 
12.26bn in 2005 (MOFCOM, 2006a) 3 
The growing importance of ODI originating from Asian developing countries is also reflected in 
several rankings of the largest MNEs such as the global `Top 100' and `Top 200' MNEs 
published by UNCTAD. 4 These UNCTAD rankings present the largest MNEs from both 
developed and developing countries by total foreign assets. The ranking for 2004 includes five 
developing country companies in the Top 100, including China-based China International Trust 
and Investment Corporation (CITIC). A further ten developing country companies are 
represented in the Top 200, including an unnamed Chinese company (UNCTAD, 2006). The 
strength of Chinese and NIES companies is also observable in another ranking by UNCTAD 
which lists the top 100 non-financial developing country MNEs with regard to total foreign 
assets. Seventy-seven of the top 100 companies were headquartered in Asian countries in 2004, 
of which ten are from China, namely, in descending order: China International Trust and 
Investment Company (CITIC), China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co., China State Construction 
Engineering Corporation, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinochem 
Corporation, TCL Corporation, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China 
Minmetals Corp., Cofco International Corp., and BOE Technology Group Company Ltd. 
(UNCTAD, 2006). Of these ten Chinese companies, seven are ranked among the top 50 
developing country MNEs in UNCTAD's `Top 100' list. Compared to the first year of the 
publication of the ranking in 1993, the significant presence of Chinese companies in 2004 is 
3 The data reported by MOFCOM is not necessarily congruent with UNCTAD data. UNCTAD 
reports lower ODI flows for 2004 and 2005 and has generally valued Chinese ODI stock 
differently than MOFCOM. An explanation for this divergence is presented in Chapter 5. 
° Further rankings exemplifying the growth of Chinese firms are the Fortune Global 500 (15 
Chinese firms in 2005 and 19 in 2006 [Fortune, 2007]), the Forbes Global 2000 published in 
2007 (44 firms [Forbes, 2007]), the Business Week's Global 1000 (6 firms in 2006 [Business 
Week, 2006]), the Top 200 Emerging Markets Companies also published by Business Week 
from 2001(10 firms [Business Week, 2001]), and the Deloitte Technology Fast 500 Asia Pacific 
Ranking 2006 (60 firms [which also includes Hong Kong-based firms; Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, 2006]). 
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striking. No Chinese company was listed in 1993 and even in 2000 the ranking included three 
Chinese firms only (UNCTAD, 1995,2002). Given the growing importance of FDI from 
developing countries, and from China in particular, there is a need for scholars to systematically 
investigate the determinants and drivers of Chinese ODI. This research is concerned with the 
investment motivations of Chinese companies such as the top ranked ones mentioned here and 
their mainland peer companies. 
2.1.2 Host country distribution of ODI flows 
The distribution of worldwide inward FDI mirrors to some extent the development of global 
ODI. As with global ODI, the Triad economies are also the main recipients. These economies 
have attracted an average of about 70% of annual inflow since the 1970s (see Table 2.2). 
Overall, this share is considerably lower than the respective ODI share. European countries in 
particular received lower proportions of global inward FDI flow than they contribute to ODI. 
This is partly explained by the upsurge of inward FDI into North America and by the rise of the 
NIEs and China as main recipients of inward FDI flows. 
Table 2.2: FDI inflows by region, 1970-2005 (Five year average: total USD billion and % 
of world total) 
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
World 179.5 307.8 587.5 1,290.1 2,010.6 6,068.8 7,269.8 
Developed 79% 74% 68% 83% 68% 70% 65% 
economies 
Europe 45% 40% 26% 35% 41% 41% 45% 
N. America 27% 28% 37% 43% 22% 27% 18% 
Asia/Oceania 7% 6% 5% 5% 5% 3% 2% 
Developing 21% 26% 32% 17% 31% 29% 31% 
economies 
L. America 10% 12% 11% 5% 8% 11% 10% 
Asia/Oceania 4%. 10% 18% 10% 20% 16% 19% 
Africa 6% 4% 3% 2% 2% 1% 3% 
Transition n/a n/a 0% 0% 1% 1% 3% 
economies 
Notes: (1) Some columns do not sum to one hundred due to rounding errors. 
(2) A complete country list and classification is presented in Appendix A. 1. 
Source: UNCTAD (2007a). 
The developing countries as a whole have received a large proportion of worldwide inward FDI 
flows annually since 1970 (around 25%) with a gradually increasing proportion being directed 
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towards China (Zhao, 2003; Zhou and Lall, 2005). China received around one-third of all FDI 
flows into developing countries during the mid-1990s and did so again in 2002 and 2003. 
Around forty per cent of all FDI flows to Asian countries were directed to China (UNCTAD, 
2007a; Zhao, 2003). The majority of FDI flows into China originated from nearby Hong Kong 
SAR, Macau SAR and Taiwan (Naughton, 2007) S The worldwide development of FDI inflows 
by region is summarised in Table 2.2. 
2.2 Theoretical foundations of foreign direct investment 
This section reviews and discusses theories that have the potential to explain the volume and 
distribution of Chinese ODI. Traditionally, theories on FDI derive from research on 
industrialised country MNEs, since these were among the first to internationalise on a large 
scale. Starting with what is regarded here as the core theory of FDI - the internalisation theory 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976) - this section presents and discusses theories and frameworks 
typically applied to analyse FDI from industrialised countries. In addition to internalisation 
theory, the following theories and frameworks are reviewed: (i) Dunning's eclectic paradigm 
(also called the OLI paradigm), which stipulates that ownership and host country location 
advantages must be present for a firm to internalise transactions across borders; (ii) the 
international investment strategies of firms (Dunning, 1993); (iii) the Stages Theory (also called 
the `Uppsala' approach), and (iv) the international new venture theory, which challenges the 
stages theory by stating that some firms conduct FDI very quickly after establishment. In 
addition, because the internationalisation process of a firm may be accelerated by access to 
social networks, (v) the international entrepreneurial network theory is presented. Implicit in all 
these theories is that institutions play an important role in the internationalisation of firms. 
Hence, (vi) new institutional theory is introduced. This section finishes with an assessment of 
the ability of these theories to explain FDI from developing countries. The theoretical insights 
from this section are used to develop a model of Chinese ODI which is presented in Chapter 4 
and tested in Chapters 6 and 7. 
2.2.1 The general theory of foreign direct investment - Internalisation theory 
Buckley (1990) argues that the core (general) theory of FDI is the internalisation theory. 6 The 
general principles of internalisation are twofold (Buckley and Casson 1976). Firms (i) 
SA significant but indeterminate share of FDI in China from Hong Kong is generally assumed to 
be 'round-tripping' FDI, i. e. funds that are legally and illegally channelled out of China to be 
reinvested in China through a foreign investment vehicle in order to take advantage of 
preferential treatment extended to foreign investors (see also Section 3.3 and Wall, 1997). 
6 This section draws mainly upon Buckley et al. (2007a). 
16 
internalise missing or imperfect external markets across borders until the costs of further 
internalisation outweigh the benefits, and (ii) firms choose locations for their activities along the 
supply-chain that minimise the overall costs of their operations. 7 Imperfect markets are 
distortions in the price system caused by structural or cognitive factors. Structural 
imperfections relate to government imposed or enforced formal constraints such as barriers to 
competition and poorly defined property rights which lead to rising transaction costs. Cognitive 
imperfections relate to uncertainties concerning, for example, future foreign exchange rate 
developments and business-related government policies (Dunning, 1995; Hennart, 2001). 
Expansion by internalisation of markets across borders means that firms use FDI to gain an 
advantage over (local) competitors in a host country by replacing imperfect external markets in 
intermediate products and services with their organisational, hierarchical corporate structure and 
by appropriating the returns that this may generate (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Buckley, 1988; 
Hymer, 1960). Through internalisation, companies may benefit from lower transaction costs 
(such as communication and contracting costs), improved protection of intangible assets, 
increased bargaining power, improved buyer/seller certainty and expanded transfer pricing 
possibilities (Agarwal, 1980). In so doing, companies perceive other arm's length modes of 
internationalisation, such as exporting or non-affiliate licensing, to be more costly. 
Buckley (1993) comments that there may be justifications for special applications of the core 
theory. To illustrate, the most commonly used example of the exploitation of imperfect markets 
are companies in knowledge-intensive industries with valuable intangible assets (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Buckley, 1988; Buckley, 1993). Internalisation theory is not constrained to 
research-intensive industries, however. Rather, it is a special application of the core theory. It 
follows from this that special applications of the internalisation theory to accommodate firm, 
industry or county characteristics (such as the internationalisation of small firms and of 
developing country firms) are possible extensions (Buckley, 1988). This raises the possibility 
that developing country ODI, and, for the purposes of this study, specifically ODI originating 
from China, might be better explained by a special application to be nested in the core theory. 
These general principles, as well as the following theories and frameworks, are derived from 
research on industrialised country MNEs. The internalisation of imperfect markets across 
borders argument remains relevant for non-industrialised country companies as it constitutes the 
core element of FDI theory. However, in the case of developing country MNEs, it is likely that 
7 Market imperfections are created by, for example, government intervention while, in contrast, 
market failure is based on monopolistic power, unintended externalities and so forth (Boddewyn 
and Brewer, 1994). 
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a set of particular market imperfections exists which require special applications of the general 
theory. This argument is further developed in Chapters 4,6 and 7. 
2.2.2 The Eclectic Paradigm 
Although internalisation theory is arguably the core theory to explain FDI, Dunning (2000) 
asserts that the internalisation of imperfect markets is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for firms to conduct FDI. Dunning (1977) proposes that the investing firm needs to hold 
ownership advantages relative to local firms. Ownership and locational advantages are taken 
into consideration by a company if internalisation advantages cannot be utilised through a direct 
investment. In such instances, the firm would rather export or license. The importance of 
ownership and locational advantages and the ability to internalise these advantages as a pre- 
condition for FDI have been drawn together by Dunning (e. g. 1980,1988,2000,2002) to form 
his so-called eclectic paradigm or OLI (Ownership-Location-Internalisation) paradigm. 
The necessity of a firm having ownership advantages follows from the second aspect of the core 
theory. To be able to out-compete local firms in a foreign setting, the investing firm needs one 
or more ownership advantages. An ownership advantage is an asset that competitors cannot 
imitate, copy or otherwise access over the short-run, securing for the owner monopolistic rents 
(Penrose, 1995). The monopolistic rents which the company gains during this period have to be 
large enough to compensate for the risks associated with investing in a new and unfamiliar 
business, political and cultural environment (Hymer, 1960). 
Dunning (2000) argues that ownership advantages have to be identified and fostered (O), 
accessed (Os) and utilised (Oa) by a company. Ownership advantages based on specific assets 
(O, ) can be either endogenous or exogenous to the firm. Endogenous ownership advantages are 
of a technological, managerial or organisational nature and can be tangible, as in the case of 
technology, or intangible, in the case of management and organisational capabilities and brands. 
Exogenous advantages refer to privileged access to input factors such as (government) funding, 
raw materials and labour allocation which can be exploited to reduce costs. The ability to 
internalise and utilise these endogenous and exogenous assets is labelled O, by Dunning. This 
notion of ownership advantages has been recently extended by Dunning with the addition of 
institutionally-related competitive advantages (O; ) (Dunning, 2006a). The ownership advantage 
O; refers to company-specific incentives and motivation structures which enables it to either 
exploit existing ownership advantages or to access and gain new ones. It is generally assumed 
that companies develop their ownership advantages in their domestic markets over time before 
they internationalise (e. g. Dunning, 2000; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hymer, 1960). As a 
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consequence, large enterprises with a dominating position in their home market are normally 
those that possess the capabilities to invest internationally (Hymer, 1960). However, firms from, 
for example, developing countries which are smaller and less well endowed with firm-specific 
advantages than their counterparts from developed countries are argued to undertake FDI in 
order to augment their asset stock and strengthen ownership advantages in order to close the 
capability gap (e. g. Bartlett and Goshal, 2000; Fosfuri and Motta, 1999). 
The second element of the eclectic paradigm relates to host country locational factors. Dunning 
argues that the selected host location needs to possess immobile factor endowments (L) which 
can be combined with the ownership advantages of a company so that it serves markets through 
FDI rather than through export. The locational factors comprise hard and soft factors. `Hard' 
factors denote immobile and non-renewable factors, such as raw materials, which have to be 
excavated. Important hard factors are natural resources such as oil and mining products, timber 
and food resources for example. `Soft' factors are highly influenced by the institutional 
environment of the host region (Meyer, 2004; Henisz, 2004; Delios and Henisz, 2003). Soft 
locational factors comprise, inter alia, political and business risk and commercial transparency, 
the level of education and skills of the workforce, the quality and enforcement of laws and 
regulations, the level of corruption and the freedom and support concerning research in sensitive 
areas such as biotechnology and genomes, for example (Andersen, 1997). Location advantages 
are combined with ownership and internalisation advantages, otherwise the MNE would 
produce locally through licensing and other contractual agreements. 
The third pillar of the eclectic paradigm is the internalisation theory of Buckley and Casson 
(1976) as described above, which is incorporated by Dunning as I-factors. 
The eclectic paradigm is not without criticism. Several gaps and inconsistencies have been 
identified over the decades. The paradigm has been argued to be just a toolbox to analyse FDI 
and not a theory in its own right (Dunning, 2006b). It is further criticised as being a static 
approach which presents a snapshot in time while business reality is dynamic and constantly 
changing and evolving. The paradigm therefore arguably fails to accommodate properly the 
consequences of globalisation and ease of communicating internationally for businesses, which 
may help firms to relocate production abroad (Li, 2003). The concept of ownership advantage 
is argued to be vaguely defined and too focused on the engineering-related advantages of a firm 
which are not necessarily reflected in other, perhaps more important, economic advantages a 
firm needs, such as developing a product tailored for a specific market and generating surplus 
rents as a consequence (Itaki, 1991). For example, the technical expertise of German firms may 
lead to over-engineering of products which are subsequently not price-competitive. Moreover, 
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the concept of three parallel advantages blurs the explanatory power of the framework because 
of double-counting of ownership advantages under internalisation and firm-specific advantages 
(Itaki, 1991; Andersen, 1997; Buckley, 1988). 
2.2.3 The strategies driving foreign direct investment 
Although in reality a particular overseas investment project is likely to be conducted by a firm 
for pluralistic reasons which may change over time, international business theorising generally 
recognises three generic motives, namely: 
- Market seeking FDI; 
- Efficiency seeking FDI; and 
- Resource seeking FDI (Dunning, 1993,2000). 
Market seeking FDI is generally driven by the market size, growth and potential of a host 
country. It is undertaken by companies to strengthen or protect existing markets (defensive 
strategy) or to develop and explore new markets (offensive strategy). FDI motivated by 
defensive market seeking objectives tends to follow trade and occurs when a host country 
imposes or threatens to impose tariff or non-tariff barriers to imports. The response of firms is 
to invest behind the tariff wall. A defensive market seeking strategy is also said to occur as a 
firm sets up a foreign affiliate to be close to established customers to serve them better and 
strengthen their loyalty, particularly when this takes place as firms follow major customers into 
new markets. Offensive market seeking behaviour is said to take place when firms supply 
products and services to new markets. Proximity to local and third markets provides advantages 
in respect to transportation costs, information flow (to and from the market) and product 
adaptation. By investing locally, the firm also increases its control over brands, distribution 
channels and other intangible and tangible assets (Dunning, 1993). 
Efficiency seeking FDI occurs when outward investors seek lower cost locations for their 
operations and production in order to reduce production, labour, communication and 
administrative costs. Hence, firms may centralise production in a key location in response to a 
reduction in trade barriers across regionally integrating countries. It also refers to investment 
that is driven by the need to reduce costs involved with the search and implementation of new 
technologies and designs, and to internalise supply chains to increase competitiveness through 
higher efficiency. 
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Resource seeking FDI can be decomposed into three subcomponents: (i) natural resource 
seeking, (ii) technology seeking, and (iii) strategic asset seeking FDI. The natural resource 
seeking motive refers to investments in the exploitation of natural factor endowments of 
countries such as oil, minerals and other raw materials. Such investments are undertaken for 
commercial purposes or with the intention to secure the supply of scarce raw materials for the 
national economy, i. e. to fulfil a national economic policy agenda. Technology seeking 
investments are conducted in areas such as research and development or in design facilities. 
Firms seek to tap into existing knowledge stocks and expertise locally or to become involved in 
the development of new technologies and standards when non-participation would diminish 
future competitiveness. Often, the investor intends to benefit from spill over and demonstration 
effects deriving from agglomerations of similar minded companies and from complementary 
industries. 
The third resource seeking sub-group is strategic asset seeking FDI which is motivated to 
acquire tangible and intangible assets, skills and capabilities that cannot be delivered in house in 
a timely or cost effective way by the investing firm. This include investments to obtain 
(internationally) recognised brand names, better access to local distribution systems and access 
to managerial practise and expertise. Typically, firms try to obtain these hard-to-replicate assets 
through acquisition. While the eclectic paradigm generally assumes that companies would 
exploit ownership advantages in the host country, the strategic asset seeking motivation gives 
leeway to allow for asset-augmenting investments. Asset-augmenting ODI occurs when a 
company lacks critical assets itself that constitute an ownership advantage in a host country - 
that is, the company is a `multinational without advantage' (Fosfuri and Motta, 1999) - and so 
invests abroad to access local resources to build and strengthen its ownership advantages. 
Table 2.3 summarises some factors that influence the investment strategy. This demonstrates 
that some factors impact on several investment strategies at the same time and are not clearly 
distinguishable from each other. 
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2.2.4 `Stages' theory 
Based on case study research of four Swedish companies, Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 
(1975) proposed that companies conduct FDI after having gained international experience 
through less committed and less risky business activities. This proposition has been further 
developed by Johanson and Vahlne (1977) into the stages theory. This gradual and sequential 
view of internationalisation is also known as the Uppsala model and the `internationalisation' 
approach. 
The internationalisation of a company is argued to occur with an inward and an outward 
orientation (Welch and Luostarinen, 1988). The former is confined to the borders of the home 
country. - The company engages with international business partners through importing, 
international strategic alliances in the home country and by undertaking original equipment 
manufacturing for foreign companies, for example. Having an outward orientation requires that 
the company actively operates across borders. Outward orientated business activities comprise 
exporting, non-affiliate licensing and FDI. 
Under this approach, it is assumed that companies new to the internationalisation of their 
operations lack the experience of internalising markets in a new environment with respect to 
culture, business (culture), politics and so forth. Although these firms possess ownership 
advantages they may fail to grasp all the potential merits of an FDI because transaction costs 
vary in response to geographic and psychic distance. Psychic distance is the difference in 
culture, language and political and business environment between the home and host country as 
perceived by managers (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). The broad definition of 
psychic distance makes it difficult to measure in a single proxy. Thus, there exists no proxy 
encapsulating these factors into a single psychic distance measurement but rather a set of 
different measurements (Dow and Karunaratna, 2006). Having said that, the most commonly 
used proxies are based on cultural distances between countries (Hofstede, 1980) and indexes or 
clusters based on Hofstede's work like the cultural distance index (Kogut and Singh, 1988) or 
the country clusters of similar cultures (Ronen and Shenkar, 1985). 8 
In the Uppsala model, it is argued that firms start slowly and stepwise to internalise 
international markets, starting with countries closest and most similar to the home country in 
terms of culture and the political and business environment. With greater international business 
experience firms feel more capable and prepared to invest in more psychic distant countries and 
9 With respect to the difficulty of measuring and comparing culture see discussion between Earley 
(2006), Hofstede (2006) and Javidan et al. (2006) and between Hofstede (1996) and Hampden- 
Turner and Trompenaars (1997). 
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broaden their foreign market coverage (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). This incremental internationalisation process enables companies to 
identify and exploit business opportunities and to successively expand their scope of business 
into areas in which they were previously not competitive (Chang, 1995; Johanson and Vahlne, 
2006). Besides increasing the distance from the home country, the operational scope is also 
argued to deepen over time. Low resource commitment and limited risk characterise the 
starting phase of internationalisation through indirect export and later direct export. Resource 
commitment is increased sequentially as the company concludes international licence 
agreements, opens representative and sales office abroad and, eventually, sets up production 
facilities. The sequential stages of internationalisation can be summarised as increasing resource 
commitment and enhanced risk-taking as a consequence of augmented business experience in 
increasingly geographical and psychically distant markets. With rising business experience in 
foreign markets, the firm gathers tacit skills and strengthens its ownership advantages. The two 
aspects to internationalisation: deepening the commitment in one market (i and ii) and 
broadening the coverage of foreign markets (iii and iv) are illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.1: The Uppsala theory 
(i) Increasing 
commitment to 
host market 
(ii) Increasing 
commercial risk 
Zer 
(iii) Increasing 
psychic distance 
from home 
country 
(iv) Increasing 
numbers of host 
markets served 
Notes: WOS: Wholly-owned subsidiary; JV: Joint venture. 
Source: The author 
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However, the psychic distance perceived by managers is not only reduced through direct 
experience following a direct investment in a foreign country but also through different 
mediators without the firm being physically present abroad. Mediating factors include, inter 
alia, being a supplier to an international company in the home country, forming a strategic 
alliance with an international firm in the home country and by purchasing from international 
suppliers (Karlsen et al., 2003; Welch and Luostarinen, 1993). Continuous and intensive 
contact with foreign businesses sensitises the domestic company before it internationalises and 
provides it with some experiential knowledge about certain foreign companies and business 
behaviour. The increasing application of the internet as a means for international 
communication and interaction may have a similar effect. Companies can get into contact with 
worldwide customers through e-commerce functions which may increase their awareness of 
customer attitudes and behaviour without being physically present in a foreign market (Yamin 
and Sinkovics, 2006). 
The Uppsala theory has been criticised. The focus of the theory is on a gradual 
internationalisation of marketing seeking companies without acknowledging that some 
companies remain at one stage, for example by only exporting to other countries although 
investing might be more cost efficient, apply different `stages' simultaneously in different 
countries, and retreat from internationalisation and divest their foreign equity holdings. These 
shortcomings question the general applicability of the theory. It also fails to explain the 
considerable amount of FDI flows driven by resource seeking and efficiency seeking motives 
(Bell and Young, 1998; Andersen, 1997; Li, 2003). It can be argued that natural resource 
seeking FDI cannot be explained by the stages theory as the company has to invest where the 
immobile resources are present. It is also not clear what triggers the initial decision to 
internationalisation as well as how domestic and international external factors have an impact 
on the internationalisation process (Andersen, 1993). The model also does not address how the 
(international) personal experience and network of the management team affects a company (i. e. 
firms can recruit managers with the relevant international experience) (Johanson and Vahine, 
2003; Welch and Luostarinen, 1988). The above described different facets of international 
interaction may reduce the perceived psychic distance and internationalisation costs (Eriksson et 
al., 1997), and help to accelerate the internationalisation of a company through FDI (Nachum 
and Zaheer, 2005) and enable it to leapfrog certain internationalisation stages, for example by 
conducting its first investment in a psychic distant country. Such leapfrog can be caused by an 
overestimation of knowledge about psychically proximate countries which can lead to the 
(misleading) assumption that business operations in the host country can be carried out in a 
similar way to the home market. Such behaviour would negate existing business and cultural 
differences which require adaptation to the local market and consequently would impede 
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business performance (O'Grady and Lane, 1996). A similar phenomenon can be observed when 
companies only use e-commerce to internationalise the business, regard locally experienced 
knowledge about foreign markets as unimportant and thus may not reap the full potential of the 
market (Yamin and Sinkovics, 2006). Finally, a lack of properly defined conditions and factors 
such as psychic distance makes it complicated to identify causal linkages between the stages 
(Andersen, 1993; Child et al., 2003) which makes empirical testing difficult. 
The criticism is reflected in ambiguous empirical results of the stages theory. Empirical studies 
have employed different key variables, research designs, and settings. Consequently, these 
studies have either confirmed (e. g. Erramilli et al., 1999) or rejected (e. g. Lau, 2003) the theory. 
A case in point are `international new ventures' or 'bom-globals' which are considered below. 
Despite these conflicting results and the shortcomings described above, this theoretical 
approach may have some merits in explaining Chinese ODI. Chapter 3 illustrates that Chinese 
ODI in the early 1980s was mainly destined to developed countries in terms of investment value 
which is contrary to the Uppsala theory. The majority of investment projects are, however, 
found in countries proximate to China which confirms the theory. Chapter 6 and 7 therefore try 
to answer the question if the Uppsala theory is applicable to explain Chinese ODI. 
2.2.5 International new ventures 
A group of internationalised enterprises resides outside the realm of the stages theory. In 
contrast to the stages theory, some companies internationalise very soon after establishment and 
overcome the problems of psychic distance quickly and without major problems. As the 
Uppsala theory fails to accommodate this type of firms, a theory on `international new ventures' 
has been suggested by Oviatt and McDougall (1994). `International new ventures', also called 
`born-globals' or `international entrepreneurs', internationalise with, or shortly after, 
establishment "to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the 
sale of outputs in multiple countries" (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994: 49). Such companies gain 
and strengthen their ownership advantages by grasping perceived business opportunities 
internationally. Or, as defined by Oviatt and McDougall (2005: 540), "international 
entrepreneurship is the discovery, enactment, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities - 
across national borders- to create future goods and services. " Such firms internalise markets in 
an early stage of their development and further develop through the experience and knowledge 
they gain internationally (Zahra et al., 2000; Zahra, 2005). Although the internationalisation 
process for such firms differs from the one stipulated by Johanson and Vahlne (1977), they 
might still invest in psychically close countries first before internationalising further. Having 
said that, of crucial importance is the question of where international new ventures can find 
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markets that constitute business opportunities rather than considering the dimension and effect 
of psychic distance (Ibeh et al., 2004). 
International new ventures internationalise in a very short timeframe after being established, and 
are, typically, small-sized and lack a dominant position in their domestic market. Thus, they 
cannot rely on the size of their company or an established domestic market where they can 
generate scale economics that constitute an ownership advantage. Rather, the possession of, and 
access to, (generally) intangible assets provides them with an ownership advantage which 
facilitates their internationalisation (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). 
The theories on international new ventures and the internationalisation in stages are 
complementary and can be treated as two ends of a spectrum (Sapienza et al., 2006; Oviatt and 
Douglas, 1994). The former describes fast moving firms who are risk-takers with high resource 
commitment. Such firms are knowledge-intensive or knowledge-based firms which seek to 
quickly exploit their gained ownership advantage internationally and to exploit their 
monopolistic advantage for as long as possible, since they operate in a fast-moving business 
environment (Oviatt and Douglas, 2005). The latter describes slow, risk-averse firms which, 
generally, operate in traditional, slowly advancing and mature industries. One factor which may 
support the internationalisation of international new ventures is their network embeddedness. 
This point is developed in the following section. 
2.2.6 International entrepreneurial networks - Network theory 
Regardless as to whether or not firms invest internationally soon after establishment or after a 
gradual learning process (see Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5), their investment decision-making may 
be influenced by access to a network. Firms following a `gradual' stages approach to 
internationalisation and international new ventures can benefit from, and may even accelerate, 
their internationalisation by accessing international business and social networks (Oviatt and 
McDougall, 2005; Johanson and Vahlne, 2003). Networks are a "set of high-trust relationships 
which either directly or indirectly link together everyone in a social group" for the recursive 
exchange of information (Casson, 1997: 813). Business and social networks are informal 
institutions which can therefore enable companies to internationalise or foster their 
internationalisation process as they disseminate information between actors previously unknown 
to each other and can lower the actors' transaction costs (Johanson and Vahlne, 2003,2006; 
Aharoni, 1999; Standifird and Marshall, 2000). Another perspective is to consider such 
networks as intangible assets of a company (Coviello, 2006). To date, the importance of 
networks has been especially stressed for entrepreneurial firms (e. g. Oviatt and McDougall, 
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2005; Casson, 1997) and for small firms which are part of an international production network 
(e. g. Chen and Chen, 1998; Chen, 2003). This type of company seeks business opportunities 
regardless of where there are to be found. Access to a network can be a source of privileged 
knowledge about business opportunities in potential target countries (Johanson and Vahlne, 
2006). A large, sparse network is therefore crucial for them as it will disseminate more 
information than would a dense network. However, networks can also be of significance to 
companies with weak ownership advantages; for example, mature companies from developing 
countries with limited resources and capabilities to rely on to internationalise. The label 
`international entrepreneurial network' comprises both business and social networks (Zhang and 
van den Bulcke, 1996). 
Networks can be differentiated using three distinguished characteristics: (a) strong vs. weak ties, 
(b) the size of the network, and (c) dense vs. sparse network (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005). 
Both strong and weak ties (that is, linkages and relationships with other actors), share the 
feature that they constitute two-way flows of information between people (Casson, 1997). Ties 
are strong when they constitute a durable and reliable relationship built upon emotional 
investment and trust. Due to the high and constant investment required for such a relationship, 
these ties are normally small in number and thus not ideal for fostering the internationalisation 
of companies (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005). But because of the relationship, strong ties are 
generally easily accessible and responsive to any request (Nebus, 2006). Weak ties are more 
common. The larger a weakly tied network a company is embedded in is, the more likely it is to 
receive information about possible international business opportunities as each actor is 
imbedded in its specific context with access to information non-members lack (Granovetter, 
1973,1983). Relationships with customers and suppliers can be regarded as weak ties based on 
mutual business interests. Of interest for the internationalisation of a company are linkages to 
international customers established through, for example, trade relationships or international 
joint ventures in the home country (Welch and Luostarinen, 1993). Additionally, contacts to 
representatives of a potential host country resident in the home country are also a significant ties 
(such as to investment promotion agencies, international chamber of commerce and other 
economic exchange supporting bodies). A special set of weak ties are indirect ties, that is, ties 
through a so-called broker (or bridges or middle-man). Brokers connect formerly loose actors 
with each other and can thus facilitate exchange of information and business interaction (Oviatt 
and McDougall, 2005; Casson, 1997). Brokers are generally regarded as constituting weak ties, 
while not every weak tie is automatically a broker (Granovetter, 1973). Brokers can be existing 
suppliers and customers as well as other social contacts in the home or host country. 
There is another set of ties that can neither be clearly categorised as being strong nor weak: 
these are social ethnic ties. Social ethnic ties derive from some commonalities between 
individuals, such as same ethnicity or being part of a widely spread family, or a common history 
or background like studying at the same school or university. These ties are therefore not 
necessarily business-related. Social ethnic ties across national borders may be regarded as 
strong since they are social ties and therefore involve high personal investment and commitment. 
However, loose and brief social contacts to third parties can also be regarded as social ethnic 
ties although they are weak. Social ethnic ties can stretch internationally through travel and 
migration as, for example, can be seen in the Chinese, Greece, Indian, Irish, and Mexican 
linkages to the USA, the presence Overseas Chinese in Asia or the Japanese ties with South 
America (e. g. Rauch and Trinidade, 2002; Liu, 2000; Yoshino, 1974). 
The size of the direct and indirect network measured in terms of number of actors or nodes a 
company is linked with or tied to, may influence the potential internationalisation speed of a 
company. Generally, with increasing network size, the internationalisation speed accelerates as 
information about business opportunities are easily exchanged collected and exploited (Oviatt 
and McDougall, 2005). This is enhanced by the fact that increasing network size goes in hand 
with increasing linkage weakness as it becomes too resource-intensive for the firm to maintain 
strong ties with every actor (node) and it becomes progressively more difficult for every actor to 
be linked to everyone else. 
A sparse network describes a network where the ties of one company are' not or rarely 
interlinked with others; it is therefore normally a weak tie network. On the other hand, in a 
dense network all nodes are tied with every other node. Each type of network has its advantages 
and shortcomings. Sparse networks provide more information from disperse markets to a 
company, increasing the likelihood of it finding new business opportunities. Dense networks 
are characterised by redundant linkages and a higher inherent trust level. Such networks can be 
regarded as clubs based on trust and reputation. Information about misbehaviour is 
disseminated within the network and the specific actor warned or excluded. This form of 
supervision and control is lacking in a sparse network (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005). 
Companies that use actors and brokers in their network to internationalise do not necessarily 
invest in a psychically close location. Rather, they follow business opportunities either 
identified by themselves or suggested by their network wherever they become visible. The 
building and utilisation of networks differs from country to country and is shaped by the country 
specific institutional arrangements which sheds especial importance on cross-cultural 
networking (Parkhe et al., 2006). The influential sphere of institutions extends to other 
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(business) areas as well and makes it pertinent to incorporate it in a theoretical framework on 
Chinese ODI. It has been alluded to the wide-spread Overseas Chinese community which 
helped the Chinese economy to re-integrate to the world economy after 1979 (Chapter 1). Such 
Overseas Chinese networks constitute informal institutions which may also facilitate the 
internationalisation of Chinese firms. 
It is argued that the unit of analysis in discussion of this type should be the network itself (Lavie, 
2006). However, the scope of this research necessitates deviating from this view as it is 
restricted to the utilisation of network connections to gain information about markets, business 
opportunities and, ultimately, the foreign direct investment by Chinese companies. 
2.2.7 Institutions and internationalisation 
The theories and frameworks reviewed so far, consider the institution environment as being one 
factor of influence on the decision-taking of firms. The degree of relevance attributed to 
institutions varies, however. The institutional framework considered by this work is more often 
than not limited to the host country or region (e. g. Dunning, 2000). The institutional 
environment of the home country is typically left aside. The term `institution' comprises a wide 
range of elements including customs and beliefs, religious and other norms, judiciary and 
bureaucracy, government structures and market mechanisms (North, 2005; Williamson, 2000). 
The eclectic paradigm explicitly refers to the host country with the idea of locational advantages. 
The concept of psychic distance in the stages theory acknowledges implicitly home and host 
country institutions by considering the perceived "distance" between them. Network theory 
refers to institutions indirectly by asserting that networks can be used to lower transaction costs 
in an unfavourable environment. Probably the most explicit consideration of the role of 
institutions in international business is made by the internalisation theory. The exploitation of 
market imperfections across borders necessitates some actions by institutions to create the 
market imperfections in the first place. This somewhat arbitrary acknowledgement of home 
country institutions in international business validates a review of institutions and the 
proposition of stronger consideration in research on developing country ODI in particular. 
Developing countries have typically a restrictive institutional environment towards ODI in order 
to minimise the outflow of capital. ODI is often perceived by the local government as 
detrimental to the economic development of the country (UNCTAD, 1996). 
9 The network approach in this research does not attempt to model an extensive mathematical 
network analysis assessing the effects of ties, nodes and black holes (e. g. Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). First, data availability limits the feasibility of this approach for Chinese MNEs currently. 
Second, the network approach is utilised in an informative way to support the research only. 
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The internationalisation of companies is not only triggered by their aspiration to internalise 
imperfect markets across borders but it is also influenced by the domestic and host country 
institutional framework. The host country's institutional setting has been incorporated in the 
eclectic paradigm as a locational factor (e. g. Dunning, 1988). It has been scrutinised and tested 
for host countries (e. g. Meyer, 2004), as well as for the impact on investing firms (e. g. Delios 
and Henisz, 2003a, 2003b). Moreover, the impact of the domestic institutional framework has 
been acknowledged in research in terms of push-factors triggering the internationalisation of 
companies (such as foreign exchange fluctuation and restrictive industry policy and in terms of 
promotion activities [e. g. Duran and Ubeda, 2001; Bulatov, 2001; Sim and Pandian, 2002; Lall, 
1986; Pradhan, 2004]). However, institutional theory has not been formally incorporated into 
theories such as the eclectic paradigm, stages theory or network analysis (Parkhe et al., 2006; 
Grosse and Behrman, 1992). This is an important omission. Institutions provide the formal and 
informal economic playing field for companies and they determine the incentive mechanisms 
and schemes deriving from this (North, 1990; Peng, 2002; Wright et al., 2005). The 
institutional setting of a country thus determines greatly the pace and scope of the domestic 
economic development due to the constraints and resources it provides and the herefrom 
evolving path dependencies (North, 1990,2005). The institutions of interest and relevance here 
are the government and its adjacent structures, namely legislature, judiciary and bureaucracy. 
Although these are formal institutions, their sphere of action may reach into informal areas 
when laws and regulations are interpreted and applied in a discretionary way. The influence of 
the institutional framework is not restricted to the domestic realm but can also play a crucial role 
(both positively and negatively) in the internationalisation of domestic companies, as discussed 
below. More specifically, the behaviour and decisions of domestic institutions may lead to 
domestic market imperfections which are then exploited by inward investing MNEs or constrain 
the evolution of domestic firms which could be competitive internationally. 
2.2.7.1 Institutions governing international economic activity 
Take, for example, a closed, state-controlled economy, in which state-owned enterprises are key 
economic actors as an institutional setting. Such a setting not only discourages companies from 
internationalising but may effectively prohibit it. This is because such a state may implement 
various means to control the agglomeration and utilisation of foreign exchange which could be 
used to internationalise (for example, balance of payments controls). The control mechanisms 
are directed against the international economic engagement of domestic enterprises. Such 
policies lead to strict control of the national capital account to prevent foreign exchange from 
being transferred abroad, the discretionary selection of state-owned companies to engage in 
international trade and the requirement to go through a rigorous approval process if a state- 
owned company wants to invest internationally. The stimulation of exports through an 
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(artificially) undervalued currency, subsidies and other preferential treatment that aims to 
establish export-led growth can be a further discouragement for ODI as it may become more 
costly to internalise across borders. This institutional framework restricts companies from 
conducting FDI even if they see an opportunity or are willing to face the risks involved with 
international business activities and possess ownership advantages to run successfully an 
international affiliate. As a consequence, domestic enterprises are hampered in strengthening 
and upgrading their knowledge and technology stock and, subsequently, their competitive 
position in the domestic and international market is undermined (e. g. Dunning et al., 1998; 
Young et al., 1996; Ozawa, 1992). So long as the economy remains tightly state-controlled 
such policies are accomplishable; leaving aside the merits of such a policy. 
If this is one side of the institutional spectrum concerning the `support' of domestic company 
internationalisation, an open, market-led economy with private enterprises being the dominate 
actors is at the other end of the spectrum. Such an economy has liberalised it capital account 
controls and foreign exchange utilisation restrictions, and the decision to invest internationally 
rests solely in the hands of the domestic companies without government interference. 
Government rather tries to support domestic companies by establishing a (positive) framework 
constituting of, for example, subsidies for ODI and other preferential treatments such as 
domestic tax concessions and cheap access to capital. In such an institutional framework, 
domestic companies are able to take the chance to internalise international markets when they 
identify an opportunity and possess the relevant ownership advantages to carry out the 
investment (as predicted by the eclectic paradigm). This development might be further 
supported by protective measure towards infant or pillar industries as identified by the 
government and its agencies. Obviously, there is a wide range of institutional arrangements 
between these two poles which influences domestic companies to varying degrees. Policies 
with potential direct effects on ODI are summarised in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: Direct effects of government policies on ODI 
Tnrreace 
a) V5 cl U 
U 
t-ý 
A 
0 
aý y 
Cd 
i-) 
U 
U 
A 
Market imperfections 
Decrease 
" Overvalued currency' " Liberalisation of capital controls on ODI1 
" Subsidies for ODI1 
" Export controls' 
" Price controls' 
" Government protectionism2 
" Particularistic economic goals3 
" Undervalued currency' " Privatisation of SOEs' 
" Wage controls' " Vigorous enforcement of arm's length 
" Export subsidies' transfer pricing' 
" Restrictive ODI approval processes " Lack of support from government4 
Adapted from: Brewer (1993). 
Sources: 1 Brewer (1993), 2 Dicken (2003) and Hennan and Keegan (1979), 3 Warner et al. 
4 (2004), Villela (1983). 
2.2.7.2 Institutions governing home country conditions 
There are also institutional influences which indirectly effect the internationalisation of 
companies. These include further push-factors such as domestic protectionism, industry and 
capital market imperfections. Domestic protectionism is normally enforced by local political 
entities to protect (or nurture) local companies. However justified such policies might be, they 
constrain the business and growth opportunities of non-local companies. Similarly, an 
unbalanced industry policy and credit allocation may impede the development of competitive 
local firms. An industry policy in favour of selected industrial sectors may neglect and oversee 
potentially important developments in other industry sectors. The lack of support and 
recognition can hamper the domestic development of companies in such a sector. Equally, a 
government-induced credit allocation that focuses on specific industry sectors, on company size 
or on ownership forms is not beneficial for the overall economic development as it impedes the 
growth of potential companies (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). Companies outside the credit 
allocation scheme have to explore new funding sources, such as their personal funding and 
social (international) networks (Buckley et al., 2007a). In such cases, companies might seek to 
invest abroad to ensure sound growth and to keep up with developments in their specific 
industry. Some evidence for such policy behaviour can be found in China, for example. Credit 
allocation in China is argued to be biased towards state-owned enterprises for most of the time 
since 1978 (Lardy, 1998) and the Chinese government has initiated different scheme to bolster 
the development of large, competitive domestic enterprises (Nolan, 2002; Naughton, 2007). 
These factors could have been beneficial for the development in China, while the provincial 
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market protection has somewhat impeded the creation of nation-wide enterprises until the mid- 
1990s at least (OECD, 2002). 
2.2.8 Specific theoretical considerations for foreign direct investment from developing 
countries 
As outlined in the beginning of this chapter (see Section 2.1), FDI flows and the number and 
size of MNEs originating from developing countries have reached considerable proportions. It 
is generally acknowledged today that MNEs from developing countries are driven by the same 
generic investment strategies as their counterparts from industrialised countries. Nevertheless, 
adjustments and extension of FDI theory and on the behaviour of MNEs from these countries 
may be necessary to account for country specifities (UNCTAD, 2006; Buckley and Mirza, 1999; 
Yeung, 1994a; Pradhan, 2004). This is because, extensions and amendments of common theory 
to accommodate the specific conditions of the MNEs from developing countries may increase 
the explanatory power for this new breed of MNEs (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Yeung, 1994a; 
Giddy and Young, 1982). The reasoning for this is based on the notion that ownership 
advantages of developing country MNEs and their motivations to invest abroad may deviate 
from the patterns known for industrialised country MNEs. This point is now developed below 
in the context of the key contributions to international business theory previously described in 
this chapter. 
Eclectic paradigm 
Monopolistic advantages through state-of-the-art technology, intangible assets and firm size are 
generally less in evidence for developing country MNEs when compared with industrialised 
country ones. When these advantages are present they are normally smaller as these firms are 
less research-intensive (Lall, 1983a). These firms therefore have to secure their ownership 
advantages differently. Such advantages may derive from the adaptation of purchased, imported 
or licensed technologies to local conditions (i. e. factor prices, input characteristics and demand 
conditions). This experience can then be extended to host countries with similar market 
conditions to their home country (Lall, 1983a; Monkiewicz, 1986; Lecraw, 1977,1993; Kumar 
and Kim, 1984). Hence, such firms are argued to compete on low-quality and low-priced 
products (Lecraw, 1993) and focus on labour-extensive production because of abundant cheap 
labour in the domestic market (Ghymn, 1980). This means that the home country experience 
may constitute a key source of competitive advantage for these firms. It is argued that a firm is 
sensitised by the institutional and business environment it confronts at home which helps it to 
better and more quickly adapt to the specific needs of a host country with respect to matters 
such as the necessary R&D efforts and spending, labour-intensity of production, marketing and 
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sales strategies and so forth (Lecraw, 1977; Kumar, 1982; Lall, 1983a; Monkiewicz, 1986). 
This sensitivity may also explain investments by developing country firms in host countries 
deemed too risky and unstable by MNEs from an industrialised country. Hence, the identified 
firm-specific advantages increase the likelihood of South-South ODI; that is, investments by 
MNEs from one developing country into another, instead of ODI in an industrialised country. 
Nevertheless, developing country ODI in an advanced country may still occur. The investment 
strategy into advanced countries is argued to be in line with a point made earlier: that MNEs 
from developing countries are generally considered to lack ownership advantages in comparison 
to industrialised country MNEs (Bartlett and Goshal, 2000; Dunning et al., 1998; Dunning, 
2001; Makino et al., 2002). Recent research therefore posits that the lack of ownership 
advantages may push developing country MNEs to invest in more developed countries in order 
to obtain knowledge and built-up a competitive advantage (e. g. Bartlett and Goshal, 2000). 
This can be considered asset-seeking FDI. It has thus been argued that developing country 
MNEs invest in developed countries to extend or built-up firm-specific advantages which they 
combine with the advantages mentioned above and exploit then other developing countries 
(Erramilli et al., 1999). Indonesian companies, for example, are argued to acquire companies in 
industrialised countries to access knowledge, technology and expertise and, also, to use the 
foreign affiliate to expand the export operations from Indonesia (Lecraw, 1993). Other 
investments in industrialised countries are asserted to support domestic exports to these 
countries and tend to be rather service- than manufacturing-oriented (Kumar, 1982). Resource 
seeking investments may be undertaken by developing country firms in industrialised countries 
as well depending of the global distribution of the resources and the ease to access such 
resources in a host country. 
The location (L) element of the eclectic paradigm is constrained to the host country and does not 
account for the domestic institutional framework of an MNE. This might have been justified in 
times where the home country institutional backgrounds of MNEs were fairly homogenous, i. e. 
all being well-developed, transparent market economies with a democratic, pluralistic system 
and relatively similar cultural backgrounds. It has been shown in Section 2.1, however, that 
since the mid-1990s companies from developing countries are increasingly investing overseas. 
These firms differ substantially in respect of their home country institutional frameworks from 
industrialised country firms and amongst each other. This phenomenon necessitates considering 
the accommodation into FDI theory of domestic locational factors, in particular domestic 
institutions, and an assessment of how these influence ODI behaviour of local companies. This 
may help to explain ODI by developing country MNEs because, as previous research suggests 
(e. g. Dunning et al., 1998) companies from developing countries internationalise despite a lack 
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of tangible ownership advantages vis-ä-vis their industrialised country counterparts. In fact, 
besides asset specific advantages, O; and O, and access to resources are of importance as well. 
Hence, conducting FDI because of a perceived lack of ownership advantages and the aspiration 
to catch-up can be a major investment motive for developing country firms. 
Uppsala approach 
MNEs from developing countries are argued to generally follow the stages theory by investing 
first in countries psychically close to the home country (e. g. Giddy and Young, 1982; Yoshino, 
1974). Examples can be found in research on firms from Argentina (Ferrantino, 1992), Brazil 
(Villela, 1983), Hong Kong (Lau, 1992,2003), India (Pradhan, 2003; Lall, 1983b), Republic of 
Korea (Erramilli et al., 1999; Kumar and Kim, 1984), and Malaysia (Zin, 1999). To further 
attenuate investment risk, developing country MNEs [in the 1970s and 1980s] were found to 
often hold a minority stake in joint ventures with local firms (Yeung, 1994b; Lecraw, 1977, 
1993; Tallman and Shenkar, 1990; Pradhan, 2004). The minority-stake phenomenon seems to 
disappear successively as developing country companies gain international experience, skills 
and funds which makes it more feasible for them to establish majority owned and wholly-owned 
affiliates (Pradhan, 2003,2004; Lee, 2002; Lecraw, 1993). An exception seems to be South 
Korean MNEs, which have generally relied on majority owned affiliates from an early stage of 
internationalisation (see O'Brien, 1980). 
Institutional environment 
The institutional environment of developing countries has been taken into consideration by the 
body of literature to describe the development of developing country ODI. Domestic 
institutions affect the internationalisation of domestic companies four ways. First, as described 
above, familiarity with the institutional environment of the home country may give MNEs an 
advantage over other (industrialised country) firms when they invest in a host market with 
similar characteristics. Second, firms may suffer from unfavourable business development 
conditions at home which pushes the companies abroad. Commonly mentioned institution- 
related push factors include an unstable or unpredictable monetary, fiscal and judicial policy, 
domestic political risk (e. g. Bulatov, 2002; Villela, 1983), and the difficulty of earning hard 
currency through means other than ODI (Buckley and Mirza, 1999), for example. Third, and in 
contrast to the second point, home governments may encourage domestic companies to 
internationalise and change the institutional framework accordingly. This may happen for 
different reasons. Some governments may seek to create MNEs to help to achieve national 
economic development goals or foreign policy objectives. MNEs created for these purposes 
often seek to secure raw materials abroad or be an executor of foreign policy directives which 
may, be designed to support official development aid, for example (Mazzolini, 1980; Warner et 
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al., 2004). In this respect, governments may encourage domestic companies to invest in a 
particular host country for a specific purpose (World Bank, 2006b). Consequently, government- 
controlled or government-owned firms might place less attention to host country risk level and 
psychic distance considerations because it fulfils national policies and is thus supported by the 
government (financially and politically). This also raises issues around the (necessary) size of 
the company and the (necessary) stage of economic development of the home economy as well 
as issues concerning the firm's position in an (international) value chain and industry and firm- 
specific characteristics (Bell and Young, 1998; Lee and Chen, 2003). Cases in point are the 
Asian MNEs. The Chinese government undertakes activities to encourage ODI in raw material 
exploration to meet growing demand at home (e. g. Dhume and Lawrence, 2002). Similarly, the 
Singaporean, South Korean and Malayan governments have built their MNEs (Yeung, 1998; 
Dicken, 2003; Hennan and Keegan, 1979). 
This review of developing country MNE context shows that common international business 
theory is applicable to this type of firm. However, it also shows that some refinement is 
necessary to the general theory because a stronger acknowledgement of the home country 
institution effects is arguably required. 
2.2.9 Further theories on foreign direct investment 
A number of other theories have been put forward to explain the raison d'etre of the MNE. 
These theories are considered to be outside the scope of the present study for a number of 
reasons. The theories are mentioned here briefly for completeness. 
The investment development path (e. g. Dunning and Narula, 1996; Duran and Ubeda, 2001) has 
some merits if it can be applied to the provincial or sub-provincial level and by industry. 
Country level analysis does not reveal much about the destination of ODI and the theory does 
not account for intra-/inter-industry agglomeration effects and location specifities (e. g. 
institutional fabric). The product-life cycle theory by Vernon (1966) assumes maturing 
products in a mature market - China is a developing country market with hardly mature markets. 
Aliber (1971) considered foreign exchange differentials as a determinant of FDI. This approach 
lacks explanatory power as a stand-alone theory especially as the Chinese Yuan is pegged to the 
US dollar. It is used here as general support to theories. Knickerbocker (1973) suggested that 
FDI is a reaction to oligopolistic pressure. Following this approach, oligopolies in the Chinese 
market or the international market push Chinese companies to conduct ODI. Again, this 
approach lacks explanatory power as a stand-alone theory. 
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2.3 Empirical studies on foreign direct investment determinants 
Having set out the theoretical background for FDI with emphasis on the applicability to 
developing country ODI, the purpose of this section is to provide a rationale for the inclusion of 
particular independent variables that are used in this study to test the model of Chinese ODI 
which has been developed. To the best of our knowledge, the empirical investigation of 
Chinese ODI patterns has not been analysed in this way before. Therefore, justification for the 
inclusion of particular independent variables in the equations has to be based on their use in 
studies that model FDI that originate from other countries. Where possible, research that 
concentrates on ODI from developing countries is discussed separately. This is now done 
below. 
Market-seeking FDI 
In econometric work market seeking FDI is generally found to be strongly induced by the 
absolute current market size (Gross Domestic Product or GDP), relative current market size 
(Gross Domestic Product per capita or GDP per capita) and future market potential, as is 
reflected in the current and past growth of annual GDP (Agarwal, 1980). Theory predicts that 
these market-related determinants have a positive effect on inward FDI from industrialised 
countries and this is supported by several studies. For example, Clegg and Scott-Green (1998) 
find a positive association between Japanese investment and GDP for six EU countries. A 
number of studies of the ODI position of the USA find a positive correlation between its (flows 
or stocks) and host country market size of a number of developed and developing countries in 
the 1970s (Loree and Guisinger, 1995), of Mexico in the 1990s (Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 2000) 
and of European countries (Lunn, 1980,1983), so do the studies by Scaperlanda and Balough 
(1983), and Scaperlanda and Mauer (1969,1972). In a more recent study, Sethi et al. (2003) 
find that US FDI is generally directed towards countries with high gross national product (GNP) 
but that it shifts to lower GNP and GNP per capita countries over time. These findings on 
developed country ODI are generally confirmed by studies focusing on ODI from developing 
countries. With respect to developing country ODI, Erramilli et al. (1999) find that South 
Korean ODI was directed to relatively wealthier, higher-income countries in the 1980s but 
shifted to lower-income countries around the year 1990. Rammal and Zurbruegg (2006) tested 
the importance of the host country's GDP per capita and annual GDP growth as a driver of 
intra-ASEAN ODI. They found that, while a host country's GDP per capita is a determinant for 
FDI from Thailand, the future market potential (measured as GDP growth rate) is significant 
and positive for ODI from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand but not for that from 
the Philippines. 
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There is, however, a large body of empirical work in which a positive correlation between FDI 
inflows and market size is not found. For example, Clegg and Scott-Green (1998) find that 
Japanese ODI into the EU-9 is negatively associated with host country GDP. Similarly, Culem 
(1988) and Goldberger (1972) cannot find any significant association between inflows and 
market size for US investment into Europe. Loree and Guisinger (1995) find no significant 
association between US ODI and host country GDP per capita for the year 1982 while Clegg 
and Scott-Green (1998) do not find a significance effect for GDP growth. 
The mixed results for market size leave it unclear when and why one of the market-related 
variables provides stronger explanatory power than the others (Chakrabarti, 2001). 
Natural resource-seeking 
A number of studies examine the effect of natural resource endowments of a country on levels 
of inbound FDI. These studies use four different measurements to proxy natural resource- 
seeking investments. The varying results of the natural resource variable as a determinant of 
inbound FDI may be a result of the employment of different proxies. 
Asiedu (2006) uses the share of fuel and minerals in total exports (%) as a proxy for natural 
resources. Her results show that FDI as percentage of GDP is positively associated with a larger 
share of fuel and minerals exports. A proxy with a similar industry focus is employed by 
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004). They measure natural resources in fuel exports as a percentage 
of total exports. Similarly Johnson (2006) employs a dummy variable for oil abundance and 
additionally measures natural resources endowment in the form of production of crude oil in 
thousand barrels per day. The study by Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) supports the findings of 
Asiedu (2006) for a different set of African countries (that is resources endowments have a 
positive effect on inbound FDI flows) while Johnson (2006) reports mixed results. Johnson 
finds a negative effect of oil production on inward FDI to Central and Eastern European 
countries when tested with a set of traditional FDI determinants but no significance when a set 
of transition-specific variables are included in the model. However, he does find a positive 
effect on oil abundance for Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 1° Energy resource 
abundance has been employed by Campos and Kinoshita (2003) as a dummy variable based on 
country characteristics defined by De Melo et al. (1997). Campos and Kinoshita (2003) find 
that abundant natural resource endowment is positively associated with FDI to CIS countries. 
10 It should be noted that Johnson (2006) uses a dummy to proxy oil and gas abundance. The four 
CIS countries Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan score one and the remaining 
twenty one countries score zero. 
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However, the coefficient they report is not significant for the less well resource endowed 
Eastern Europe and Baltic host countries. For developing countries, Chen (1992) finds that 
larger, raw-material dependent Taiwanese firms demonstrate more of a propensity to invest 
abroad than do small resources dependent and small and large resource independent firms. 
The problem with the proxies used in this research is that they focus very much on one industry 
sector and are thus very much country, region or industry specific. The problem of using single 
proxies becomes especially evident when analysing FDI inflows to a larger set of countries that 
do not have the same set of natural endowments. Two conflicting trends may be observed. 
First, the importance of natural resource-seeking investment to total FDI may not be captured 
because of the minor importance of the resources proxied in the majority of countries. Second, 
the importance of natural resource seeking FDI may be overstated in some years and for some 
countries as such investments tends to be smaller in numbers, large scale, capital-intensive 
projects (that is, low in number but high in value). These investments may therefore 
overshadow other investments, especially in other natural-resources, in particular years in time 
series data. 
Strategic asset seeking-investment 
FDI in R&D is argued to be an efficient way to source knowledge in a host country. Besides 
the typical behaviour of adapting products to local market needs, such investment might also 
indicate capability-augmenting FDI (Kuemmerle, 1999; Iwasa and Odagiri, 2004). Empirical 
studies on strategic asset seeking-investments that use R&D related proxies provide mixed 
evidence. Love (2003) analyses USA investments in major industrialised countries and reverse 
investments. While he finds a positive relationship between R&D intensity and US ODI, he 
finds no such relationship or a negative one for inward FDI to the USA. Similarly, he finds a 
zero or a negative effect on FDI flows for R&D-intensity differences between host and home 
country. Anand and Delios (2002) use a R&D intensity difference variable and find that it is 
generally positively associated with FDI from Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom to the 
USA. Splitting the sample into sub-samples, they find that asset-augmenting FDI is attracted by 
total R&D in the host country, but that this variable is not significant for asset-exploiting 
investment. Love (2003) tests whether asset-seeking or asset-exploiting motives drive FDI 
between the USA and major OECD countries and employs a model using relative technological 
advantages. He finds that inward FDI to the USA is mainly in R&D intensive industries, as 
firms seek to exploit domestic technological capabilities. He also finds that the technology 
exploitation motive is also significant for US ODI (Love, 2003). A different way to measure 
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knowledge sourcing FDI is purported by Griliches (1990) and further provided by Al-Laham 
and Amburgey (2005), Iwasa and Odagiri (2004) and Sun et al. (2002). They assert that the 
number of patents applied for or granted in a host country is a proxy for the stock of local 
knowledge that promotes strategic asset seeking FDI. A higher number of granted patents 
indicates a stronger research and knowledge base in the host country which the investing firm 
may then seek to tap into or acquire through spillover, demonstration and other effects. This 
notion is supported by Cantwell et al. (2004) who state that patent activities are a good indicator 
of technological activity and the technology base in the host country. Al-Laham and Amburgey 
(2005) use the number of patents granted to U. S. American biotechnology firms as a 
determinant for foreign equity investment in such companies. However, they find no 
significance for this variable. Co and List (2004) examine the impact of granted patent in a 
specific geographic area in the USA on new inward FDI inflows and find a positive relationship. 
Filippaios et al. (2003) suggest that US American ODI is triggered by the number of patent 
applications made in the target country. However, this variable was dropped from their final 
estimation without explanation. 
In the context of developing country ODI, Pradhan (2004) identifies the extent of in-house R&D 
to be an important driver of Indian ODI. This finding contrasts with the general assumption that 
developing country firms lack ownership advantages but rather indicates that some Indian firms 
have developed firm-specific advantages. Makino et al. (2002) investigate FDI by Taiwanese 
firms, and find that they tend to invest in developed countries for asset-augmenting reasons. 
E iciency-seeking 
As explained in Section 2.2.3, efficiency investments are generally undertaken by firms to 
decrease overall business costs. Empirical studies generally proxy business costs via a wage 
variable on the basis that (relatively) lower wages is a determinant of FDI (home/host country 
wage differentials). This is generally supported (Agarwal, 1980). While Love and Lage- 
Hidalgo (2000) find support for the proposition, Loree and Guisinger (1995) find no significant 
association between host country wage rates and FDI. 
Foreign exchange 
Exchange rate differentials between home and host country currencies are general assumed to 
affect FDI. This is because an overvalued home country currency encourages ODI by lowering 
the relative cost of buying foreign assets while an undervalued host country currency 
encourages inward FDI by reducing the relative costs of domestic assets. Thus, a home country 
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facing an appreciation of its currency should observe an increase in ODI and decrease in inward 
FDI while a host country experiencing a depreciation of its currency should experience the 
converse (Froot and Stein, 1991; Cushman, 1985; Agarwal, 1980; Kohlhagen, 1977; Love and 
Lage-Hidalgo, 2000). Exchange rate effects have been tested using bilateral exchange rate 
levels and exchange rate volatility (Blonigen, 2005). A number of studies confirm the 
determinant effects of the foreign exchange rate on FDI (e. g. Chang, 1995; Clegg and Scott- 
Green, 1998). However, Agarwal (1980) finds no such relationship while Blonigen (2005), for 
example, finds that some studies report contradicting effects using the same data. The research 
is briefly reviewed below. 
Chang (1995) shows that Japanese ODI to the USA has been driven by the appreciation of the 
Japanese Yen against the US dollar. Clegg and Scott-Green (1998) find support that the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) between home and host country currencies positively affects 
FDI but that a change in the REER has a negative effect. Differences in results may be due to 
the difficulty of measuring REER accurately (Chinn, 2005,2002). Cushman (1985) finds some 
positive effects of host country currency depreciation on inward FDI - though, not for all of his 
models. With regards to exchange rate expectations Cushman (1985) also finds a strong 
negative association between host country's currency appreciation and inward FDI. 
A number of studies have examined the effects of exchange rate differences on Asian ODI. For 
example, Chen et al. (2006) find that market seeking motivated Taiwanese firm investment is 
positively associated with changes in the host country's foreign exchange (relative to Taiwan) 
and level of foreign exchange. FDI by efficiency-seeking firms is negatively associated with 
these factors, however. Bae and Hwang (1997) also find mixed results for Korean ODI, which 
they find is driven by an appreciation of the Korean Won relative to the US dollar and a 
depreciation relative to the Japanese Yen. The former is explained by the decreasing export 
competitiveness while the latter is argued to occur as Korean companies seek to secure access to 
Japanese technology which becomes too costly to import. 
Trade 
Trade-related factors may affect FDI in three distinctive ways. First, trade is often a precursor 
of FDI (Buckley and Casson, 1981). A company serves a foreign market through exports until 
the foreign market is sufficiently large and FDI becomes more cost-effective than supplying the 
market from a distance. Second, barriers to trade may encourage companies to invest and 
produce locally in order to circumvent the market entry barrier (that is tariff jumping FDI) 
(Blonigen, 2005; Buckley and Casson, 1981). Trade-barrier variables have been employed 
42 
widely in research on FDI determinants and are mainly found to effect FDI positively (e. g. 
Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994; Clegg and Scott-Green, 1998; Culem, 1988; Love, 2003; 
Lunn, 1983; Wezel, 2003). Blonigen (2005) argues that tariff-barriers differ across industries 
and are therefore difficult to measure. He argues that anti-dumping measures are a better proxy 
for trade barriers and a better indicator for trade barrier induced FDI from developed countries. 
Third, in order to reduce supplier uncertainty, companies may integrate backward up the supply 
chain (Buckley, 1988). 
For these reasons, a number of studies on FDI determinants have included a measure or 
measures of trade intensity. A positive relationship between total home country exports and 
ODI is generally found for Asian developing country ODI. For example, Bae and Hwang (1997) 
find that South Korean FDI is associated with host countries with which South Korea has a 
greater trade balance, while Kimura and Lee (1998) find that South Korean FDI is positively 
associated with Korean exports to Asia, Europe and the world in total but not with exports to 
North America. Lim and Moon (2001) find partial support for Kimura and Lee's study (1998) 
but positive effects on Korean ODI are only found for developing countries and mature 
industries. Lim and Moon (2001) find that this effect decreases over time. For Taiwanese firms, 
Chen (1992) finds a positive association between ODI and the export-ratio of Taiwan. 
Ferrantino (1992) finds positive correlations for India and Argentina. Seo and Suh (2006) find 
that South Korean FDI to ASEAN-4 countries, i. e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand, is rather export-creating than substituting and tends to be export platform investments 
for exporting to third countries. However, some of their findings lack statistical significance. 
Finally, Kwon (2002) shows that horizontal FDI by South Korean firms is more sensitive to 
trade-barriers than is vertical FDI. 
Geographic distance 
Geographic distance between home and host country is likely to affect the internationalisation 
of firms because it moderates transport and communication costs, among other things. However, 
studies on the relationship between geographical distance and FDI yield ambiguous findings. 
On the one hand, the incentive to substitute FDI for export increases with geographical distance 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976). However, Grosse and Trevino (1996) propose that access to 
market information becomes more burdensome and expensive with increasing geographic 
distance and this favours exports to FDI. Using distance between the home country's capital to 
the closest US city, Grosse and Trevino (1996) find the geographic distance is negatively 
associated with levels of inward FDI to the USA; with the notable exception of FDI from Japan. 
Terpstra and Yu (1988) employ the same proxy but find no significant effect on the investment 
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activities of US advertising firms. The negative finding of Grosse and Trevino (1996) is 
supported by Buch et al. (2005) for German FDI and Ferrantino (1992) for Argentinean and 
Indian FDI which they find to decrease with increasing distance from the home country. 
Ferrantino (1992) measures geographic distance as shipping distance and finds it to be 
negatively correlated with ODI. This indicates that firms from Argentina and India tend to 
invest in invest in nearby countries. Geographic distance is not only used as a supplementary 
measurement with trade in extant studies but also to analyse FDI sequences. For example, 
Erramilli et al. (1999) find that early South Korean FDI was directed to proximate countries 
later FDI to more distant countries. Arguably, this supports the Uppsala theory of incrementally 
expanding the geographical scope for South Korean firms investigated. 
Openness 
Along with trade and inward FDI, the openness of a country to international business is often 
taken as a proxy in studies of FDI determinants for attractiveness to foreign companies. 
Openness is measured in different ways and empirical work therefore reveals mixed results. For 
example, Yeaple (2003) in his study employs a dummy for inward FDI openness calculated 
from the World Competitiveness Report with no significant result while Billington (1999) in a 
study of FDI to the United Kingdom calculates openness to trade based on tax revenue figures. 
In his survey, Chakrabarti (2001) reports that other studies have reported both positive and 
insignificant effects of openness on FDI citing Kravis and Lipsey (1982), Culem (1988), 
Edwards (1990) and Pistoresi (2000) as supportive studies and Schmitz and Bieri (1972) and 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) with insignificant findings. 
Host country risk 
As was argued in section 2.2, the institutional setting of a host country is an important 
determinant in the investment decision of a firm (Delios and Henisz, 2003a). The institutional 
setting impacts on a range of variables ranging from political and business risk to the 
enforcement of laws, corruption and bureaucratic predictability. Delios and Henisz (2003a, 
2003b) analyse the impact of host country policy uncertainty on the market entry form and 
sequence for Japanese firms. They find that host country policy uncertainty negatively effects 
the entry of Japanese firms, while less Japanese companies will invest in such an environment 
and the companies which do invest tend to choose the less risky and committing entry form. 
A widely used measurement for country risk - comprising business and political risk - is the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) composite index. A number of other proxies used in 
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empirical investigations of FDI determinants are, for example, Business Environmental Risk 
Intelligence (employed by Gaba et al., 2002 and Globerman and Shapiro, 2003), Freedom 
House (used in the work of Dow and Karunaratna, 2006; Pournarakis and Varsakelis, 2004), 
and Transparency International (used by Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Voyer and Beamish, 2004; 
Robertson and Watson, 2004, for example). While Blonigen (2005) agrees that institutions are 
important determinants, he questions the reliability of the available indices because they are 
often based on subjective expert opinion. Biswas (2002) employs the ICRG and finds a positive 
association between increased FDI levels and lower host country risk. A study by Benassy- 
Quere et al. (2007), using different country indices and a proxy for host country institution, 
reveals that good institutions and low risk are important determinants of inbound FDI. 
Although the propensity of developing country MNEs to invest for risk diversification and 
minimisation reasons has been theorised and inferred from descriptive analysis of secondary 
and anecdotal data (e. g. Cross et al., 2007; O'Brien, 1980), to date, no empirical study testing 
this hypothesis could be identified in the extant literature. The only indication that Asian MNEs 
might be inclined to invest in a safe and predictable environment is provided by Rammal and 
Zurbruegg (2006), who find that the host country regulatory quality is an important driver for 
intra-ASEAN FDI. 
Cultural distance 
One of the most often used proxies for cultural distance are the measures defined by Hofstede 
(1980), which were subsequently collapsed into a single measure by Kogut and Singh (1988). '1 
Using a composite measure for cultural distance based on the four dimensions of Hofstede 
(1980), Sethi et al. (2003) find that US FDI historically has been directed towards culturally 
proximate countries but has recently shifted to culturally more distance countries (that is, from 
Europe to Asia). Delios and Henisz (2003a) group countries with similar cultural backgrounds 
as suggested by Ronen and Shenkar (1985) and rank these culture-based groups against Japan. 
They find that Japanese firms are less likely to serve markets in country groupings that are less 
culturally similar to Japan. 
A different approach is used by Ferrantino (1992) for developing country ODI. Based on the 
idea that migrant flows establish social networks across borders which may help to reduce 
transaction costs (see also Section 2.2.6), Ferrantino employs proxies for the number of host 
country immigrants in Argentina (source country) and Indian emigrants in a host country to 
11 Shenkar (2001) provides a thorough criticism of the single cultural distance index suggested by 
Kogut and Singh (1988). 
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measure transaction cost reduction effects. Both proxies show a positive relationship between 
migration and ODI. Gao (2003) also uses ethnic groups as a proxy for international networks. 
Gao computes the ratio of Overseas Chinese in a home country to assess their influence on 
accumulated FDI to China from that home country. He finds that the Chinese inward FDI stock 
from a host country rises with ratio of Overseas Chinese in that country. 
Interest rates 
A number of studies reveal that FDI is generally sensitive to interest rates and tends to increase 
with rising interest rates in the home market (e. g. Barrell and Pain, 1996; Reinhart and Reinhart, 
2001). Increasing interest rates in the home country raise debt-serving costs which can push 
firms to invest abroad. Grosse and Trevino (1996) and Bajo-Rubin and Sosvilla-Rivero (1994), 
however, find no significant effect of US and Spanish interest rates on inward FDI, respectively. 
Results for ODI from Asian countries are mixed. Bae and Hwang (1997) use two proxies to 
measure Korean interest rates which, they propose may push Korean companies to invest abroad. 
The proxies are not significant though. In contrast, Rammal and Zurbruegg (2006) find the 
interest rate of ASEAN host countries has a significant effect on ODI originating from 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore but not for ODI from the Philippines or Thailand. 
Inflation rates 
Volatile and unstable inflation rates in a host country discourage market seeking FDI by 
creating long-term commercial uncertainty which impedes strategic corporate planning, 
especially in respect of price-setting and profit expectations (Buckley et al., 2007a). Rammal 
and Zurbruegg (2006) test to what extent the host country's annual inflation rate (consumer 
price index) accounts for variation in intra-ASEAN ODI patterns. The inflation rate is found to 
have a significant discouraging effect on Malaysian ODI but no measurable effect on ODI from 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Summary 
The above overview of empirical studies on the determinants of FDI reveals mixed results for 
the significance of all variables presented. This indicates that probably not just one factor is 
sufficient to explain patterns of FDI but rather that a wider range of economic, institutional and 
social infrastructure factors interact dynamically to influence observable variables in the 
investment behaviour of MNEs (Agarwal, 1980). The diverging empirical results are not due to 
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home country bias, i. e. whether or not the home country is industrialised, but rather depend on 
the model specification and the source and treatment of the employed variables. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has set the context within which Chinese ODI will be analysed. First, some 
stylised facts on the global development of FDI since 1970 and the spatial spread of MNEs have 
been presented in order to provide context for this research. China ranks steadily higher in both 
categories over this time period. Chinese ODI flows increased from forty-four million US 
dollars in 1982 to early four and a half billion US dollars in 1993 and were valued at about 
twelve billion US dollars in 2005. At the same time, the number of Chinese MNEs represented 
in rankings of major MNEs has increased significantly. A more detailed account on the 
evolution of Chinese ODI is presented in Chapter 3. To analyse and discuss this phenomenon, a 
well developed theoretical framework is essential. This chapter therefore reviews theories on 
FDI and MNE behaviour which have been developed and extensively tested for industrialised 
country firms. Of the presented theories, the eclectic paradigm and international investment 
strategies are most commonly employed in the analysis of Chinese ODI (see Section 3.3). 
Reference to these theories is made throughout the remainder of this thesis. In the last section 
of this chapter a number of determinants of FDI as identified in empirical studies for developed 
and developing countries are presented. The selection of the variables has been based on the 
theories presented in the previous section. The influence of the variables is often empirically 
ambiguous because of the model specifications and data treatment. This occurrence is true for 
studies on developed and developing countries. Chapter 7 will build on this body of literature in 
cross-sectional analyses with a view to identify the determinants of Chinese ODI. 
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3 Chinese outward foreign direct investments - patterns 
and explanations 
Since the instigation of the `Open-Door' policies (gaige kaifang) in 1978, China has evolved 
from a position of marginal relevance for ODI to become an important source country among 
developing countries (see Section 2.1). This development is generally argued to have evolved 
in five distinctive phases, which reflect changes in China's political and regulatory framework 
and its business environment (Buckley et al., 2006; Wu and Chen, 2001; Sauvant, 2005). 
Before these phases are described, it is useful to take a step back and to consider the history of 
China: the effect of this on firm internationalisation, the types of firms that become MNEs and 
prior research on Chinese ODI. The following section provides a brief review of China's 
economic development between 1948 and 1978 and the reform measures implemented after 
1978 to put Chinese ODI in context. This is followed by a description of political actors that 
have actual and potential influence on Chinese ODI and with a classification of enterprise 
ownership types in the Chinese corporate system. The knowledge of the political actors and 
forms of firm ownership will help the reader to understand the impact of ODI policies and 
regulations when these are discussed in connection with the five phases of Chinese ODI 
development. The concluding section of this chapter critically assesses the explanatory strength 
of the academic literature on the development of Chinese ODI as described in the Chapter 2. 
Based on the identified explanatory gaps and with reference to the theories and frameworks 
introduced in Chapter 2, the chapter also sets forth the research questions that guide this 
research. 
3.1 China's political economy between 1949 and 2005 
To understand the recent growth of Chinese ODI and some `Chinese characteristics', it is 
necessary to go back in time to provide a background to the development of the modern Chinese 
economy and the institutions that govern it. 12 The Chinese economy between 1949 and 1979 
leaned heavily towards a Soviet-styled centrally planned economy with an internal focus on 
heavy industry and closure to international economic relations. This was exemplified in a trade 
to GDP ratio of up to around 10% for China until 1978 which increased to 65% in 2005 
(Naughton, 2007). 13 Although China followed the Soviet model, the Chinese economy was 
never as rigorously planned as the Russian one, with only up to six hundred commodities being 
12 Obviously, this review is superficial. In-depth analysis of these issues can be found in, for 
example, Naughton (1995), Steinfeld (1998), Child (1994), Hsu (1991), Holz (2003), and Huang 
and Ma (2001) on economic and business issues and Zhang (1998), Goldstein (1991), and 
Weatherly (2006) on internal and external political issues. 
13 This section draws much upon the excellent account of China's economy by Naughton (2007) 
and is extended and supported by additional sources as indicated. 
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allocated within the Chinese system compared with sixty thousand in the Soviet Union 
(Naughton, 2007). Despite the lower degree of control, the Chinese government nevertheless 
nationalised the economy until 1956. This government-guided industrialisation neglected the 
development of both a domestic service sector and household consumption and this impeded the 
development of balanced economic structure and economic growth. Indeed, concentration on 
heavy industry and misinformation were responsible for a major economic shock in China - the 
Great Leap Forward (1958 to 1960). In an attempt to accelerate industrialisation, resources 
were diverted from the primary sector and rural areas in general to industries in urban areas with 
fatal consequences. A further economic drawback was the dispersed resettlement of industrial 
structures to the Chinese hinterland in response to potential foreign aggression during the period 
of the so-called Third Front (1964 to 1966) (Naughton, 1988). This political initiative was 
undertaken without considering the impact on economic efficiency and competitiveness. While 
the impact of the Cultural Revolution (1967 to 1969) was felt heavily in the political and social 
realm, it left the economy fairly untouched. The years between the Revolution and the Open- 
Door policy are characterised by attempts to consolidate and improve the economic situation. 
Despite all the drawbacks, the Chinese economy grew between 1952 and 1978 at an average 
rate of 6% per annum (Naughton, 2007). 
In 1978, the Chinese government instigated the `Open-Door' policy with effect from 1979. The 
`Open-Door' policy was first of all a reaction to the economic situation in China and was 
`designed' to improve it. Gradualistic economic reform was therefore instigated instead of a 
planned reform project with a determined end goal such as, for example, an open market 
economy. This led to a process of `tit-for-tat' and numerous economic reform and adjustments 
trials and experiments. The advantage of a gradual trial-and-error approach was that China 
could test which economic reform measure best suited the domestic economy and institutions at 
a particular point in time without leading to any disruption of the economic system. The 
opening of special economic zones (SEZs) for foreign enterprises, the introduction of a dual 
price system and the pursuing of a dual exchange rate are examples of this experimentation. 
SEZs were created in secluded areas of China with virtually no contact between foreign and 
domestic firms. But it provided Chinese firms and institutions with an opportunity to learn from 
foreign MNEs. The dual price system led to a `growing-out of the plan' (Naughton, 1995) by 
allowing domestic firms to sell production that exceeded the directed quantity at market prices. 
Likewise, state-owned companies (SOEs) were selectively and partially released into more 
managerial-led governance through the introduction of a system of greater managerial 
responsibility and autonomy (Broadman, 2001; Child, 1994). In many cases, this preceded 
careful privatisation (OECD, 2002). Non-state owned corporate forms were slowly accepted 
into the Chinese economy and the economic leeway provided by the reform measures is 
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evidenced in the exceptional growth of township and village enterprises (TVEs) and private 
firms during the 1980s and 1990s. The young firms established themselves a market place 
despite political and financial constraints and put competitive pressure on state-owned firms 
(IFC, 2000; OECD, 2002). In 1992, China adopted a `socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics' and this continues to the present day. Put into practice, this means that the 
government allows some economic freedom but also maintains an active role by keeping public 
ownership over selected `key' companies and industries (OECD, 2002; Scott, 2002). In the 
1990s, continuing and discretionary implementation of reforms at sub-national level caused an 
unpredictable economic environment in which the institutional environment remained uncertain 
over the long-run. As a reaction, Chinese companies diversified quickly into newly identified 
business opportunities to secure short-term strategic advantages and profits (Gutherie, 1997) 
which led to highly diversified Chinese conglomerates. The process of market openness to 
foreign business, liberalisation, deregulation and corporatisation of SOEs arguably culminated 
with China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. This ended a process 
of nearly sixteen years of international negotiations and domestic economic alignments but also 
strengthened future reform measures by increasing external pressure to maintain policy 
direction through its WTO accession commitments (OECD, 2002). 
3.2 The institutional environment for Chinese outward direct investment 
As was indicated in the previous section, an analysis of Chinese ODI would be incomplete 
without acknowledging the institutional fabric within which Chinese companies are embedded, 
as this is likely to influence their investment behaviour (Child and Tse, 2001; Granovetter, 
1985). For most of China's recent history, business transactions and government supervision of 
state-owned enterprises have been based on personal networks and small `fiefs' rather than the 
codified and impersonal procedures as typically found in a market economy (Boisot and Child, 
1988,1996; Ralston et al., 2006). Corporate actors just recently turned to be more market- 
oriented conducting business (Ralston et al., 2006) which is partly a reaction to the competitive 
pressure from non-state owned firms. For this reason, this section describes key actors in 
Chinese ODI; first by describing the corporate actors and then the political and administrative 
actors. 
3.2.1 Corporate actors in China 
The descriptive analysis of Chinese ODI above and the theoretical explanations that follow later 
in this chapter are mainly based on the international investment behaviour of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). The internationalisation of firms other than SOEs is seldom taken into 
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account in extant research on Chinese ODI (exceptions are Warner et al., 2004; Liu and Li, 
2002). This chapter therefore provides a description of the different corporate forms in China 
and their economic position in the Chinese economy. One way of defining corporate actors in 
China is by their ownership form and their mode of coordination. Thus, three main enterprise 
forms can be distinguished, namely (i) SOEs, (ii) non-private enterprises and (iii) private 
enterprises (adapted from Boisot and Child, 1996). In turn, each of these three classes embraces 
several forms of ownership types. This classification constitutes a workable classification 
because in fact the official ownership statuses of Chinese firms are manifold, overlapping and 
often not meaningfully distinctive, because their status depends on the manner of their 
registration rather than on the nature of the shareholders (OECD, 2005b). 
State-owned enterprises 
The term `state-owned enterprise' (SOE) comprises all companies which are directly or 
indirectly owned by the Chinese government and its ministries. Thus, under this category fall 
SOEs such as CNOOC and Shougang which are both partially owned by the State Asset 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), as well as enterprises that are 
controlled directly or indirectly by a ministry, provincial or municipal governments. It also 
includes firms which have been converted to a new company form and are registered today as 
joint-ownership enterprises or limited liability corporations because a government authority is a 
significant shareholder (Kanamori and Zhang, 2004; Clarke, 2003). Likewise, SOEs listed on 
the Chinese stock exchanges in Shanghai or Shenzhen have typically floated only a limited 
number of shares, the remainder of which rest with government authorities and are not tradeable 
(Kanamori and Zhang, 2004; Zhang, 2004). Some of the most prominent Chinese MNEs are to 
a significant degree state-owned but have also considerable numbers of shares owned by 
(foreign) strategic investors, as in the cases of Lenovo and TCL (Zeug and Williamson, 2003). 
SOEs are, despite all reforms, often subject to conflicting - political and ideological - demands 
from multiple national and sub-national government authorities which each exert direct and 
indirect influence to a greater or lesser extent (Hassard et al., 2002; Clarke, 2003). 
Collective enterprises 
The term `collective enterprise' comprises both collectively-owned enterprises (COEs) and 
township-village enterprises (TVEs). While COEs are normally found in urban areas, TVEs 
resemble the same company form in rural districts. Both company forms commonly belong to 
its employees or the local community. But, because of the typically strong ties between firms 
and local government, they are, by virtue of involvement, owned by the local government or 
other local authorities (Boisot and Child, 1996; Gibb and Li, 2003). Consequently, they sit 
somewhat between SOEs and private enterprises in terms of government support and market 
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responsiveness (Peng et al., 2004). A case in point is Haier, the Chinese white goods 
manufacturer, which is partly owned by the city government of Qingdao, Shandong province 
(Yeung and DeWoskin, 1998). 14 Collectively-owned enterprises such as Haier are often 
labelled as SOEs while TVEs constitute hybrid forms which lean more towards being privately- 
owned firms. 
Private enterprises 
To date, it remains somewhat unclear which enterprise forms are captured by the phrase `private 
sector'. Following Heberer (2003), the private sector comprises individual companies (geti hu), 
private companies (siren qiye), foreign-invested companies and companies which have been 
classified as SOEs above, namely joint stock companies and limited liability companies. 
Besides these entities, a large number of private firms are said to have a `red hat', i. e. they are 
officially registered as collectively-owned firms or TVEs to circumvent any potential state 
repression (Heberer, 2003; IFC, 2000). Privately-owned firms are therefore affected by local 
policies and governments which often act as business facilitator for and protector of the 
entrepreneur and manager (Boisot and Child, 1996; Gibb and Li, 2003). The most prominent 
privately-owned Chinese MNEs are Wanxiang, the automotive component producer, and 
Huawei, the telecommunication equipment manufacturer. It is pertinent to point out that wholly 
foreign-invested firms and Sino-foreign international joint ventures in China are also regarded 
as private enterprises but are excluded from this research. 
Although the above discussion distinguishes between different ownership forms, the 
classification scheme is not without ambiguity. Property rights are not as well defined and clear- 
cut in China as they are in industrialised countries. Rather they have steadily evolved and they 
are established and revisited (Boisot and Child, 1996). This poses difficulties in specifying 
definitive ownership forms. Moreover, some enterprise forms exist in China without any 
statutory basis but are rather tolerated by administrative discretion (Clarke, 2005). We note, 
though, that legal changes in China since the end 1990s have strengthened the position of non- 
state owned enterprises and that property rights became better defined in 2004 (Kanamori and 
Zhao, 2004; Heberer, 2003). This indicates that a more specifiable distinction of corporate 
forms towards the end of the period under investigation may be feasible. However, for the 
period under study it is assumed that the here presented classification is appropriate. 
14 White goods are household appliances such as kitchen and laundry equipment. This is to 
differentiate from brown goods (electronic entertainment goods such as TVs and stereo 
equipment) and grey goods (computer peripherals) (Stremersch and Tellis, 2004). 
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3.2.2 Political and administrative actors in China 
There are a number of key political and administrative actors in China that impinge upon 
Chinese ODI. These include the State Council, State Administration for Foreign Exchange, the 
Ministry of Commerce, the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform 
Commission and SASAC. The following descriptions of these administrative actors also reflect 
the numerous and on-going restructurings of the Chinese government system (Pearson, 2005). 
State Council (119 -R) 
The State Council is China's executive organ (or cabinet). It is headed by the Premier and 
supervises ministries, special organisations, offices, and other administrations such as the ones 
discussed below. The State Council drafts and develops law and regulations which have to be 
approved by the National People's Congress and the Standing Committee. As the executive and 
administrative organ of China, the State Council also coordinates the national economic 
development, manages foreign affairs and concludes bilateral treaties. The State Council 
decides upon major economic policies and liberalisation measures, although the policy 
initiatives for these steps may come from its subordinate ministries, administrations and 
commissions (Zhao, 2006). 
State Administration for Foreign Exchange (Ii Il] cX'/[ W gFm) 
The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) was established and equipped with 
administrative tasks concerning the usage and flow of foreign exchange in 1979 (Zhang, 2004; 
Lin and Schramm, 2003; Shan, 1989). SAFE consolidated the activities and responsibilities 
formerly distributed over several ministries in relation to the supervision of China's foreign 
exchange control (Lin and Schramm, 2004). Although the authority over SAFE moved in 1982 
from the Bank of China to the newly created central bank, the People's Bank of China, the 
administration arguable remained relatively independent until a subsequent government 
restructuring in 1998 (Lin and Schramm, 2003; Shi and Gelb, 1998). This led to SAFE 
strengthening its mandate in following ODI-related functions: (i) the reporting of the balance of 
payments (BOP) data to the State Council and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), (ii) 
recommending foreign exchange policies to the People's Bank of China, (iii) overseeing the 
transfer of foreign exchange out of and into China under the capital account, and (iv) managing 
China's foreign exchange reserves (Zhang, 2004). Despite its apparent wide range of 
responsibilities, the influence of SAFE on Chinese ODI has been described by some researchers 
as minimal (Zhang, 2003; Wang, 2002). 
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Ministry of Commerce (ýsrýFa#A I) 
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) was established in 2003. It resulted from a merger of 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) with selected 
responsibilities of the State Economic Trade Commission and the State Development and 
Planning Commission, namely domestic trade, foreign economic coordination and the 
coordination of international trade of industrial products, raw material and semi-finished 
products (Munro and Yan, 2003). The major responsibilities of MOFCOM with regard to 
Chinese ODI cover: (i) the supervision of Chinese ODI by drafting and implementing policies 
and regulations and considering non-financial ODI projects for approval; (ii) bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations on investment and trade treaties and representing China at the WTO 
and other international economic organisations; (iii) ensuring the alignment of China's 
economic and trade laws with international treaties and agreements; and (iv) coordinating 
China's foreign aid policy and relevant funding and loan schemes (Munro and Yan, 2003). 
These functions provide MOFCOM with direct and indirect opportunities to guide and influence 
the scope and direction of Chinese ODI. Indeed, MOFCOM issued the first regulations on 
Chinese ODI in 1984 and 1985, namely the Provisional regulations governing the control and 
the approval procedure for opening non-trade enterprises overseas (July 1985) and the 
Circular concerning the approval authorities and principles for opening non-trade joint venture 
overseas as well as in Hong Kong and Macao (May 1984) (Zhang, 2003). 
People's Bank of China (P MA 4R'(5 ) 
The People's Bank of China (PBC) was established as China's central bank in 1983 and is 
currently directly supervised by the State Council (Zhang, 2004). The PBC is responsible for 
the overall financial policies and rules and dealings with international financial organisations 
such as the World Bank. It also supervises and manages the foreign exchange reserves of China 
(Chang, 1989). With respect to the latter function, the PBC imposed significant changes to 
China's foreign exchange regime in 1994 and this provided the PBC with tighter foreign 
exchange control (Barale and Jones, 1994). The combined powers over domestic monetary and 
financial policies and foreign exchange control give the PBC the possibility to levy one function 
against another. Careful management of China's foreign exchange reserves used in 
international investment projects by Chinese companies has helped the PBC to fulfil domestic 
monetary objectives such as a stable and low inflation rate because domestic enterprises could 
be encouraged to spend Yuan and reduce pressure on the monetary supply side (Pettis, 2005). 
The PBC also regulated the financial service sector and hence ODI by financial institutions 
prior to 1992. In 1992, securities, insurance and banking services were spun-off into separate 
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regulatory authorities among whom the China Banking Regulatory Commission today approves 
ODI projects by Chinese banks (Pearson, 2005). 
National Development and Reform Commission 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), sometime referred to by its old 
name the State Development and Reform Commission, emerged from the institutional structure 
of the State Planning Commission (Munro and Yan, 2003). The NDRC is the main government 
body that designs, regulates and coordinates the economic development and industrial policy of 
China. As part of this function it regulates government investments into domestic industries 
(Pearson, 2005). One key function of the NRDC is to develop "strategies, goals and policies to 
balance and optimise [... ] China's overseas investments. " (Munro and Yan, 2003: 4). As part 
of this role, the NDRC has issued guidelines concerning access of domestic firms to soft loans 
to finance their internationalisation (Schwartz, 2005). In a similar vein, the NDRC, in 
cooperation with MOFCOM, has published a host country catalogue that lists the countries for 
which the Chinese government will provide subsidies for a FDI project (Zweig and Bi, 2005). 
The NDRC is also involved in the approval process of Chinese ODI. Large-scale Chinese ODI 
projects in industry sectors such as natural resources and other projects involving larger sums of 
foreign exchange need prior investment approval from the NDRC. The threshold has changed 
over the years and stands currently at USD 30 million. The latter is part of NDRC's functions 
to maintain equilibrium in balance of payments (Munro and Yan, 2003). 
State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (M r*, ' ~'ý ý) 
A relatively new governmental authority is the State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC). The SASAC was established by the State Council in 2003 to represent 
the Chinese government as owner of and investor in non-financial SOEs. SASAC has wide- 
reaching responsibilities and powers (Naughton, 2007; Pearson, 2005). Prior to its 
establishment, its functions were divided among the State Economic Trade Commission and 
several ministries and other government authorities that controlled and supervised `their' 
companies independently from each other. Sometimes this created competing SOEs (Munro 
and Yan, 2003; Mueller and Lovelock, 2000; Pearson, 2005). In this respect, it is the objective 
of the SASAC to ensure that the SOEs under its supervision remain competitive and even 
increase profitability and the value of the assets involved (Pearson, 2005). It remains 
questionable if such an institution can fulfil this type of objective (Clarke, 2003). In SASAC 
supervision is split: The national SASAC directly controls nearly 170 national SOEs while sub- 
national SASACs take up this role for provincial SOEs (Naughton, 2006,2007). Both levels of 
SASAC exercise their power through the appointment of senior managers to SOEs and the 
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involvement in major decision-making of firms under its control (Naughton, 2007). A 
considerable number of senior management positions are actually appointed directly by the CCP 
(Naughton, 2007). This structure and the strong influence of the party do not necessarily lead to 
the appointment of the most suitable, but rather the most rewarded, managerial candidates with 
questionable consequences for the company's domestic and international operations. ODI 
projects by SOEs under the supervision of SASAC are unlikely to be decided without the 
explicit approval of SASAC. The decision to invest overseas either through a greenfield 
investment or an acquisition can be regarded as a major decision that impacts on the company's 
profitability and the value of the involved assets. Any ODI project therefore touches upon the 
key objectives of SASAC. Examples of overseas invested Chinese firms under the direct 
control of SASAC include the following which rank among the Top 100 developing country 
MNEs as published by UNCTAD (2006), namely, CNOOC, CNPC, Sinochem Corporation, 
China State Construction Engineering Corporation, China Minmetals Corp, COFCO, and TCL 
(through SASACs' holdings in Huizhou Municipal Investment Holdings) (see also Section 2.1). 
SASAC also controls smaller SOEs such as China Aviation Oil, which has operations in 
Singapore, and the international trading company, Sinosteel. 
The division of responsibility between the state actors described above is not always clear and 
has changed during the institutional reforms since 1979. Overlapping duties, conflicting 
interests between and within bureaucracies and multiple government authorities that a company 
has to approach illustrates the potential of the institutional framework to hamper the 
development of Chinese ODI. Smaller SOEs and privately-owned companies without well 
established relations ('guanxi') with the administrations, in particular, may be discouraged 
especially by such an institutional environment. 
Having set the background and introduced the corporate and political actors, it is now time to 
turn to data on Chinese ODI. The next section reviews the development of Chinese ODI since 
1979. This section makes reference to the political actors outlined here and provides 
information about the changes and their responses to the regulatory framework which may be 
partly responsible for changes in the spatial distribution, amount, and number of ODI projects 
undertaken by Chinese MNEs since 1979. 
3.3 Development of Chinese outward direct investment since 1979 
Before 1979, Chinese ODI was modest because up to then China had followed an autarkic, 
import-substitution led economy model, under which only selected state-owned trading 
companies gained the right to establish foreign affiliates (Zhang, 2003). Data on ODI prior to 
56 
1979 are therefore sketchy but values are likely to have been miniscule. This research therefore 
focuses on the years 1979 to 2005. Since 1979 and the implementation of China's `Open-Door' 
policy, Chinese ODI has increased steadily, especially after 2000 (see Section 1.1). Chinese 
ODI is generally described as having developed in five distinctive phases (Wong and Chan, 
2003; Wu and Chen, 2001; Ye, 1992; Tseng and Mark, 1996). The classification follows 
changes to its geographical scope and adjustments to China's political and regulatory 
environment towards ODI, namely concerning the formal approval process. This section 
presents the development of Chinese ODI with respect to policy changes which have the 
potential to have impacted on Chinese ODI. These policy areas are foreign exchange control, 
foreign trade, and foreign affairs. The five phases embrace the years 1979 to 1985,1986 to 
1991,1992 to 1998,1999 to 2001, and 2002 and onwards. '5 The key regulations issued during 
each of the five phases concerning ODI are listed for each period. 
3.3.1 Phase 1: The Open-Door policy and first steps on international grounds (1979- 
1985) 
From the outset of the `Open-Door' policy, the Chinese government not only endeavoured to 
create an institutional environment to attract foreign MNEs to China but also to encourage 
Chinese companies to expand internationally through FDI (Zhang, 2003). China authorised 
selected state-owned trading companies under the auspices of the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) 16 and sub-national economic and technology cooperation enterprises to establish 
their first foreign affiliates (Zhang, 2003; Ye, 1992; Taylor, 2002; Tan, 1999). The objective of 
allowing controlled Chinese ODI was to ensure that it became an integral part of the Chinese 
economy and contributed to the social welfare of China and certain political goals. Moreover, 
the Chinese macroeconomic policy since the 1970s has focused on the accumulation of foreign 
exchange earnings. Only regulated ODI could help to avoid `unnecessary' outflow of hard 
15 Although there is a general agreement that Chinese ODI developed in distinctive phases 
disagreement exists between the authors: Ye (1992) argues there were two phases prior to 1992, 
namely 1978 to 1985 and from 1985 onwards. Tseng and Mark (1996) and Wong and Chan 
(2003) agree with Phase One being 1978 to 1985. The latter, however, defines the second Phase 
differently, namely from 1986 to 1991. Wong and Chan further distinguish Phase Three (1992- 
98) and Four (1999 to 2001). Tseng and Mark's Phase Three covers the years 1991 to 1996. 
Somewhat different is the classification by Wu and Chen (2001), who delineate their four phases 
as follows: 1979 to 83,1984 to 85,1986 to 92 and 1993 to 2001. Note that these models 
commonly have a closed last phase overlapping with the publication of the article. 
16 The Ministry of Commerce evolved from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC) in 2003. MOFTEC was the successor organisation to the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) following a reorganisation in 1993. For 
simplification purposes, this study uses the term MOFCOM throughout while acknowledging 
that specific responsibilities and scope of function vary between the three organisations. 
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currency. '? The extent to which ODI benefited the Chinese economy and signalled a departure 
from socialistic ideology was heavily discussed during the 1980s and this debate partially 
impeded its development (Zhang, 2003). Each outbound investment project had to pass a 
thorough approval process in which several institutions were involved. The key political actors 
in the two stage process were the State Council, MOFCOM, SAFE18 and the NDRC (Ye, 1992; 
Tseng and Mak, 1996). 19 Although the process has been modified several times since, the basic 
procedure remains unchanged to date. A firm applies, first, to SAFE to use foreign exchange 
earnings abroad and, second, to MOFCOM or the NDRC for the approval of the investment 
project business case (Deschandol and Luckock, 2005; Yin et al., 2003; Horsley, 1990). The 
first step was necessary because SAFE is responsible for the administration of sourcing, 
conversion, remittance and monitoring of the repatriation of foreign exchange and of investment 
profits (Yin et al., 2003; Lin and Schramm, 2003). Only companies which had been granted an 
export license had the right to retain a share of foreign exchange earnings under the suspicion of 
the retention scheme (Lardy, 1992; Shan, 1989). Under this retention scheme, exporting firms 
were allowed to hold a certain amount of foreign exchange earnings while the remainder had to 
be turned over to the Chinese government (Guo and Han, 2004). The retention scheme 
favoured firms in the costal provinces and certain industrial sectors, especially the light industry, 
over others. Firms in these areas could accumulate considerable amounts of foreign currency 
entitlements (Lardy, 1992). The retention scheme only entitled a company to use the amount of 
foreign exchange earned, with the prior approval from the relevant government authority - 
SAFE. The company therefore did not possess foreign exchange as such (Lardy, 1992). Hence, 
retained foreign exchange earnings could not be used freely for ODI but had to be approved by 
SAFE first. An application for an outward investment which included the usage of hard 
currency was therefore not possible for every Chinese company. To circumvent this policy, 
Shan (1989) asserts that trading companies established foreign affiliates to keep (illegally) hard 
currency earnings outside the Chinese system but within their international network of affiliates 
to draw on them when appropriate. 
17 See Liew (2004) and Hall (2004) for an extensive survey on China's convoluted foreign 
exchange rate policy making. 
18 SAFE evolved from the State Administration Exchange Control (SAEC) in 1994 which itself 
succeeded the State General Administration of Exchange Control (SGEC) (Shan, 1989; 
Bumgarner and Prime, 2000). For simplification purposes, this study uses the term SAFE 
throughout, while acknowledging that responsibilities and scope have varied between the three 
organisations. 
19 The involvement and responsibilities of the government authorities have varied since 1978 in 
accordance with a gradual liberalisation and decentralisation of the approval process. This 
process mirrors the general pattern of economic reform in China which is generally associated 
with decentralisation and a careful introduction of market forces (Child and Tse, 2001; Boisot 
and Child, 1996). 
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Once the application had been accepted by SAFE, a further application had to be made to 
MOFCOM or the NDRC. Only projects of an investment value less than USD IOmn could be 
approved by MOFCOM. All other investment projects had to receive NDRC approval (see also 
Table 3.1). The application involved the submission of the following documentation: a 
feasibility study, a certificate from SAFE, a statement from the Chinese embassy in the target 
country, an investment recovery plan and documentation on the legal environment of the target 
country (Horsley, 1990). To pass the approval successfully, early overseas projects had to fall 
into one of the following four categories: (i) securing access of domestically scarce natural 
resources, (ii) accessing and transferring technology to China, (iii) enhancing export 
possibilities for Chinese companies, and (iv) augmenting managerial skills through 'on-the-job 
training' (Guo, 1984). To support the transfer of technology and managerial knowledge and to 
attenuate business risk, the establishment of a foreign joint venture abroad was promoted by the 
Chinese government. 
These restrictive measures partly explain the slow growth of Chinese ODI despite an overvalued 
Chinese Yuan. At the beginning of the Open-Door policy, the Chinese Yuan was inconvertible 
under neither the current nor the capital account. Rather, the exchange rate was perceived as an 
administrative accounting tool of minor priority for the autarkic Chinese economy (Lardy, 1992; 
Lin and Schramm, 2004). The lack of any market forces to determine the value of the exchange 
rate was reflected in an overvalued Chinese Yuan during the pre-reform era, which continued to 
the mid-1980s. 
Table 3.1: Key ODI regulations in Phase 1(1979 to 1985) 
Regulation Issued Comments Enunciator 
Circular on the approval July 1985 A core document for laying MOFCOM 
procedures for international out the principal for the 
economic and technical regulation and control of ODI. 
cooperation corporation to set up Opened ODI to all economic 
overseas subsidiaries entities with financial 
resources, foreign joint venture 
partner and relevant 
capabilities' 'Z 
Provisional regulations governing July 1985 Ceiling for investments to be MOFCOM 
the control and the approval evaluated by MOFCOM and 
procedure for opening non-trade NDRC stands at USD IOmnl 
enterprises overseas 
Circular concerning the approval May 1984 The first regulation on Chinese MOFCOM 
authorities and principles for ODI' 
opening non-trade joint venture 
overseas as well as in Hong Kong 
and Macao 
Sources: 1 Zhang (2003), 2 Cai (1999). 
59 
Though overvalued, the neglect of involvement in the global economy, the inward-looking 
development strategy and tight foreign exchange control meant that Chinese firms were not 
encouraged to establish foreign affiliates during this period. 
Nevertheless, the very small number of foreign affiliates established by trading companies prior 
to 1979 increased rapidly with the instigation of the Open-Door policy. The number of foreign 
affiliates increased to more than 100 ventures by 1983, covering a wide range of businesses. 
These operations were mainly established in industrialised countries (Guo, 1984). International 
joint ventures were, for example, established in the service sector such as in banking and 
technical consultancy, and in trade-related activities (for example, manufacturing and resource 
development). Early investments abroad were conducted by companies such as CITIC, one of 
today's major Chinese MNEs. CITIC was established by the State Council in 1979 with the 
explicit goal of investing and diversifying internationally. Sinotrans, the Chinese logistics 
company, established an affiliate in the USA in 1980 and China National Metals and Minerals 
Import and Export Corp. (Minmetals), the specialised trading company, opened offices in Hong 
Kong and the United Kingdom (Zhang, 2003). By the end of 1985, Chinese companies had 
invested around USD 900 million abroad, signifying a strong growth on the USD 44 million of 
FDI stock owned by Chinese MNEs three years earlier (UNCTAD, 2007a). 
3.3.2 Phase 2: The Government encourages Chinese ODI (1986-1991) 
With the issuance of new regulations by the MOFCOM in 1985, restrictive policies on ODI 
were eased in Phase 2. The approval process was opened to SOEs other than trading companies 
(Zhang, 2003) and, as Tan (1999) argues, to private enterprises. 20 Companies still had to 
undergo the formal administrative approval process, including the evaluation of sufficient 
financial and managerial capacity of the investing firm and evaluation of the foreign joint 
venture partner (Wong and Chan, 2003; Tseng and Mak, 1996). Advances in the technological 
and managerial standards of Chinese enterprises promoted the outward investment drive of the 
Chinese firms and of Chinese authorities at all levels. At the same time, international activities 
in more mature industries were encouraged by the Chinese government with the aim of profit 
20 The explicit inclusion of privately-owned firms in the MOFCOM directive is questionable. 
Private firms were for the first time recognised in 1982 as supplementing entities to SOEs. 
However, this ownership form was only properly defined in 1988, in 1997 it was acknowledged 
to be an integral part of the Chinese economy and its legal status strengthened in 1999 (Heberer, 
2004; Kanamori and Zhao, 2004). The political debate on the usefulness of Chinese ODI, on the 
one hand, and the debate and gradual legitimisation of privately-owned firms on the other 
suggests that the 1985 directive only affected SOEs. Moreover, it was a directive by SAFE, 
NDRC and MOFCOM issued as late as 2003 that arguably legalised ODI by private firms for the 
first time (Yin et al., 2003; Norton Rose, 2005). 
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maximisation (Wu and Chen, 2001). During Phase 2, SAFE and MOFCOM issued refined 
regulations on ODI, on the usage of retained foreign exchange earnings. They also increased 
the transparency of the documentations needed during the ODI approval process (see Table 3.2). 
Following these policy changes, the numbers of Chinese international investment projects grew 
quickly from the 185 seen at the end of Phase 1 to 801 by the end of 1990 and 904 by the end of 
1992 (Table 3.3 and Tan, 1999). 
The growth of Chinese ODI was also supported by another development. Official Chinese 
development strategy shifted from an import-substitution to export-led growth. The overvalued 
Yuan had become a constraint because it artificially increased the price of Chinese products on 
international markets. Around the mid-1980s, the Chinese government began to devalue the 
Yuan to support Chinese exporters and to promote hard currency earnings (Lardy, 1992). To 
further support Chinese exporters and accumulate foreign exchange, the Chinese government 
favoured `in kind' ODI projects. Such projects involved the export of physical equipment, 
know-how, and raw materials, for example, instead of foreign currency earnings. 
Overseas projects considered to be of national strategic importance, however, have traditionally 
enjoyed foreign exchange-related privileges. Qualifying Chinese firms have been able to 
readily purchase foreign exchange and receive loans denominated in foreign currency from 
domestic financial institutions, even during periods of tight foreign exchange control (Cross et 
al., 2007). 
The Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relation and Trade reports the total accumulated 
current value and number of approved ODI projects since 1990 (Table 3.3 and Table 3.5). 
Before the end of Phase 2, Chinese companies largely invested in developed countries. About 
70 per cent of Chinese investment was destined to these countries while only 30 per cent was 
hosted by developing countries (measured in average USD billion ODI stock). Within the 
group of developed countries, the North American countries of Bermuda, Canada and the USA 
received the lion's share, accounting for 41 per cent of total Chinese ODI stock at the end of 
1992. Investments to the USA were mainly attributable to the acquisition of Mesta Engineering 
Corporation by Shougang, the Beijing-based steel company, in 1988. This acquisition was 
actually Shougang's first ODI project (Zhang, 2003). 
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Table 3.2: Key ODI regulations in Phase 2 (1986 to 1991) 
Regulation Issued Comments Enunciator 
Regulations on the drafting August 1991 A core document throughout NDRC 
and approval of project (effective by) the 1990s on the requirements 
proposals and feasibility study for an ODI project approval 
4 
reports of overseas investment 
projects 
Opinion of the State Planning March 1991 A core document throughout NDRC 
Commission on the (effective by) the 1990s 4 
strengthening of the 
administration of overseas 
investment projects 
Rule for the implementation of June 1990 Detailed regulation on what SAFE 
administrative measures for was required to apply for an 
the investment of foreign overseas investment 
exchange overseas 
Administrative measures on April 1990 Primary rules concerning ODI PBC 
overseas financial institutions in the financial sector 6 
Measures for foreign exchange March 1989 First regulation on the use of SAFE 
control relating to overseas foreign exchange; examination 
investment of self-owned foreign 
exchange funds 1,2, 
Regulations governing the July 1988 5% of the ODI sum had to be MOFCOM 
approval of setting up of trade- deposited in a special account. 
related enterprises overseas All foreign profits to be 
remitted to the Chinese state. 
The firm could retain 100% 
foreign exchange quota 1" 2' S 
Sources: ' Zhang (2003), 2 Cai (1999), 3 Huang (2005), 4 Tong and Groffman (2000), s Zhao 
(2006); 6 Yu et al. (2005). 
It is relevant to note, however, that the data presented here may underreport the extent of the 
international activities of Chinese firms at the time because they regularly secured international 
loans to complement the foreign exchange remitted from China (Ye, 1992). In contrast to the 
investment value, the number of investment projects was higher in developing and transitional 
countries than in developed economies (61% vs. 39%) during this phase. This indicates that 
Chinese ODI was of large-scale in North America while investments in Asia/Oceania were 
generally dominated by a large number of small-scale projects. At the end of Phase 2, Chinese 
investments were registered in hundred and one countries (see Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.3: Geographical distribution of Chinese ODI: Accumulated stock for the period 
1979 to 2005 (period average stock in USD billion and % of period average) 
Phase 1 and 2 
1979-92(a) 
Phase 3 
1992-98 
Phase 4 
1999-01 
Phase 5 
2002-05(b) 
World SD bn) 1.21 bn 1.99 bn 3.78 bn 14.50 bn 
Developed economies 70 % 59 % 37 % 23 % 
Europe 3% 3% 2% 5% 
North America 41% 37% 24% 13% 
Asia/Oceania 27 % 20 % 10 % 6% 
Developing economies 27 % 35 % 57 % 71 % 
Latin America 5% 7% 14 % 9% 
Asia/Oceania 18 % 21 % 26 % 54 % 
Africa 4% 7% 16% 8% 
Transition economies 3% 5% 5%1 6% 
Notes: (1) The MOFCOM publication reports Chinese ODI from 1990 onwards only. The 
figures in this column refer to Phases 1 and 2 by inference as they represent 
accumulated figures; (2) The latest available data are for the year 2005. 
Sources: MOFCOM (1991-2002) Almanac. of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
and MOFCOM (2004-2006) China Commerce Yearbook. 
3.3.3 Phase 3: The impact of Deng Xiaoping's journey to the South (1992-1998) 
In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping, de facto leader of China from the late 1970s to' early 1990s 
(Yahuda, 1993; Naughton, 1993), travelled to Southern China in an effort to express his support 
to economic reforms and market opening. This landmark journey strengthened the liberal 
politicians in the CCP and bureaucrats in the government agencies and marked a departure from 
the restrictive and containing policies that characterised the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square 
incident in 1989 21 As a consequence of this newly gained liberalisation momentum, Chinese 
ODI officially became part of China's national economic development plan and was publicly 
endorsed by the then chairman of the CCP and, later, president of China Jiang Zemin (Zhang, 
2003). Encouraged by these measures, local and provincial government authorities increasingly 
engaged in overseas businesses and allowed companies under their supervision to establish 
affiliates abroad. The government officials were also driven by the conviction that the 
21 Steadily rising inflation (to an annual rate of nearly 30%) and political tensions led to a week- 
long set of demonstrations on the Tiananmen Square, Beijing, in 1989. These demonstrations 
were eventually broken up by military force. This was followed by a tightening and partial 
withdrawal of economic reforms which decreased significantly the confidence of foreign 
observers and investors (Naughton, 2007). For a good account of the Tiananmen Square 
incident see Zhang et al. (2001). 
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internationalisation will help Chinese firms to increase their competitiveness and to circumvent 
trade discrimination by host countries (Tan, 1999). This came to a halt, however, when 
MOFCOM became suspicious of defalcation of state-assets through the establishment of 
questionable international ventures (that gave rise to illegal privatisation) and in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Ding, 2000a; see also Section 3.3). This crisis forced MOFCOM 
to tighten the approval procedure and to better screen and monitor each outward investment 
project (Wong and Chan, 2003). This policy was supported by SAFE and its local offices in 
1998 when it stopped approving foreign exchange for ODI projects (Lin and Schramm, 2003, 
2004). The precise effect of the approval ban, however, is not clear. Official MOFCOM data 
published in the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and undisclosed 
SAFE data (SAFE, 2005) record approvals for outward investment projects for the years 1997 
to 2000. This discrepancy may indicate deviating de jure and de facto realities in China. 
At the beginning of Phase 3, the thresholds that defined which government organisation was 
responsible for approving Chinese ODI were adjusted (see Table 3.4). MOFCOM and NDRC 
became responsible for investments of up to USD 30 million while the State Council had to 
approve any ODI project valued above USD 30 million (Zhan, 1995). Likewise, in 1995, the 
investment value threshold for the approval of foreign exchange in an outbound investment 
project was adjusted upwards. Formerly, applications for an investment project under USD 
lmn were dealt with by SAFE's regional offices and only projects above USD lmn by the 
national SAFE. Following a SAFE Circular in 1995, SAFE branches in 14 selected provinces 
and municipality were given the right to approve investments projects of up to USD 3million in 
value. 
Further reform measures implemented were concerned with the Chinese currency and foreign 
exchange earnings. First, from 1994 to 2005 the Yuan was pegged to the US Dollar at a 
nominally fixed rate. Since 2005, the Chinese government has eased this peg and has devalued 
the Yuan against the US Dollar. Second, the foreign exchange retention scheme and swap 
markets were abolished in January 1994. A buyer-seller market was introduced instead (Guo 
and Han, 2004). Prior to 1994, only Chinese companies which had been granted international 
trading rights could earn foreign currencies and use this to fund their ODI projects. Companies 
without trading rights were thus restricted in their international investment activities (Zhang, 
2003; Zhang, 1999). The number of potential Chinese international investors was thus 
`artificially' limited to a small `club' of (successful) international trading firms. With the 
liberalisation of 1994, the Chinese government moved from an `earn-to-use' to a `buy-to-use' 
foreign exchange policy regime. This is arguably a crucial development in the evolution of 
Chinese ODI, since the approval procedure generally began with an investigation of the foreign 
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currency involved. From 1994 onwards, foreign exchange entitlements could be bought from 
SAFE to finance ODI projects regardless of whether or not the applicant had previously 
generated foreign exchange earnings through trade. It is likely that this liberalisation step 
enabled more Chinese companies to finance their international investments by converting 
domestically earned Yuan into foreign currency. 
The largest recipient of Chinese ODI between 1992 and 1998 (in terms of average USD 
investment stock per period) was again North America with a share of 37% of total Chinese 
ODI stock (see Table 3.3). Canada received the largest share with 18.3% of total Chinese ODI 
followed by the USA (17.5%). The third place was held by Australia (16.3%). This pattern is 
manifested in the high ratio of Chinese investment in industrialised countries in general (59%) 
of total stock versus investments in developing countries (41%). This investment pattern is 
probably a reflection of resource-seeking investments in Canada and Australia where the 
majority of the approved investment value was directed towards the extraction of petroleum and 
natural gas and in diversified investment (SAFE, 2005). During this period, Chinese companies 
began to conduct large-scale acquisitions abroad, exemplified by the purchases by CITIC of the 
Australian firms Metro Meat (1994) and Portland Aluminium Smelter (1998) (CIBUL, 2007). 
Table 3.4: Key ODI regulations in Phase 3 (1992 to 1998) 
Regulation Issued Comments Enunciator 
Notice on supplemental Sept. 1995 Chinese investors are allowed SAFE 
provisions to the administration to purchase foreign exchange 
measures on foreign exchange for an ODI project; prior to 
for overseas investment this, a Chinese investor had to 
earn the foreign exchange 2 
Examination and approval Sept. 1993 The source of ODI funding has SAFE 
standards on foreign exchange to be assessed prior other 
risk and fund source approvals. This contradicts 
examinations for outbound NDRC regulations which 
investments prohibits SAFE to issue the 
certification before NDRC 
approval 
2' 3,4 
Regulations of MOFCOM on March 1992 Implementation of a USD MOFCOM 
the administration of the (effective) 30mn investment value ceiling 
approval and examination of for projects to be evaluated by 
non-trading overseas enterprises NDRC and national MOFCOM 
(trial draft) instead of the State Council 1.5 
Sources: ' Zhang (2003), 2 Yu et al. (2005), 3 Yu and Hwang (2005), 4 Cai (1999), 5 Tong and 
Groffman (2000). 
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The investment project pattern of Phase 3 is very similar to Phase 2. Developing and 
transitional countries dominate with a share of 67%. The increase by 6 percentage points on the 
previous period was caused by proportionally more investments in the transitional economies. 
Table 3.5: Geographical distribution of Chinese ODI: Accumulated period average of 
investment projects 1979 to 2004 (total number and % of total) 
Phase 1 and 2 
1979-92(a) 
Phase 3 
1992-98 
Phase 4 
1999-01 
Phase 5 
2002-04(') 
World (total number) 904 1881 2855 7574 
Developed 
economies 
39 % 33 % 28 % 27 % 
Europe 9% 7% 6% 7% 
North America 18% 16% 14% 13% 
Asia/Oceania 11 % 9% 7% 7% 
Developing 
economies 
54 % 53 % 58 % 63 % 
Latin America 7% 7% 7% 5% 
Asia/Oceania 36 % 36 % . 37 % 49 % 
Africa 11% 11% 14% 9% 
Transition 7% 14 % 14 % 11 
Economies 
Average number of 101 137 149 159 
host countries 
Notes: (1) The MOFCOM publication reports data on Chinese ODI from 1990 onwards only. 
The figures in this column therefore refer to the years 1990 and 1991 but infer to the 
complete Phases One and Two as they represent accumulated figures; 
(2) The latest available data are for the year 2004. 
Sources: MOFCOM (1991-2002) Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
and MOFCOM (2004-2006) China Commerce Yearbook. 
3.3.4 Phase 4: Pre-WTO accession adjustments and the `Go Global' policy (1999-2001) 
Phase 4 was characterised by contradictory policies toward ODI. On the one hand, the Chinese 
government tried to consolidate excessive and poorly administered ODI projects by 
strengthening the outward investment approval process and capital controls. On the other, firms 
in the light industry sector (textiles, machinery, and electrical equipment) were encouraged to 
internationalise (Wong and Chan, 2003; Wu and Chen, 2001). In 1999, MOFCOM tried to 
encourage Chinese firms to establish assembly plants overseas to support the export activities of 
Chinese firms. The same objective was followed when MOFCOM selected thirty-three 
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experimental SOEs in the main export sectors to receive priority state assistance to invest 
abroad - of which thirteen firms were in consumer electronics (Wu and Sia, 2002). 
Additionally, and most importantly, the Chinese government instigated in 1999 `Go Global' or 
`zou chu qu' (7 ü) policy which was a strong, public commitment to adopt an institutional 
environment to foster outbound investment. 22 The policy was officially supported by the 
former Chinese President Jiang Zemin and the former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji (Zhu, 2001) 
and became formal policy with the incorporation in the 10`h Five Year Plan (FYP) in 2001 
(Child and Rodrigues, 2005). The `Go Global' policy was issued to encourage and support 
(financially and administratively) Chinese firms to internationalise with the aim to strengthen 
their competitive advantage and, recursively, the economic restructuring and development of 
China. This policy was also a reflection of the Chinese perception that China had by now 
become sufficiently developed to take its appropriate place in the global economy, as 
symbolised by the international strength and scope of its MNEs (Zhao, 2007). A key initiative 
of the 10`h FYP was to push SOEs to `Go Global'. Five hundred-and-twelve companies have 
been identified to be of key importance to China's international business aspirations and have 
received preferential attention (Wu and Sia, 2002). 
During Phase 4 the spatial distribution of Chinese ODI started to change considerably compared 
to the previous period in terms of investment value (Table 3.3). The developing countries 
received on average a 22 percentage point larger FDI stock from China per year than in the 
previous period. This growth took place mainly in Africa (+ 9 percentage points), Latin 
America and the Caribbean (+ 7pp), and South, East and Southeast Asia (+ 5pp). Accordingly, 
Chinese ODI in the developed countries declined relatively. Most significant were the drops in 
share of Chinese ODI located in North America (- 13pp) and Asia/Oceania (-10pp). 
Considering that these figures reflect the stock of China's outward foreign direct investment, the 
actual flows to developing countries were clearly significantly higher than to developed 
countries over this period. 
The distribution of investment projects by number at this time supports this shift. The 
investment numbers in developing and transitional countries rose by 5 percentage points and 
accounted for a share of 72% of total number of Chinese ODI projects. The number of projects 
22 The starting year of the `Go Global' policy is ambiguous. Cai (2006) states that Premier Jiang 
Zemin announced the policy in 1998 while Child and Rodrigues (2005) refer to the year as being 
1999. Sauvant (2005) and Zhang (2005) take the year 2000 as the starting point. A fourth group 
of researchers refers to the year 2001 in connection with the FYP (e. g. CAITEC and WDA, 
2005). The most recent date is proposed by Kaartemo (2007) who refers to 2003. The 
discrepancies probably derive from (i) access to original sources in Chinese and (ii) reference to 
either the first mentioning or the public implementation of the policy. 
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in Africa rose along with the investment value. By the end of 2001, Chinese companies had 
invested in 149 countries. 
3.3.5 Phase 5: Accession to WTO and `Go Global' implementation (2002 onwards) 
Since China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 the business 
environment for Chinese enterprises has changed dramatically. WTO accession necessitates the 
gradual opening of once locally protected domestic markets to comply with its accession 
protocols and the WTO's `most favoured nation' rule. Domestic enterprises thus face 
increasing competition from Chinese and foreign invested enterprises as well as from foreign 
importers. Growing domestic competition is likely to force many Chinese companies, 
especially private-owned enterprises which lack political support, to find new markets both in 
China and abroad, and this is likely to provide fresh stimulus to Chinese ODI flows (von Keller 
and Zhou, 2003; Taylor, 2002). 
Against this backdrop, the Chinese government has undertaken several initiatives to facilitate 
Chinese ODI (see Table 3.6). First, the investment approval process has been decentralised to 
sub-national government authorities while investment in seven selected countries only require 
approval at a national level (revealingly, the relevant countries are not mentioned in any 
reference referring to this policy however). Second, the government has simplified and 
abolished the feasibility study as part of the application documentation but now stresses market 
forces and the managerial capabilities of the investing enterprise instead. Third, control on 
international capital movement will be eased which should promote Chinese outward FDI (FT, 
2004). Finally, enterprises are no longer required to deposit security at SAFE and are allowed 
to raise money on international finance markets to help fund ODI activity (Wong and Chan, 
2003). 
A further liberalisation step involved the foreign exchange approval process which changed 
significantly in 2002. First, some twenty-six approval requirements were repealed by SAFE in 
2002 and 2003. This was followed by abolition of a foreign exchange risk assessment and the 
foreign exchange deposit and exchange rate risk analysis (Zhang, 2006; Yin et al., 2003; EN 
ViewsWire, 2004). Third, SAFE also allowed Chinese firms to use foreign exchange of up to 
fifteen per cent of the total investment sum to cover set-up cost prior to its final decision 
(Deschandol and Luckock, 2005). Fourth, throughout previous years, SAFE capped the amount 
of foreign exchange available to domestic enterprises for outbound investment. This artificial 
limit was abolished in 2006 (Stender et al., 2006). Fifth, further liberalisation concerns whether 
or not the national or sub-national SAFE office is responsible for approving foreign exchange. 
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Following China's typical proven trial-and-error economic reform, six coastal provinces were 
selected in October 2002 to trial the decentralisation of foreign exchange purchase for ODI by 
domestic firms. After the successful trial period and successive geographical extension, this 
policy came in force nationwide in 2005 (Zhao, 2006). This gives local SAFE branches more 
leeway and should shorten the approval process considerably. 
A similar measure was undertaken by MOFCOM. The national MOFCOM office is now only 
involved in approving investments by companies under the supervision of the central 
government (for example, under supervision of SASAC)23 and investments by any company in 
seven selected target countries (including Iraq, Japan, and the USA). Investments in other 
regions still need to be evaluated by provincial MOFCOM offices (MOFCOM, 2004a; FT, 
2004). Resource-seeking FDI exceeding an investment value of USD 30 million and non- 
resource seeking FDI exceeding USD 10 million have to receive approval from the NDRC 
(Norton Rose, 2005; Deschandol and Luckock, 2005). Resource-seeking investments above 
USD 200 million and non-resource seeking investment above USD 50 million have to be 
approved by the State Council (Yu et al., 2005). Regardless of the size of investment, the State 
Council and the NDRC are also responsible for any investment in Taiwan and countries that 
have no official diplomatic relationship with China (Yu et al., 2005). The number of 
government authorities involved in the approval process has been increased. The key 
authorities remain SAFE, MOFCOM, NDRC and, to a lesser degree, the State Council and the 
Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs. Newly involved are the specialised supervisory 
bodies of financial institutions such as the Chinese Insurance Regulatory Commission which 
approves ODI by Chinese insurance companies (Wang, 2002; Tong and Groffman, 2000; Wong 
and Chan, 2003; Norton Rose, 2005). It has been indicated that the formal approval process is 
likely to evolve further over time into a pure registration and monitoring process, easing 
overseas investment further. The liberalisation from a system of micro-control to macro-control 
mechanisms have de jure significantly eased the internationalisation of Chinese firms via ODI. 
In a recent statement on existing regulations concerning the ODI approval process, MOFCOM 
(2005) stated that Chinese firms are guided via the approval process to invest in a feasible 
project in an economically and politically stable host country that has concluded a bilateral 
treaty with China on investment and taxation. The investment should also carry benefits for the 
firm and for China's economy by: (i) promoting China's exports of goods and services, (ii) 
23 In contrast, Yu and Hwang (2005) state that companies under the central government can decide 
independently whether to invest or not. These firms only have to make a post-investment filling 
with the NDRC. 
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enhancing the firms' technological capacity and R&D activities, (iii) enabling the firm to create 
and establish an international brand. 
Despite these liberalisation and decentralisation measures and political assurances, criticisms of 
the current regime persist. China continues to maintain tight control on the capital account of 
ODI (Lin and Schramm, 2003). The investing company has to have foreign trading rights to be 
able to generate foreign exchange. Although trading rights are now awarded more widely to 
private and state-owned firms since the late 1990s (Saich, 2004), applications for trade licenses 
can be rejected or, once awarded, they can be withdrawn. This impedes the earning of hard 
currency and the development of overseas businesses. Moreover, the division of approval 
responsibilities between the NDRC and MOFCOM is often unclear for potential Chinese 
investors and local government agencies (CAITEC and WDA, 2005). This might be more 
relevant for large-scale natural resource investments by state-owned enterprises. Long (2002) 
characterises the approval process as being very time-consuming, resource intensive and not 
designed to encourage firms to invest overseas. By contrast, discretionary local politics often 
contradict national law and investment procedure. Local institutions occasionally allow ODI 
without any formal procedure in favour of a well-connected nomenklatura (Ding, 2000a). 
Arguably, a large part of Chinese ODI has not been formally approved (and registered) by the 
Chinese government but rather has been channelled out of the country using, for example, 
private channels and transfer pricing methods (Deng, 2004). This applies to ODI by both SOE 
and privately-owned firms and may be a reaction to a restrictive approval regime. The Chinese 
government established current account convertibility in 1996. Although the government has 
slowly adjusted policies and frameworks for capital account convertibility, this was not 
achieved until 2007 (Roberts and Tyers, 2003). The achievements with regards to the capital 
account concentrate on inward FDI and export facilitation, 24 whereas similar action to support 
Chinese ODI remain underdeveloped to an extent that it is perceived as a very restrictive system 
(Lin and Schramm, 2004; Guo and Han, 2004). This stand in stark contrast to the 
acknowledgement by the Chinese government that a freer regime towards outward investment 
will help domestic enterprises to diversify business risks more effectively and is an essential 
element of the `Go Global' policy (Groombridge, 2001; Guo and Han, 2004)25 
24 Zhang (2006) notes that the Chinese definition of currency convertibility may deviate from the 
Western one. In particular, he asserts that China is likely to define it as full convertibility on the 
current account and liberalisation of long-term transactions only on the capital account. 
25 In contrast, it is argued by some observers that a restrictive stance towards ODI is beneficial to 
the Chinese economy as it eases pressure of capital flight and thus on wider economic 
implications with respect to inflation, non-performing loans and unemployment (Schwartz, 
2005). Both perspectives seem to be outdated, as Zhang (2006) reports extensive reforms 
between 2001 and 2004. 
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Moreover, the Chinese government involvement does not remain on a macro-level. The 
provision of an `acquisition fund' and cheap loans also shape the investment decision of 
Chinese MNEs and constitutes an invaluable source of competitive advantage (Antkiewicz and 
Whalley, 2006; Child and Rodrigues, 2005) 26 Micro-control is evident in the annual appraisals 
by MOFCOM and SAFE to assess the performance of overseas affiliates (MOFCOM, 2004a; 
People's Daily, 2002). Based on the outcome of the evaluation, future approvals of outbound 
investment and expatriation of staff is granted or not. Such types of `parental' involvement by 
the Chinese authorities in the decision-making of state-run and non-state-run enterprises is said 
to be common practice (Ring et al., 2005; Child and Tse, 2001). The macro-control of Chinese 
ODI is likely to be facilitated by the so-called `Outbound Catalogue' issued by MOFCOM and 
NDRC in 2004 for the first time. This catalogue lists the governments' preferred host countries 
and industries and tries to attract Chinese firms to them by offering preferential access to 
finance and tax concessions and other incentives (Deschandol and Luckock, 2005). It is 
possible that the role of the catalogue will be extended to the foreign investment catalogue 
which regulates inward investment to China. Finally, there seems to be some evidence that the 
Chinese government's approach towards outbound investment is shaped greatly by the level of 
surplus on the capital account (Zhao, 2006). The reform and liberalisation measures could be 
reversed if the growth of China's foreign exchange reserve slows down and falls below a 
politically unacceptable threshold. 
The observed changing pattern of outward FDI for the period 1999 to 2001 has continued in 
Phase 5 (see Table 3.3). The proportion of ODI stock of Chinese investments to developing 
countries rose to 77% and for industrialised countries it continued to decline to 23% compared 
to Phase 4. However, this time most developing countries experienced a relative decrease as 
well. The share of Asia/Oceania more than doubled to 54% while Africa (-8 percentage points) 
and Latin America (-5pp) saw their relative share decline. Similarly, project numbers in 
Asia/Oceania increased by l2pp but declined in Africa and Latin America by 5 and 2 
percentage points respectively. The number of Chinese investment projects in developed 
countries has remained stable. 
The increase in Chinese ODI to the developing countries can be partially explained from a 
foreign policy perspective. China has long seen itself as the advocate and supporter of 
developing countries and as a strong regional player building upon its legacy (Wang, 2006a; 
Broadman, 2007; Cornelissen and Taylor, 2000; Bailey, 1975; Chai, 1979). After a period of 
26 Xiao and Sun (2005), for example, report that CNOOC received for its failed take-over bid to 
Unocal a preferential USD Ibn loan from the Chinese government. USD 2.5bn of the loan was 
interest-free and the remainder enjoyed with 3.5% interest over thirty years. 
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inward orientation, China is progressively building upon this perception. It uses its foreign 
policy and punctuated official development aid to support its objectives in international 
relations and international business. As a consequence, China's foreign policy and foreign aid 
are successively brought in line with the overseas investment ambitions of Chinese companies 
and political goals of the national government. The regions where this is most pronounced are 
Africa and ASEAN. This strategy is manifested in mainly three facets: (i) state visits, (ii) 
official development aid, and (iii) specialised regional committees and organisations: 
State visits 
The most visible features of China's alignment of the `Go Global' and foreign policy are the 
numerous high-profile state visits of China's leaders to developing countries which are often 
intended to smoothen the way for Chinese companies into the host country (Liu, 2001). Among 
the most prolific state visits have been the tours by President Hu Jintao through Latin America 
(2004) and Africa (February 2004, April 2006, and January 2007), Premier Wen Jiabao's visit 
to Africa in June 2006 and Foreign Minister's Li Zhaoxing Africa tour in January 2006. Both 
regions have not received such an intensive political recognition by any other major 
industrialised economy or developing country. During each state visit, China has signed a 
number of wide-ranging economic co-operations agreements, foreign aid schemes and Chinese 
investment, such as an agreement on exploration rights for CNOOC in Kenya. 
Official development aid 
China's official development aid is generally allocated to transportation and telecommunication 
infrastructure projects, but it also includes the construction of new sports facilities, parliaments 
and other real estate (Pheng and Hongbin, 2003). The interesting aspect of China's aid scheme 
is that it often supports the receiving country by offering it significant loans at often lower-than- 
market rates. Loans of this type are often conditional on the receiving country awarding a 
Chinese company with investment opportunities has been evident in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Laos 
and Sierra Leone for example (Zhan, 1995; Frost, 2005; FT, 2005b; FT, 2006a; FT, 2006b). 
China's official development aid strategy therefore not only helps her to increase its political 
stance on and influence in the host country. It also supplies Chinese companies with 
international contracts which helps them establishing an overseas market and setting up 
affiliates in a government-backed, hence low-risk manner. 
Specialised regional committees and organisations 
To further support its international stance, China supports the South-South Cooperation 
initiative by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) by participating in the 
Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) and Economic Cooperation 
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among Developing Countries (ECDC) programmes. One of China's explicit objectives in its 
cooperation strategy is to foster the `Go Global' agenda and, in particular, to support and 
encourage privately-owned Chinese enterprises to invest in Africa (Zhao, 2007). As a mean to 
increase private Chinese ODI, China has established the China African Business Chamber for 
private businesses only and seeks to conclude double taxation treaties and bilateral investments 
treaties with the African Nations (TCDC Update, 2005,2006). These points were further 
articulated in "China's African Policy" paper issued in January 2006 (TCDC Update, 2006). 
Further, China has set up the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation which has been held thrice 
since 2000. The Forum is a high-profile gathering of African and Chinese head of states and 
ministers designed to strengthen the partnership and to discuss political and economical issues 
of mutual benefit. It also helps to promote and conclude economic cooperation and assistance 
with Africa. A similar forum does not exist between China and any other region. 
Table 3.6: Key ODI regulations in Phase 5 (2001 onwards) 
Regulation Issued Comments Enunciator 
Notice on the statistical system Jan. 2007 Amendment of the 2004 version MOFCOM, 
of direct overseas investment to incorporate quarterly NBS 
information on the signing of 
overseas investment projects and 
round-tripping investments via tax 
havens and to better track and 
account for investments by private 
enterprise 
Circular on revision of certain June 2006 Lifts SAFE restrictions on the SAFE 
foreign control policies amount of foreign exchange 
relating to overseas available annually to domestic 
investments investors' outbound investments. 
(alternate translation: Notice Domestic investors are now able 
on the adjustment of certain to undertake offshore investments 
foreign exchange control using self-owned foreign 
policies for overseas exchange, foreign exchange 
investment) purchased with Yuan and/or 
domestic loans 1.4 
Detailed rules for the Oct. 2005 Specifies and clarifies the 2004 MOFCOM 
examination and approval of regulation on requirements, risk 
investments to open and avoidance, and project 
operate enterprises abroad feasibili 10 
Circular on the issues on Sept. Annual finance plan with NDRC, 
offering more financing 2005 preferential treatment of China Exim 
support to key overseas investment projects in (i) natural Bank 
investment projects resource exploitation, (ii) export 
enhancing infrastructure, (iii) 
R&D, and (iv) M&A 10 
Circular on expanding the trial May 2005 Reform of the exchange approval SAFE 
regions for the pilot program regime is extended to the whole 
concerning overseas country: Further decentralisation, 
investment i. e. local SAFE offices decide 
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(alternate translation: Circular about a higher threshold; total 
on Issues Relating to foreign exchange available for all 
Enlarging Pilot Reform of investor has been increased to 
Foreign Exchange USD 5bn per annum; Remit out of 
Administration Concerning China prior to obtaining approval 
Overseas investment) as required, e. g. preparation and 
start-up period 
6 
Notice concerning the policy Oct. 2004 A loan will be provided if the FDI NDRC, 
on providing credit and loan projects fulfils at least one of the China Exim 
support for overseas projects following requirements: Bank 
encouraged by the State - Natural resource-seeking in 
which China is short; 
- Promote Chinese export; 
- R&D in advanced international 
technology; 
- M&A to increase international 
competitiveness and market 
exploration of the Chinese finm2 
The interim measures for the Oct. 2004 All kinds of companies are NDRC 
administration of examination (effective) allowed to invest abroad; sets out 
and approval of the overseas the threshold values for 
investment projects examination at national level and 
clarifies the approval process 17 
Provisions on the Examination Oct. 2004 National approval for seven MOFCOM 
and Approval of Investment to (effective) countries/regions required, 
Run Enterprises Abroad remaining countries are approved 
at sub-national level; No 
feasibility study is required 
anymore 
16 
Decision on Reforming July 2004 Major reform of the ODI approval State 
Investment System and departure of former practice Council 
which initiated subsequent 
reforms 6 
Countries and Industries for July 2004 Companies complying with MOFCOM, 
Overseas Investment Guidance requirements and having received Ministry of 
Catalogue the investment approval have Foreign 
(alternate translation: preferential treatment concerning Affairs 
Investment in Foreign funding, tax collection, foreign 
Countries Industry Sector exchange, customs and others; 
Guidance Catalogue) Lists more than seven supported 
industry sectors and 67 approved 
countries 
8,18 
Tentative administrative rules April Rules concerning international NDRC 
on approval of offshore 2004 M&As: No international M&A 
investments projects agreement can be signed by a 
Chinese investor without the 
approval by NDRC 13 
Issues relevant to further Oct. 2003 Simplification of approval SAFE 
intensifying the reform of procedures; establishment of pilot 
foreign exchange areas for eased and extended local 
administration on external approval 5,8,10 
investment circular 
Circular of the issues related May 2003 No further information provided" NDRC 
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to granting financing support 
to key overseas projects 
encouraged by the state 
Notice on certain issues March SAFE is only investigating SAFE 
relating to simplify foreign 2003 domestic foreign exchange 
exchange fund source sources. Foreign exchange 
examination for overseas obtained from a source outside of 
investment mainland China no longer 
examined Z 
Statistic system of overseas Dec. 2002 Agreement to jointly publish MOFCOM 
investments annually a bulletin on Chinese and NBS 
ODI development 15 
Comprehensive external Oct. 2002 Clarification of standards and MOFCOM 
investment results evaluation procedures for evaluating ODI 
procedures applications 5 
Joint annual inspection of Oct. 2002 Post-investment regulation ' SAFE 
overseas investment tentative MOFCOM 
procedure 
Sources: 1 Stender et al. (2006), 2 Yu et al. (2005), 3 Zhang (2003), 4 Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer (2006), 5 Yin et al. (2003), 6 Yu and Hwang (2005), ' Tong and Groffman, 
2000; 8 Norton Rose (2005); 9 Zhao (2006); 10 UNCTAD (2007b); " MOFCOM 
(2007); 12 Huang (2005); 13 Xiao and Sun (2005); 14 Cai (1999); 15 MOFCOM and 
NBS (2002); 16 MOFCOM (2004a); 17 NDRC (2004); 1 China Law and Practise 
(2005). 
3.3.6 Industry sector distribution 
An analysis of Chinese ODI would be incomplete without an overview of industry sector 
distribution. Chinese ODI by industry sector may reflect areas of government support and 
competitiveness of Chinese firms. In this section, a different dataset is used to the previous 
section. While the previous section mainly relies on MOFCOM data, this section is informed 
by data collected by SAFE. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 depict the aggregated industrial distribution of SAFE-approved Chinese 
ODI by (i) investment project and region and by (ii) investment value and region for the period 
1979 to 2001 (SAFE, 2005). The regions are as follows: North America (USA and Canada 
only), Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Oceania. With regard to the number of 
investment projects, some interesting observations can be reported. First, the ratio of primary, 
manufacturing and service projects are similar for North America, Europe and Asia with 4 to 
8% of projects in the primary sector, 43% to 49% in manufacturing and 43 to 53% in services. 
Although the ratios are similar, it has to be borne in mind that absolute figures differ across 
these three regions. Asia registers the majority of approved Chinese investments (1583 projects) 
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whereas North America (612) and Europe (358) score fewer. Considering the different 
economic development stages and thus different factor prices in North America and Europe on 
the one hand and in Asia on the other, a stronger concentration of manufacturing investments in 
Asia is assumed. Thus, the high number projects in the manufacturing sector for Latin America 
and Africa is not surprising. 
The service sector receives relatively small numbers of investment projects. Only in Africa and 
Oceania does it reach a share of more than 20%. Chinese ODI in this sector has been (and this 
argument will be developed later) devoted to support the trade functions of Chinese firms and, 
to some extent, secure hard currency from abroad and keep it within the organisation. 
Chinese investments in the primary sector predominantly occur in Latin America, Africa and 
Oceania. This reflects probably the investments in fishery, timber and other agricultural 
products in these countries as reported by Frost (2005), Wu and Sia (2002), Cal (1999) and 
others. 
Source: Author's calculation based on SAFE (2005). 
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Figure 3.1: China's approved outbound investment projects by industry sector and host 
region, 1979-2001 (% of total project numbers in the region) 
The above observations no longer apply when the approved investment values are examined. 
Investment in the service sector is the most important contributor to Chinese ODI in Asia (72% 
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of total investment value) and Europe (60°/, ) but it plays only a marginal role in Latin America 
and Africa. These figures compare well to the above 60% share reported by Zhan (1995), based 
on MOFCOM data, and the share of around 60% stated elsewhere (e. g. Wong and Chan, 2003; 
Taylor, 2002). Service-related investments in Europe, North America (26%) and Asia may be 
at least partially trade supporting investments. Such investments are typically of small scale and 
this would explain some of the difference observed between investment value and project 
numbers. 
The strong position of investments in the manufacturing sector in North America becomes more 
pronounced when investment values are examined. More than 60% of Chinese ODI occurs in 
this sector in this region; a share no other region achieves. Investments in Europe and Latin 
America comprise about a third of the total in the manufacturing sector while in Africa 
manufacturing FDl is much less pronounced with 9% of the total (SAFE, 2005). The overall 
share of the manufacturing sector updates Zhan's (1995) observations who asserts that it 
accounts for a relatively small share of total Chinese ODI. 
Source: Author's calculation based on SAFE (2005). 
Figure 3.2: China's approved ODI value by industry sector and host region, 1979-2001 
(% of total to the region) 
Zhan (1995) suggests that about 25% of total Chinese ODI occurs in the primary sector. This is 
partially reflected in the data by SAFE (2005) as well. Investments into Latin America, Oceania 
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and, especially, Africa have been dominated by large-scale investments in primary resources. 
North America, Europe and Asia are for the period under investigation not host to major 
Chinese investments in this sector (1979 to 2001). 
3.4 Explaining Chinese outward direct investment -A literature review 
The analyses in the literature of the evolution of Chinese outward FDI has focused, to date, on 
SOEs using established international business theories. The eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1999) 
and the international investment strategies of FDI (market-, resource-, and efficiency-seeking) 
(Dunning, 1993) are the most frequently applied. The sequential and ad-hoc internationalisation 
have also been touched upon in research papers on the subject, as has the importance of 
international networks to Chinese firms. The literature is now reviewed with the aim of 
identifying key determinants and to highlight shortcomings in extant work. This section 
commences with a discussion of the research results of the theoretical approaches applied and 
identifies explanatory gaps. Based on these, the research questions for this study are developed. 
3.4.1 The eclectic paradigm applied to Chinese MNEs 
To date, ownership advantages of state-owned Chinese MNEs are argued to be limited at best 
(Nolan, 2002; Cai, 1999). Such companies are regarded as lacking the R&D capacities of 
industrialised country MNEs and do not have the international sales and profit structure needed 
to compete internationally. It is therefore questioned what kind of assets such firms would 
internalise when investing abroad. In a mid-1990 survey, the managers of Chinese MNE 
acknowledged this lack of firm-specific advantages (Duan [1995] in Ding, 2000a). However, as 
the Chinese economy develops and introduces further technological upgrading and the Chinese 
MNEs obtain more international experience, Chinese enterprises are likely to gain intangible 
ownership advantages (Deng, 2004). Another way of increasing the technological capacity is 
through spillover effects from industrialised country MNEs which have invested in China 
(Buckley et al., 2002). On the other hand, Cai (2006) does not regard lack of intangible and 
tangible assets as a major disadvantage. Rather, he argues that the main problem Chinese 
companies face internationally is the lack of sound financial resources. Obviously, considering 
this crucial inconsistency with neoclassical theory, this observation suggests that supplementary 
explanations might have to be found to explain the internationalisation of Chinese firms. One 
could argue that state-ownership of most Chinese MNEs of itself constitutes a firm-specific 
advantage that industrialised countries MNEs do not possess (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Ding, 
2000a). The political, financial and material support provided by the Chinese government could 
yield a significant advantage over those MNEs that have to achieve profitability to raise the 
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shareholder value and report business plans to their shareholders. At least some state-run 
Chinese MNEs have set up foreign affiliates to support either domestic development goals or 
China's international diplomacy goals. The importance of operation costs seems to be minor in 
these cases. In contrast, financial support by the government has been argued to be limited or 
absent by a number of Chinese senior managers such as Ms Ma, Senior Vice President and 
Chief Financial Officer of Lenovo, the computer company (Balfour, 2005). Although Lenovo is 
50 per cent owned by Chinese authorities, Ms Ma stresses that Lenovo's internationalisation 
strategies and operations are based solely on commercial considerations. Child and Rodrigues 
(2005) contradict this statement, however, and make the case that Lenovo has expanded through 
privileged access to financial, scientific and other human capital support prior to its first 
international investment and has received government backing when pursuing international 
acquisitions. This simple overview points to the fact that there is little consensus regarding 
what drives Chinese ODI, even for the same case-study firms. The determinants are not 
satisfactorily delineated or proven. Hence, the first research question of this study is: 
RQI - What are the determinants of Chinese ODI? 
3.4.2 International investment strategies of Chinese MINES 
Market-seeking FDI 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, market-seeking motivation is argued to be related mainly to 
providing a support function for Chinese domestic enterprises. In this view, outward FDI is 
seen as being designed to help Chinese firms to familiarise with international market behaviour 
and requirements, to collect market information for subsequent investments and to facilitate 
exports of Chinese domestic firms to increase their hard currency earnings. This view is 
acknowledged in the work of Buckley et al. (2006), Wu and Sia (2002), Zhang (2003), and Wu 
and Chen (2001), among others. Examples of FDI driven by these motivations include the 
investments by a Chinese pharmaceutical company in Thailand with the ultimate objective of 
supplying the region of Thailand-Myanmar-Cambodia and the investment of another Chinese 
firm in the African fish industry to subsequently export fishing vessels from China to Africa 
(Tan, 1999). Export-supporting FDI has been of interest to the Chinese government for many 
years as well (see Section 3.3) as a way to generate income in foreign currency and to increase 
China's foreign exchange reserves (Wall, 1999). Two types of FDI that Chinese firms use to 
circumvent trade barriers have been observed: they either invest behind the trade barrier or they 
establish an export-platform in a third country which faces less or no trade restrictions for the 
specific products produced (Wall, 1999). During the 1990s, the prime objective of market- 
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seeking FDI is said to have changed. Buckley et al. (2006) propose that the main purpose is 
gradually switching to more defensive and offensive measures to either defend existing markets 
or develop new one, respectively. To illustrate, Tan (1999) states that the investments by China 
Southern Glass in the USA and Australia were designed to increase its control over distribution 
in important export markets. Moreover, Chinese companies have invested internationally in 
order to access and develop new markets as domestic markets have become increasingly more 
competitive and saturated, especially after 2001 and China's WTO accession. The international 
diversification of business interests by Chinese firms is supported by the Chinese government to 
spur their growth and competitiveness (Wall, 1999). One reason is the on-going economic 
integration of China into the world economy and heightened domestic competition following 
China's WTO accession in 2001 (UNCTAD, 2006; Sauvant, 2005; Beebe, 2006). Moreover, 
the domestic growth of Chinese firms has often been constrained by inadequate distribution and 
logistics networks, market saturation and regional market protection across a range of industry 
sectors (Zeng and Williamson, 2003). Market-seeking investment behaviour has also seen 
Chinese firms re-orientate their FDI strategy towards developing countries in Asia and Africa. 
The Chinese investments in these countries are argued to be small-scale and labour-intensive 
projects producing low-value added products for the local market (Deng, 2004). This 
investment behaviour mirrors the international strategies identified for other developing country 
MNEs (e. g. Lecraw, 1993; Wells, 1983). 
RQ2 - To what extent is Chinese ODI driven by market-seeking motivations? 
Resource-seeking FDI 
Natural resources-seeking FDI are argued to be mainly stimulated by the Chinese government to 
ensure sustainable supply of natural resources where China has domestic shortfalls, in order to 
satisfy the high domestic demand and to maintain high economic growth rates (Buckley et al., 
2007a; Buckley et al., 2006). The internalisation of key raw material inputs such as minerals, 
petroleum, timber, fishery and agricultural products (Wu and Sia, 2002; Cai, 1999; Wall, 1999) 
is driven with a view to obtaining stable and relatively cheap access to these products compared 
to oscillating prices on world markets (Tan, 1999). These investments are undertaken to fulfil 
certain political imperatives which may cushion any commercial risk for the investing company 
(see Section 3.3). 
Resource-seeking FDI has been historically directed towards developed countries such as the 
USA, Canada and Australia (Buckley et al., 2006; Wu and Sia, 2002; Zhan, 1995; Guo, 1984). 
This is exemplified by the acquisition of stakes in Australian mineral and food companies by 
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China Metallurgical Import and Export Corporation and by CITIC, both in the 1990s, and by the 
acquisition of Canada-based PetroKaz by CNPC in 2005, amongst others (Wu and Sia, 2002; 
Wall Street Journal, 2005). Not all acquisition attempts have been welcomed and concluded 
successfully, however. CNOOC failed in 2005 to acquire Unocal, the California-based oil 
company, mainly because of political concerns in the USA about issues of national security and 
domestic energy supply (Marchick et al., 2005; Graham and Marchick, 2006). China 
Minmetals aborted the purchase of Noranda (Canada) after exclusive negotiations over some 
two years (FT, 2005b). More recently, a qualitative shift observed which is accompanied by 
investments in developing countries. Chinese companies are increasingly leveraging national 
foreign policy and official development aid agreements with developing countries and are 
adjusting their location strategies accordingly (Ma and Andrew-Speed, 2006; Deutsche Bank 
Research, 2006). Hence, since the late 1990s resource-seeking investments have occurred more 
frequently in developing countries, for example, in Sudan, Angola, Kyrgyzstan (all in oil), and 
South America (in minerals especially). 
RQ3 - To what extent is Chinese ODI driven by resource-seeking motivations? 
Technology-seeking 
International technology-seeking FDI by Chinese MNEs is argued to be special in a number 
respects (von Zedtwitz, 2005). Such investment occurs predominantly in advanced 
industrialised countries, such as Europe and the USA with the objective of obtaining 
technologies either through the acquisition of a company (or its sub-units) or the establishment 
of a affiliate in a cluster region (Warner et al., 2004; Wall, 1997). Although this is reasonable, 
extant research underplays the significance of developing country firms investing offensively in 
advanced countries to close the technology-gap with industrial leaders (von Zedtwitz, 2005). 
The most common entry mode used by Chinese MNEs in this respect is the acquisition of a host 
country company to quickly secure access to advanced technology, management practice and 
other assets (Warner et al., 2004; Deng, 2004). To illustrate, Haier used both approaches to 
gain access to new, advanced technology by establishing a de novo refrigerator factory in the 
USA in 1999 and by purchasing a refrigerator factory from a leading European manufacturer in 
Italy in 2001 (Wu and Sia, 2002; von Keller and Wei, 2003). Chinese companies which access 
foreign technology through acquisition tend to transfer technology and other tangible assets 
back to China to strengthen their production facilities; foreign markets are subsequently 
serviced through exports with products made to higher specifications (Wall, 1999). One of the 
most prominent examples of this is the acquisition of MG Rover by Nanjing Automobile 
Corporation (NAC). Although NAC has retained some production facilities in the UK, major 
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parts of the production line have now been transferred to Nanjing where production commenced 
in 2007 and will serve as a blueprint for a subsequent third production line which the company 
plans to open in the USA in 2008 (FT, 2006c, 2007b). 
With the increase of international technology sourcing, Chinese companies are also adapting 
their research and development (R&D) facilities and structures to better internalise 
internationally-acquired know-how (von Zedtwitz, 2005). For example, Huawei, the privately- 
owned telecommunication equipment company, set up five international R&D units by 2003 
which were established together with manufacturing and marketing units in order to rapidly 
catch up with international leading telecommunication equipment companies (Chen and Jiang, 
2003). The approach by Huawei runs counter to common experience observed among 
industrialised country NINEs which tend to internationalise their R&D units after having 
successfully established their customer-oriented units in the host markets (Chen and Jiang, 2003; 
Cantwell, 1995). 
RQ4 - To what extent is Chinese ODI driven by the objective of accessing advanced 
technology? 
Strategic asset-seeking FDI 
Strategic asset-seeking motives are often a driving force behind Chinese investments in the 
USA and Europe, although it is not necessarily confined to these regions. The acquisition of 
(often) insolvent or underperforming European and US firms is done to acquire established 
brands, advanced technologies and management know-how, and to access distribution channels 
and foreign customers. Such behaviour is playing an ever increasing role in investment 
behaviour of Chinese firms and is done for asset augmenting reasons (Buckley et al., 2006; 
Child and Rodrigues, 2005). In recent years, the strategic focus of Chinese consumer product 
manufacturers is argued to rest on the acquisition of brands that are more visible in international 
markets (Deng, 2004). Amongst the most high-profile examples are the acquisition of IBM's 
PC business (USA) by Lenovo, the purchase of MG Rover (UK) by Nanjing Automobile 
Corporation in 2005, and the purchases of Thomson's cathode ray tube television and DVD 
businesses (France) and Schneider Technology (Germany) by TCL in 2002 and 2003 
respectively. While all examples have a technology component, the Chinese company also 
often buys into a regionally or even internationally well-established brand: in these cases Think 
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(IBM)27, Rover, Schneider, and the Thomson brands RCA and Thomson. Actually, Germany 
arguably is a particularly attractive target country for this type of Chinese investment because a 
lot of small- and medium-sized companies are in difficulty but are well known (in China) for 
their technology, quality and well established brands (Reinert and Altrichter, 2004). Brand 
acquisition by Chinese MNEs is not universal, however. For example, Haier relied on its own 
brand when it started to invest first in Asia and then in the USA. The brand and the 
technological capabilities were, however, underdeveloped at the time of market entry and this 
suggests that Haier sought to build brand-related capacities and competencies while developing 
a new market (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). 
RQ5 - To what extent is Chinese ODI driven by the objective of accessing strategic assets? 
E iciency-seeking FDI 
Efficiency-seeking FDI is said to be of minor importance to MNEs from developing countries in 
general (Lall, 1982; Lecraw, 1977) and Chinese firms too (e. g. Buckley et al., 2006; Deng, 2003, 
2004; Zhan, 1995). There are two explanations for the lack of importance of this FDI motive. 
First, Chinese MNEs generally do not coordinate and re-organise international supply chains to 
benefit from different factor input costs because many are young and have not yet established 
geographically disperse operations that would benefit from reorganisation and rationalisation. 
Second, China possesses abundant low-cost labour and cheap land itself so many Chinese 
MNEs may prefer to relocate their labour-intensive production within China than shifting it 
abroad (Zhan, 1995). Nevertheless, Wu and Sia (2002) claim to have identified some emergent 
trends in this area. In particular, they state that Chinese companies seek to benefit from lower 
transportation costs and to avoid trade restrictions and barriers by establishing production 
facilities in developing countries. As they do so, these companies also outsource low- 
technology intensive production and establish regional production networks (as supply chains) 
in which the Chinese parent company is the kernel. It can be argued, however, that this 
investment behaviour identified by Wu and Sia (2002) is less efficiency-seeking and more 
market-seeking behaviour. Another example of efficiency-seeking behaviour is provided by 
Lenovo which as early as 2003, outsourced the majority of its laptop and component production 
to subcontractors in Taiwan (Naughton, 2007). Notwithstanding these observations, efficiency 
seeking FDI is not investigated further in this study. As Chinese firms continue to expand their 
geographic reach and range of international production, however, it is likely that efficiency 
27 In addition, Lenovo secured the trademark rights for IBM in connection with Think products for 
five years (FT, 2005c). 
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seeking FDI will become more commonplace, a factor that should be properly taken into 
account in future research on Chinese ODI. 
Historic and Emergent investment behaviour framework 
A step towards formalising the evolution of international investment behaviour by Chinese 
firms has been undertaken by Buckley et al. (2006). Using secondary data, Buckley et al. (2006) 
advance a framework that describes historic and emergent investment behaviour of Chinese 
firms abroad (see Table 3.7). This is based upon the strategic investment drivers for ODI of 
Dunning (1993) as applied in other studies on Chinese ODI (e. g. Deng, 2004). However, 
instead of taking a static stance to investment behaviour typical of research on Chinese ODI, 
Buckley et al. (2006) instead acknowledge that investment strategies of Chinese MNEs have 
changed in a dynamic institutional and business environment. Hence, they identify historic and 
emergent characteristics for each investment strategy: Natural resource-seeking investment was 
early confined to a small number of developed countries but is increasingly becoming more 
globally spread and covers more commodities; early market seeking investments sought to 
support Chinese exporters but is latterly more fine-grained, following defensive and offensive 
strategies; while early asset seeking investments were driven by the need to collect primary 
market information and knowledge but occurs latterly more to secure access to brands, 
distribution channels, and other tangible and intangible assets, for example. The shift in 
strategies Buckley et al. (2006) observe is supported by the changing attitude of the Chinese 
government towards ODI. While the government formerly pursued a strongly regulated and 
controlled or `hands on' approach, it advocates today a `hands off' approach. This is articulated 
clearly in the deregulation and liberalisation of Chinese ODI approvals describes in the five 
phases of Chinese ODI as presented in Section 3.3. It is also confirmed by the work of Hong 
and Sun (2006) who state that the international investment decisions of Chinese MNEs has been 
relocated from the central government to local government and are today taken mainly by the 
Chinese firm itself. Buckley et al. (2006) also consider changes to the industry sector 
distribution and foreign market entry mode choice of Chinese MNEs in their framework: 
Chinese ODI has shifted from being service-oriented to be manufacturing dominated, while 
wholly-owned affiliates substitute for joint ventures as the favoured entry mode. Cross and 
Voss (2007) update this framework and assert that the year 2000 is the watershed year in the 
changing investment behaviour of Chinese firms. It was then that discussions about the `Go 
Global' policy began and this was formally acknowledged in the 10th five year plan, constituting 
major triggers for the qualitative shift in Chinese ODI observed by Cross and Voss (2007). 
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Table 3.7: Historic and emergent investment behaviour of Chinese MNEs 
Market seeking- 
strategy 
Natural resource- 
seeking strategy 
Strategic asset- 
seeking strategy 
Efficiency seeking- 
strategy 
Sectoral distribution 
Entry mode 
Historic: pre-2000 Emergent: 2000 and after 
To support the export 
function of the parent 
company 
Defensive (import-substituting and 
quota-hopping FDI) and offensive 
(to develop new markets) 
Raw materials extraction 
mainly in developed countries 
Raw materials and other 
commodities, more widely 
distributed 
To obtain foreign market To obtain foreign technology and 
information and knowledge brands and to access foreign 
distribution channels, managerial 
know-how and capital markets 
Of limited importance due to Of limited importance due to 
abundant pool of low-cost increased agglomeration effects and 
labour in China abundant pool of low-cost labour 
Services-oriented (mainly 
trade-related) 
Manufacturing-oriented 
Joint venture Wholly-owned affiliate 
Source: Adapted from Buckley et al. (2006), see Cross and Voss (2007). 
All of the literature reviewed in this section examine FDI motives of Chinese firms but fall short 
at identifying these relationships between the spatial distribution and investment motivation of 
Chinese ODI. Preliminarily, however, it seems to be apparent that resource-seeking 
investments are concentrated in African countries such as Sudan and in Central Asia (in terms 
of oil and gas). Likewise, technology-seeking FDI tend to occur more often in the industrialised 
rather than developing countries. To gain stronger support and evidence for these relationships 
cross-sectional analyses covering longer time periods are necessary. This is undertaken for the 
first time in this study. 
RQ6 - Have the determinants of Chinese ODI changed over time? 
Additional FDI motives 
Besides the familiar investment strategies, two further objectives are argued to have driven 
Chinese ODI since the 1980s. These are, first, political concerns and, second, an array of 
motivations based on poorly defined and enforced property-rights in China (Ding, 2000a)? $ 
The former is especially related to the union of China with Hong Kong SAR in 1997. It is 
28 This discussion of political motives and (semi-)illegal practises is based on Ding (2000a). 
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argued that prior to 1997, mainland Chinese firms and (sub-national) government authorities 
intended to show political support and commitment to Hong Kong and to reintegrate it quickly 
into the mainland by establishing overseas affiliates or purchasing local firms there. These early 
Chinese investments in Hong Kong are argued to have been ultimately designed to show the 
mainland's power over Hong Kong, and its dependence on it (Wall, 1999). The property rights 
issue refers to different instruments used to gain private access to public assets with the 
intention of rent-seeking. Ding (2000a) illustrates this with several examples from the late 
1980s and early 1990s where the internationalisation of Chinese firms was essentially a catalyst 
to abuse public assets. The most obvious outcome was the quasi-privatisation of overseas 
Chinese affiliates by the managers running them (Naughton, 2003; Broadman, 2001). Such 
asset-stripping occurred typically in the form of registration of the affiliate under the name of 
the managers (which deprived the Chinese parent company from access to and control of the 
foreign assets), or by the channelling of the affiliate's funds to a newly founded but unofficial 
firm in China (Ding, 2000b). While the former often received the blessing from the parent 
company, the latter was outright illegal. In most cases, little attention was given to these 
incidences because high-ranking Chinese cadres and their relatives were often involved. A 
further shadowy motivation was related to the `round-tripping' phenomenon. Round-tripping 
denotes inward FDI which originates in the host country but was subsequently channelled 
outside the country and returned to benefit from tax holidays, subsidies, and other benefits, 
offered only to foreign investors. Thus, round-tripping is a form of rent-seeking. Concerning 
the Chinese outward investments to Hong Kong, a significant but indeterminate amount is 
argued to have happened for round-tripping purposes (e. g. Prasad and Wei, 2005; Weiss, 2004; 
Li, 2004). Asset-stripping and rent-seeking investment behaviour by Chinese firms are 
discussed for completeness here but do not inform a research question in this study because the 
`official' data used here do not capture these types of activities. 
3.4.3 Stages theory and the development of Chinese MNEs 
The applicability of the internationalising approach (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) to Chinese 
MNEs has yet to be tested thoroughly. So far, industry studies conclude that the theory is not 
supported by the internationalisation of Chinese enterprises. The largest Chinese construction 
companies by annual revenues develop their international presence without any sufficient and 
sustainable position in their domestic market. Rather, they seem to be China headquartered 
enterprises that rely on their international markets for business development, often supported by 
government authorities that have concluded infrastructure development agreements with 
developing countries in Asia and Africa (Frost, 2005; Pheng and Jiang, 2003). Similarly, high- 
technology intensive companies like Huawei have internationalised quickly with considerable 
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resource commitment as they established manufacturing, service and R&D units in 
industrialised countries and manufacturing and service units in developing countries. In so 
doing, it has leapfrogged the process of incremental spatial and resource expansion (Chen and 
Jiang, 2003). Contrary to this assertion, Li (2006) states that Huawei - and its Chinese 
competitor ZTE - in fact internationalise sequentially by establishing overseas affiliates in 
geographically and institutionally proximate countries first and by keeping its initial resource 
commitment low each time. Only with the international experience gained in developing 
countries did Huawei start to set up affiliates in developed countries Li argues. Du (2003a) 
asserts that the internationalisation of Haier also challenges the stages theory because Haier 
exported first to developed countries which are, arguably, geographically and culturally distant 
from China. However, earlier in her study, she mentions that Haier exported for some six years 
prior to seeking developed country markets. The evidence presented in her study is not 
persuasive, therefore. It is further contradicted by Du (2003b) who lists Haier's overseas 
investments since 1996 - the first investments occurring in nearby Asian countries which are 
still host to the majority of Haier's international investment projects. There is little other 
research on the applicability of a sequential internationalisation strategy of Chinese firms. This 
lack of research and evidence is probably due to lack of corporate access which is essential in 
pinpointing the development of internationalisation of a firm. Another explanation could be the 
neglect of the access of Chinese firms to international social networks. Such firms could benefit 
from the mediating role such networks play with respect to psychic distance which may support 
the internationalisation of such firms. This point is of importance and requires some further 
attention. It is hence discussed in a section further below. 
RQ7 - Do Chinese firms follow a gradualistic approach to internationalisation? 
3.4.4 China's new international ventures 
Empirical and anecdotal evidence on Chinese new international ventures or `born globals' is 
limited. The best account of such an internationalisation process is provided by Zhang (2003) 
who discusses the establishment and subsequent growth of CITIC. CITIC expanded quickly 
internationally and invested in a diverse range of unrelated industry sectors very soon after its 
formation in 1979. As early as two years after its establishment, it opened an office in Hong 
Kong and within seven years founded resource-seeking affiliates in Australia, Canada and the 
USA. This expansion was possible by the strong financial and political support of China's State 
Council which founded CITIC. Other examples and concomitant research, to our knowledge, 
do not exist. Chinese firms may, however, profit from their international networks when 
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seeking to invest internationally and this may allow them to expand rapidly into psychic distant 
markets (as is elaborated on below). Thus: 
RQ8 - Do Chinese firms conduct FDI shortly after establishment? 
3.4.5 International entrepreneurial networks and Chinese MNEs 
Li (2003) argues that international latecomers establish business relations with firms in the host 
country to compensate for their late entrance into international markets. Access to an 
international network may help them to reduce investment costs and risks by facilitating the 
collection and evaluation of first-hand and trustworthy market information on the host market. 
Thus, it is not necessarily the most proximate country with a similar cultural fabric to China that 
Chinese firms invest in, but the location with the most pronounced ethnic Chinese business or 
entrepreneurial network (Zhang and van den Bulcke, 2000). 
One strand of reasoning relates to the `ethnicity' and firm-specific advantage argument. Liu 
(2000) states that the importance of international business networks in facilitating the 
internationalisation of ethnic Chinese firms has been generally acknowledged. Sung (1996) 
extends this perspective by identifying exogenous firm-specific advantages of Chinese MNEs in 
the form of ethnic and family connections with the Overseas Chinese which supports the 
investing firm and helps it to mitigate its business risk by disseminating business and market 
information. 29 Similarly, Tong (2003) and Bräutigam (2003) conclude that networks between 
the Overseas Chinese and China have played a significant role in the international investment 
decisions-making of Chinese firms. For example, the investment of Chinese firms in Africa has 
been found to have been significantly advanced by established personal connections with the 
host country (e. g. Bräutigam, 2003). Thus, cultural proximity only rather than the umbrella 
concept of psychic proximity may be the crucial factor initialising overseas investment by 
Chinese firms (Zhan, 1995). The Overseas Chinese Diaspora is especially widespread in Asia 
and was a crucial source of inward FDI to China from Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong 
during the 1980s and 1990s (Liu, 2000; Henley et al., 1999; Ng and Tuan, 2002; Yeung, 1999; 
Sikorski and Menkhoff, 2000). Further research supports the importance of international social 
networks in business facilitation by concluding that international immigration networks are an 
important factor in the extension of trade relations with the respective native home country 
(Gould, 1994; Rauch and Trinidad, 2002). The size of the Overseas Chinese Diaspora is largest 
29 Overseas Chinese are defined by Poston et al. (1994: 633) as `all Chinese living outside 
mainland China and Taiwan, including Huaqiao (Chinese citizens residing abroad), Huaren 
(naturalized citizens of Chinese descent) and Huayi (the descendents of Chinese parents). ' 
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in Asia but their associations are represented globally. By 1990, about 37 million Chinese lived 
outside mainland China, with the majority 66 per cent found in the four Asian countries of 
Indonesia (20%), Thailand (16%), Hong Kong and Malaysia (15% each) at this time. Asia 
comprised in total 88 per cent of all Overseas Chinese people. A further 8, per cent lived in 
North and South American countries, 2 per cent in European countries and 1 per cent in Oceania. 
The remainder lived on the African continent (Poston et al., 1994). In countries such as Hong 
Kong, Macau, Singapore the percentage of Overseas Chinese of the total population was over 
70 per cent. The Overseas Chinese people in these three countries, along with Malaysia (about 
30% of total population) and Indonesia (about 5%), played a crucial role in the local economy 
as they often controlled the leading firms (Yeung, 1999; Poston et al., 1994). Although these 
data are dated, it is unlikely that the distribution of Chinese people abroad have changed much 
since. The Overseas Chinese, though relying on personal contact, have established Overseas 
Chinese associations worldwide and these provide a platform to meet during the regularly 
occurring conventions of like-minded entrepreneurs from China and other countries to evaluate 
and assess business opportunities and to spin personal networks (Liu, 2000). A further function 
of these associations is arguably to represent mainland Chinese firms abroad (Liu, 2000); most 
probably in the decades prior to significant Chinese ODI. Based on these observations, the 
argument can be made that Chinese firms are likely to invest primarily in Asian countries where 
established international connections with the Chinese Diaspora can act as facilitator for their 
internationalisation. This is as proposed by Li (2003), among others. 
By contrast, however, Gomez (2004) asserts that the role of the Overseas Chinese in the 
internationalisation process of Chinese firms is exaggerated. By analysing investments by the 
Overseas Chinese in the UK, Gomez concludes that little or no contact had been established 
between the investor firm and the ethnic Chinese living the UK prior a firm's investment. One 
explanation may be that Gomez' firm sample might represent mature and experienced firms 
who do not seek or need the support of other (local) firms. It should be noted, however, that the 
importance of international networks may differ depending on the ownership form of the 
Chinese firm. In particular, SOEs which enjoy the financial support of the domestic government 
authority supervising them may assign a minor role to the access to international networks than 
more independent Chinese MNEs. Similarly, this way of risk attenuation might play a more 
prominent role in the international investment decision-making of small- or medium-sized 
privately-owned Chinese firms, for example (Yang, 2005). 
To date, research on the importance of networks for Chinese businesses has tended to rely on 
inferences drawn mainly from anecdotal evidence on Overseas Chinese business or has made 
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assertions without empirical evidence (e. g. Yang, 2005). To inform the above discussion, cross- 
sectional analyses are required. Thus: 
RQ9 - To what extent do the Overseas Chinese people influence the international investment 
behaviour of Chinese firms? 
3.4.6 The institutional embeddedness of Chinese MNEs 
The discussion in Section 3.3 has shown that China's institutional environment has the potential 
to bear greatly upon the investment behaviour of Chinese MNEs. To some extent, this reflected 
in the literature on Chinese ODI. 
Zhan (1995) describes the political stance towards ODI in China as being cautious, and this is 
reflected in the regulatory framework, which was more restrictive in the 1980s and much of the 
1990s (see Section 3.3). This constraining environment provided Chinese firms and 
government authorities the time to gradually gain experience in international business. At the 
same time, the Chinese government has supported Chinese firms with financial aid to encourage 
them to internationalise and mitigate business risk. One measure has been to link China's 
official development aid to ODI (Zhan, 1995). A good example is the unconditional loan by 
Chinese government provided to Angola in 2005 which helped Sinopec to oust Total, the 
French oil company, from extending drilling rights and to secure prestigious offshore oil- 
drilling rights (Meidan, 2006; Frynas and Paulo, 2006). Such Chinese government behaviour 
may be most fruitful where the Chinese government and Chinese firms have a good bargaining 
position vis-ä-vis host country governments that attract only modest amounts of investment 
from the industrialised nations. This may be countries generally avoided by industrialised 
country firms as a reaction to pressure from civil society on ethical (e. g. human rights) or 
political (e. g. international embargo) grounds such as Sudan and Myanmar. The Chinese 
government has also provided other institutional support, in form of, for example, easy access to 
external finance and privileged access to the domestic education market, to selected firms to 
help them to build the necessary capabilities and strength to internationalise (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005; Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2006). The government has assisted by gathering 
host market information (Taylor, 2002) and instigated the `Go Global' policy in 1999 and 
formally incorporated in national policy with the 10`h and 11th five year plans. The Chinese 
government has over the years encouraged Chinese ODI in specific sectors, namely 
manufacturing, resource exploitation and resource augmentation (Cai, 1999). All these 
initiatives and policies are described at length in Section 3.3. 
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It should be noted, however, that these policies are often opaque and poorly publicised and 
hence not fully known to Chinese firms. The current regime is not fully supportive of Chinese 
ODI (Wong and Chan, 2003). For example, the approval of each investment project makes it 
difficult for Chinese firms to bid for a foreign company. A take-over offer with governmental 
approval of the project may breach existing regulations while waiting for the approval often 
cause unnecessary delays (Xiao and Sun, 2005). Despite all this, Liu et al. (2005) argue that 
China's domestic institutions have had little direct effect on Chinese ODI but instead indirectly 
support Chinese firms by providing a sound institutional environment for economic growth 
which helps domestic firms to develop and build-up competitive capabilities. Such capabilities 
may then be used to extend the firms activities across borders. 
What is clear is that Chinese MNEs are embedded in a particular economic order at home which 
leads to strong interrelations, and sometimes collusion, with government authorities. This then 
impacts on the international investment behaviour (Cai, 1999; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). The 
knowledge of Chinese firms of operating in a dynamic developing country environment 
characterised by discretionary and burdensome bureaucracies may have actually provided these 
firms with firm-specific advantages and the development of certain core competences these 
firms could exploit in similar characterised countries - that is advantages deriving from home 
country embeddedness (Costin and Herken, 2006). An the other hand, Taylor (2002) states that 
the provision of a sound macro-economic framework within China including the further 
marketisation of SOEs and strengthening of monetary and fiscal policy, has benefited the 
development of Chinese MNEs greatly. Such measures have decreased the extent of 
discretionary implementation and enforcement of ODI regulations on the sub-national level and 
this has sometimes led to contradictions between national regulations and the official approval 
procedure (Ding, 2000a). However, this leeway may actually have enabled private Chinese 
firms to internationalise prior to 2004 as constraining laws and regulations have been 
circumvented. 
This discussion shows that the incorporation of the domestic institution in an analysis of 
Chinese ODI is of crucial importance (Taylor, 2002; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Although the 
institutional framework is generally acknowledged and its potential influence appreciated in 
extant research, it is not consistently and rigorously addressed nor empirically measured. Based 
on these discussions: 
RQIOa - To what extent does the domestic institutional framework in China support the 
international investment strategies of Chinese firms? 
91 
As discussed in Section 3.3, China is increasingly involved with supranational organisations and 
international agreements (e. g. WTO accession) and seeks to conclude multilateral and bilateral 
agreements and treaties to promote international cooperation and, directly or indirectly support 
the internationalisation of domestic firms. These activities may at least in part be interpreted as 
an attempt by the Chinese government to establish a level-playing field for international 
investing Chinese firms. With regard to the international investment behaviour of Chinese 
firms, the following question arises: 
RQ10b - To what extent does the international institutional framework support the 
international investment strategies of Chinese firms? 
3.4.7 Non-SOEs as international investors 
Non-state owned and, eventually, privately-owned Chinese enterprises are thought to have 
invested internationally since the mid-1980s. Ye (1992) mentions that out of thirty-seven 
Chinese MNEs interviewed in 1988 and 1989, only six were state-owned. Ding (2000a) 
mentions private Chinese MNEs briefly, arguing they are investing overseas to secure their 
wealth outside an uncertain Chinese political environment and because of hyperinflation in 
China amongst several other reasons. Further evidence on the internationalisation of private 
Chinese firms is patchy. Deng (2004) mentions that of the top 500 Chinese MNEs one is 
privately owned but, like Ding (2000a), fails to name the company. Recent political measures 
seem to have eased ODI by private-owned Chinese firms. Zhang (2006) mentions that the 
Chinese government issued a directive in 2004 allowing private firms to invest abroad legally 
and MOFCOM (2006b) reports the provision of greater financial support by the Export-Import 
Bank of China (China Eximbank) towards private enterprises. The China Development 
Gateway (2005) comments on a lifting of trade restrictions on private firms (from January 2001). 
This allows private firms to own a foreign exchange bank account and earn foreign exchange 
entitlements (both are preconditions to be eligible for ODI). Furthermore, Qin (2004) states that 
the Chinese government encourages private firms to increase their direct investments in Africa 
in particular to fulfil China's compliance to UNDP's South-South cooperation agreement. 
Newspaper articles increasingly report on private Chinese MNEs such as D'Long and 
Wanxiang investing in Europe and the USA and, finally, regional investment promotion 
agencies have published information about privately-owned Chinese outward investors 
(CAITEC and WDA, 2005; GfW, 2005). Judging from this sketchy account, private Chinese 
MNEs are growing in number and justify attention. 
RQII - Do the determinants of Chinese ODI vary by ownership type? 
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3.5 Summary 
This chapter presents a holistic review of the development of Chinese ODI and identifies a 
number of gaps in the body of literature on this phenomenon. In Section 3.2 the corporate 
actors investing abroad are introduced as are the political actors that impinge on them through 
their interventions. It is essential to have a clear understanding of these actors to follow the 
evolution of Chinese ODI and the twists and turns it has undergone (Section 3.3). Chinese ODI 
has not developed smoothly nor has the institutional framework in which it takes place. The 
identification of outward investment drivers and the rational underpinning the investment 
decision-making process in Chinese firms is therefore difficult to evaluate with any accuracy 
and this is mirrored in the extant body of research on Chinese ODI. Moreover, the bulk of this 
work is descriptive. There are therefore unanswered questions around the international 
investment strategy, use of networks and the speed of internationalisation of Chinese MNEs. 
These preliminary observations, the research questions and the theories presented in Section 2.2 
are used in Chapter 4 to advance a model that, it is argued here, more completely presents the 
framework within which Chinese ODI happens than is available in prior research on the subject. 
In this, special attention is paid to the institutional realm that companies operate in. This model 
is then tested using qualitative and quantitative research methods and the findings are presented 
in Chapter 6 and 7. 
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4 An explanatory model of Chinese outward direct 
investment 
In the previous chapter the assertion is made that research on Chinese ODI fails to explain fully 
the phenomenon. Research to date generally offers inconclusive accounts based on crude 
analysis of secondary data and lengthy case studies of a small number of high profile Chinese 
MNEs (e. g. Liu and Li, 2002). In Chapter 3, the case is made that the institutional environment 
in China is an important factor in the development of Chinese ODI, and that this cannot be 
disregarded. This chapter therefore follows a novel approach 30 A new model is introduced 
with the aim of explaining Chinese ODI patterns and the international investment behaviour of 
Chinese companies. The model is rooted in the theories reviewed in Section 2.2, with special 
emphasis given to institutional theory. It is proposed in the model that institutions on the sub- 
national, national, and international levels play a key role in shaping Chinese ODI. In this thesis, 
this new explanatory model of Chinese ODI is termed the `Chinese outward direct investment 
regime' or, in short, the `Chinese ODIR'. Parts of the model are tested in Chapter 6 using 
primary data and cross-sectional econometric modelling, the findings for which are presented in 
Chapter 7. 
4.1 Institutional theory 
Given the clear importance of institutions to Chinese ODI (as indicated in Sections 3.1,3.2, and 
3.3 of this thesis), it is pertinent to make reference to `new institutional theory' in order to 
justify aspects of the Chinese ODIR model advanced later in this chapter. Institutional theory 
suggests that the domestic institutional configuration determines the pace and scope of a 
country's macro- and micro-level economic development as a consequence of the constraints 
and resources provided by government to local and foreign firms (North, 1990; Redding, 2002). 
The institutional setting is generally stable and path dependent and therefore unlikely to change 
in the short-run - though exceptions exist like the European transitional countries, the 
unification of Germany in 1990 and in China in recent history (North, 2005). 
An `institution', by its nature, is a broad and fuzzy concept (Markusen, 2003). It therefore has 
to be clarified what kind of institutions are of interest in this research. The concept of 
institution generally encompasses a wide range of elements, including customs and beliefs, 
religious and other norms, the legislature, judiciary and bureaucracy, government structures and 
market mechanisms, amongst other things, many of which are difficult to measure. All of them 
are ultimately interlinked and influence each other (Williamson, 2000). However, this research 
30 This chapter builds upon and extends Buckley et al. (2007a, 2007b). 
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is neither concerned with institutions as long-lasting and `difficult to change' belief systems and 
tradition nor does it use institutional theory to explain organisations and their operationalisation 
(e. g. North, 2005; Scott, 1987). The term `institution' is applied here to delineate aspects of 
those institutions that coordinate aspects of an economy and which are partially codified and 
contain an element of enforcement. It is therefore constrained to the realm of formal elements 
(namely legislature, judiciary and bureaucracy, government structures, market mechanisms) and 
informal elements (mainly social relations). The formal rules are implemented and policed 
mainly by governments and their agencies. The domestic and international investment decision- 
making of an MNE is constrained by conditions set by the home institutional environment, i. e. 
the market imperfections created by the institutional fabric or, more colloquially, the `rules of 
the game' and `how the game is played' (Williamson, 2000; Buckley et al., 2006; North, 1990; 
Peng, 2002; Wright et al., 2005). Hence, institutional change occurs when rules change the 
incentive structure and payoff expectations of the actors `playing the game' (Eggertsson, 1997). 
Given this background, institutional theory is often used to investigate the effect of the 
institutional environment on domestic firms and economic growth, for example, on the effects 
of monetary and anti-trust policies. The constraints given by an institutional environment affect 
the decision-making of a firm (Aharoni, 1999) by contributing to, or underpinning, a firm's 
capabilities (Murtha and Lenway, 1994). In this respect, Murtha and Lenway (1994) argue that 
the institutional environment of a command economy has typically government fixed trade 
plans which leave home firms with little or no strategic flexibility: some firms are government 
supported and thus have increased capabilities, while the remainder are deprived of the trading 
potential due to administrative restrictions. The transition to a market economy is not 
necessarily combined with the establishment of firm-specific advantages, which would enable 
local firms to invest abroad (Murtha and Lenway, 1994) because of path dependencies 
associated with the former institutional environment that did not favour competition and the 
building of core competences amongst domestic firms. Only when the economy has 
transformed sufficiently towards a market- and private-firm based economy will firms develop 
internationally enduring firm-specific advantages. Although this view relates very well to ODI 
from former state planned economies like China, it leaves aside the fact that outward investment 
from these countries may be driven by other factors as well. First, changes in the institutional 
fabric (a) towards a more accountable, credible and less bureaucratic burdensome regime in 
general (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Brewer, 1993) or (b) designed to foster the 
internationalisation of domestic firms in particular may give rise to ODI as economic transition 
progresses. Second, ODI of a country may still be dominated by a government driven 
internationalisation of state-owned or state-influenced firms even as the economy becomes more 
market related. This would constitute an artefact of state planning different to the 
administrative fiat describes above. While the state planning is a constraint, the new 
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institutional arrangement may constitute an ownership advantage enjoyed by beneficiary firms. 
These examples show that progression to a market-based economy may account for an upsurge 
in outward investment from any given country. Adjustments to the institutional fabric to allow 
for international business exchange and the evolution of competitive companies can be regarded 
as a source of market imperfections generated by the government which effect domestic firms 
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). 
The theory of internalising market imperfections across borders of Buckley and Casson (1976) 
contains an implicit acknowledgement of the importance of home country institutional elements 
on ODI (see Section 2.2). However, Buckley and Casson (1976) do not elaborate upon or 
develop this dimension fully. Market imperfections are often not accidental but are created and 
promoted by home country institutions and the constraints are imposed with intent (North, 
1990). This is certainly the case for China, as evidenced in Section 3.3 and by the following 
quotation from Scott (2002: 65) "[... ], the Chinese state is constituted to act [... ] as an active 
player, promoting and controlling economic development. The norms governing state actors 
and citizens clearly differ: Chinese officials are more likely to presume that they, rather than any 
subordinate constituency, are obliged to decide and act for the common good. " Plenty of 
examples can be found in relation to Chinese ODI despite the fact that the Chinese government 
has withdrawn much of its presence with the institutional reforms in 1999 and thereafter. The 
establishment of CITIC by the State Council in 1979 and the favourable loan scheme extended 
to CNOOC to bid for Unocal in 2005, are examples of institutionally derived market 
imperfections (Zhang, 2003; Xiao and Sun, 2005). 
The institutional reach, however, is neither constrained to the domestic development of firms 
nor to domestic economic interactions. It also impacts, both positively and negatively, on cross- 
border business transactions, home country growth models and, it follows, on the outbound 
investments and international trade of domestic firms. Domestic institutions can therefore shape 
the internationalisation strategies and motivations of firms (Brewer, 1993; Murtha and Lenway, 
1994; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). Expressed another way, the behaviour and decisions of a 
country's domestic institutions may lead to, or reduce, market imperfections which then impact 
on the decision-taking of its MNEs (Brewer, 1993). Likewise, supranational institutions may 
affect the behaviour of firms in a similar way. At a supranational level, the concept of 
`institution' comprises a set of informal and formal factors. In the context of a country's 
outward direct investment regime (ODIR), informal factors may include state visits, foreign 
policy initiatives, and international entrepreneurial networks while the formal elements include 
concluded bilateral investment treaties, membership of the free trade areas and customs unions, 
and participation in international led development co-operations such as the South-South 
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initiative by UNDP, for example. Most countries are today embedded in a nexus of formal 
multilateral and, increasingly, bilateral agreements which are administered and managed both 
within supranational agencies and between individual governments (Ramamurti, 2001). 
Although separate, these formal and informal factors are interlinked. State visits commonly 
pave the way to more formal arrangements and relationships as the terms and conditions of 
bilateral agreements and accession to a free trade area are negotiated and implemented. These 
elements can support and strengthen the behaviour of a country's MNEs abroad (Ramamurti, 
2001). We therefore recognize that the institutional setting within which Chinese MNEs 
operate has both a national and supranational character and that formal and informal elements 
exist at both levels. 
In the following two sections, aspects of this discussion are incorporated into the modelling of 
China's ODIR. In this, national and supranational elements are recognised, as are formal and 
informal elements. To help distinguish between elements, the terms `exogenous' and 
`endogenous' are applied. The former refers to elements found beyond the state borders of the 
home country, while the latter refers to elements present with state borders. This usage extends 
Eggertsson's (1997) perspective who argues that exogenous factors lie outside the direct sphere 
of influence of a firm but are controlled by the national political actors, that is, governmental 
institutions. 
4.2 The Chinese outward direct investment regime 
Themes and issues discussed previously are incorporated, and linkages with previous sections of 
this thesis are made explicit. Inevitably, this process leads to some repetition of context, but this 
is required in order to provide coherency and conclusiveness to the model. 
4.2.1 Endogenous institutional factors 
The national elements -which are referred to here as `endogenous institutional elements'- 
include those formal structures and outcomes of Chinese government that pertain directly to 
outward FDI and indirectly effect Chinese ODI. The former comprises the policies and 
regulations of agencies such as the Chinese Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs, the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), the National Development and Reform 
Committee (NDRC), and the People's Bank of China (as described in Section 3.2). Also 
important are policy implementation and enforcement by the national legislature, judiciary and 
bureaucracy. 
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Formal endogenous factors with direct influence 
For China, as with many developing countries, the control and, effectively, the restriction of 
ODI has been a major strand of economic policy. 31 The maintenance of domestic investment 
levels and the bolstering of foreign exchange levels are priority objectives (Sauvant, 2005; 
Vandevelde, 1998). The institutional framework is therefore likely to have determined, to a 
considerable degree, the ability and will of domestic firms to invest abroad; an overly restrictive 
foreign exchange policy and outward investment approval procedures may restrict or even 
prevent ODI from happening (Buckley et al., 2007a). 32 On the other hand, the institutional 
framework may have a positive affect on some firms. The institutional framework of the home 
country can also contribute to the ownership advantages of a wide range of companies. 
Companies that originate from a rather restrictive institutional framework gain substantial 
experience of how to cope with such an environment. Of itself this can constitute a firm- 
specific advantage, which enables firms to internalise smallest changes and opportunities (i. e. 
market imperfections) provided by the system. These are the advantages of home country 
embeddedness, and they can include ability to cope effectively with changing institutional 
settings and discretionary policies, economising on the use of scarce capital and other input 
factor, the successful exploitation of domestic and international network capacities to 
circumvent market imperfections, and the ability to scale products and production systems to 
suit local needs. This knowledge can be applied in foreign countries that have a similar 
institutional setting and market environment. In fact, companies might feel more comfortable 
investing in a country with a similar institutional setting as they can better appreciate it, utilise 
existing operational leeway and foresee any political developments and administrative decisions 
that might ensue (Wells, 1983; Lall, 1982; Lecraw, 1977). Because of the ownership 
advantages gained from their context specific institutional framework, Chinese MNEs (like 
other developing country MINEs), are likely to have a distinctive foreign investment strategy in 
terms of location, as exemplified by a perverse reaction to risk and return not predicted by 
studies on the FDI behaviour of industrialised country firms. These considerations contrast to 
31 Taiwan's government, for example, sought to achieve domestic economic development and 
prohibited ODI until the 1960s. Restrictions on ODI were eased in four phases from 1962 
onwards and firms were increasingly encouraged and supported to invest abroad (UNCTAD, 
1996). The South Korean government encouraged ODI to support exports, fishery and 
strengthen competitiveness but prohibited it in areas which could negatively affect the economy 
(Kumar and Kim, 1984). Japan restricted the value of assets held abroad by domestic companies 
based on balance of payment considerations until the late 1960s (Stone, 1998). ODI restrictions 
are not constrained to developing countries, however. The United Kingdom restricted ODI 
between 1914 and 1931 to prevent outflow of hard currency in support of the war economy 
(Atkin, 1970). 
32 We note that Chinese firms can also influence and shape the institutional framework they are 
embedded in which reflects back on the firm's potential behaviour and performance (Barney and 
Tolbert, 1997). 
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the view of Dunning (1996) among others who argues that domestic institutions have either a 
low neutral effect or an adverse effect on the ownership advantages of OECD country MNEs. 
As Section 3.2 makes clear, the Chinese government has defined greatly the legal, regulatory 
and financial components of the Chinese ODIR, either directly, by administrative fiat (via the 
ODI approval process and foreign exchange controls), or indirectly, using economic policy 
implementation and other measures (Buckley et al., 2006). But the government is also the 
ultimate owner of SOEs (which dominated Chinese ODI prior to 2003) and has in this role 
effectively been the key operational decision-taker in many investment projects (Buckley et al., 
2006). Thus, firms may receive direct governmental support and preferential treatment and may 
get experienced how to operate under a flawed institutional arrangement or exploit 
imperfections of the local market. The endogenous elements of the Chinese ODIR are therefore 
likely to shape outbound investment behaviour. 
The most recent measure directly linked to Chinese ODI is the `Go Global' strategy (see Phases 
4 and 5 in Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 for a full account). China has supported the 
internationalisation of domestic firms since the instigation of the `Open-Door' policy. 
International investments by Chinese firms are also made to support the national economic and 
social development and restructuring (Wang, 2001; Zhao, 2000) (see Section 3.3). In the long- 
run, the policy of creating favourable conditions for domestic enterprises should see increasing 
numbers of Chinese firms locate productive activities abroad. The response of relevant 
government agencies has been to provide greater support and promotion of ODI by offering 
favourable policies and procedures to investors in many areas, such as in finance, insurance, 
foreign exchange, taxation, human resources, law and regulation, the provision of information 
services, training courses on international business and foreign languages, and the establishment 
of a Overseas Business Service Centre in Beijing and Chinese Chambers of Commerce in 
foreign countries (see Section 3.3.5). These measures are partially undertaken with the support 
of international organisations such as UNCTAD and professional organisations such as foreign 
regional development agencies and consultancies. Key ODI-promoting measures introduced 
recently include improvements in the availability of commercial loans and funding from the 
Export-Import Bank of China for earmarked projects (using China's extensive foreign exchange 
reserves)33 and preferential arrangements concerning foreign exchange and corporate income 
tax exemptions to qualifying firms and projects (see Sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.5). Arguably, many 
of these developments constitute soft budget constraints enjoyed by Chinese MNEs. Soft 
budget constraints are domestic capital market imperfections. As will be seen, this notion is 
33 China's foreign exchange reserves are valued at more than USD 1,000bn, the largest in the world 
(FT, 2006d). 
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fundamental to aspects of the forthcoming analysis. Soft budget constraints normally occur 
when an organisation's spending is not bound to an annual budget but are extended with high 
probability by the supervising authority if expenditures exceed the earnings and the survival of 
the organisation is at risk (Kornai, 1986; Kornai et al., 2003). 4 This capital is normally made 
available at below market rates for a considerable period of time, creating a semi-permanent 
disequilibrium in the capital market which (potential) outward investors can exploit. Access to 
soft budget constraints may thus supply companies with sufficient funding to operate abroad. 
Thus, capital market imperfections can become an ownership advantage for certain companies 
(Buckley et al., 2007a). Besides soft budget constrains, three further capital market 
imperfections have been identified for China. Their impact reaches from providing companies 
with excess capital which they can use (i) to either invest international on a trial-and-error basis 
without putting their domestic business at risk, (ii) to outbid competitors in a fight for resources 
(especially energy and raw materials, brands and technology) (first three market imperfections 
listed below), and (iii) to enable firms to invest in the first place (Buckley et al., 2007a). The 
last factor may be a consequence of domestic government bias in the industry policy and credit 
allocation. The specific capital market imperfections are as follows in the case of China: 
(1) Soft budget constraints enjoyed by state-owned companies 
State-owned and state-associated (or state-led) firms may enjoy different co-existing forms of 
soft budget constraints: they may have capital made available to them at below market rates or 
receive capital at market rate but are not forced to pay it back (Xiao and Sun, 2005). Both 
phenomena may be more prevailing in an economy with poor corporate governance on both 
parts, the lender and the borrower (Lardy, 1998) and where state-owned companies play a 
significant economic and social role (Broadman, 2001), (such as for Petronas in Malaysia and 
Chinese SOEs in general); 
(2) Inefficient banking system 
Inefficient banking systems may make soft loans to potential outward investors either as policy 
to support the domestic and international growth of the company and through inefficiency, that 
is negligence of and nescience concerning risk assessment and cronyism. A developing country 
economy like China often lacks a sound and independent banking system but instead may be 
dominated by state-owned banks. When capital is made available within such a banking system 
to other state-owned companies, the transferred capital could be perceived as `remaining within' 
34 Early work on soft budget constraints focused on companies in socialist economies (e. g. Kornai, 
1986). More recent work, however, has clarified that soft budget constraints can be observed for 
local government authorities, non-profit organisations, and financial intermediaries in non- 
socialist countries as well (e. g. Kornai et aL, 2003). 
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the state system and undermine required scrutiny of the deal. This is argued by Lardy (1998) to 
be evident for China; 
(3) Intra-firm cross-subsidising 
Business groups may operate an inefficient internal capital market that has the effect of cross- 
subsidising international business operations. 35 The necessary funds for such an internal 
market are generated in the domestic market and by the exploitation of business opportunities 
in any business sector; 
(4) Social financial networks 
Family-owned firms may have access to capital from family members, friends, peers and 
through their wider network. Although this financial source does not necessarily provide access 
to cheap capital, it might provide access to the required capital. for running and expanding the 
company. 
Although these capital market imperfections may constitute a short-term advantage, they also 
may lead to the opposite in the long-run. Unrestricted access to capital may inhibit the 
development of international competitiveness because companies have reduced incentive to 
allocate their resources in the most productive manner. This outcome would contradict the 
overall objective of the `Go Global' policy in the case of China. 
Furthermore, the intention of the Chinese government is to improve the quality of ODI-related 
services by further devolving decision-taking on outward investment approvals to local 
government (see Section 3.3.5). It also intends to minimize `unfair competition' among 
Chinese companies abroad by guiding the dispersion of Chinese firms (Wang, 2001) and to 
introduce measures to coordinate investment in a way that prevents ODI in the same industries 
in the same countries, because this might lead to `market cannibalism' among Chinese firms. 36 
The Chinese government is also active at a supranational level in further supporting and 
strengthening the outward orientation of Chinese companies. It intends to conclude more 
bilateral investment agreements and double taxation treaties to protect Chinese investors (Wang, 
2001) (see Section 4.2.2) and to further coordinate for mutual benefit China's foreign affairs and 
official development aid policy (Chen, 2006). In sum, and following full implementation of 
35 Business groups are defined as "legally separate firms bound together in persistent formal and/or 
informal ways" (Granovetter, 2005: 429). Business groups differ from conglomerates which 
generally have less operational and personal ties with their affiliates. 
36 Apparently, though, these measures are confined to competition between Chinese firms but not 
with domestic and other foreign firms in the host country. 
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China's WTO commitments, China is likely to further deregulate and liberalise outward FDI- 
restricting measures with indirect, `hands-off economic policies increasingly substituting for 
direct, `hands-on' administrative methods of management (Buckley et al., 2006; Sauvant, 2005) 
(and Sections 3.3.4,3.3.5 and 3.4.2). The impact on the international investment decision- 
making of Chinese firms depends on the perceived credibility of these government measures 
(Murtha and Lenway, 1994). Given the current high government support, Chinese firms have to 
be certain enough that this support is either long-term enough or provides sufficient (monetary) 
short-term benefits that market imperfections created are worthy of internalisation. 
Formal endogenous factors with indirect influence 
Chinese MNEs, prima facie, are not only influenced by China's policies directly affecting ODI 
but also indirectly through other measures. One of these is China's stance toward inward FDI. 
The Chinese government supports the technological catching-up of domestic firms by 
implementing, assimilating and successively upgrading foreign technology through accumulated 
learning in Sino-foreign joint ventures, in-house R&D and demonstration effects (Kim, 1980; 
Pack and Saggi, 1997). These three measures are argued to lay the foundation for the creation 
of firm-specific advantages in form of tacit knowledge (Buckley et al., 2002). All these are 
generally agreed as prerequisites for ODI (Dunning, 1988; Kogut and Zander, 1993). In this 
respect, the Chinese government has allowed certain international firms' to invest in China only 
under the condition of the establishment of a knowledge transferring institution, providing local 
firms with the opportunity to access knowledge (Pack and Saggi, 1997). To further foster the 
catching-up process of domestic firms, the Chinese government has also initiated several 
technology- and innovation driven company funding schemes during the 1990s, to build a 
comprehensive national innovation system (Sigurdson, 2005; Liu and White, 2001). Local 
firms absorb knowledge through direct and indirect linkages. Direct linkages involve both 
backward-(supplier) or forward-(customer) linkages, as well as any kind of business 
collaboration, license arrangements and the purchase of production equipment (Pack and Saggi, 
1997) while indirect linkages derive from `watching' other firms' business operations, functions 
and products and imitating them (Inkpen, 2000). Both kinds of linkages are present in China, as 
a consequence of the increased inward internationalisation China's after Deng Xiaoping's 
journey to South China in 1992 which was interpreted as a commitment to increased 
liberalisation and market openness. The positive effect of spillovers on Chinese firm's 
productivity is confirmed by Buckley et al., (2002). Sino-foreign joint ventures, the dominant 
entry mode during the 1990s (Teng, 2004), have given the Chinese partner multiple possibilities 
of directly learning from its foreign partner while the growing presence of (wholly owned) 
foreign firms per se provides them with ample examples to follow and copy (Khanna et al., 
1998; Inkpen, 2000). A case in point is the lawsuit involving the US-based IT-firm Cisco and 
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telecommunication equipment producer Huawei, concerning intellectual property infringement 
based on indirect `linkages', `demonstration effects' and `learning' by Huawei (FT, 2007c). 
Similarly, Haier has benefited from the transfer of technology in its Sino-foreign joint venture 
with Liebherr, the German refrigerator company. Haier has also relied on international 
consultancy firms to help it implement an internationalisation and growth strategy (Liu and Li, 
2002). 
Actions based on these types of formal institutions may intermingle with the informal sphere, 
for example, in instances when laws and regulations are interpreted and applied in a 
discretionary way by certain actors in society. The informal aspect is further exacerbated in the 
manifold and dense personal linkages that Chinese firms have to government officials, which 
can lead to local protectionism and favourism. This can also be induced by partial state- 
ownership (Ding, 2000a; Ralston et al., 2006; Boisot and Child, 1996; Broadman, 2001). 
However, these informal, interpersonal linkages as well as discretionary policy implementation 
and enforcement are outside the scope and practicality of this particular research. 
4.2.2 Exogenous institutional factors 
Of the supranational institutional elements of the Chinese ODIR -the exogenous institutional 
factors- both formal and informal elements are recognised that might possibly impact on the 
investment decision taking of Chinese firms. Of interest are four supranational elements of the 
Chinese ODIR that have the potential to influence Chinese ODI flows and which have each 
become increasingly prevalent over the last two decades, namely bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs), double taxation treaties (DTTs); membership of the World Trade Organization/General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (WTO/GATT) and international entrepreneurial networks. 
BITS and DTTs are often seen as policy instruments which countries introduce to improve their 
locational attractiveness to MNEs (Mallampally and Sauvant, 1999). This should also be the 
case for Chinese firms, especially as China has entered into a number of bilateral investment 
treaties and agreements with potential and current host countries (see Section 3.3.5). China is 
also participating increasingly in supranational agreements and treaties administered by 
multilateral bodies such as the WTO. Collectively, these agreements and treaties have the 
potential to shape direct investment and trade flows between China and other countries; the 
latter often serving as a precursor for FDI. These endogenous elements to China's ODIR are 
discussed in more detail below. 
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Bilateral investment treaties and Chinese ODI 
BITs are concluded between two countries to protect and promote bilateral investment flows 
(UNCTAD, 2000,2005b). 37 Prior to 1979, a total of 165 BITs were concluded between 
countries, a figure which proliferated to 2,392 in 2004 (UNCTAD 2005b). Of these, almost 
1,600 were agreed in the 1990s, which highlights their growing importance in the international 
political economy (UNCTAD, 2000). China signed its first BIT with Sweden in 1982 to protect 
Chinese firms (Cai, 1999) and is now second only to Germany as a signatory nation in terms of 
numbers of BITs concluded. China has concluded 116 BITs by February 2006, of which some 
63 have been agreed with other developing countries (UNCTAD, 2006,2005b). A BIT 38 
provides a legally binding situation in which the foreign investor enjoys greater investment 
protection for its tangible and intangible assets than domestic laws would otherwise provide and 
is therefore generally argued to reflect a progressive and positive attitude towards economic 
liberalism by the contracting parties (Vandevelde, 1998). The conclusion of a BIT should 
ensure a relatively high level of investment protection which helps the internationalising firm to 
attenuate risk considerations in the investment decision and focus on commercial considerations 
(Voss, 1982). In other words, a BIT regulates a distorted market and dilutes market 
imperfections created by inefficient and (potentially) hostile host governments. Typically, a 
BIT includes the following elements: national treatment of foreign investors, most favoured 
nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment of foreign investors, abolition of discriminatory 
treatment of foreign investors, compensation for expropriated property, free repatriation of 
profits and capital and the use of extraterritorial dispute settlement mechanisms (Neumayer and 
Spess, 2005; Ginsburg, 2005). It may also involve the removal of restrictions on FDI and may 
prevent the host country from imposing requirements on the investing company such as local 
content or obligatory technology transfers (Somarajah, 2004; Ginsburg, 2005). A BIT normally 
applies equally to outbound and inbound investments (UNCTAD, 2000). In addition to these 
direct measures, the BIT may lead to greater transparency, an improved institutional framework 
and the removal of FDI restrictions in signatory countries. All this may work as a trigger for 
FDI since overall investment costs and risks are decreased and business opportunities are 
widened (Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Ramamurti, 2001). BITs have therefore become an 
important policy tool for international organizations such as UNCTAD which actively helps 
developing countries to negotiate, sign and ratify BITs and double taxation treaties (UNCTAD, 
2000). Moreover, a concluded BIT may also provide a signalling effect to potential investors 
37 BITs and double taxation treaties are both a special kind of International Investment Agreements 
as are bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements and multilateral investment 
agreements (UNCTAD, 2005b). 
38 It is worth remarking that BITs are concluded between a developed and a developing country or 
between two developing countries only. To date, there has been no BIT concluded between two 
developed countries (Ginsburg, 2005). 
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from third countries (outside of the agreement) because of the commitment to a liberal, 
transparent and predictable investment environment presented by signatory countries and its 
departures from perhaps previously hostile attitudes toward foreign investors (Sornarajah, 2004; 
UNCTAD, 2005b; Naumayer and Spess, 2005). 39 However, any such signalling effect may 
gradually deteriorate over time (Naumayer and Spess, 2005) when the degree of implementation 
and enforcement of the treaty becomes more important. The effects of a BIT are further 
diminished by the fact that the dyadic negotiations are normally led by the country with the 
strongest bargaining position (typically the capital-exporter), and with a weaker counterpart, 
which may lead to an asymptotic treaty (Sornarajah, 2004; Ginsburg, 2005). 
The empirical evidence concerning the effect of BITs on the investment behaviour of 
industrialised country MNEs is ambiguous. What limited work on the subject is available is 
now reviewed. This is done here and not in the literature review on traditional FDI 
determinants present in Section 2.3 because this issue is seldom investigated in econometric 
work on FDI determinants. This is also the case for DTTs which are considered in the 
following section. Some research finds empirical support for the positive impact of BITs on 
FDI (e. g. Neumayer and Spess, 2005; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Grosse and Trevino, 2005; 
Salacuse and Sullivan, 2005). One of the more comprehensive studies, that by Neumayer and 
Spess (2005), find that BITS signed between developing and OECD countries have had a strong 
positive and robust affect on inward FDI flows to developing countries over the period 1970 to 
2001. They also find evidence that BITs signed with third countries have a positive signalling 
effect on FDI inflows from other countries. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) reveal that 
implemented treaties have a stronger positive effect than ones that have merely been signed. 
However, they find limited evidence that signalling effects are at work in third countries. They 
also find little pattern of significance depending on the level of development of the countries 
involved. This is supported by Ginsburg (2005) who reports that advanced developing 
countries are more likely to sign a BIT. Grosse and Trevino (2005), in a study of the 
determinants of FDI to Central and Eastern Europe, report a strong positive relationship 
between the total numbers of BITs concluded by a country and inbound FDI flows. Banga's 
(2006) study on the impact of BITS on inward FDI to fifteen Asian developing countries finds 
that the conclusion of such treaties supports the attraction of investments from developed 
countries. 40 
39 In contrast, Vandevelde (1998) argues that only the potential host country to FDI is forced to 
liberalise. The home country is acts nationalistic and protective and is seldom challenged by a 
BIT to change this. 
40 The fifteen countries are: Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet Nam (Banga, 2006: 43, 
Table 1). 
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Other research yields contrasting results. Banga (2006) reports that his earlier positive finding 
for FDI originating from a developed country is not confirmed for South-South FDI flows. 
Banga argues that a BIT between two developing countries does not increase bilateral FDI. 
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) argue that the effect of a BIT on FDI is mitigated by country 
risk levels. 1 They find that, of the developing countries that have concluded a high number of 
BITs, those with high levels of country risk attract less inward FDI, while the converse is found 
for low risk countries. One interpretation is that investing firms are more influenced by 
(commercial) risk conditions than by the nature of supranational investment relations between 
home and host country. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) also finds that the existence of a BIT has 
little to no affect upon the flow of FDI from OECD to developing countries. Indeed, the USA 
has not concluded a BIT with most Southeast Asian countries, most notably China, but 
American companies are nevertheless important investors in these countries (Sornarajah, 2004). 
Hallward-Driemeier (2003) argues that a BIT may have an institution-substituting effect instead 
of providing a better institutional setting, a finding that supports the work of Tobin and Rose- 
Ackerman (2005). This accords with Ginsburg (2005), who argues that BITs can have a 
counterproductive effect on the development of sound institutions because the host country can 
rely on supranational bodies for dispute settlement and enforcement. The lack of institutional 
development may serve to restrict investor confidence and FDI inflows in the long-run if this 
were the case. 
To our knowledge, the effect of BITs on Chinese MNEs' international investment behaviour has 
not been researched before. However, the Chinese government is actively pursuing a strategy to 
increase the protection of outward investors. Especially since 1998, the style of BITs concluded 
by Chinese is said to have changed to accommodate increasing ODI and the rising number of 
Chinese investors (Cai, 2006). For example, the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs has 
established a Department for External Security Affairs to enhance the support and protection of 
Chinese investors (Cai, 2006). Given the number of BITS that China has concluded and the 
importance it is assigned to by the Chinese government, the weight of evidence suggests that 
there is likely to be a positive relationship between Chinese ODI and a BIT concluded between 
China and a potential or current host country. In addition, Chinese firms may also be attracted 
by the signalling effect of other BITs if they appreciate the role of dyadic treaties between China 
and another country. 
41 Different studies have created a country risk index composed of indicators measuring 
commercial, political and social risks (Oetzel et al., 2001). One commonly used index, for 
example, is the ICRG composite index (PRS, 2006) which measures country risk on a scale from 
0 to 100 with a lower score indicating riskier countries. This notion of country risk contains 
more information than the creditworthyness used by, for example, Cosset et al. (1992) and Eaton 
et al. (1986). 
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Double taxation treaties and Chinese ODI 
As with BITs, the increasing importance of double taxation treaties (DTTs) is reflected in the 
proliferation of such agreements over the last two decades. The number of DTTs concluded 
worldwide doubled from 1990 to reach 2,758 in 2005 (UNCTAD, 2006). DTTs are normally 
concluded between two countries to avoid the double taxation of companies operating in both 
countries. Country attractiveness is increased because future tax rates on (profitable) foreign 
affiliates are made more predictable for the investing parent company (Davies, 2004). As with 
BITs, DTTs are therefore said to have signalling effects to firms from third countries. DTTs, 
however, also reduce the opportunities for tax avoidance by MNEs, which may be an 
investment disincentive (Egger et al., 2006; Davies, 2004). Moreover, DTTs may be less 
important than other locational determinants, especially for investments in developing countries. 
For example, foreign investors in Africa ranked DTTs in 18`h position behind other locational 
factors such as economic and political stability (UNIDO, 2006). This suggests that DTTs have 
some merit in the investment package, but may not be as important as other FDI determinants. 
Although, theoretically, DTTs are deemed necessary and useful to investing firms, to date, 
empirical studies of the affect on the investment strategies of industrialised country MNEs have 
found either zero effect or a negative effect on FDI flows and stocks (Egger et al., 2006; Davies, 
2004). For example, Egger et al. (2006) find a significant negative association between newly 
implemented DTTs and outward FDI stock from OECD countries. In other words, DTTs are 
associated with less FDI to a host country. One explanation is that the enactment of DTT 
principles results in smaller public budgets in the host country, constraining the resources to 
build the physical, commercial and social infrastructure necessary to attract and support inward 
FDI. Blonigen and Davies (2004) also find significant and negative effects of new DTTs on 
FDI, but positive and significant effects of old treaties. Ambiguities in this work maybe a 
consequence of noisy data and the inclusion of political and economical risk variables which 
mask certain interactions (Davies, 2004; Blonigen and Davies, 2004). Or, as stated earlier, 
DTTs may play a minor role when a sound business environment is in place. The Chinese 
government seeks to conclude DTTs to support domestic firms (see Section 3.3.5) but, to our 
knowledge, the effect of DTTs on the investment behaviour of Chinese MNEs -nor from any 
other developing country- has not been researched before. Following theoretical expectations, a 
positive relationship is assumed at this stage. 
WTO membership and Chinese ODI 
Membership of a host country to the WTO (and formerly to GATT) is incorporated into our 
model as a formal, exogenous element of the Chinese ODIR. The WTO is responsible for 
administering approximately thirty international treaties and agreements, such as the GATT, the 
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agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights and the agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures. These agreements govern much of the framework for international trade 
and international investment (such as most favoured nation and equal treatment of domestic and 
foreign firms, trade dispute resolution, market access, reductions in preferential trading 
arrangements and so forth) (Sornarajah, 2004). Membership of the WTO may signal to foreign 
firms that a country will conform to its strictures and obligations with respect to international 
trade and investment. The WTO thus constitutes an important supranational component of the 
institutional framework within which MNEs operate, and, by extension, this is likely also to be 
the case for Chinese ODI. The expectation is that WTO membership will be viewed favourably 
by potential Chinese investors, although lack of prior research on this point prevents us from 
providing further empirical support for this contention. 
Regional and bilateral trade agreements and Chinese ODI 
Trade is generally a precursor for FDI (Buckley and Casson, 1981). Regional and bilateral trade 
agreements bear therefore the potential to help domestic firms to establish themselves in a 
foreign market first through exports and subsequentially through FDI, especially as the 
agreements often include provisions concerning the liberalisation of the host country's inward 
investment regime and can therefore stimulate intra-regional FDI (Jaumotte, 2004; UNCTAD, 
2005b) 42 Empirical studies on the European market support the notion the intra-regional FDI 
increase with the conclusion of a regional agreement (e. g. Dunning, 1997). Regional and 
bilateral trade agreements may in principle impact ODI from any given country in a similar 
fashion as do BITs and DTTs, because such agreements open host country markets to foreign 
firms. Trade agreements are, however, not further considered in this study. This is because 
China has not participated in sufficient numbers of trade agreements over the period under 
investigation to warrant their inclusion. However, China is now negotiating trade agreements 
since its accession to the WTO with a number of countries and regional organisations. These 
are either under negotiation or already have been concluded. They contain steps towards 
greater trade and investment liberalisation as provided by China's commitments under WTO 
membership (Wang, 2004). Since 2002, China has been able to conclude or agree upon 
frameworks with ten countries and regions (Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2004; Chen, 2006). 
Informal, exogenous elements and Chinese ODI 
In addition to these formal elements, it is argued here that the Chinese ODIR also contains 
informal, exogenous elements. In particular, an informal exogenous element may constitute the 
access to an international social or business network (drawing upon discussions in Sections 
42 These agreements are known under various names, including "free trade agreement", "regional 
trade agreement", "economic partnership agreement", "economic complementation agreement", 
or "closer economic partnership arrangement" (UNCTAD, 2005b). 
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2.2.6 and 3.4.5). Such a network may exist between a Chinese company and (i) the Overseas 
Chinese, (ii) its trading partners, (iii) and international business facilitators (such as investment 
promotion agencies). Access to such a network has the potential to increase investment flows 
between countries by lowering transaction costs (see Sections 2.2.6 and 3.4.5). Further 
elements may include foreign policy such as official development aid and state visits by leading 
politicians to and from host countries concerned (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4.6). State visits as 
such are interpreted as informal because they are generally intended to appease and befriend the 
visited country but bear no codifiable and enforcement mechanisms like home country 
government action. Such visits may, however, be followed by informal and formal 
arrangements between the governments that can affect the investment behaviour of Chinese 
firms. Section 3.3.5 provides examples for China's political activism in Africa which falls into 
this category. It is argued in Sections 2.2.6,3.3.5 and 3.4.5 that all these types of informal, 
exogenous elements may effect the decision-making of Chine firms positively. 
4.3 The Chinese ODIR and international business theory 
The Chinese ODIR is presented diagrammatically in Figure 4.1. This synthesises the discussion 
outlined in this chapter. 
Although Chinese companies are embedded in and influenced by the institutional framework 
presented in this chapter it is apparent from the empirical studies reviewed in Section 2.3 that 
these elements alone are unlikely to fully explain Chinese ODI. The role of institutional factors 
has to be disentangled from other influences such as demand conditions and competition levels 
in the host country. Hence, a combined model that brings the institutional elements and 
traditional theoretical explanations for FDI together may exert much greater explanatory power 
than less holistic modelling can accomplish. The Chinese ODIR as presented in Figure 4.1 
therefore integrates internalisation theory, the investment strategies of the MNE, and the speed 
of commitment to the host market (taking a steer from the Uppsala and the New International 
Ventures theories) presented in Section 2.2. The internalisation theory is depicted at the core of 
the framework showing internalisation across borders through the investment in a foreign 
market. The increase of international investment commitment and psychic distance may depend 
on a firms' access to networks as described in Section 2.2.6. The exploitation of such access 
may decide whether a firm rather adopts an internationalisation approach as predicted by the 
Uppsala theory and the New International Venture theory. The inclusion of the international 
investment strategies (market-, efficiency-, natural resource-, technology- and strategic asset- 
seeking) reflects the basic strategies that Chinese firms pursue in the host country but may be 
influenced by the domestic institutional environment. 
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4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, a framework is presented that describes the Chinese ODI regime (ODIR). This 
is a novel way to represent the institutional factors that have the potential to shape Chinese FDI 
outflows. As such, it constitutes one of the main contributions made by this study to the 
understanding of Chinese ODI. Chinese firms are embedded in a nexus of formal and informal 
constraints at home and internationally that might influence their investment decision-making. 
The acknowledgement of this and the insight it brings in the evaluation of Chinese MNEs are 
important. This notion gains even more weight when Chinese ODI is considered because 
Chinese firms have been highly politicised for most of the period after 1979. 
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The next chapters assess the explanatory power of the Chinese ODIR as presented in Figure 4.1. 
First, interview and survey questionnaire data gathered from Chinese MNEs is evaluated with 
respect to the model (Chapter 6). Second, two cross-sectional models formally test the Chinese 
ODIR (Chapter 7). Model One concentrates on the impact of domestic institutions in China 
while Model Two is concerned with exogenous elements. 
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5 Methodology 
This chapter sets out the research methods for this study. Scholars such as Shenkar (1994), Ang 
(1998) and Eckhardt (2004) argue that Chinese business and China's business environment have 
special characteristics which are most effectively examined by methodological triangulation and 
employment of different data sets. It is asserted here that the use of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods and the investigation of primary and secondary data address the research 
questions best. This chapter first presents a review on quantitative and qualitative research with 
explicit reference to international business research on China. The chapter further describes the 
use and collection of primary and secondary data to address the research questions as presented 
in Sections 1.2 and 3.4. It describes the way interviewees in China were identified, approached 
and interviewed. It goes on with a description of how the survey questionnaire in the UK was 
administered and data analysed. Finally, the set of variables to be used in the econometric 
models in Chapter 7 are outlined and evaluated. 
5.1 Mixed methods approach for Chinese business research 
There are a number of challenges associated with doing research in China and about China 
which have to be considered at the outset of the research design. Some of the challenges are 
research method-specific while others concern both quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
primary and secondary data. This section places the discussion of the challenges in the wider 
context of research methods used in international business research generally and highlights the 
merits of triangulation in the context of China. 
5.1.1 General issues 
As will be seen in Section 5.1.2, quantitative and qualitative research methods both have 
shortcomings which can be addressed using methodological triangulation (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). Methodological triangulation combines the complementary data collected and analysed 
with qualitative and quantitative research methods to answer research questions (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 1998). Therefore this approach can achieve a more holistic picture of the research 
object and helps to answer aspects of research questions that other methods cannot. Given the 
infancy of the current research object (namely Chinese ODI), the questionable reliability of 
official data and my position as an outsider with, prima facie, limited access to Chinese 
companies, a triangulation approach is the most appropriate method for this research. 
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5.1.2 Challenges in cross-sectional research 
Quantitative analysis on China using secondary data generally relies on three different sources, 
namely official sources in China, international organisations and, with respect to international 
investment or trade flows, the partner country. All of these sources, however, have their 
shortcomings which need to be considered by the researcher and addressed where possible. 
Chinese government agencies publish a wide range of statistical yearbooks covering, among 
other things, international trade and foreign direct investment. The available data are often 
constrained by five factors. First, a legal and operational definition of particular items of data is 
often missing (Shenkar, 1994) or, if set out, tends not to be permanent. Classifications and data 
collection methods are often changed over time with little, if any, retrospective adjustment of 
the data concerned (Sinton, 2001). The latter especially compromises longitudinal research of a 
quantitative type. Second, sub-national institutions in China generally have some freedom in 
creating statistics which they report to their superiors. This causes incoherence in data coverage 
and compromises, again, longitudinal and inter-province research (Holz, 2004; Shenkar, 1994; 
Xu, 2004). The most prominent Chinese statistic constantly under criticism for faulty sub- 
national reporting is China's gross domestic product (e. g. Rawski, 2002). Having said that, and 
importantly for this study, the most reliable Chinese statistics concern international trade and 
(inward) FDI as these have a foreign counterpart to provide `checks and balances'. Third, inter- 
province comparison and the generalisation of findings are not always possible (Shenkar, 1994). 
The provincial statistical bureaus have some flexibility over what statistical figures they report 
as is represented in the deviating data coverage in the provincial statistical yearbooks (Voss, 
2004). Fourth, the national statistical bureau may not disclose statistics it deems classified or 
otherwise of political sensitivity (Clegg et al., 1996; Shenkar, 1994). Five, the Chinese 
government has in the past often used statistics for ideological means to support its political 
agenda. This praxis leads to a distortion of the statistical data and again makes longitudinal 
analysis challenging (Shenkar, 1994). Although there are some apparently difficulties with 
Chinese data in particular, the Chinese government has in recent years strengthened its 
international co-operation with organisations such as the OECD and UNCTAD to increase the 
accuracy, reliability and international comparability of official Chinese secondary data (Xu, 
2004). 
To overcome the challenges from the Chinese side, it may seem reasonable to rely on statistical 
data published by international organisations such as UNCTAD, OECD or the World Bank. 
The advantage of using such data is that they derive from a single source which strives to refine 
and tidy up data it receives. International organisations, however, do not collect FDI data 
themselves but rely on the source countries to provide them with it or they use data collected by 
113 
other international organisations. Hence, research has to cope with several challenges 
concerning the reporting of FDI and inter-country comparability. First, an initial portfolio 
investment (that is, investment which remains under the 10 per cent threshold for being 
classified as FDI) may be followed by a subsequent portfolio investment. Combined, these two 
investments could constitute an FDI because the sum attains the threshold level but is not 
recorded as such (Stephan and Pfaffmann, 2001). Second, host countries apply different 
ownership thresholds for the classification of an investment as FDI, varying typically from 10 
per cent to 50 per cent. While an investment may be regarded in one country as FDI it may be 
seen in another as a portfolio investment (Stephan and Pfaffmann, 2001). The ten per cent 
threshold is internationally most commonly adapted. Third, the definition of FDI comprises 
retained earnings, inter-company loans and equity capital shares in foreign companies 
(UNCTAD, 2006). Some countries, however, underreport their inward FDI by not including 
retained earnings or short-term inter-company loans (Stephan and Pfaffmann, 2001). Fourth, 
countries may apply varying accounting standards especially with respect to the calculation of 
retained earnings and the classification of inter-company loans as equity investments. This 
affects the levels of reportable FDI (Stephan and Pfaffmann, 2001). A case in point is China, 
which has moved from an accounting system designed to support the centrally planned 
economic system to a system more similar with the once found in market economies (Tang, 
2000; Chen et al., 2002). To date, however, differences between the Chinese and the 
International Accounting Standards still exist, and this is most apparent in the reported earnings 
of publicly listed firms in China (Chen et al., 2002). Lastly, research concerning FDI has the 
advantage that two countries are involved. Thus, official data of the host country could be used 
for analysis. Nevertheless, depending on the investment amount and investment project number, 
the host country statistical office may not disclose the inward FDI figure for a particular source 
country. This, for example, is the case for Chinese investments to the UK, which are neither 
included in official British documents nor otherwise available to protect the investor. 
5.1.3 Challenges in qualitative research 
To overcome the problems associated with secondary data, primary data can be collected using 
either a survey questionnaire or interviews. Both approaches have their merits and challenges in 
the context of China as illustrated below. 
The use of a questionnaire poses a couple of serious concerns in China. First, the applicability 
of a questionnaire designed by a scholar in a culture different to her home culture can cause 
construct validity problems due to `native category' issues (Buckley and Chapman, 1996; 
Shenkar, 1994). Native categories describe the impact of language barriers, differences in 
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cultural traditions and backgrounds on the understanding of the questions asked as these build 
on culture-specific categories. Second, the translation of a questionnaire into Chinese is 
complicated. Exact meanings cannot always be translated and, hence, lead to misunderstandings 
on the part of the respondent and, subsequently, to misinterpretation by the researcher (Shenkar, 
1994). This problem has an even greater importance when the survey questionnaire is 
administered in different parts of China as numerous dialects are spoken. For example, Roy et 
al. state (2001: 207) that " "high risk" can be translated as "qiang feng xian" in northern and 
middle China but as "gao feng xian" in southern China. To Chinese from the south, the word 
"qiang" has two meanings, one is related to the "magnitude" and the other to "strength". " 
Construct validity may be impaired as a consequence of ambiguous interpretation. Third, the 
Chinese respondent might answer with an ideal picture to avoid losing face (miau zu) and not 
with reference to reality or her beliefs and opinions (Adler et al., 1989). Such a pattern 
questions the construct validity of the questionnaire and external validity. Fourth, Chinese 
people are often either not familiar with survey questionnaires or are culturally constrained (to 
avoid uncertainty and favour collectivism), and, hence, tend to place a score in the middle of a 
five or seven Likert-type scale (Shenkar, 1994; Si et al., 2003). Finally, when a scale in a 
survey questionnaire includes `lucky' numbers - two, eight, and nine - these answers are more 
often chosen than others (Ang, 1998). Again, construct validity, as well as reliability and 
external validity, suffer from such behaviour. 
The problems with secondary data and survey questionnaires lead some researchers to suggest 
that interview-based research is more suitable for research on China (Eckhardt, 2004). However, 
there are pitfalls to this approach as well. First, most non-Chinese researchers are not 
sufficiently fluent in Mandarin, the official language in China, or any other local dialect like 
Cantonese which is essential for Southern China. Often, the non-Chinese researcher therefore 
has to rely on a local interpreter who may be employed by the Chinese government or the CCP. 
The interpreter may translate work in loyalty to her ultimate employer with the aim of 
preventing the interviewer from gathering potentially harming or critically information about 
the party, the society or the economic situation. In the worst case, she could refuse to do 
translation at all, being aware that the foreign researcher depends on her goodwill (Shenkar, 
1994). The right choice of interpreter is also important from another perspective. Besides the 
problem of biased translation, the interpreter might not be familiar with international business 
terminology and find it difficult to translate exact meanings. This again can lead to 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations (Fischer, 2001). Consequently, construct validity 
cannot be ensured. Second, Chinese interviewees may tend to answer questions suitable to her 
position in a hierarchy and not her own opinion (Eckhardt, 2004). Third, the richness of the 
collected data may be constrained when data collection is conducted by an outsider, i. e. a non- 
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Chinese who does not belong to a defined group in China. Chinese people are often afraid of 
giving away too much information which may subsequently undermine their position of power 
(Roy et al., 2001). For these reasons, it is therefore advisable to conduct interviews in 
collaboration with a Chinese researcher (Eckhardt, 2004). Fourth, the inclusion of a Chinese 
researcher in the project may also support access to potential interviewees. Foreigners and 
outsiders in general often find it difficult to get access to Chinese organisations when they do 
not speak the local language fluently enough and are not known to the organisation. A local 
researcher may overcome these problems. Hierarchal structures and groups, give rise to another 
crucial aspect, which is interdependence. Interdependence describes the situation when 
someone acts and thinks in a context-related way and in relation to her personal environment 
rather than based on personal beliefs and attitudes (Eckhardt, 2004). As a consequence, it is 
important to understand the environment in which the interviews take place to interpret 
responses correctly (Eckhardt, 2004; Fischer, 2001). 
In the following sections the methods used to collect primary and cross-sectional data and their 
limitations are outlined. 
5.2 Primary data collection 
For this reason, the primary collection process was split into two parts: interviews in China and 
a survey questionnaire distributed to Chinese affiliates in the UK. Section 5.2.1 describes the 
interview process in China. Section 5.2.2 describes the questionnaire survey undertaken in the 
UK. 
5.2.1 Interviews in China 
Primary data collection by interview in China took place between May 2006 and August 2006. 
This section describes the process of identifying potential interviewee candidates and Chinese 
affiliates and how the interviews were conducted and analysed. The section concludes with 
limitations and constraints faced using these data collection method. 
5.2.1.1 Interviewee identification 
Potential interviews candidates were identified among Chinese firms, government decision- 
makers and stakeholders such as foreign investment promotion agencies with an office in China. 
The key people interviewed were senior managers from Chinese firms. Interviews with 
government staff and investment promotion agencies were considered to provide auxiliary, 
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independent support to the data obtained from the core interviews. To be able to interview a 
significant number of Chinese MNEs with different ownership forms, the two provinces and 
municipal area with provincial status of the Yangtze River Delta were selected as the main 
provinces for the interviews to take place: Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai. The reasons for this 
are as follows. The Yangtze River Delta is a regional economic powerhouse in China, which 
the following stylised facts illustrate. It is a major recipient of inward FDI to China, attracting 
on average around 30 per cent of total inflows during the years 2001 to 2003 (NBS, various 
years) and it registered the largest number of foreign enterprises by 2005 (NBS, 2006). The 
gross domestic product (GDP) accounted on average for 21 per cent of China's GDP between 
the years 2001 and 2005 (NBS, 2006). The large GDP share is especially driven by private 
enterprises in Jiangsu, Shanghai and Zhejiang (Wang, 2006b) which are numerous in the 
Yangtze River Delta region. The large private economy provided sufficient possibilities to talk 
to Chinese MNEs of different ownership types. The provinces and the municipal area of the 
Yangtze River Delta accounted for nearly 30 per cent of Chinese ODI stock in 2004 (MOFCOM, 
2004b). Finally, the University of Leeds is a member of the Worldwide Universities Network 
(WLJN). In China, only the Universities of Nanjing (Jiangsu) and Hangzhou (Zhejiang) are 
WUN members. WUN offers fieldwork funding in China only when it is conducted in 
collaboration with a WUN university. This was a further practical argument to focus the 
interviews on this region. The School of Management of the University of Nanjing agreed to 
collaborate on this particular research project which subsequently secured WUN funding for the 
fieldwork. Co-funding was also secured from the Universities' China Committee, London. The 
collaboration proved to be useful to get access to some companies as the School of Management, 
Nanjing enjoys a good reputation in the region and is an important gatekeeper to organisations 
(Odendahl and Shaw, 2001; Kincaid and Bright, 1957). 
Companies 
Several sources were used to identify potential firms to be interviewed. No public available 
directory on outbound investing Chinese companies exists to date. Hence, a total population is 
not known from which firms could have been sampled (Singleton and Straits, 2001). Instead, 
firms were added to a newly created database at random when identified. SOEs were relatively 
easy to locate as most of the `Top 500' Chinese firms are SOEs and have often invested abroad. 
Privately-owned companies are difficult to track down, however. Different means were 
therefore used to identify firms. First, the attendance of a Chinese international trade and 
investment fair, such as the East-China Fair in Shanghai (http: //www. east-china- 
fair. com/enindex. htm), was taken as one indicator for potential outbound investment activities 
of the participating firm. In particular, privately-owned companies were identified using this 
approach. Second, international business and trade publication such as the Financial Times, 
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The Economist and Business Week were used to identify further potential interview candidates 
headquartered in the Yangtze River Delta region. Prior to departure to China, the numbers of 
identified Chinese firms in the focal provinces were as follows: Jiangsu: twenty-nine, Shanghai: 
twenty-two, and Zhejiang: eighty. Third, a `snowball strategy' was employed after 
commencing the research in China. Each interviewed international stakeholder, was asked if he 
or she could either name one or two outbound investing Chinese firms or recommend the 
researcher to one or two of relevant companies they were in contact with. Thus, access to a 
network through a gatekeeper was achieved and the privacy of the Chinese firm ensured 
(Odendahl and Shaw, 2001). With the help of the `gatekeepers' three further Chinese firms in 
Shanghai were identified and interviewed. Table 5.1 presents a summary of the interview 
schedule. 
Government organisations 
A number of government organisations with a potential influence on the ODI process of 
Chinese firms (as identified in Chapter 3.2.2) were identified for interview. The selected 
organisations on the provincial level were SAFE, MOFCOM and the NDRC. To identify the 
correct interviewee in each organisation, staff in some investment promotion agencies were 
asked to recommend an appropriate interview candidate in each of the provincial organisations. 
International stakeholders 
The limited number of foreign investment promotion agencies (IPAs) in China and the 
objections of other IPAs to an interview led to a concentration of interviews with European 
IPAs in China. Both, national and regional IPAs were identified and interviewed. IPAs were 
identified through an internet search with the keywords `investment promotion agency' and 
`Invest in .... ' and `China'. Additionally, important international recipients of global FDI were 
checked to see if they have (i) an IPA and (ii) an office in China. A third source was the `snow- 
balling' technique. Each interviewed IPA was asked for contact details of other IPAs, and in 
many cases these were provided. 
Figure 5.1 summarises the spatial distribution of the interviews conducted. It shows that the 
majority of interviews took place in the Yangtze River Delta as planned, and, of these, most 
interviews took place in Shanghai. 
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Figure 5.1: Spatial distribution of interviews in China 
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5.2.1.2 Interview organisation and structure 
Interview candidates identified using the approach described above were contacted from the UK 
in March and April 2006 before the researcher left to China in May 2006. An invitation letter 
was prepared in English and translated by a native Chinese into Chinese. A second native 
Chinese colleague with considerable research experience in dealing with Chinese firms 
corrected and improved the language (see Appendix A. 2). The translated invitation letter was 
sent as a facsimile to the most senior manager of the firm. In the letter, the scope of the research 
was explained and the Chinese research partner (School of Management, Nanjing) introduced. 
Managers were invited to join the research and an interview requested. This approach secured 
one interview (with Company 1) before leaving for China. The remaining interviews were 
organised in China by contacting potential interviewees per telephone without sending them a 
second written invitation. Non-corporate interviewees were asked if they could suggest one or 
two other potential interviewees. Some IPAs were very helpful providing either contact details 
of government officials and other IPAs or by contacting firms directly. Of the ten company 
interviews, one was organised through the School of Management, one through a foreign MNE, 
three by IPAs, and one by a government official. 
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Foreign IPAs, MNEs and other stakeholders were contacted by the researcher in English after 
having arrived in China. Chinese firms and government officials were contacted by an 
interpreter. Three interpreters were employed during the fieldwork. All have been senior 
students at the School of Management of the University of Nanjing. Each interpreter was 
trained by the researcher in the objectives of the research project and the interview questions 
before commencing telephone calls and joining interviews. 
Anonymity has been ensured to every interviewee to raise the response rate and to be allowed to 
voice-record the interview. Most interviewees agreed to voice-recording of the interview. 
Additionally, interview notes were taken and transcribed immediately afterwards. Hence, Table 
5.1 presents a `disguised' interview schedule. 
The interviews were semi-structured to minimise measurement error and to achieve a better 
comparison of the interviews (Singleton and Straits, 2001; Gillham, 2005). Slight deviations in 
the interview questions occurred to account for the affiliation of the interviewee: (a) companies, 
(b) government officials, and (c) IPAs, foreign MNEs and other stakeholders (see Appendices 
A. 3 to A. 5). The structured but open questions provided flexibility for the researcher to react to 
and engage with the answers of the interviewee (Kincaid and Bright, 1957). All interviews 
were designed around four broad themes to address the research questions RQ2, RQ3, RQ4, 
RQ5, RQ9, RQ1Oa, and RQ11 in particular. The four themes were: internationalisation stages, 
investment strategies, international networks, and domestic institutions. With regard to research 
questions RQ2 to RQ5 (which focus on international investment strategies), the interview was 
designed to identify the possible investment drivers. Concerning RQ9, it was intended to gain a 
good understanding of access and usage of Chinese firms to international networks. The 
delicate question concerning the impact of domestic institutions on investment decision and an 
in-depth insight on administrative mechanisms (RQ1Oa) were thought to be obtainable 
especially through interviews. RQ11 was tackled by interviewing Chinese firms of different 
ownership forms and by interviewing government officials, IPAs, and others about their 
perceptions of Chinese MNEs by ownership type. All this has allowed analysing the interviews 
systematically following the structure of the model advanced in Chapter 4 and the overall 
research questions of this research. 
5.2.1.3 Limitations concerning interviews 
The interviews conducted had number of limitations. First, similar to experience by other 
researchers (e. g. Thomas, 1993; Yeung, 1995) it was difficult to get access to firms, and this 
kept the number of company interviews small. Although numerous IPAs provided very useful 
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insights about the development, strategies and motivations of Chinese MNEs and were helpful 
in organising interviews, the research object is the Chinese firm. Interviews with some thirty 
firms would have strengthened the research findings and improved the generalisibility of this 
aspect of the project. Second, although the researcher has a reasonable command of Mandarin, 
it was deemed necessary to conduct interviews using an interpreter. Questions were asked in 
English, and these were translated for the interviewee. Similarly, responses were translated to 
English, despite the fact that the researcher was able to comprehend some of what was said. 
This process gave rise to a number of limitations. In particular, the interpreters were of varying 
quality. All three were very engaged and interested in the research but had different levels of 
understanding of international business and experience in interpreting interviews. Conducting 
all interviews with one interpreter would have ensured that all were conducted in the same way. 
The fourth limitation is the usage of an interpreter in general. Having to rely on an interpreter to 
enforce the researcher's questions dilutes the possibility to press the interviewee to answer a 
question clearly. 
Table 5.1: Anonymised interview schedule 
Interviewee(s) Place and date Duration 
Chinese outward investors (Company) 
1 Vice General Manager Nanjing (Jiangsu) 90 min 
28 May 2006 
2 (a) Dept Director of the HR Development Division Qingdao (Shandong) 90 min 
(b) Marketing Manager Assistant 19 June 2006 
3 (a) Former Vice President Wuxi (Jiangsu) 105 min 
(b) Deputy General Manager 12 July 2006 
4 Executive Director Shanghai 120 min 
14 July 2006 
5 Vice General Manager Shanghai 75 min 
18 July 2006 
6 Managing Director Shanghai 60 min 
21 July 2006 
7 Chief Managing Officer Hangzhou (Zhejiang) 120 min 
24 July 2006 
8 (a) Special Assistant to Chairman Yiwu (Zhejiang) 90 min 
(b) Manager Overseas Marketing Department 26 July 2006 
9 Former General Manager of the Australia affiliate Shanghai 70 min 
1 August 2006 
10 Vice President Danyang (Jiangsu) 75 min 
4 August 2006 
Chinese government authorities (Government) 
1 Assistant Director Shanghai 60 min 
17 July 2006 
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2 Business developer Chengdu (Sichuan) 60 min 
via Skype 
20 July 2006 
3 (a) Deputy Director Nanjing (Jiangsu) 45 min 
(b) Overseas Investment Division 28 July 2006 
4 Section Chief Ningbo (Zhejiang) 60 min 
2 August 2006 
5 Vice Division Director Nanjing (Jiangsu) 60 min 
3 August 2006 
International stakeholders 
IPA 1 Chief representative Shanghai 30 min 
via Telephone 
25 May 2006 
IPA 2 Chief representative Nanjing (Jiangsu) 10 min 
via Telephone 
25 May 2006 
Foreign MNE Chief executive officer Nanjing (Jiangsu) 60 min 
1 June 2006 
European embassy Trade Officer Shanghai 30 min 
2 June 2006 
IPA 3 Business Development Manager Shanghai 60 min 
2 June 2006 
Sino-European business facilitator 1 Business Shanghai 30 min 
Development Manager 2 June 2006 
IPA 4 Chief executive officer Shanghai 30 min 
5 June 2006 
IPA 5 Business Development Manager Shanghai 75 min 
3 June 2006 
IPA 6 Investment Promotion Officer Shanghai 80 min 
5 June 2006 
IPA 7 Chief representative Hangzhou (Zhejiang) 60 min 
7 June 2006 
IPA 8 Trade Officer Shanghai 75 min 
13 June 2006 
IPA 9 Investment Manager Nanjing (Jiangsu) 90 min 
14 June 2006 
IPA 10 Deputy Director Shanghai 60 min 
3 July 2006 
IPA 11 Representative Shanghai 90 min 
3 July 2006 
IPA 12 General Manager Shanghai 80 min 
4 July 2006 
IPA 13 Inward Investment Officer Shanghai 90 min 
5 July 2006 
Sino-European business facilitator 2 Nanjing (Jiangsu) 60 min 
Chief representative 19 July 2006 
Chinese consultant General Manager Hangzhou (Zhejiang) 30 min 
24 July 2006 
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5.2.2 Survey of Chinese affiliates in the United Kingdom 
This section describes the survey undertaken with Chinese affiliates in the UK. It sets out the 
identification process of Chinese affiliates in the UK, the survey design and how the survey was 
organized and distributed. It concludes with some limitations of this approach. 
5.2.2.1 Identification of Chinese affiliates in the UK 
To date, there exists no official database on Chinese firms active in the UK. Several public 
sources were therefore used to identify UK-based affiliates of Chinese firms. Most firms were 
identified using the business information providers ICC (ICC, 2005a, 2005b) and Hemscott 
(Hemscott, 2005). Further companies were identified using the homepages of the Chinese 
Embassy in London and UK Trade and Investment (UKTI), as well as business press such as the 
Financial Times. From these sources 151 affiliates of Chinese firms in the UK were identified 
that were indicated to be operating in 2005. This number was subsequently reduced to 132 as 
dissolved, dormant and liquidated companies were excluded from the database. This figure 
compares well to the UKTI's statement that 220 mainland Chinese companies had invested in 
the UK by 2006 (UKTI, 2006). The database was then further reduced to 125 firms as those 
companies for which a valid postal address could not be found were deleted. 
5.2.2.2 Survey questionnaire organisation and distribution 
In August 2005,125 Chinese affiliates in the UK received a paper-based questionnaire and 
cover letter in English explaining the objectives of the research together with a prepaid return 
envelope (see Appendix A. 6 and A. 7). Because the Chinese affiliate runs a business in the UK 
and has to interact with an English-speaking environment, it was decided to not translate the 
survey questionnaire into Chinese. Anonymity and unidentifiably of individual respondents in 
the analysis was assured to every Chinese firm in the cover letter. The mailing was directed to 
the identified senior manager of the UK-based Chinese affiliate or, in cases when no individual 
could be identified, to the senior manager. The questionnaire was followed-up with a number of 
telephone calls to explain the project and to encourage participation. If the Chinese company 
then agreed to participate in the survey, the questionnaire was resent, either by mail, email or 
fax, depending on the request of the participant. The whole process stretched over eight months 
until March 2006. 
The returned questionnaires and follow-ups led to the exclusion of a further seven firms for 
various reasons (the firm had since been dissolved or originated from either Hong Kong or 
Taiwan). During this process, however, an additional four Chinese firms active in the UK were 
identified. A questionnaire with cover letter and pre-paid return envelope was sent to these 
firms as well. Thus, a total population of 122 affiliates of Chinese firms active in the UK was 
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identified. Twenty-one usable responses were received from these firms, giving a response rate 
of 17.2 per cent. 
Before sending the questionnaire to the Chinese affiliates, it was piloted during spring and 
summer 2005 with two UK firms which were founded by two mainland Chinese individuals. 
The survey questionnaire was designed around investment strategies and motivation to address 
in particular research questions RQ2 to RQ5 and on strategy changes over time (RQ6). 
5.2.2.3 Limitations to the survey questionnaire 
The survey questionnaire has some limitations. First, the identified population of Chinese 
affiliates in the UK is relatively small. It is thus difficult to draw a random sample from the 
population and address only the sample with a questionnaire. Second, the identified population 
does not necessarily correspond with the true population of Chinese firms in the UK. The view 
is that it is a fair representation. Other studies inflate the number of Chinese firms in the UK by 
intermingling firms from mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and sometimes 
Singapore into the category `Chinese firms' (e. g. GLAEconomics, 2004). Third, the small 
number of usable returned questionnaires limits the analytical methods that can be applied. 
Fourth, the parent companies of the respondent firms in China were not interviewed during the 
China fieldwork phase. Thus, this aspect to the research does not deal with `matched pairs' and 
this reduces opportunities for triangulation of this element of the data collected. 
5.3 Quantitative analysis and secondary data sources 
This section describes and discusses the data sources for the dependent and independent 
variables as employed in the econometric modelling described in Chapter 7. 
5.3.1 Data sources and limitations of the dependent variable 
Chinese data sources of Chinese ODI used in later cross-sectional models are now reviewed, 
namely SAFE data (employed in Section 7.1) and MOFCOM data (employed in Section 7.2). 
The data published in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China is included for completeness. Aspects of reliability and validity are considered for all 
three data sources. 
SAFE 
The State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is highly involved in the approval of 
Chinese ODI (see Section 3.2.2). SAFE has to approve the source and amount of foreign 
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exchange used by a domestic Chinese enterprise in an overseas investment. Without the 
approval by SAFE the Chinese company cannot proceed to MOFCOM to apply for the approval 
of the business project. SAFE therefore records all foreign exchange transactions approved for 
Chinese ODI as well as capital transfers between the Chinese headquarters and its foreign 
affiliate (such as reinvested earnings and intra-company loans) and subsequent investments and 
private sector transactions (Buckley et al., 2006; Wu and Sia, 2002). The data collected by 
SAFE therefore largely reflects China's balance of payments (BOP) data as published by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The SAFE dataset available for this research projects is 
based on SAFE-approved Chinese ODI projects made between the period 1979 and 2001. The 
data include information on host country, industry sector, foreign market entry mode, and 
commitment of the Chinese investor. This depth and width makes the SAFE database 
invaluable for research on Chinese ODI. SAFE staff asserts that his dataset is the most 
complete and most detailed available on Chinese ODI and includes all projects that fell under its 
remit over the period under investigation. 
There are, however, some limitations associated with the SAFE data (Buckley et al., 2006): 
SAFE only approves and records Chinese ODI involving transfers of money. When Chinese 
ODI involves any transaction in kind, i. e. for example when the Chinese investor contributes to 
an investment project with transfers of equipment, raw materials and intangible assets, these 
transactions are not approved and recorded by SAFE. Chinese firms were encouraged to invest 
in kind, especially during the 1980s (Guo, 1984) (see Section 3.3.1) and this may have led to 
some underreporting of early Chinese ODI. It should also be noted that SAFE data as reported 
to the IMF is based on collected sample data which may underrepresented real changes to 
China's BOP (Zhan, 1995; Wu and Sia, 2002). Moreover, some Chinese ODI projects initiated 
or approved by local governments may not be reported to SAFE (and subsequently to 
MOFCOM) in order to circumvent the approval process or because the company was exempted 
from the process (Zhang, 2003; Ding, 2000a). In addition, the SAFE data is only available up to 
the end of 2001 (when the decision was taken in SAFE to no longer compile data at the level of 
disaggregation it had done previously) which excludes the period for which MOFCOM reports 
the fastest and steepest increase of Chinese ODI. 
MOFCOM 
MOFCOM is the second government authority involved in the approval of initial Chinese ODI 
projects (see Section 3.2.2). MOFCOM reports in its Almanac of China's Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade (prior to 2004) and China Commerce Yearbook (after 2004) non-financial, 
approved Chinese ODI by host country. The data is mostly presented as aggregated data and as 
volume change over two years. The reporting of approved projects causes some of the same 
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problems as for SAFE data. The exclusion of financial ODI causes further problems. 
Traditionally, financial institutions from industrialised countries follow their customers abroad 
(UNCTAD, 2004b). The omission of ODI by China's financial institutions, such as the 
acquisition of Indonesia-based Bank Halim by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
and the USD 1.3 billion purchase of the Bank of America businesses in Hong Kong and Macao 
by the China Construction Bank, both in 2006 (CIBUL, 2007; FT, 2006e), leads to an 
underreporting of Chinese ODI which will become more severe with increasing Chinese ODI 
flows. MOFCOM is also not responsible for approving and, hence, registering and reporting 
ODI by privately-owned firms, nor intra-company loans and reinvested earnings (Wu and Sia, 
2002). Moreover, MOFCOM does not record large-scale Chinese ODI which have been 
initiated by a certain political agenda and foreign policy objectives such as some projects in 
South Asia and Africa (Buckley et al., 2006). Such investments require the approval of the 
State Council only. Data published by MOFCOM may therefore significantly underreport the 
value and scope of Chinese ODI (Wu and Sia, 2002; Cai, 2006). It should be noted, however, 
that MOFCOM together with the National Bureau of Statistics has undertaken initiatives to 
strengthen the statistical reporting system and has implemented the `statistical system of direct 
overseas investment' (MOFCOM and NBS, 2002). This system places reporting 
responsibilities on the investing firm and the national and sub-national branches of MOFCOM 
and widens the scope of the reporting system compared to previous years. MOFCOM (2006c) 
has also issued in late 2006 a further notice on the importance of a timely, accurate and 
comprehensive reporting system and the fulfilment of each party's responsibilities. From 2007, 
MOFCOM and NBS will also collect and report quarterly data on Chinese ODI along with 
information on ownership type (MOFCOM, 2007). These measures indicate that the Chinese 
government authorities have acknowledged the current shortcomings in the reporting system on 
Chinese ODI and could soon make the above criticisms obsolete. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China 
The National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) publishes annually the Chinese Statistical 
Yearbook (CSY). The CSY reports on both the Chinese balance of payments and non-financial 
Chinese ODI. While the former is reported from 1997 onwards, the coverage of Chinese ODI 
starts with the CSY 2005 covering 2004 only. Chinese ODI data for 2004 covers net and 
accumulated end-2004 Chinese ODI by industry sector only. The CSY 2006 also includes 
information on non-financial Chinese ODI to selected host countries for the year 2005. The 
limited coverage and current inconsistency in presentation excludes this dataset from use in 
econometric analysis. The BOP data published in the CSY mirrors SAFE data as published in 
the Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (IMF, 2006) and data extractable from UNCTAD's 
TNGFDI online database (UNCTAD, 2007a). Both IMF and UNCTAD report, however, data 
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covering years reaching back until the early 1980s. The crucial limitation of the BOP data is its 
unidimensionality. Only total ODI is reported, with no breakdown by host country or industry. 
This dataset is therefore not useable when the determinants of Chinese ODI are investigated and 
investment strategies are sought to be identified. 
Obviously, all three sources do not report illegal, non-approved capital outflows which are often 
disguised as `foreign' re-invested in China to benefit from preferential treatment to foreign- 
invested enterprises (round-tripping). These flows are argued to be of some magnitude (Zhan, 
1995; Wu and Sia, 2002; Deng, 2004). The best estimates of illegal capital outflows from 
China are based on the errors and omissions items in the BOP (Gunter, 2004). Gunter corrects 
the official errors and omissions data for China's holdings in foreign financial assets, 
underinvoicing of exports and overinvoicing of imports and lack of disclosure of China's short- 
term foreign debts before estimating the degree of capital flight from China between 1984 and 
2001. Misinvoicing is said to be pervasive among internationally active SOEs as it allows them 
to keep foreign exchange earnings and to claim more foreign exchange titles at the designated 
Chinese banks it is required to sell the earnings to (Groombridge, 2001). Employing this 
thorough approach, Gunter (2004) finds significant fluctuations in capital flight in accordance 
with government policies. He concludes that over the eighteen year period of his study, capital 
flight amounted to up to USD 920 billion which represents the upper spread of his estimation. 
This figure is significantly higher than the accumulated ODI stock reported by either MOFCOM 
(USD 44.33bn) or UNCTAD (USD 34.66bn) for the end of 2001. Despite these shortcomings, 
the MOFCOM data, and especially, the SAFE data are the best available on Chinese ODI and 
its distribution by host country. Both are therefore used in the econometric modelling presented 
in Chapter 7. 
5.3.2 Data sources and limitations of the independent variables 
This section describes the data sources for the independent variables used in the econometric 
models which are collected from different publicly available sources. All variables with 
monetary figures were either obtained in constant prices (year 2000) or were transformed into 
constant prices (year 2000). The `traditional' variables are discussed first, followed by the new 
`institution-related' variables that derive from previous discussions (Sections 4.2 and 4.3) and a 
set of control variables which are included for methodological reasons. Abbreviations in 
brackets denote the variable's acronym used in the econometric analyses in Chapter 7. All 
variables used are also presented together with the acronym, source, and selected references to 
empirical studies in Table 5.2. For purposes of simplification, variables from both econometric 
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models are discussed together. The discussion of each model in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 presents 
43 the variables employed in that specific model 
Market-seeking investment 
The alternate proxies for market-seeking investment decisions by Chinese companies are gross 
domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita and GDP growth. Data for all three proxies were 
taken from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank (World Bank, 
2006a). The World Development Indicators database was accessed through ESDS International. 
Drivers for natural resource-seeking investment 
Two different proxies are used to measure the natural resources endowment of a host country, 
namely (i) the percentage of ores and metals exports to total merchandise exports and (ii) the 
export of crude oil and natural liquefied gas. Data on ores and metals exports was taken from 
the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006a) and on crude oil and natural liquefied 
gas exports from the Oil Information 2006 published by the International Energy Agency (2006). 
The World Development Indicators and Oil Information databases were accessed through ESDS 
International. 
Strategic asset seeking-investment 
The propensity of Chinese firms to conduct asset-seeking FDI is proxied by the total number of 
patent granted per year to residents and non-residents by a host country as published by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (2006). 
Institutional variables 
Domestic (endogenous) institutional dummies 
Changes to China's domestic policies are integrated in the cross-sectional models in Chapter 7 
using two time dummies and one structural break. These proxies have not been employed in 
earlier studies on Chinese ODI but derive from discussions in Chapters 3 and 4. First, the 
journey of Deng Xiaoping to Southern China in 1992 and its effects on liberalisation policies is 
incorporated. The dummy takes the value zero for years before 1992 and one for the year 1992 
43 This section presents variables as employed in Model One and Model Two in Chapter 7. 
Theoretically, more or other variables could have been employed such as home-host country 
wage differentials, host country infrastructure, and intellectual property rights protection among 
other things. To achieve a more accurate representation of Chinese ODI, the spatial distribution 
has been taken into consideration with the selection of the country sample. The inclusion of a 
significant number developing countries meant the exclusion of some variables due to missing 
data. 
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and thereafter. Second, the effects of the change to China's foreign exchange regime in 1994 
are captured by a time dummy. The dummy takes the value one for the years following the 
regime change and zero for earlier years. Third, the instigation of the `Go Global' policy in 
1999 is captured as well. This time, a structural break is used instead of a time dummy. The 
structural break splits a given period under investigation into two groups and allows for 
comparison of the results across time frames. 
Supranational (exogenous) institutional variables 
Information about the conclusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITS) and Double Taxation 
Treaties (DTTs) between China and a host country and the total number of BITs and DTTs 
concluded by a host country were obtained from UNCTAD 44 The WTO/GATT membership 
status of a host'country was obtained from the WTO (2006) website. 
The cultural proximity of a host country to China is measured as the proportion of Overseas 
Chinese people to the total population of the host country. A host country with an Overseas 
Chinese population equal to or larger than one per cent of the total population is a dummy 
variable with the value of one assigned, and zero for all other host countries. The total 
population of a host country was obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World 
Bank. Data on Overseas Chinese was obtained for the year 1997 (or nearest) from various 
sources, including Ohio University (2006), Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (1998), Ma 
(2003), Kent (2003) and the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2006). The country estimate 
for Croatia was provided directly by the Chinese Embassy in Croatia. 
The geographic distance between a host country and China is based on the distance between 
country capitals and was calculated using the free internet-based tool available at 
www. geobytes. com. The coverage and accuracy of the tool at geobytes. com were tested by 
comparing the results with those retrieved from www. indo. com and www. wcrl. ars. usda. gov/ 
cec/java/capitals. htm. Geobytes. com was regarded as superior because of its higher accuracy 
and better data coverage. 
Country risk 
In both econometric models the country risk composite International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) as published by the PRS Group (2006) was used. The ICRG comprises measurements 
44 I am very grateful to Mr Zhan, Chief of the International Arrangements Sections of the Division 
on Investment, Technology & Enterprise Development at UNCTAD, and Mr Bekele, Associate 
Economic Affairs Officer at the International Arrangements Sections (UNCTAD), for providing 
me with the data. 
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for political, financial, and economic risk factors. The three subcomponents of the measure 
comprise twelve, five and five variables, respectively. The subcomponents of `political', 
`financial' and `economic' risk are aggregated to a value between zero and one hundred. A 
country risk level of zero denotes an extremely risky country while, at the other extreme, a level 
of one hundred denotes a very stable and safe country. The annual composite data by the PRS 
Group have been used. The ICRG has been acknowledged to be the most comprehensive 
measurement of country risk with regard to country and time period coverage (World Bank, 
2007; Nordal, 2001). Having said that, it should be noted that the validity of the ICRG is 
constrained by reliance on the opinion of a few experts. It also refers mainly to risk factors as 
perceived by industrialised country rather than developing country firms. This is an important 
point, and is revisited later in relation to discussion of the findings. 
Control variables 
The official exchange rate of a country, measured in US dollar, was taken from the World 
Development Indicators while the annual inflation rate of a host country was obtained from the 
World Economic Outlook Database published by the International Monetary Fund (2006). The 
official exchange rate and annual inflation are used to calculate the purchasing power parity 
(PPP). PPP is calculated using the difference in the inflation rate between the host country and 
China plus the percentage appreciation the host country's currency against the Chinese Yuan. 
The data on Chinese trade: exports from China and imports to China were obtained from the 
China Statistical Yearbook published by the National Bureau of Statistics (various years). 
Finally, the openness of a host country to inward FDI flows is measured as an annual ratio of 
inward FDI flows to GDP as published by UNCTAD (2007a). The rational for inclusion of 
these variables is provided by the research reviewed in Section 2.3 on FDI determinants in 
general. 
In this study, these variables are assigned acronyms which are presented in Table 5.2. Table 5.2 
also presents the source of each variable and selected references of empirical studies which used 
the variable in similar work on FDI (but not necessarily on Chinese ODI). The time dummy 
1994 and the structural break 1999 are indicated as `new' because no study could be identified 
using that use two proxies for economic liberalisation in China. This again points to the novelty 
of this study. 
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5.4 Summary and project overview 
The structure of the research project is presented in Figure 5.2. Starting with the month in 
which the research was commenced, the Figure shows how the literature review informed the 
research questions (see Section 3.4) and led to the conceptualisation of the model advanced in 
Chapter 4. To address the research questions, primary and secondary data were collected 
roughly in parallel. The results of the survey questionnaire and the cross-sectional analysis 
provided different levels of insights and helped to inform the last part of primary data collection, 
the structured interviews. Although the interviews came last, they are the first to be discussed 
in Section 6.1 in connection with the model from Chapter 4. The survey questionnaire results 
are discussed in Section 6.2 before turning towards the econometric modelling in Chapter 7. 
Figure 5.2: The research project 
Literature review I October 2004 
Formulation of 
research questions 
Development of the 
theoretical models 
May 2005 
Development of a 
survey questionnaire Specification of the 
econometric models 
Identification of and data collection 
Chinese at iliates in the 
August 2005 
UK and survey Analysis and distribution 
assessment of the 
Analysis and models 
assessment of the 
survey data Development of T interview questions 
Interviews in China August 2006 
Refinement of the 
Analysis of the models 
interview data 
Writing up of the ýJ 
research results 
Up to June 2007 
Note: The overview of the stages of the research project is not drawn to scale. 
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6 The determinants of Chinese outward direct investment 
- interpretations from primary data 
In this chapter parts of the Chinese ODIR model presented in Chapter 4 are tested. The 
particular focus of this chapter with regard to the model rests on the internationalisation strategy 
and motivation of Chinese firms and their changes over time and the impact of network effects 
and domestic institutions. This is done by analysing and discussing primary data. The data 
have been collected through semi-structured interviews in China and a self-administered survey 
questionnaire in the UK, as explained in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. 
6.1 Interviews of Chinese multinational companies 
Based on the Chinese ODIR model advanced in Chapter 4, in this section, an analysis is 
presented of the internationalisation strategies and motivations of Chinese firms based on 
primary data collected in interviews with senior managers of the parent company in China. The 
main concern relates to the impact of international networks and of the domestic institutions on 
outbound investment behaviour of respondent firms. 
6.1.1 Rationale and outline of the fieldwork 
Interviews with senior managers of Chinese MNEs were implemented for two reasons. First, 
current official data historically refers mainly to SOEs and in most recent years Chinese ODI is 
generally dominated by SOEs with only modest outbound investments by private companies. 
Conducting interviews therefore provides a possibility to gain in-depth insight of the investment 
motivation of private firms, and their perceptions about the domestic institutional environment 
and the effect of international networks on their internationalisation. Second, the interviews 
provided opportunities to see if there are influences on Chinese ODI other than the ones 
proposed in Chapter 4. By interviewing both state-owned and non-state owned firms the results 
by ownership type can be compared. 
6.1.2 Interview results and discussion 
The companies present in the interview sample are mainly well established and large enterprises 
in terms of number of employees. The size ranges from twelve employees (Company 6) to 
more than 40,000 (Companies 1,2 and 7). The age of the firms ranges from three years 
(Company 6) to more than fifty years (Companies 1 and 9) with a median of twenty-two years. 
Inter-industry comparison of the interviewed firms is allowed for as the automobile, fashion, 
134 
and high-technology industry are represented by two companies each. Three firms are active in 
the consumer electronics industry, and one further company is mainly active in the machine 
tools sector (see also Table 6.1). Likewise, the coverage of three SOE, six private-owned 
enterprises and one collectively-owned enterprise allows for comparison by ownership types. 
This addresses RQ6. Except for Company 2 (from Shandong Province), all companies are 
headquartered in the Yangtze River Delta region as follows: Jiangsu province (3), Shanghai (4) 
and Zhejiang province (2). 
Table 6.1: Descriptive analysis of Chinese firms interviewed 
Firm Location Ownership type Industry Size Year 
1 Jiangsu State-owned Automobile Large 1947 
2 Shandong Collectively-owned Electronic consumer products Large 1984 
3 Jiangsu State-owned Electronic consumer products Large 1979 
4 Shanghai Privately-owned High-technology Small 2002 
5 Shanghai Privately-owned High-technology Small 2004 
6 Shanghai Privately-owned Fashion Medium 1993 
7 Zhejiang Privately-owned Automobile Large 1969 
8 Zhejiang Privately-owned Fashion Large 1995 
9 Shanghai State-owned Electronic consumer products Large 1995 
10 Jiangsu Privately-owned Machine tools Large 1992 
Notes: (1) Firm size - large: 2250 employees and an annual turnover zEUR 50 million; 
medium: 50 to 250 employees and an annual turnover between EUR 10 and 50 million; 
small: 10 to 49 employees and an annual turnover between EUR 2 and 10 million 
(Eurostat, 2007). EUR 1= Chinese Yuan 10.43 (www. xe. com; 15 May 2007). 
(2) `Year' refers to the year of establishment of the company in China. 
Source: Interviews and companies' homepages. 
6.1.2.1 International investment strategy and locational choice 
The major drivers for ODI of all companies are to gain access to new markets or defend an 
established market position. International investment tends to have followed the Uppsala theory: 
the interviewed firms export to the host country or a third market prior to invest in the country 
(as in the cases of Companies 2,3,5, and 8). The interviewee of Company 2 stated that the firm 
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tended to gain market share and experience in a foreign market through exporting before 
increasing its commitment to the host country. An investment in an important host country is 
necessary because success there depends on being able to adapt the product to local needs and to 
disguise being a Chinese company by producing locally (Company 2). Gu Chujun, chairman of 
the board of the white goods manufacturer Guangdong Kelon Electrical Holdings, expressed a 
similar concern in an interview with Business Week (Business Week, 2004). He senses that 
foreign customers equate Chinese products with low quality and are generally unaware of 
Chinese brands. The perception of customers is also important for Company 9. Customers trust 
a locally invested company which can offer its own after-sales service more readily than can an 
exporting company. Company 9 therefore invests in markets with a high potential and has done 
so already in eight countries (both developed and developing countries). 
Another reason for investing abroad was expressed by Companies 3 and 10: These companies 
either faced existing trade barriers (Company 3) or anticipated forthcoming trade barriers 
because of the political atmosphere in the host country (Company 10). An investment behind 
the trade barrier enables the companies to defend their market position. To minimise the 
commitment, however, Companies 1 and 3 established completely knocked-down assembly 
lines only in the host markets. Company 3 actually moved a step further by establishing the 
assembly line in cooperation with a local partner which further attenuated the business risk 
connected to an FDI project for it. 
Company l's export business started in the 1960s. On request of the principal shareholder, the r 
government, products were exported to Viet Nam without an export and import license. Such a 
license was later awarded in 1995. The company invested in different developing countries first 
before targeting an industrialised country. The first ODI was made in Argentina in the 1990s. 
The assembly plant did not develop well, however, because of a currency crisis in Latin 
America. Besides the Argentinean business, Company 1 has today further low-scale completely 
knocked-down assembly plants in Russia and Sudan which produce for the local market. In 
2005, the company pursued its most important foreign investment by acquiring a known 
manufacturing company in the United Kingdom (see also below). A further plant may be 
opened in Malaysia. 
Another market-seeking investment was conducted by Company 3. Company 3 invested in 
Indonesia and Malaysia to open assembly plants for completely knocked down parts in the mid- 
1990s. The investment decision was driven by high demand in the country and increasingly 
higher tariffs. The company had exported to these countries previously but faced a changing 
customs system which increased export prices. It therefore adopted a defensive market-seeking 
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strategy to maintain market share. The company invested in Argentina in 2000 for similar 
reasons. In both occasions, an economic crisis in 1997 and 2001 ended the foreign venture. As 
a consequence, the firm had to divest its South Asian and South American businesses. The 
Southeast Asian business was further affected by a change to the import tariff system in the host 
country. While earlier high import tariffs favoured local assembly of products, the change to 
lower tariffs on finished products diminished this. Company 3 argued that `political crises like 
the Asian Crisis in 1997 and that in Argentina cannot be anticipated. This raises an interesting 
issue. Do Chinese firms thoroughly evaluate the country risk of a target country before 
investing there? 
There is a sense that Chinese firms operate domestically and internationally with a very short- 
term strategic orientation (IPA 12). Focusing on short-term profits, these firms try to grasp 
business opportunities as they appear. Second, it is commonly argued that developing country 
firms tend to invest in peer countries because of `home country embeddedness' they would be 
more familiar with the institutional system and, hence, be more successful (see Sections 2.2.7 
and 2.2.8). The comments of the interviewee from Company 3 point to the opposite. The firm 
invested in both Southeast Asia and South America shortly before the relevant crises became 
apparent. Indeed, the negative experience of Company 3 is today highly ingrained in the 
interviewees' attitude towards ODI. The interviewees argue that, though investments in 
developing countries are relatively cheap and the company has been approached to invest in 
other developing countries, unforeseeable political risks make investments in developing 
countries unpalatable. Chinese companies should therefore, the interviewees go on, invest in a 
safe and stable country -in this case, in a Triad economy. These countries have, however, high 
market entry and operational cost and require a well established Chinese brand prior to 
investment. An investment in the Triad economy is therefore not feasible for a Chinese firm at 
the current point in time. The interviewees suggest that Chinese firms should rather cooperate 
with foreign firms in China, and manufacture for and learn from them. This concern is shared 
by Company 9. High business operation costs forced Company 9 to divest its European 
business. Company 9 established an affiliate in a European capital to run the European business 
from there. Soon after establishment, however, the firm moved several times to find cheaper 
office space. Ultimately, the firm gave up because of high office and labour costs. The high 
labour cost and regulation was of concern for Company 9 because it was not sure whom they 
were hiring. The interviewee, who was responsible for the European operations before he was 
delegated to other foreign affiliates, considers that it takes at least six months for a Chinese firm 
to properly assess and train a new employee abroad. If the company is not satisfied with the 
employee, European law makes it difficult to fire the person easily. International Chinese 
business failure has also occurred with firms outside this sample: The grey and white goods 
137 
producer TCL acquired the cathode-ray-tube TV business from France's Thomson in 2003 to 
become the world largest TV unit producer. In 2006, however, TCL divested most of the 
European business operations. TCL had been unable to turn around the European operation and 
suffered from continuous loss. One factor driving this development was the company's 
underestimation of the market shift from tube to flat screen TV sets (FT, 2006f) 45 
A somewhat different market penetration strategy has been pursued by Company 5. The 
company was founded in 2002 and established its first foreign affiliate in Hong Kong at the end 
of 2005. The quick internationalisation has been forced by internationally active competitors 
and limited infrastructure in China which impeded domestic corporate growth. Several reasons 
favoured Hong Kong over other locations: First, an agent of the company had established links 
to Hong Kong firms and this secured some customers for the firm. Second, Hong Kong was 
perceived as a good location for pursuing business outside of China. The affiliate in Hong 
Kong has been labelled the Asian headquarters. Third, Hong Kong has a well educated, 
English-speaking workforce but is culturally close to mainland China, which makes it easier to 
conduct business. The investment in a psychically close country follows, again, patterns 
predicted by the Stages theory. The fourth reason is outside the theory, though. Company 5 
was looking for a venture capitalist to partner with it. The investor happened to be in Hong 
Kong and thus it was a logical decision for the company to establish an affiliate nearby. With 
additional funding and with the support of an international network (see below), Company 5 
invested in the UK in 2006 and intends to invest in San Francisco and Los Angeles sometime 
during 2007. 
Two companies in the sample arguably followed an asset-seeking investment strategy by 
acquiring a European firm. Company 1 purchased in 2005 an insolvent British manufacturing 
firm. The objective was to gain access to an established but ailing brand and to revive it, and to 
access high quality physical assets and opportunities to enhance the products manufactured in 
China based on the acquired technology. At the same time, the Chinese firm would get access 
to advanced technology and blueprints which could help to upgrade the business in China and 
make the products more appealing to the customer. It was also thought that this would 
strengthen its bargaining position in a related Sino-foreign joint venture. The foreign partner in 
this strategic alliance is currently the technology supplier. This dependency may attenuate with 
newly gained know-how, however. After finalising the acquisition, the Chinese firm has 
45 TCL actually failed to establish a sustainable business despite receiving a combined Chinese 
Yuan Million credit (about USD 2billion) and USD 1.5billion overseas business insurance to 
support its international expansion from the Import and Export Bank of China, China Export 
Credit Insurance Company and China Development Bank (SinoCast China Business Daily News, 
2005). 
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transferred part of the production line to Nanjing to produce for the Chinese market. A second 
and third production line will eventually commence production in England and the USA. The 
acquisition of know-how and technology and subsequent transfer is not uncommon after a 
purchase by a Chinese firm: Qingdao Iron & Steel General Corporation bought the bankrupt 
steel mill Geneva Steel (USA) for USD 40mn to dismantle the production facilities in the USA 
and reassemble them in China. The same happened after Jiangsu Shagang Corporation acquired 
the German smeltery Westfalenhuette in 2001 and the German state-of-the-art coking plant 
Kaiserstuhl in 2002 (CIBUL, 2007). 
A different objective has been followed by Company 4 which bought an Italian fashion 
manufacturer in 2006. Rather than focusing on the technology and design capabilities of the 
Italian firm, the Chinese company is seeking to use it as a gate to the European market. 
Additional purchases of European companies might follow if this serves the aim to establish the 
company better in Europe. 
Compared to the other companies in the sample, the development of Company 8 is quite 
different. The company started to export to countries with a mature fashion market soon after 
establishment and opened affiliates in Hong Kong, the United Arab Emirates and Russia. A 
consequence of being "established in China, developed in the world" (Company 8), 
international business accounts now for more than 60 per cent of the firm's turnover. Although 
the company intends to invest in Europe, it has identified the Chinese market as mature enough 
to expand and invest domestically as well. The international business share to total revenues is 
therefore likely to decrease over time. 
6.1.2.2 Networks facilitating internationalisation 
"When staying at home you rely on your parents, 
when going away you rely on your friends. " 
Company 8 
The companies interviewed use business and social networks to get information about the target 
country to invest in. In some occasions, they are actually pulled into the target country by the 
network. Though both business and social networks facilitate internationalisation, they are 
employed to varying degrees by respondent firms. 
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Business links are foremost established (a) via customers or (b) through export agents. A sparse 
network of agents in particular can play a vital role in providing information about the foreign 
market and potential investment opportunities which could help setting up the business. Further 
information can be sought from other Chinese firms which have invested in the target region. 
Approaching Chinese firms in the target market for business intelligence is seen to be more 
fruitful when the company is not a direct competitor. Consequently, the company can only gain 
general information about the business and legal conditions in the target market but no product, 
customer habit and competitor specific information (Company 8). Such business links can also 
be used for acquisitions. Company 1 had established business contact with a European 
company in 1998 and subsequently acquired it in 2005. The first hand knowledge about the 
target company provided Company 1 with crucial information on which to pursue the purchase. 
Social linkages are of lesser importance. The large SOE interviewed argued that their business 
is too big to rely on such personal networks. Though other firms acknowledged that linkages to 
the Overseas Chinese and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce sometimes exist to collect 
information about the target market prior investing, they assert these facilities are not perceived 
as very important. The Overseas Chinese Diaspora may be too assimilated to the local 
environment and lack a reflective and objective opinion about the business environment and 
opportunities in the respective target country (Company 8). Nevertheless, Overseas Chinese 
people are welcomed as employees in the foreign affiliate because they may help to bridge the 
communication gap between the parent, the foreign affiliate and the host market by speaking 
both Chinese and English fluently (e. g. Company 5). A deviation from expectation as expressed 
in the model on Chinese ODI advanced in Chapter 4, Chinese firms seem not to employ 
Overseas Chinese people as brokers to attenuate transactions costs and facilitate the 
establishment of a new business. They are rather employed after the business has been 
established to achieve lower transaction costs for the running operation. Although this function 
of the Overseas Chinese differs from the model, it still holds true that mainland Chinese firms 
may invest in locations with a significant portion of ethnic social ties which can be exploited. 
No difference could be detected by firm size or ownership form. One reason for this could be 
that foreign Chinese affiliates generally tend to be relatively small regardless of the ownership 
form of the parent company. Chinese affiliates in the UK and in Germany, for example, often 
have not more than five employees (see also Section 6.2; Young et al., 1998; GFW, 2004). 
Besides linkages to customers, suppliers and ethnic groups, other access to business facilitators 
is important in the internationalisation of Chinese firms. Most IPAs interviewed screen Chinese 
companies to identify potential investors. Selected enterprises are approached to consider an 
investment in the home country of the IPA - the IPA functions here as a bridge for the Chinese 
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company. In so doing, IPAs either focus on the largest Chinese firms, under the assumption that 
size is a good predictor of investment capability and willingness, or they seek to identify 
Chinese firms which could complement the economic structure of the home country. The latter 
approach is not confined to any particular firm size or ownership type but rather aims to get the 
`best' investor. For example, this investor selection process was of crucial importance for the 
internationalisation of the two international new ventures in the sample (Companies 5 and 6). 
Both companies had been approached by a foreign IPA `out of the blue' and invited to consider 
an investment in the home region of the IPA. Because of the call from one IPA and the 
business connections provided by it, the companies did not consider other locations either in the 
European host country, in Europe in general or outside of Europe for the investment. The 
companies therefore do not know if monies are invested in the most profitable way and if any 
long-term strategy and corporate development might be impeded by the investment. Indeed, 
Company 5 would like to identify an IPA in California to take the role of a middleman for the 
USA and help it to establish an affiliate. 
Conflict is detected between the experience and viewpoint of small Chinese international new 
ventures and the interviewees of larger firms. One large SOE (Company 9) confirmed that IPAs 
try to persuade the company to invest in a particular region. He asserts, however, that the 
services offered are too expensive. The IPA tries to indulge the company by offering the best 
lawyers, accountants, business sites and so forth which are, at the same time, also the most 
expensive ones. In-house research, reports Company 9, can do the same job as an IPA to lower 
cost. And such research has to be done anyway as no company would invest abroad without 
evaluating the proposed target region itself and against other regions. The provided contact in 
the target region may be, though, revived later when the foreign business has left the infant 
stage and becomes more prosperous. It can therefore be suggested that small and relatively 
resource-scarce Chinese firms may rely more on IPAs as a bridge or broker to connect them to a 
target market than larger ones do. 
Company 6 reported satisfaction with the service provided by the IPA and its support in 
establishing potential business contacts in the target region, but the firm is reluctant to follow 
the call. Without having established a strong market position in China and lacking abundant 
financial resources, a foreign commercial commitment may put the whole organisation at risk it 
was stated. This is a gamble the owner is not willing to take. Instead, its investment decision 
has been postponed while working on and extending the business links to the target country. 
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Despite the usefulness of drawing on the knowledge and experience of networks, Company 9 
stated that even the best linkages cannot substitute an own affiliate as a source of information 
and knowledge flows as the middleman usually filters what he disseminates. 
6.1.2.3 Ambiguous impact of the institutional environment 
The Chinese government is generally argued to perceive ODI positively and encourages it 
(Government 1,2,3 and 5). Chinese ODI in manufacturing in Africa and Southeast Asia is 
seen as a good means to circumvent trade barriers and import quota of major target markets. 
Investments in developed countries are viewed as a good channel to access technology and 
better production facilities not readily available in China. The current trend is therefore to 
establish R&D facilities instead of trade offices in these countries (Government 1). The 
Chinese government therefore provides preferential long-term loans for large Chinese ODI 
projects. Additionally, local agencies organise seminars to inform potential Chinese investors 
about foreign business opportunities, market conditions and legal environment in conjunction 
with IPAs from a potential target country. To adjust these measures to `customers' needs, 
Government 2 regularly visits potential Chinese investors to gain a better understanding of their 
international business plans. Although they do advise the firm on locational choice, the final 
investment decision is taken by the firm interviewees reported. The latter point is reinforced by 
the interview with Government 3. This agency screens the investment applications and points 
out to Chinese firms if there is the danger of entering into competition with other Chinese firms 
in the host market which would cannibalise their market share. The government will not, 
however, reject the application. Government 4 actually argued that the whole application 
process is a registration process to gather information on where and how many Chinese firms 
invest. Based on this information, the local authorities can provide more focused host country 
and industry information to Chinese firms. 
The perception of the impact of these measures differs greatly by ownership type. SOEs 
generally see no problem in the approval process and perceive no other bureaucratic measures 
as hurdles to invest abroad. The Jiangsu-based SOEs (Companies 1 and 3) regard the 
institutional setting as at least neutral towards the firm's international ambitions. This gives the 
firms enough leeway to make strategic decisions without interference and unnecessary hurdles. 
The acquisition of a UK company by Company 1 was supported by the local government and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The former provided essential advice about legal and taxation 
issues while the latter corresponded with the national and local government of the host country. 
The initiative to purchase the insolvent firm came, however, from Company 1 and it also did not 
receive any subsidies to carry out the acquisition. The acquisition had to be approved by the 
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shareholders of the company. Any approval system for this particular investment and other 
investment abroad by the company was not recognised by the interviewee. The increasing 
bargaining power through government involvement is also reported by Company 2. Company 3 
acknowledged that they benefit from the composition of its shareholders. One shareholder is 
headed by a former high-ranked national politician. This connection provides the company with 
invaluable access to resources and bargaining power. The larger enterprises generally 
acknowledge that they enjoy good relationships with the local government, which is interested 
in prosperous local companies. They argue that the typical government support received is help 
in understanding the legal and regulative environment in the host country and advice on how to 
go smoothly through the outward investment approval process. But the interviewees stated the 
government neither interferes in business decisions directly nor instructs the company to 
conduct a certain investment in a particular country. The government is also supportive in other 
aspects. The interview with a government agency in Chengdu (Government 2) sheds some light 
on this. The local branch of the national agency has identified the key industries in Sichuan 
which could be internationalised. The agency is therefore developing a long-term strategy for 
member companies to be able to internationalise in cooperation with the relevant business 
associations. This includes considerations about level of research intensity, supply chain 
improvements, a general `upgrade' of the industry, and identification of target markets. The 
primary target markets are currently Russia and Southeast Asia which provide the relevant 
resources and technologically lag behind China and which provides companies from Sichuan a 
firm-specific advantage. The secondary target is Europe, and Germany specifically. The 
interviewee mentioned two reasons for the country choice: Germany is the largest European 
market for typical Sichuan products and is not mainly focusing on attracting high-value added 
and high-technology FDI from China as other European countries arguably do. To achieve 
these objectives, the agency has to persuade other government authorities to provide better 
supportive measures to local companies. The Sichuan example reveals two important issues: 
First, the local government is not only supportive to ODI but rather actively tries to provide a 
domestic institutional environment which nurtures the growth of domestic firms and enables 
them to venture abroad. Second, core local industries are identified and strengthened. This 
strategy may increase the likelihood that these firms are internationally competitive and also 
reinforces domestic economic growth. It fails, however, to support capable companies outside 
of the core industries. 
The smaller, private firms generally perceive the institutional environment in a less positive 
light than do SOEs. The institutional environment has generally disfavoured ODI by private 
firms for a very long time (reported by Company 4). One way of constraining ODI is a very 
cumbersome approval process for which privately-owned firms do not receive advice like their 
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state-owned peers. Such firms therefore tend to invest in a foreign tax haven like the British 
Virgin Islands which provides them with easier access to external funding and avoids future 
ODI approval by the Chinese government (Companies 4 and 5). The latter objective is denied 
by Government 2, however. The objective is to reinvest the money back in China (round- 
tripping) rather than circumventing the Chinese ODIR this interviewee contends. She 
acknowledges, however, that numerous privately-owned firms channel funds outside of China 
using personal contacts for ODI. Her agency is trying to encourage these firms to 
retrospectively register these investments to give them a more official status. 
An exception to this negative perception was given by the interviewee of Company 8. He saw 
no problem with the local government authorities in supporting the company's international 
activities. The interviewee, who is the Special Assistant to the company's Chairman, is a 
former employee of the local MOFCOM office where he was in charge of supervising local 
ODI. It therefore remains questionable to what extent he answered from a company or 
government perspective. It is also unclear how his established contacts within MOFCOM and 
possibly other authorities facilitated the company's internationalisation. 
The perception on the impact of the Chinese ODIR differs more by ownership type than by 
home province of companies from the Yangtze-River Delta provinces. Nevertheless, provincial 
differences could be detected. The Vice President of Company 10 revealed that the company 
was recently bought by a Chinese affiliate of a state-owned firm. He was formerly managing 
this Hubei province based subsidiary. The Vice President therefore has been in the unique 
position to experience the impact of very different provincial institutional environments on ODI. 
The attitude of bureaucrats in Hubei towards ODI was very negative he reports. An ODI 
approval easily took six months to be approved which hampered the international development 
of the company. In contrast, this process is normally finalised within four weeks in Jiangsu he 
says. This negative experience somewhat mirrors the perception that government authorities 
have to be encouraged to support firms to invest abroad (indicated by Government 2). 
6.1.3 Summary 
The analysis of Chinese MNEs based in the Yangtze River Delta partially supported the 
Chinese ODIR as advanced in Chapter 4 and answered the research questions underpinning the 
framework. Depending on the firm size, the institutional environment has been a barrier to 
outbound investment (RQ10a and RQI J). Recent reforms of the approval system and an 
increasingly positive attitude of the government authorities in this coastal region towards ODI 
have eased that tension. The international network has only a supportive role (RQ9). Business 
networks and contacts to business facilitators like IPAs are generally favoured over ethnic 
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connections when it comes to gaining host market information. Overseas Chinese are 
appreciated though as communicative bridges to the foreign market, and as customers and 
employees. Moreover, the majority of the interviewed Chinese firms went through a sequential 
internationalisation process starting with direct or indirect exporting before investing abroad. 
This finding supports the Uppsala model for Chinese MNEs (RQ7). Hence, it is no surprise that 
outbound investment is mostly driven by defensive market-seeking motives. Only the two 
Chinese international new ventures Companies 4 and 5 seem to follow an offensive strategy to 
access new markets (RQ8). Moreover, the ability of Chinese firms to assess business risks 
connected to the political and economical situation and to the business environment in the host 
market seems somewhat underdeveloped as the examples of Company 3 and 9 showed. As 
these firms enjoy well established connects to and support from their local governments, some 
support is found for the notion of capital market imperfections as a determinant of Chinese ODI 
as advanced in Chapter 4. Finally, Chinese firms interviewed are motivated predominantly by 
market seeking strategies (RQ2). Only a minority of firms interviewed conducted a foreign 
direct investment either to access technology (RQ4) or in order to acquirer an established brand 
(RQS). ' Natural resource seeking motives could not be detected (RQ3) as the firm sample 
contained manufacturing firms only. 
Having analysed data gathered at the Chinese headquarters, it is important to see how these 
findings are reflected in foreign affiliates. The next section therefore investigates the 
internationalisation strategy and competitive advantage of the Chinese firm as perceived by 
affiliates in the IX. 46 
6.2 A survey of Chinese affiliates in the UK 
6.2.1 Rationale and outline of the fieldwork 
This section is concerned with the investment motivations of Chinese firms (RQ2 to RQ5) and 
changes to the determinants of Chinese ODI over time (RQ6). 47 This is done by looking at 
Chinese investments in the UK. Within Europe, the UK accounts for the majority of global FDI 
inflows. Chinese ODI destined to the European market in general and to the United Kingdom in 
particular is only a small fraction of total Chinese outflows (see Table 6.2). Official data 
published by MOFCOM indicates that the European Union (EU-27) received an annual average 
of about 2.5 per cent of total Chinese ODI flows between 1990 and 2003. The modest amount 
46 Note, however, that the firms surveyed in the UK are not affiliated with the parent companies 
interviewed in China. 
47 This section is based on Cross and Voss (2007). 
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of Chinese ODI destined to Europe is low relative to global Chinese ODI figures, and in 
comparison to the amount of global FDI Europe receives from elsewhere. Europe received 
consistently around forty per cent of annual global flows between 1990 and 2005 (UNCTAD, 
2007a). Although overall Chinese ODI to Europe is small, Liu (2004) states that China has 
become a top ten foreign investors in the UK. The UK was chosen as a focus country for this 
part of the study for reasons of convenience. Subsequent research on other host countries for 
Chinese ODI would provide interesting comparisons. 
The low proportion of total Chinese ODI accounted for by Europe is reflected in the number of 
recent Chinese FDI projects observed by Europe-based institutions. GLAEconomics (2004) 
reports that seventy investment projects were undertaken by Chinese companies in Europe 
between 1997 and 2004, with the UK being the main recipient with forty investment projects. 
The IPA Invest in France Agency (2006) reports similarly modest figures for the period 2002 to 
2004, during which they observed twelve investment projects made by Chinese firms in Europe. 
However, current numbers of Chinese owned projects in Europe have risen since 2004. 
Between 2004 and mid-2006, ninety-two such projects took place, according to Invest in France 
Agency (2006). The increase of Chinese investments into Europe is also reflected in the rising 
number of acquisitions of European firms by Chinese MNEs (see Table 6.3). In many cases, 
this has involved the purchase of underperforming assets, and, in several cases, of insolvent 
firms. Of twenty acquisitions made by Chinese MNEs of European companies between 1997 
and 2005, nineteen were completed after 2000 and sixteen after 2003. British companies were 
the acquisition targets on five occasions; all after 2000. These acquisitions seem to be strategic- 
asset related investments whereby the Chinese companies are motivated to obtain access to 
existing technology, patents, R&D facilities, brand name, and distribution channels. This 
accords with the strategic asset motivation identified for Chinese MNEs more generally in 
recent years by Buckley et al. (2006), von Keller and Zhou (2003), among others (see Section 
3.4.2). Although these sources indicate that the numbers of Chinese investment projects have 
increased, two remarks are necessary. First, figures for Europe are still relatively small when 
compared to the total number of outbound investment projects made by Chinese firms. To 
illustrate, Invest in France reports ninety-two projects in Europe between 2004 and mid-2006 
while the Chinese government approved 1,067 investment projects in total in 2005 alone (China 
Law & Practise, 2006). Second, project-level data should be viewed with caution. The official 
Chinese publications on ODI, the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
and the successor China Yearbook of Commerce, state that 282 investment projects in the 
Europe Union (EU-15) were approved between 1997 and 2003 (MOFCOM, various years). 
Although these are approved figures and do not necessarily correspond with realised 
investments, the difference of 253 investment projects is considerable. 
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Table 6.2: Cumulative stock of Chinese ODI to Europe, 1990-2003 (three year average, 
USD million and %) 
1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998 1999-2001 2002-2003 
Total (three year average in 
USD million) 
Developed countries (% 
European Union 27 (%) 
Austria 
Belgium & Luxembourg 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Other Western Europe (%) 
Central and Eastern Europe 
(%1 
1,338.48 1,760.11 2,354.67 3,777.62 10,382.09 
69.44 64.12 49.95 36.11 22.60 
2.36 2.55 2.50 2.43 2.60 
0.10 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.03 
0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.10 
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03 
0.04 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.05 
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 2.22 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 
0.58 0.52 0.41 0.26 0.32 
0.52 0.48 0.42 0.36 0.61 
n/d n/d n/d n/d 0.00 
0.02 0.09 0.18 0.21 0.13 
n/d n/d n/d n/d 0.00 
0.22 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.25 
0.00 0.00 0.16 0.15 0.07 
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 
0.18 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.11 
0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 
0.06 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.03 
0.00 0.00 0.07 0.34 0.20 
n/d n/d n/d n/d 0.00 
n/d n/d n/d n/d 0.00 
0.15 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.07 
0.08 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.04 
0.33 0.33 0.29 0.22 0.24 
0.33 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.07 
4.11 5.58 4.36 3.60 4.08 
Notes: (1) n/d (no data) denotes years for which no Chinese ODI to the host country was 
recorded by MOFCOM. 
(2) Chinese ODI data for three European countries is not available. 
Source: MOFCOM (various years) Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
and MOFCOM (2004) China Commerce Yearbook. 
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Table 6.3: Selected acquisitions of British companies by Chinese firms 
Acquiring company I Target company Industry Year USD mu 
Nanjing Automobile Corp. 
Shanghai Automobile 
Industry Corporation 
Huaxiang Group 
China Zhenhua Oil Ltd. 
Greencool Technology 
Holding Ltd. 
Note: n/a: not available. 
MG Rover 
MG Rover 
(blueprints only) 
Lawrence Automotive 
Interiors 
Amlon Trading Ltd. 
Leyland Product 
Developments 
Source: CIBUL (2007) China M&A Database. 
Automobile 2005 106.0 
Automobile 2004 67.5 
Automobile 2006 6.7 
Oil and Gas 2005 n/a 
Automobile 2004 n/a 
To date, academic analysis of Chinese investments in Europe is limited. To our knowledge, 
only two such academic studies have been conducted: Young et al. (1998) examine Chinese 
investments in the UK and Van den Bulcke and Zhang (2006) have identified the reason for 
declining numbers of Chinese affiliates in Belgium. 
Young et al. (1998) identified twenty-four Chinese companies in the UK. The majority of them 
were long established, small scale, state-owned trading enterprises. Such companies are 
motivated to invest directly in the UK for different reasons than are industrialised country firms. 
This observation derives mainly from two factors: First, the internationalisation strategy of 
Chinese companies is founded largely on directives issued by the State Council. Second, 
general theory asserts that companies need to hold ownership advantages over domestic firms in 
the host country to compensate liabilities of foreignness for unfamiliarity of the host country's 
business and political environment (see Section 2.2.2). In the Young et al. (1998) study, the 
researchers observe no obvious ownership advantages among the Chinese firms interviewed. 
The authors regard this as a major constraint for future corporate development. This is 
reinforced by a lack of focus by the Chinese firms investigated on core competences. The 
companies rather tend to diversify in an often unrelated range of businesses. Nevertheless, 
Young et al. (1998) acknowledge that state-ownership helps the firms to mitigate business risk. 
The Chinese government often carries the ultimate financial burden of any international 
business for Chinese firms, especially when soft-budget constraints are enjoyed by the parent 
company in China which has been often the case during the 1980s and 1990s (Naughton, 2007) 
(see Sections 3.1 and 4.2.1). 
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Van den Bulcke and Zhang (2006) identified thirty Chinese affiliates operating in Belgium 
during the 1990s. However, by the end of the 1990s, most of these companies had either moved 
their European operations to Germany or the Netherlands or had closed down without providing 
further information about their European business activities. Two of the main drivers for 
disinvestment identified by Van den Bulcke and Zhang (2006) were the difficulties associated 
with getting employee visa and work permits, which severely interrupted business operations. 
Other research argues that the relatively low Chinese investment figures into Europe can be 
explained by factors identified for FDI from other Asian countries in the 1980s and 1990s (von 
Keller and Zhou, 2003; Stone, 1998; UNCTAD, 1996). Specifically, it is argued that Chinese 
companies preferentially invest in the USA because it is a larger, more homogeneous market, 
and has had stronger economic and political ties with China for a longer period than has Europe. 
Both Young et al. (1998) and Van den Bulcke and Zhang (2006) do not take into consideration 
if and how the investment strategies of Chinese companies have changed over time. The UK 
was one of the first countries to host Chinese firms in the early 1980s (Zhang, 2003). China's 
industry and corporate structure has changed significantly since then. It is therefore sensible, as 
Buckley et al. (2006) propose, to look at historic and emergent Chinese ODI pattern with 
respect to the investment strategies (see also Table 3.7). This framework proposes that Chinese 
firm' behaviour has changed since 2000 in response to evolving domestic and international 
conditions. This section applies this theoretical framework to a real case, namely Chinese 
investments in the UK, to assess the explanatory power of the framework. More specifically it 
is proposed that the investment motives and determinants of Chinese firms which have entered 
the UK market prior 2000 differ from later entrants firms. This approach informs especially 
RQ6 of this study. 
6.2.2 Methodology 
The survey questionnaire was distributed to Chinese affiliates in the UK (see Section 5.2). The 
survey was designed in such a way that it allows `historic' and `emergent' investment behaviour 
to be identified under each investment strategy type ('market-' and `asset'-seeking) and the 
perceived competitive advantage of the respondent firm. A five-point Likert-type scale was 
employed in the questionnaire, with the categories ranging from (1) `of utmost importance' to (5) 
`of no importance' or (1) `strongly agree' to (5) `strongly disagree' for the items under 
investigation. The questions were labelled in the order of appearance in the survey 
questionnaire and are presented together with the mean score for early and late entrants in 
Tables 6.9 to 6.12. Throughout the discussion the mean is reported together with a superscript 
denoting early entrants (E) and late entrants (L) and with a subscript denoting the relevant 
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question. The subscript denotes, first, the question type with regards to the historic-emergent (H 
E) investment strategy framework and, second, the investment strategy itself, i. e. offensive 
market-seeking (0), defensive market-seeking (D) and asset-seeking (A) investment. 
6.2.3 Research findings and discussion 
Stylised facts about the responding Chinese investors are presented first. This is followed by a 
discussion of investment strategies identified for Chinese companies in the UK from the survey 
instrument. To test the historic-emergent investment strategy framework, the data is split by the 
time of entry into the UK as follows: Firms which have invested prior 2000 are labelled `early 
entrants' (labelled `early' or `E') and are proposed to have followed a historic investment 
behaviour (N=12). `Late entrants' invested in the UK in 2000 or later (labelled `late' or `L') 
and are argued to follow an emergent investment behaviour (N=9). Finally, the perceived 
sources of competitive advantage of both groups of Chinese investors are evaluated as reported 
in response to survey questions. 
6.2.3.1 Stylised facts of Chinese investors in the UK 
Similarly to Young et al. (1998), Chinese investors in the UK are generally found to be mature 
and large companies. This is reflected in the age of respondent firms and in the numbers of 
worldwide employees. About half of the respondent companies were either first established in 
the 1940s and 1950s or following China's economic liberalisation during the 1980s and 1990s. 
In contrast to the interview sample, there is no Chinese `born global' among respondent firms 
(see also Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4: Years of establishment of parent company and FDI projects in the UK 
Establishment of the parent First outward FDI by Establishment of UK 
Decade company in China(s) the parent companyO'» operation(`) 
2000s 0 3 9 
1990s 5 6 5 
1980s 6 5 6 
1970s 1 0 1 
1960s 1 1 0 
1950s 5 0 0 
1940s 3 0 0 
Notes: (a) N=21; (b) N=15 (6 missing); (c) N=21. 
The majority of the respondent firms are state-owned Chinese enterprises (62.9%; see Table 
6.5). Only two companies (9.5%) regard themselves as being privately-owned. Four companies 
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are listed on a Chinese stock exchange (in Shanghai or Shenzhen). However, lack of 
information on shareholder structure makes it difficult to further classify these as either state- or 
privately-owned. Nevertheless, the majority of Chinese listed companies are typically either 
directly or indirectly state-owned (Wong et al., 2004). This leads us to infer that the public 
listed companies in our sample can be regarded as state-owned. Interestingly, the ownership 
pattern of Chinese investors differs across the two time frames in question. Early investment 
projects were normally conducted by SOEs. Among the late investors, five are state-owned but 
already two are privately-owned. This distinction may reflect recent changes in the Chinese 
economy which is steadily becoming more driven by the private sector (OECD, 2005b) (see 
Section 3.1). 
Table 6.5: Ownership structure of the Chinese parent company 
Year of first entry to UK 
Pre-2000(8) 2000 and afterro» 
under SASAC (c) 91 
under a Chinese Ministry 11 
cn under a Chinese Province government 10 
under a Chinese Municipality 00 
Chinese listed company 13 
Privately-owned enterprise 02 
Township and Village Enterprise 00 
Notes: (a) N=11 (1 missing) and (b) N=7 (2 missing); (c) SASAC: State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission. 
In line with the Chinese policy direction towards ODI (see Section 3.3), most Chinese 
investment in the UK occurred after 1979. Eleven Chinese affiliates were established between 
1979 and 2000 and nine thereafter (Table 6.5). The trend of increasing numbers of investment 
projects by Chinese firms reflects the general pattern of Chinese ODI into Europe as described 
in Section 6.2.1. The one Chinese affiliate established in the 1960s is most probably a state- 
owned trading company, since such firms were allowed to invest abroad before 1979 (Zhang, 
2003). 
The majority of the respondent Chinese firms have significant international business experience. 
This is inferred from the number of other countries in which these companies operate. Fourteen 
companies have operations in at least eleven countries and another four have operations in 
between six to ten countries (at the time of the survey). Although data on the spatial 
distribution of these countries is not available, the numbers of foreign affiliates suggests that the 
companies are generally well accustomed to operating at an international scale (see Table 6.6). 
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Table 6.6: Scope of internationalisation of respondent firms 
Year of first entry to UK 
No. of countries with Chinese affiliate Pre-2000" 2000 and afierh 
20 and more 54 
11 to 20 32 
6to 10 21 
2to5 11 
Note: (a) N-- 12, (b) N=9. 
The Chinese parent companies are generally large in size in terms of' numbers of employees (see 
Figure 6.1). This is not reflected in their investments in the UK, though. Fifteen Chinese 
companies have more than five thousand employees worldwide. The majority of Chinese 
investments operations in the UK, however, employ workti)rces of less than twenty-four 
employees (N7-20) (see Figure 6.2). One explanation is that the majority of the Chinese 
respondents are engaged in trade-related activity (see Table 6.7). 
Figure 6.1: Number of employees worldwide of Chinese respondent firms 
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The Chinese respondents firms have commonly more than one business activity in the UK. The 
focus is on trade-related activities, however. In general, late entrants are proportionally more 
active in trade-related activities (64.3%) than are early investors (60.0%). On the other hand, 
late entrants are also more involved in manufacturing related activities (21.4% compared to 
5.0%). The explanation for this is straightforward: early entrants tended to establish and operate 
a representative office more frequently (35.0%) than do late entrants (14.3%) (see Table 6.7). 
Table 6.7: Type of UK operation of Chinese respondent firm 
Year of first entry to UK 
Pre-2000 2000 and after 
Representative office 6 2 
Export 5 1 
Import and Sales 4 5 
Import and Warehousing 2 1 
Import and Local servicing 1 2 
Manufacturing (Acquisition) 1 0 
Manufacturing (Greenfield) 0 2 
Manufacturing (N) 0 1 
Note: Multiple answers possible. 
Table 6.8: Business operations by industry sector of respondent firms 
Year of first entry to UK 
Pre-2000 2000 and after 
Transport, storage and communication 5 1 
Wholesale and retail trade 4 3 
Real estate and business activities 2 1 
Manufacturing 1 1 
Hotel and Restaurant 1 0 
Financial services 1 1 
Fishing 0 1 
Construction 0 1 
Note: Multiple answers possible 
The distribution of business operation by industry sector of the Chinese respondent firms 
supports these findings. Both early and late entrants generally operate in trade-related industries 
(E=64.3% and L=44.5%). Interestingly, cross tabulation between Table 6.7 and 6.8 reveal that, 
although four firms indicate their operation type is manufacture-related, only two respondents 
actually place their business operation in the manufacturing sector. 
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6.2.3.2 Investment strategies of Chinese respondent firms 
Offensive Market-seeking behaviour 
The responses to the questionnaire provide some evidence that the main investment strategy for 
market-oriented Chinese companies in the UK differs between early and late entrants (see Table 
6.9). The main purpose for late entrants is to raise their company profile in a large market for 
which they have identified growth potential for their company (x105 = 1.89). Instead of serving 
the UK through exports from China or elsewhere, these companies see greater merit in 
operating with a local office in the UK which can enhance their local recognition and corporate 
-L -L development ( x1 01= 2.00, x 04 =1.89). Moreover, these companies generally focus their 
current attention on the UK market specifically, since they do not seek to obtain Europe-wide 
reach from their UK base (xE03 = 3.13). This might change in future, though, as late entrants 
indicate that they are seeking to collect European market information (xHOt = 3.00). These 
findings indicate that late entrants have indeed adapted an emergent investment strategy in the 
UK market (see Table 6.2). This finding is further supported by the fact that early entrants do 
not score as important the market size and potential of the UK (z O5 = 3.45). Nor do they place 
importance on the need to raise the company's profile in the British market or to increase the 
overall profit of the company (XED4 = 3.45, x O3 = 3.00). Early entrants are, however, 
concerned with developing new markets outside of China (YE01= 2.25). 
Table 6.9: Offensive market-seeking investment drivers of Chinese respondent firms 
Investment motive 
Year of first entry to 
UK 
< 2000 2000 5 
xE xL 
E04 To raise the profile of your company in Europe 3.45(8) 1.89 
E05 Size and potential of the British market 3.45w'w 1.89 
EO1 To develop new markets outside of China through direct investment 2.25 2.00 
E03 To increase corporate profits 3.00 2.25(d) 
HO1 To collect information and gain knowledge about European markets 2.83 3.00 
E03 To establish a headquarters for your firms' European operations 3.27(8) 3.13(d) 
H02 Proximity of the UK to large, third markets for exports 3.40(D) 3.50(4) 
E06 Strength of your company's brand in the UK 3.91w'w 3.63(d) 
H03 Ease of exporting to the industrialised countries from the British 4.22(`) 4.43(e) 
location 
Notes: H= `historic', E= `emergent'; 1= `utmost importance', 5= `of no importance'; NE= 12, 
except (a) 11, (b) 10, (c) 9; NL= 9, except (d) 8, (e) 7. 
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Other offensive market-seeking drivers are not scored highly by either early or late entrants. 
For example, both early and late entrants indicate that they are not investing to use the UK as an 
E -L export platform to serve third markets in continental Europe (xHO2 = 3.40, . xH03 = 
4.22; XH02 = 
3.50, xHo3 = 4.43). 
Defensive Market-seeking behaviour 
The defensive driven investment strategies for early and new entrants are similar (see Table 
6.10). This suggests that the prepositions derived from the historic-emergent investment 
strategy framework of Buckley et al. (2006) are not supported for this type of Chinese 
investment to the UK. Chinese investments seem to be a reaction mainly to the increased 
integration of China into the global economy and the growing international competition that 
Chinese companies face as a consequence (YED3 = 2.25; zED3 = 2.67). They are not a response 
to competitive pressures and saturated demand in the home market, which Buckley et al. (2006) 
regard as an emergent trend (x rMED, 3.45, xED2 = 4.20; xED1= 3.88, z2=4.44). Thus, 
Chinese companies invest in the UK to defend and further expand their close relationship with 
British customers (x,, 4 = 3.00; x4 = 2.89). Such behaviour is considered as both a historic 
and emergent feature of the investment strategies by Buckley et al. (2006). Other defensive 
Table 6.10: Defensive market-seeking investment drivers of Chinese respondent firms 
Investment motive 
Year of first entry to 
UK 
< 2000 2000 5 
YE xt 
ED3 In response to growing international competition 2.25 2.67 
ED4 To be closer to your important customers 3.00 2.89 
HD3 To improve the competitiveness of your company's export activities 3.27(°) 3.13`) 
HD2 To support export activities in the European Union 3.30(') 3.22 
HD1 To support your company's export activities in the UK 2.91w'w 3.33 
ED7 To overcome tariff and non-tariff barriers to your company's trade with 4.36(8) 3.56 
the UK and the European Union 
ED1 In response to growing competitive pressure in Chinese markets 3.45(') 3.88(c) 
ED6 To defend existing market share in the British market by investing 3.82(') 4.67 
locally 
HD4 To help obtain business license or other approvals for your products in 4.100» 4.38(c) 
Europe 
ED2 Because your parent company's markets are becoming saturated in 4.200» 4.44 
China 
ED5 To spread the risks associated with producing internationally 4.18(a) 4.67 
Notes: H= `historic', E= `emergent'; 1= `utmost importance', 5= `of no importance'; NE= 12, 
except (a) 11, (b) 10; NL 9, except (c) 8. 
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investment motives, such as circumventing trade barriers set up by the European Union, seem to 
be an issue for late and not early entrants (x 7=4.36; xED7 = 3.56). A risk diversification 
strategy is not identifiable for either category of investors (xED5= 4.18; xEDs= 4.67). Overall, 
these findings can be attributed to the high level of state-ownership of early entrant firms 
sampled, a status which may have given them ready access to cheap finance at home and led the 
investment decisions to be influenced by national political and economic agendas of China 
(Buckley et al., 2007a; Young et al., 1998). 
Asset-seeking investment strategy 
The asset-seeking investment strategies pursued by Chinese companies support a qualitative 
shift in behaviour as proposed in the Buckley et al. (2006) framework (see Table 6.11). Late 
entrants highlight as important the need to acquire new and advanced management skills and to 
tap into existing pools of knowledge to improve their overall business profile and profitability 
(xL3 = 2.78, xEA = 3.25). This could mean that late entrants are more likely to be searching 
for technologies and soft skills to enhance their competitive position in the markets in which 
they operate. These two strategies are less pronounced for early entrants (xL3 = 3.08, 
x44 4.10). Early entrants are more driven by historic investment strategies, i. e. to be closer to 
suppliers and to gain better access to intermediate products (. L2 = 3.42, xL2 = 3.40). 
Interestingly, and in contrast to current understanding, the respondent Chinese companies are 
not interested in purchasing a British brand (xL6 = 4.55; XA6 = 4.25). 
Table 6.11: Asset-seeking investment drivers of Chinese respondent firms 
Year of first entry to 
UK 
< 2000 2000 5 
Investment motive 
YE XL 
EA3 To gain better access to new management know-how and ideas 3.08 2.78 
EA4 To gain access to new technology 4.10ro» 3.25(`) 
HA2 To gain access to intermediate products not readily available in China 3.40(b 4.33 
EA2 To be closer to your British suppliers 3.42v» 4.22 
EA6 To purchase a known British brand 4.55(&) 4.25(`) 
EA1 To carry out research and/or product development in the UK 4.09(1) 4.44 
HAI To obtain access to raw materials not available readily in China 4.18(b) 4.56 
EA5 To improve access to sources of cheaper external finance 4.09(8) 4.56 
Notes: H= `historic', E= `emergent'; 1= `utmost importance', 5= `of no importance'; NE= 12, 
except (a) 11, (b) 10; NL= 9, except (c) 8. 
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There are two explanations. First, late entrants may be sufficiently confident of their current 
Chinese brand and may see no reason to buy an existing one. Second, the reluctance of early 
entrants to acquire a British brand may be due to the lack of importance placed by them on 
profile and public awareness building in the UK. 
Competitive advantage 
We now assess the sources of competitive advantage as reported by the respondent firms (see 
Table 6.12). The most striking finding is that Chinese companies in the UK seem to base their 
competitive advantage on soft-skills, for example the business skills held by the management 
team that was gained through international education (x 4=2.09, x412 = 2.82; xc44 = 1.75, 
XCA12 = 2.88). Though business skills are important, it is questionable just how sustainable a 
firm-specific advantage this is for Chinese MNEs. A more authentic firm-specific factor 
highlighted by respondents may be represented by the extensive international corporate network 
and the strong support from the Chinese parent company reported. Both aspects are present for 
early and late entrants but are more pronounced for latter ones (xCAIo = 2.91, %11= 2.55; 
x"O = 2.50, x 1, = 1.88). The strong support from the Chinese parent company may provide 
the UK affiliate with cheap investment capital arising from imperfect Chinese capital markets 
(Buckley et al., 2007a; Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2006). 
Table 6.12: Perceived firm-specific advantages of respondent Chinese firms 
Year of first entry to 
UK 
< 2000 2000 S 
Firm-specific advantage xE xL 
CA4 High levels of relevant business skills in your UK management team 2.09(a) 1.75 
CA11 Strong support from your Chinese parent company 2.55(8) 1.88 
CA7 Demand for your company's products and/ or services is strong 2.67ro» 2.38 
CAI0 Your firm has good access to a widespread distribution network 2.91(`) 2.50 
outside of the UK 
CA9 High level of marketing know-how in your British company 3.09(') 2.63 
CA6 You have British nationals on your management team in the UK 3.63(8) 2.63 
CA12 Internationally-educated management team in your UK company 2.82(°) 2.88 
CA8 Internationally experienced management team in your UK company 2.64(x) 3.00 
CA5 Technological dominance of your company's products 3.82(x) 3.00(b) 
CAI Lack of international experience of your parent firm in China 3.27(') 3.00 
CA3 Low level of technological capability in your parent company 3.45(1) 3.33 
CA13 Your management team in the UK is made up of ethnic Chinese 3.18(8) 3.38 
people 
CA2 Insufficient understanding of the UK business environment in your 3.25 3.44 
Chinese parent company 
Notes: 1= `utmost importance', 5= `of no importance'; NE 12, except (a) 11, (b) 9; NL 8, 
except (b) 7. 
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However, the influence of the parent company may impede the development of the UK affiliate 
as the parent companies are often reported to lack international business experience (x 1= 3.27; 
xc41= 3.00). This may lead to misinterpretations of market information and thus sub-optimal 
business strategies. This finding is somewhat surprising given that most Chinese companies 
sampled started to internationalise some years ago. Given the managerial shortcomings 
identified by the respondents of their parent company, whether or not access to international 
distribution channels constitutes genuine source of advantage to Chinese firms is an open 
question. The high level of control exerted by the parent may serve to constrain the activities of 
overseas affiliates and reduce their activity to act entrepreneurially and react appropriately to 
changing market and industry conditions. Early and late entrants in the UK do not perceive 
their products or technological capacity being competitive or advanced (xis = 3.82, x3=3.45; 
xc, s = 3.00, xCA3= 3.33). This could either be a reflection of a limited product range being 
offered by Chinese firms in the UK, compared with other countries, or that the respondents are 
confident that they will be capable to offer technologically advanced products in the future. 
6.2.4 Summary 
This section has for the first time used the theoretical propositions contained in the historic- 
emergent investment strategy framework for Chinese MNEs presented by Buckley et al. (2006) 
to analyse Chinese investment in a host country, in this case the UK. The findings provide 
partial support for the framework and, hence, some confirmation of RQ6. Concerning RQ6, the 
analysis has revealed some evidence that ODI behaviour by Chinese MNEs has changed after 
2000, i. e. for Chinese companies which entered the UK market in or after that year. The 
strategies have become increasingly more driven by the objectives of (i) developing foreign 
markets for offensive reasons and (ii) to gain better access to foreign technology and know-how 
to enable the company to strengthen their firm-specific advantages (see also Table 6.13). Such 
investment patterns are not evident for Chinese companies that invested in the UK before 2000. 
Further, defensive market-seeking investment behaviour of early and late Chinese entrants into 
the UK market is found to differ markedly. Similarly, and contrary to common opinion, both 
groups of companies have not invested in the UK for strategic asset-seeking purposes like 
acquiring an established brand. These shifts in the investment behaviour of Chinese MNEs 
have not been identified for the UK or other countries before in extant research. The firm- 
specific advantages of Chinese firms compared to those commonly held by Western MNEs are 
found to deviate somewhat. Chinese firms operating in the UK do not seem have conventional 
firm-specific advantages prior to their investment in the UK. They are better characterised as 
158 
"multinationals without advantage" (Fosfuri and Motta, 1999). Early and late entrants indicate 
that they possess good managerial skills and somewhat low levels of technological capabilities. 
These are atypical firm-specific advantages and seem, a priori, to decrease the abilities of 
Chinese MNEs to compete successfully in the UK. 
Table 6.13: Evolving investment strategies and competitive advantage of Chinese firms in 
the UK as identified in the survey 
Historic Emergent 
prior to 2000 entrant firms 2000 and after entrant firms 
Iii V1 
Offensive 
I 
-- Raise profile and access highly 
potential host market 
Response to international Response to competition 
Defensive competition and to support 
exhorts of the parent 
Underdeveloped but some Still underdeveloped but firms 
Asset seeking 
indications that firms invest to increasingly focus on accessing 
access managerial capacity and technology, managerial 
intermediate products capacities and ideas 
Source of 
competitive advantage 
Business skills, international 
management experience, and 
strong support from parent 
company 
Source: Adapted from Cross and Voss (2007). 
Business skill, strong support 
from parent company and 
demand for company's products 
This generally supports early findings by Nolan and Zhang (2002) and Shenkar (2005) 
concerning the capabilities of Chinese firms and by Buckley et al. (2007a) that the investment 
decision of Chinese MNEs may not be similar to Western MNEs. It also mirrors early research 
on South Korean MNEs by Kumar and Kim (1984), for example. Kumar and Kim argue that 
the firm-specific advantages of Korean firms deviate from Western firms in that they rely on 
low-cost production and highly motivated staff. It is, however, likely that the pattern of Chinese 
firm-specific advantage might change in future. Late Chinese entrants to the UK are already 
more likely to seek to obtain location-specific technologies which might enable them to 
strengthen firm-specific advantages. This effect would be magnified should the firms be able to 
raise their technological capabilities elsewhere as well (either in China or in other locations) and 
if the intra-firm technology transfer is effective and well guided. Sigurdson (2005), among 
others, has noted that Chinese companies are also increasingly strengthening their R&D efforts 
in China, for example. In short, this survey helps inform the following research questions posed 
in this study. In particular, it reveals that the investment motives of Chinese firms change over 
time (RQ6) and that for Chinese investments in the UK market seeking motives (RQ2) generally 
dominate over other motives (RQ3 to RQ5). However, Chinese firms which entered the UK 
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after 2000 are more likely to invest for offensive market seeking and technology seeking (RQ4) 
motives than firms which established an affiliate prior to 2000. 
6.3 Comparison and discussion of the qualitative research 
The investment strategies of Chinese companies have changed over time. The findings reveal 
fruitful insights in differences by ownership form concerning the perceived influence of the 
institutional environment on decision-making. 
The senior management team in the headquarters of Chinese firms perceives outbound 
investments mainly as a means to gain a foothold in foreign markets and service these better. It 
is possible that this understanding has not been disseminated to foreign affiliates. Chinese 
affiliates in the UK are not very clear about the investment motive of their respective parent 
(although these parents did not participate in this research). In the UK, investment is somewhat 
driven by the market but both offensive and defensive strategies are underdeveloped. Only 
firms which have more recently invested in the UK have more pronounced offensive strategy 
and also acknowledge that some was undertaken to obtain advanced technology. 
Chinese private firms perceive the Chinese institutional environment as more hostile than do 
SOEs. Although they acknowledge that the constraints have eased somewhat over the last five 
years, they tend to organise their international activities through an offshore company which 
does not suffer inventions, either directly or indirectly, of the Chinese government. Chinese 
government officials implicitly recognise that private firms have not been well treated under the 
past and current regime when they refer to the vast amount of ODI conducted by these firms 
that is not recorded by any official statistics. SOEs see the government as a neutral actor who 
rather encourages ODI as it may help to create strong companies which in return strengthens the 
local economy. This perception is in line with the viewpoint of government officials who 
despite the behaviour of private firms perceive the system as balanced and welcoming of ODI. 
The communality between the SOE and government officials is not surprising as both ultimately 
form part of the state-sector and can be regarded as mutually supportive of each other. 
The results of Section 6.1 and 6.2 somewhat differ. One explanation for the deviation in the 
research findings lies in the research method applied. First, the data analysed in Section 6.1 was 
collected in the Chinese headquarters of the company while that of Section 6.2 draws upon 
information provided by UK affiliated. Second, interview data has been used in Section 6.1 
which generally allows to reformulate a question if the respondent understands it wrongly and 
to probe if the interviewee does not reply to the question. Third, and as mentioned already, two 
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different samples of Chinese MNEs are analysed in this Chapter. It was not possible to have 
dyadic pairs of firms, that is to approach the Chinese headquarters and the respective affiliate in 
the UK. The survey questionnaire was employed first. Because it was distributed anonymously 
the identity of the responding company cannot be revealed and, hence, the parent company is 
not identified. 
This chapter has analysed Chinese ODI using primary data collected directly from Chinese 
MNEs. In particular insights around a number of research questions have been obtained. It is 
revealed that Chinese firms predominantly conduct outbound investments for market servicing 
purposes (RQ2) and only a small number of firms seek to obtain advanced technology (RQ4) or 
strategic assets (RQ5). The importance of improved access to technology may increase in future 
because the data analysed indicates that firms which invested in the UK after 2000 are more 
inclined to invest for such a motive. This also supports the notion that the investment strategies 
of Chinese firms have changed over time (RQ6). The endogenous and exogenous elements of 
the Chinese ODIR, as summarised in Figure 4.1, are partially supported. The influence of the 
formal endogenous elements is perceived differently by state-owned and small, privately-owned 
Chinese firms (RQII ). While the former perceives it as neutral or supportive, private firms 
rather perceive the institutional environment as an impediment to internationalisation (RQ10a). 
The influence of the informal, exogenous element (that is, the access to international networks) 
as similarly diverse perceived among these groups of enterprises (RQ9). 
To identify specific determinants of Chinese FDI, it is important to take a more abstract, 
aggregated perspective and employ macroeconomic data and official ODI data to inform the 
research. This is done in the following chapter. Chapter 7 builds upon material presented in 
Section 6.1 where the impact international networks and the domestic institutional environment 
have been outlined. As with this chapter, the analysis in Chapter 7 assesses whether or not 
changes to the determinants of Chinese ODI, in accordance to RQ6. 
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7 Cross-sectional data analysis of the determinants of 
Chinese outward direct investment 
This chapter presents two econometric analyses of Chinese ODI using, first, foreign investment 
project data as collected by SAFE and, second, aggregated data as published by MOFCOM. 
The analyses focuses on different aspects of the institutional framework as advanced in Chapter 
4. Section 7.1 is based on our publication in the Journal of International Business Studies 
(Buckley et al., 2007a) which concentrates on domestic institutional factors and international 
network effects. Section 7.2 concentrates on international institutional factors and international 
network effects. Both sections build upon our earlier work by Cross et al. (2007) published in 
Multinational Enterprises and Emerging Challenge of the 21st Century, a book edited by John 
H. Dunning and Tsai-Mei Lin. In order to avoid ambiguity in the presentation of the cross- 
sectional models and the discussion, Hypotheses 1 to 6 relate to Model One while the 
Hypotheses 7 to 15 refer to Model Two. The key findings, as summarised and compared in 
Section 7.3, are that Chinese MNEs are strongly influenced in their international investment 
decision-taking by cultural links to the host country, by market-seeking motives and 
increasingly by resource-seeking motives. The investment risk perception of Chinese firms also 
deviates significantly from that expected of profit maximising industrialised country firms. 
7.1 Model One: Domestic institutional factors and international network effects 
- An analysis of SAFE data 
The first econometric analysis focuses predominantly on the effects of domestic institutional 
factors, namely the effect of the trip by Deng Xiaoping to southern China in 1992 and the 
instigation of the `Go Global' policy in 1999, and of international networks involving host 
countries as presented in Chapter 4. The analysis also incorporates the international investment 
strategy model of Dunning (1993). The latter factors, and hypotheses deriving from them, are 
presented first as they constitute the `traditional' drivers of international production. The `new', 
institutional drivers of Chinese ODI and hypotheses are presented section 7.1.1. 
7.1.1 Operationalisation of Model One 
Hypotheses 
Motive for market-seekingFDI 
Market-seeking FDI by industrialised country MNEs is generally found to be destined to 
countries with large absolute markets (generally measured in GDP or GNP), countries with a 
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large relative market size (generally measured in GDP/capita) or countries with a potentially 
large market in the future (generally measured in annual growth of GDP) (see Section 2.3). 
Though these three proxies capture different aspects of market-seeking FDI, they are often used 
as alternates in the analysis of market-seeking FDI and will be treated accordingly in this study 
(e. g. Clegg and Scott-Green, 1998; Rammal and Zurbruegg, 2006). Proposing that Chinese 
MNEs generally behave like their industrialised country counterparts, the following alternate 
hypotheses can be derived: 
Hypothesis la: Chinese ODI is associated positively with absolute host market size; 
Hypothesis 1b: Chinese ODI is associated positively with host market size per capita; 
Hypothesis lc: Chinese ODI is associated positively with host market growth. 
Motive for resource-seeking FDI 
Resource-seeking FDI occurs in countries which are relatively well resource endowed. China is 
relatively scarce in natural resources. The lack of resources impedes the stable supply of energy 
and other input factors for productive processes (see Section 3.3). Ores and minerals, for 
example, are important resources in steel industry and subsequently in the construction 
industries. Both of these are industries that have expanded dramatically over the last five years 
along with the increase in gross capital formation in China. Consequently, China is a major 
importer of ores and minerals and has a market share of world imports of metalliferous ores and 
metal scrap of 21.7% in 2004, while the share of world imports was even higher for selected 
metals such as chromium (54%) and iron ore (44%) in 2004 (Deutsche Bank Research, 2006). 
It can be predicted that Chinese companies backward integrate along the supply chain in natural 
resources to ensure the stable supply of these inputs. It hence follows that: 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese ODI is associated positively with host country endowments of natural 
resources. 
Motive for asset-seeking FDI 
Asset-seeking FDI is generally destined to countries with a large accessible knowledge base. 
This can be proxied by the number of patents granted in the host country (e. g. Makino et al., 
2002). The number of patents granted in a host country generally reflects the endowment of 
domestic companies with firm-specific advantages produced from in-house R&D effort (Hall et 
al., 1986; Griliches, 1990). Foreign firms may seek proximity to companies or clusters of 
companies which are engaged in R&D and have patents filed. This proximity may enable the 
investing firm to access and internalise existing knowledge easier through collaboration, 
spillover and demonstration effects and, hence, strengthen its firm-specific advantages (see 
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Section 2.3). It has been argued that Chinese companies invest increasingly in foreign locations 
to conduct research and access foreign stocks of knowledge (von Zedtwitz, 2005; Sigurdson, 
2005; Chen and Jiang, 2003). Thus: 
Hypothesis 3: Chinese ODI is associated positively with host country endowments of ownership 
advantages. 
FDI and country risk 
Industrialised country companies tend to be relatively risk-averse when conduct FDI and invest 
in countries with low levels of country risk (comprising political, commercial and economic risk) 
or substitute arm's length service modes for FDI in countries with higher levels of risk (Buckley 
and Casson, 1981,1999; Nordal, 2001). The propensity of Chinese companies' investment 
behaviour is expected, a priori, not to differ from industrialised country firms. It is therefore 
proposed that Chinese firms direct their foreign investments to countries with relatively low 
levels of country risk. However, perverse investment behaviour would be observable if Chinese 
companies enjoy domestic capital market imperfections as advanced in Section 4.2. Such 
market imperfections could enable Chinese firms to invest in countries with relatively high risk 
levels: 
Hypothesis 4: Chinese ODI is associated negatively with rising levels of host country risk. 
Cultural proximity 
As explained in Sections 2.2 and 4.2, cultural proximity (CP) between two countries may help 
to reduce transaction costs. The investor may feel more familiar with the way business is 
conducted in the host country and establish business links easier. Cultural divergence, however, 
is internationally more common than convergence (Hofstede, 1983). More often than not 
experience companies liabilities to foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). Internationalising firms may 
therefore be inclined to invest in a location which offers greater cultural proximity. Firms may 
therefore invest in countries where a significant proportion of the population is constituted by 
emigrants'from the firm's home country, as advanced in the Chinese ODIR in Section 4.3. This 
pattern may be more pronounced in culturally more distant countries. It follows from this 
discussion and the earlier explanations in Chapter 4.3 that: 
Hypothesis 5: Chinese ODI is associated positively with the proportion of ethnic Chinese in the 
host country population. 
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Domestic policy liberalisation 
The discussion in Section 4.3 highlights that domestic policies influence the propensity of firms 
to invest overseas as the policies create or dilute market imperfections. Deng Xiaoping, late 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CCP and de facto leader of China from the 
late 1970s to early 1990s (Yahuda, 1993; Naughton, 1993), travelled twice to Southern China, 
1984 and 1992, to stress the importance of FDI and economic liberalisation (Naughton, 1993, 
2007). Both journeys strengthened the position of Chinese reformers and provided a positive 
signal to foreign investors - clearly reflected in the upsurge of inward FDI - and, arguably, to 
domestic investors willing to invest abroad (Cai, 2006). The possible effects of the first trip by 
Deng on Chinese ODI are not included this analysis as the available data series only starts in 
1984 (see Figure 1.1). The second trip in 1992, however, marks the beginning of the third phase 
of Chinese ODI and is accordingly included and the effects on Chinese ODI estimated (TD92). 
This variable captures the endogenous informal institutional element of the Chinese ODIR 
presented in Figure 4.1: 
Hypothesis 6: Liberalisation of Chinese FDI policy in 1992 increased Chinese ODI. 
Control variables 
Beside these main variables the econometric model incorporates a number of control variables 
as employed in other empirical studies on FDI (e. g. Clegg and Scott-Green, 1998; Love and 
Lage-Hidalgo, 2000; Barrell and Pain, 1996). The control variables for this model are the 
official exchange rate of the host country (LERATE), the annual inflation in the host country 
(LINF), China's exports to the host country (LEXP), imports from the host country to China 
(LIMP), the geographical distance between Beijing and the capital of the host country (LDIS) 
and the openness of the host country to inward FDI (LINFD). The data sources for each main 
and control variable are presented in Section 5.3. 
The interactions of the variables and how they are linked into the model of national and 
international institutional elements as presented in Chapter 4 is depict in Figure 7.1: 
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Figure 7.1: The Chinese ODIR - Domestic institutions (Model One) 
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Source: Adapted from Figure 4.1. 
Model and method 
The above discussion suggests the following well-specified log-linear model to explain Chinese 
ODI with respect to domestic institutions, international networks and investment strategy 
(Equation 1): 
LFDI -a+ (3, LGDP+(32LGDPP+(33LGGDP + (34LORE+(3cLPATENT-+ (36LRISK (LQ1) 
+R7CP + 138TD92 + (39LERATE +1 0LINF + (3LEXP + 1312LIMP -+ 
I3i3LDIS+ (3i4LINFDI + E;, 
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In equation EQ1, a denotes the intercept, ß stands for unknown parameter of interest and c for 
the error term. The two variables GDP per capita (LGDPP) proxying investment behaviour 
driven by relative host market size and growth in GDP (LGGDP) proxying potential future host 
market size never attained any significance in preliminary regressions and were therefore 
dropped from subsequent analysis. The absolute host market size variable (LGDP) remains in 
the model to capture market-seeking behaviour and to act as a control for market returns in the 
estimation of the relationship between Chinese ODI and host country risk. 
Table 7.1: Descriptive analysis of Chinese ODI to OECD and non-OECD countries in 
Model One based on SAFE data, 1984 to 2001 
OECD country Mean - St. Dev. 
I Non-OECD country Mean St. Dev. 
Australia 5.55 4.39 Algeria 0.06 0.15 
Austria 0.18 0.51 Argentina 0.92 1.48 
Canada 7.98 10.03 Armenia 0.02 0.10 
Czech Republic 0.33 0.58 Brazil 7.07 14.85 
Denmark 0.04 0.14 Bulgaria 0.03 0.08 
Finland 0.07 0.19 Chile 0.20 0.35 
France 0.84 0.90 Colombia 0.53 1.90 
Germany 1.91 2.35 Croatia 0.01 0.06 
Greece 0.00 0.00 Cyprus 0.03 0.08 
Hungary 0.73 1.09 Ecuador 0.23 0.40 
Italy 0.62 1.58 Egypt 5.40 18.36 
Japan 211.81 889.04 Ghana 0.97 1.96 
Mexico 16.61 48.29 Hong Kong SAR 192.18 490.34 
Netherlands 0.43 0.75 India 0.71 2.71 
New Zealand 0.30 0.48 Indonesia 4.67 11.80 
Poland 0.75 1.62 Israel 0.01 0.03 
Portugal 0.25 0.64 Malaysia 14.01 45.74 
South Korea 5.51 15.22 Morocco 14.01 0.51 
Spain 0.99 2.93 Nigeria 1.89 4.43 
Sweden 0.18 0.41 Philippines 4.89 13.60 
United Kingdom 1.57 4.09 Russia 6.90 13.50 
United States 33.13 28.11 Singapore 11.13 28.40 
South Africa 7.07 15.59 
Sudan 116.82 466.60 
Thailand 14.23 25.21 
Ukraine 0.46 0.93 
Venezuela 27.76 83.56 
OECD countries 13.17 190.02 1 Non-OECD countries 15.50 134.79 
Source: Calculated from SAFE (2005). 
Note: Means and standard deviations of Chinese ODI are calculated from project value as 
reported by SAFE, converted into constant (year 2000) USD million. 
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The dependent variable (LFDI) is the total annual amount of foreign exchange approved by 
SAFE during the investment project approval process. This analysis is based on Chinese ODI 
in forty nine host countries, twenty-two of which are members of the OECD and twenty-seven 
non-members (see also Table 7.1). Table 7.1 presents a descriptive overview of Chinese ODI in 
OECD and non-OECD countries. The data shows a large variance in the data, as illustrated by 
high standard deviations compared to the annual mean of Chinese ODI to a host country. 
Two statistical models were used to estimate equation (EQ1), namely pooled ordinary least 
squares (POLS) and the random effects (RE). A fixed effects model cannot be used since the 
equation includes a time dummy variable. A Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test was conducted to 
identify whether POLS or REs furnished the better model. The LM value is significantly 
different from zero and indicates that the REs estimation is preferable to that of POLS. The 
discussion below is therefore based on the REs results. 
The effect of Deng Xiaoping's trip to Southern China in 1992 and the subsequent policy 
changes on Chinese ODI are tested with a structural break dividing the sample into a pre-1992 
period (1984 to 1991) and post-1992 period (1992 to 2001). The impact on the level of 
economic development of the host country is tested by splitting the sample into an OECD and a 
non-OECD sub-sample. Both sub-samples are analysed for the whole period 1984 to 2001. 
The correlation matrix (Table 7.2) shows that no serious collinearity between the variables. 
Table 7.2: Correlation matrix for Model One 
LFDI 
LGDP 
LORE 
LPATENT 
LRISK 
LERATE 
LINF 
LEXP 
LIMP 
LDIS 
LINFDI 
Note: Thf 
F 
25 c a 
1.000 
0.219 1.000 
0.004 0.027 1.000 
0.069 0.668 0.192 1.000 
-0.043 0.485 0.179 0.462 1.000 
0.075 -0.261 -0.128 -0.224 -0.276 1.000 
-0.002 -0.288 0.174 -0.142 -0.453 -0.098 1.000 
0.443 0.657 -0.129 0.375 0.352 0.041 -0.395 1.000 
0.358 0.728 0.088 0.459 0.402 -0.130 -0.321 0.855 1.000 
-0.177 -0.037 0.234 -0.084 -0.010 -0.332 0.198 -0.495 -0.422 
0.183 -0.256 -0.124 -0.263 0.131 -0.007 -0.186 0.125 -0.007 
time dummy TD92 is excluded from the correlation matrix. 
1.000 
0.087 1.000 
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7.1.2 Results and discussion of Model One 
First, the determinants of Chinese ODI in Model One are discussed for the whole time period 
and OECD and non-OECD countries combined as presented in Table 7.3. This is followed by 
the introduction of the structural break for 1992 and the assessment of its impact on the 
determinants of Chinese ODI. Then, differences in findings are investigated for OECD and 
non-OECD countries in order to see if the decision-taking of Chinese forms differs between 
developed and developing host countries. 
Findings for the full time period and all countries 
Absolute host market size (LGDP), cultural proximity (CP) and policy liberalisation in China 
(TD92) are all found to be significant for the full time period and signed as predicted. These 
findings support Hypotheses Hla, H5 and H6. The level of county risk (LRISK), however, is 
found to be significant but with a sign contrary to expectation and this does not support H4. 
The proxies for natural resource-seeking FDI (LORE) and asset-seeking FDI (LPATEN7) are 
both found to be insignificant. Therefore, Hypotheses H2 and H3 are not supported. The main 
findings are now discussed in more detail. 
The absolute market size of a host country (LGDP) has a strong positive influence on Chinese 
ODI for the full time period under investigation as hypothesised (Hla). This finding indicates 
that Chinese companies tend to invest in developed countries with large absolute markets and 
thus behave more like industrialised countries MNEs rather than destining their investment to 
developing countries as predicted by the literature on developing country MNEs (e. g. Lecraw, 
1993) (see Section 2.2.8). Indeed, a1 per cent rise in LGDP increases Chinese ODI by 0.35 per 
cent. The second variable following prediction is cultural proximity (CP). This finding 
suggests that Chinese companies tend to invest in locations with a significant number of 
Overseas Chinese where they can exploit relational assets (Dunning, 2002; Costin and Herken, 
2006). This confirms the view that networks are important to the internationalisation of Chinese 
MNEs as proposed in Sections 3.4 and 4.3. The liberalisation policies instigated by Deng 
Xiaoping's journey in 1992 (TD92) are found to have had a positive effect, as hypothesised, on 
Chinese ODI (116). One interpretation is that policy changes encouraged local government 
authorities to support `their' enterprises to invest abroad. 
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Table 7.3: Results for determinants of Chinese ODI in Model One (SAFE data) 
Hla 
H2 
H3 
H4 
H5 
H6 
All countries All countries All countries OECD Non-OECD 
1984-2001 1984-91 1992-01 1984-2001 1984-2001 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 5 
Log GDP 0.3448 0.5085 0.2448 0.6674 0.3472 
(LGDP) (0.1640)** (0.2787)* (0.2009) (0.3650)* (0.2238) 
Log Ore/Min 0.1447 0.1039 0.2253 -0.0138 0.1820 
(LORE) (0.1057) (0.1654) (0.1206)* (0.3906) (0.1144) 
Log Patents -0.0363 0.0794 -0.0516 -0.0752 -0.0262 
LPATEN 0.0359 0.0605 (0.0439) (0.0773) (0.0447) 
Country risk -1.7997 -0.7347 -2.6308 -1.8973 -1.4560 
(LRISK) (0.6974)** (1.0846) (0.9750)*** (1.8807) 0.8903 
Cultural proxy 1.4929 1.4520 1.5338 2.0464 0.8414 
(CP) (0.4276)*** (0.6059)** (0.4634)*** (0.8415)** (0.6563) 
Policy dummy 0.6961 0.8033 0.9489 0.4104 
(TD92) (0.2534)*** "' 0.3002 *** (0.3178)*** (0.4021) 
Exchange rate 0.0688 0.1032 0.0246 0.2319 0.0142 
LERAT (0.0463) (0.0638) (0.0618) (0.1866) (0.0540) 
Log Inflation 0.1891 0.4664 0.1323 0.3487 0.1320 
LIN (0.0734)** (0.1167)*** 0.0896 (0.1579)** (0.0914) 
Log CIINs exp 0.6153 0.2731 0.8275 0.4062 0.8375 
(LEXP) (0.1291)*** (0.2094) (0.1803)*** (0.2053)** 0.1964 *** 
Log CHNs imp -0.2544 -0.3087 -0.3098 -0.1914 -0.3677 
LIMP (0.1027)** (0.2061) (0.1204)** (0.1898) (0.1374)*** 
Log Distance 0.1554 -0.9266 0.2885 0.7452 0.0171 
LDI (0.2972) (0.4794)* (0.3400) 0.7360 (0.4259) 
Log Inward 0.0510 0.3294 -0.0589 -0.1181 0.1218 
FDI LINFD (0.1244) (0.1562)** (0.0439) (0.2480) 0.1546 
N 402 116 286 198 204 
LM Test X2(]) = 15.43*** 
Adjusted R2 0.6019 0.6142 0.6024 
7 
0.5763 0.6737 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
(2) ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Contrary to expectations, the country risk variable (LRISK) is negatively associated with 
Chinese ODI. The variable LRISK is constructed in such a way that higher values indicate 
lower country risk. Our finding therefore suggests that Chinese ODI tend to be associated with 
risky countries. In other words, a1 per cent decrease in host country risk is associated with a 
decrease in Chinese ODI of 1.8 per cent. This finding does not support H4. As the model 
specification controls for market returns by including LGDP, the finding suggests that the 
international investment behaviour of Chinese firms differs from industrialised country 
investors. Although the perverse investment behaviour of Chinese firms is not supported by 
earlier research on country risk and ODI from industrialised countries (e. g. Biswas, 2002), it 
reflects the theoretical framework put forward in Chapter 4. The institutional framework in 
China creates market imperfections, not at least regarding the domestic capital market, which 
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may induce such kind of behaviour as the perception of risk or on the risk-adjusted return 
deviates from Western perceptions (Ruefli et al., 1999). There are a number of reasons why 
Chinese firms may not behave in the conventional manner. First, Chinese state-owned firms 
may not act to maximise profits, but rather to satisfy a somewhat more political agenda which 
could be influenced by domestic institutional elements (Boisot and Child, 1988) (see Sections 
3.3.1,3.4.6, and 4.2.1). Second, Chinese ODI is increasingly destined to developing countries 
which generally rank high in respect to country risk (Cosset et al., 1992) (see Tables 3.3 and 
3.5). Much of this investment may have been promoted by political affiliations and connections 
between China and the developing host country government concerned (see Sections 3.3.5 and 
3.4.6). Third, the home country embeddedness of Chinese firms may provide them with firm- 
specific advantages and enable them to invest in a riskier environment (Costin and Herken, 
2006) that enable them to attenuate the risk associated with operating in a similar host country 
environment (see Section 2.2.8). Fourth, Chinese firms may be prepared to invest in countries 
generally avoided by industrialised country firms because of ethical or political reasons and a 
civil society which watches over them (see Sections 3.4.6 and 4.2.1). Fifth, it should be noted 
that the relative inexperience of some Chinese firms concerning the establishment and 
management of large-scale operations abroad may have led to FDI projects being undertaken 
with insufficient due diligence and attention to associated risks (Wong and Chan, 2003; Ma and 
Andrews-Speed, 2006). Accordingly Mr Bo Xilai, China's Minister of Commerce, has stated 
that Chinese firms should evaluate investment risks more carefully before undertaking ODI 
(MOFCOM, 2006d). This view is supported by the interview findings reported in Section 6.1. 
Finally, Cai (2006) makes the point that Chinese firms invest in riskier developing countries 
because (i) the Chinese government explicitly supports investments in such countries and (ii) 
Chinese companies try to avoid competition with industrialised country MNEs. 
It is important to point out that the finding for LRISK could indicate that common country risk 
measurements may not appropriately reflect risk perceptions of developing country companies. 
The ICRG index used here as well as other indices such as the Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence (BERT) and Freedom House, are typically designed and calculated to advise 
industrialised country firms in their international investment decisions. Developing country 
firms, however, are embedded in a particular institutional framework. This means that they may 
not perceive risk in the same way as do industrialised country firms. This suggests that familiar 
country risk indices may have to recalculated and adjusted to capture the behaviour of 
developing country firms. 
The coefficients for the main variables for asset-seeking (LPATENT) and natural resource- 
seeking FDI (LORE) show no significance. Thus, the Hypothesis 2 and 3 are not supported. 
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This lack of significance suggests that Chinese firms have neither been motivated to acquire 
strategic intellectual capital assets nor natural resources over the time period under investigation. 
Findings for the structural break in 1992 and all countries 
In order to investigate whether or not the determinants of Chinese ODI have changed over time 
(RQ6), the data is divided into two time periods around 1992. The results are shown in Table 
7.3. The results indicate that different locational determinants and motivations apply over time 
as proposed by Buckley et al. (2006). Absolute market size (LGDP) and cultural proximity (CP) 
were important determinants of Chinese ODI for the period prior to 1992 but in the post-1992 
period natural resource endowment (LORE), cultural proximity (CP), and policy liberalisation 
(TD92) are positively associated instead. As in the equation for the full sample, country risk 
(LRISK) is found to be significant but with the wrong sign and for the latter period only. 
These findings are mainly in agreement with the earlier discussion (see Section 6.2) that there 
has been a significant change in the foreign investment behaviour of Chinese enterprises over 
time and that this is at least partly due to the variable policy regime, as suggested by our finding 
for the policy liberalisation variable (TD92) which indicates a surge in ODI for the year 1992. 
Arguably, this provides further substantiation for the notion that institutional factors have 
influenced patterns of Chinese ODI. It is found that, over the period under study, Chinese firms 
have moved away from undertaking mainly market seeking strategies in nearby foreign markets 
towards the securing of raw materials in riskier markets. These findings reinforce the view that 
the securing of natural resources has become an imperative in more recent . years, in line with 
Chinese domestic growth and increasing demand, and that this investment has been directed to 
countries with higher levels of country risk. 
The highly significant and positive coefficient for cultural proximity (CP) in both time periods 
supports hypothesis H5 that familiarity between populations is important in the flow of Chinese 
FDI. The facilitating role of the Overseas Chinese persists throughout the period under study, 
as expected, and suggests that relational assets indeed constitute an ownership advantage for 
Chinese firms when they invest in countries with a significant Chinese population. This 
confirms a major element of the Chinese ODIR advanced in Figure 4.1. 
172 
Findings for the full time period split by OCED and non-OECD countries 
Theory suggests that home country market imperfections can exert a significant impact on the 
decisions of foreign investors (see Section 4.2). It follows that Chinese government policy may 
have led to a distinctive pattern of ODI by host country type. Here, this is tested for developed 
and developing countries by comparing results for the sub-samples of OECD and non-OECD 
member countries in Table 7.3. Market size (LGDP) is found to be a significant determinant of 
Chinese ODI within the group of OECD countries, suggesting that Chinese investment is 
preferentially destined to larger markets. This is a conventional result, and captures the part of 
Chinese ODI that is market seeking. Also significant is the cultural proximity variable (CP). 
This variable appears to be capturing the tendency for Chinese firms to invest in OECD 
countries where a sizeable population of ethnic Chinese can be found. The significant and 
correctly signed policy liberalisation variable for OECD countries only (TD92) yields insight 
into the relatively undeveloped state of the FDI decision process by Chinese investors. The 
policy change in 1992 is associated with a large increase in FDI to the developed world. This 
implies that the decision to invest was previously tightly circumscribed by government, and this 
may be the reason why a full and conventional pattern of significance is not observed. However, 
the pattern of investment flows to the developed economies fits with Chinese government 
priorities during liberalisation (see Section 3.3.5). 
One of the most compelling earlier findings, that the main variable country risk (LRISK) is 
significant and signed contrary to expectation, is lost in both equations. From this, it is inferred 
that, while Chinese ODI is associated with higher levels of host country risk, the difference in 
risk in the data is primarily that between developed and developing countries, rather than within 
these two country groupings. The apparent preference for less-developed and risky host 
countries as against developed hosts is consistent with the argument concerning lower cost of 
capital enjoyed by state-owned enterprises, as well as with the relatively unsophisticated 
country risk evaluation processes of Chinese investors (see Sections 4.2.1 and 6.2.3). This 
result supports the theoretical contention that domestic capital market imperfections in China 
have been crucial to ODI over the time period in question as advanced in the Chinese ODIR. 
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7.2 Model Two: International institutional factors and international network 
effects - An analysis of MOFCOM data 
The second cross-sectionals analysis of Chinese ODI in Model Two focuses predominantly on 
the effects of international institutional factors, namely the effects of bilateral agreements and 
membership to the WTO, and international networks to host countries as advanced in the 
Chinese ODIR framework shown in Chapter 448 The instigation of the `Go Global' policy in 
1999 is again incorporated and a domestic policy variable is introduced to capture changes in 
the Chinese foreign exchange regime in 1994. Model Two also incorporates the international 
investment strategy framework of Dunning (1993) (see Section 2.3.3). Hypotheses related to 
`traditional' drivers of international production are presented first, followed by the hypotheses 
related to `new', institutional drivers. Model Two is necessary because, first, the SAFE data 
ends in 2001 and therefore do not capture the recent increase in Chinese ODI (see Figure 1.1). 
Second, it has been shown in Section 5.3 that MOFCOM and SAFE collect and report 
somewhat different data on Chinese ODI. Employing MOFCOM data helps to identify 
determinants of Chinese ODI over a long time period to be, evaluated. This triangulation 
improves the reliability of the findings for the research as a whole. 
7.2.1 Operationalisation of Model Two 
Hypotheses 
Market-seeking FDI 
Contrary to Model One of Section 7.1, Model Two takes a developing country MNE stance on 
market-seeking activities. Developing country firms generally tend to invest in other 
developing countries or in less developed countries (Lecraw, 1993; Wells, 1983). In both 
situations, the investing firm is argued to have firm-specific advantages which would not exist 
or are less pronounced if the firm is to invest in a more advanced country than the home country. 
Contrary to what is proposed under Hypothesis 1 of Model One, developing country firms here 
are predicted to invest in countries with a small relative and absolute market size in terms of 
GDP/capita and GDP. China is a developing country and the investment behaviour pattern of 
Chinese companies may be similar to that of other developing countries. It hence follows that: 
48 Section 6.2 is based on Buckley et al. (2007b). 
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Hypothesis 7: The relative market size of a host country is negatively associated with Chinese 
ODI flows. 
Resource-seekiggFDI 
FDI is often driven to access locally-bound resources such as oil and gas (see Section 2.3). 
China lacks sufficient oil and gas resources and has become a major importer of these 
commodities since the mid-1990s (Ma and Andrew-Speed, 2006; Naughton, 2007). These 
resources are not only important energy sources but also crucial input in other industries such as 
chemical and plastic industries. Chinese firms can either satisfy their demand through 
purchases on the international market or internalise the market through FDI in order to minimise 
price and supply volatility. The latter is favoured by the Chinese government and involved 
government authorities (as shown in Sections 3.34 and 3.3.5). It therefore follows that: 
Hypothesis 8: The level of natural resources endowments of a host country is associated 
positively with Chinese ODI flows. 
Asset-seeking FDI 
The rationale for the inclusion and application for the number of patents granted in the host 
country as a proxy for host country technology related capabilities follows the justification in 
Model One for Hypothesis 3. Thus: 
Hypothesis 9: The number of granted patents in a host country is positively associated with 
Chinese ODI flows. 
Domestic policy liberalisation 
The Chinese ODIR framework advanced in Figure 4.1 identifies domestic policies as an 
important driver of ODI by Chinese companies. The assessment of the source of hard currency 
has usually been the first step in the Chinese outward investment approval process. The 
liberalisation of the foreign exchange regime in 1994 made it easier for Chinese firms to 
generate hard currency income. This could have led to more Chinese firms considering to use 
their fund to invest internationally, hence: 
Hypothesis 10: China's outward FDI flow is positively associated with liberalization of foreign 
exchange controls in 1994. 
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Bilateral investment treaties 
BITs are generally designed to protect the investor in a host country and to promote FDI to the 
host country. Following the discussion in Section 4.2.2, such an agreement between two 
countries may therefore be associated with increasing bilateral direct investment flows. China is 
currently the second largest signatory of BITs after Germany (UNCTAD 2006,2005b). This 
may indicate that the Chinese government has recognised the role that BITs can play in 
supporting Chinese investors and increasing Chinese ODI. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a 
BIT concluded by China with a host country is followed by an increase in Chinese ODI in that 
country. In particular Chinese ODI in Thailand is said to have increased steeply after the 
conclusion of a BIT (Frost, 2005). As discussed in Section 4.2.2, an indirect effect of BITs may 
derive from a positive signalling effect to third country investors. The BIT concluding countries 
acknowledge that they consider a stable and predictable business environment and enforceable 
rights for foreign investors as being important. Such a statement may be regarded by third 
country investors as equally important as a bilateral agreement between the firm's home country 
and another country. Therefore, two hypotheses follow: 
Hypothesis Ha: A host country's propensity to attract Chinese ODI flows is positively 
associated with the conclusion of a BIT with China. 
Hypothesis lib: A host country's propensity to attract Chinese ODI flows is positively 
associated with the total number of BITs it has concluded. 
Double taxation treaties 
As was shown in Section 4.2.2, DTTs are generally designed to regulate the taxation of foreign 
investors in the home and host country. A DTT normally attenuates the double-taxation and 
possibilities of tax avoidance of foreign investors. China has signed a number of DTTs during 
the 1990s and has become an important signatory of DTTs (UNCTAD, 2005b). DTTs may 
have a similar signalling effect to third country investors as do BITs. The DTT concluding 
countries acknowledge that they consider a predictable taxation policy as important for 
businesses. Such an avowal may be regarded by third country investors as important as a 
bilateral agreement between the firm's home country and another country. Therefore, two 
hypotheses follow: 
Hypothesis 12a: A host country's propensity to attract Chinese ODI flows is positively 
associated with the conclusion of a DTT with China. 
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Hypothesis 12b: A host country's propensity to attract Chinese ODI flows is positively 
associated with the total number of DTTs it has concluded. 
WTO membership 
A further formal exogenous element of the Chinese ODIR (see Figure 4.1) is the WTO 
membership status (WTO) of a host country. The membership of the WTO (and formerly to 
GATT) may (in a similar way to BITS and DTTs), signal to foreign investors that the host 
country will conform to its strictures and obligations with respect to international trade and 
investment. This avowal is stressed by the fact the WTO governs much of the framework for 
international trade through, for example, the agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights and on Trade-Related Investment Measures. These agreements, and hence the WTO, 
govern issues related to equal treatment of domestic and foreign firms, trade dispute resolution, 
market access, reductions in preferential trading arrangements and so forth. The WTO thus 
constitutes an important formal exogenous element of the institutional framework within which 
(Chinese) MNEs operate. Hence: 
Hypothesis 13: Countries that are members of the WTO attract higher Chinese ODI flows. 
Cultural proximity 
The cultural proximity (CP) proxy in this econometric model is taken from the former analysis 
of Chinese ODI. A larger share of Overseas Chinese in the host country's total population may 
attenuate transaction costs for mainland Chinese firms and thus make it easier for them to 
connect and cooperate with local businesses in the host market. This is in line with discussions 
presented in Sections 4.2.3. Thus: 
Hypothesisl4: China's ODI is positively associated with a greater the proportion of ethnic 
Chinese people in a host country's population. 
Geographical distance 
Geographic distance (LDIS) is included as an exogenous element in the Chinese ODIR and, 
hence, in Model Two. Increasing geographical distance between host and home market raises 
the transaction costs when the business is conducted at arm's length. FDI becomes therefore 
more cost-efficient with greater geographical distance (see Section 2.3 for a discussion). 
Hypothesis 15: Geographic distance of the host country's capital from Beijing is positively 
associated with Chinese ODI flow. 
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Model Two also incorporates a number of control variables similar to the ones employed in 
Model One. The control variables for this model are the level of host country risk as measured 
by the PRC Group in its ICRG index (LRISK), power purchasing parity (LPPP), the official 
exchange rate of a country (LERATE), the annual inflation rate in the host country (LINE), 
China's exports to the host country (LEXP) and imports from the host country (LIMP) and the 
openness of the host country to inward FDI (LINFD). The data sources for both main and 
control variable are presented in Section 5.3. Figure 7.2 depicts Model Two. 
Figure 7.2: The Chinese ODIR - Supranational institutions (Model Two) 
China 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITS) +x; º, 
Capital market , /", %% imperfections Double taxation treaties (DTT s) 
Host Country 
Market seeking strategy 
Strategic asset seeking str. 
Natural resource seeking st 
Inflow barrier 
and mediators 
Investment Flow A 
Technology seeking str. 
Efficiency seeking strategy 
Country risk factors: 
a) Political 
b) Financial /' 
c) Economic 
%i%%",; Psychic proximity 
Social entrepreneurial networks b) Business environment 
NDRC: Approval 
;, c) Culture Business entrepreneurial networks: /. , 
-1 Trade linkages 
;: ':::;;:;:: wiumemoer 
Increasing international investment commitment and psychic distance: 
Ad hoc versus sequential investment 
Notes: (1) Broken arrows ( -- ---") indicate mediating (indirect) effects; 
Solid arrows () indicate direct effects. 
(2) `ForEx' stands for Foreign Exchange; 
(3) `A' denotes the affiliate of the investing firms in the host country; and 
(4) `HQ' the headquarters of the investing firm in the home country, in this case China. 
Source: Adapted from Figure 4.1. 
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Model and method 
The above discussion suggest that a well-specified model for the explanation of Chinese ODI 
with respect to the effect of international institutions and the variables derived from theory can 
be constructed as follows (EQ2): 
LFDI= c c+ ß1LGDPPC+ (32LO1L+ (33LPATENT+ (34TD94+ (35BIT+ (36LACBIT (EQ2) 
+(37DTT + (38LACDTT + ß9WTO + IIOCP + (311LDIS + P12LPISK + 
013LPPP + (314LERATE + (315LINF + (316LEXP + (317LIMP +ß18LINFDI + 
cit 
In EQ2 a denotes the intercept, ß stands for unknown parameter of interest and e for the error 
term. The dependent variable (LFDI) is the total annual amount of ODI approved and reported 
by MOFCOM. A panel of data on fifty-five countries for a period of 13 years from 1991 to 
2003 is employed extending the number of countries and years compared to Model One. 
Of the fifty-five countries twenty-two are OECD member countries and thirty-four are non- 
OECD member countries. A descriptive analysis of the employed MOFCOM dataset is 
presented in Table 7.4. It should be noted here that it is possible that the high mean for 
Denmark with respect to other European countries and Denmark's history as a host for inward 
FDI is based on false reporting by MOFCOM for a recent year. No other sources, including 
business and financial press, could support the reporting of a USD 350 million Chinese 
investment project in Denmark. 
The equation (EQ2) was analysed using POLS and one way RE estimators. A fixed effects 
estimator cannot be used since this equation includes dummy variables which are invariant with 
respect to time for the country concerned. A LM test was conducted for each sample under 
investigation to identify whether POLS or RE furnished the better model. The LM test values 
were significantly different from zero in five of nine cases indicating that RE estimators is 
preferred in these cases. Table 7.6 presents the results and shows if either POLS or RE results 
are chosen and are hence discussed in the next section. The hypothesized effect of the 
instigation of the `Go Global' policy at the beginning of Phase 4 of Chinese ODI in 1999 is 
addressed by allowing for a structural break. Possible changes in the determinants of Chinese 
ODI by level of economic development of the host country are also explored by splitting the 
sample by OECD and non-OECD membership status. The correlation matrix (Table 7.5) 
indicates no major problem of collinearity in the dataset. 
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Table 7.4: Descriptive analysis of Chinese ODI to OECD and non-OECD countries in 
Model Two based on MOFCOM data, 1991 to 2003 
OECD country Mean St. Dev. I Non-OECD country Mean St. Dev. 
Australia 
Austria 
Canada 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Italy 
Japan 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Poland 
Portugal 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
OECD countries 
11.44 22.04 Algeria 0.34 0.63 
0.19 0.37 Argentina 1.04 1.21 
27.51 75.48 Armenia 0.02 0.07 
0.37 0.74 Brazil 9.83 13.49 
27.31 98.38 Bulgaria 0.27 0.57 
0.27 0.91 Chile 0.31 1.35 
1.96 5.16 Colombia 0.67 2.02 
4.65 6.48 Croatia 0.03 0.12 
0.02 0.06 Cyprus 0.00 0.00 
0.87 1.14 Ecuador 0.11 0.18 
1.82 3.21 Egypt 4.81 6.48 
7.41 20.76 Ghana 1.17 2.12 
14.01 29.86 Hong Kong SAR 344.99 1044.83 
0.72 1.09 India 1.57 2.88 
3.50 10.54 Indonesia 11.56 21.49 
0.21 0.49 Israel 0.12 0.39 
0.00 0.00 Kenya 1.78 2.00 
22.99 56.03 Madagascar 1.25 2.50 
0.36 0.71 Malaysia 2.13 1.98 
0.25 0.50 Mongolia 5.60 11.51 
1.84 3.16 Morocco 0.56 1.29 
50.17 71.52 Nigeria 3.98 4.43 
Pakistan 2.23 3.62 
Peru 0.95 1.02 
Philippines 14.29 33.61 
Romania 1.67 2.69 
Russia 29.62 66.00 
Singapore 7.08 12.33 
South Africa 9.31 8.76 
Sudan 1.76 3.26 
Tanzania 3.30 4.87 
Thailand 17.91 36.65 
Ukraine 0.61 1.13 
Venezuela 1.59 4.36 
8.08 29.32 1 Non-OECD countries 14.19 178.38 
Source: Calculated from MOFCOM (1990-2003). 
Note: Means and standard deviations of Chinese ODI flow are calculated on the annual data 
published by MOFCOM, after transformation into constant (year 2000) USD million. 
180 
0 
Eý 
aý 
0 
w 0 
22 
E 
C 
O 
w 
C 
.r 
W 
O 
U 
d 
a 0 F 
IQiAIPI 
' ý? dNiI I ? 
dX3'I O 000, 
N 
8 00 
M 
N O 
O0 
, NIA 
N 
ö I 
8 
N - 
ýLV2IdI o O 
00 
I( . 
M. 
OM O 
ddd 
0 
- 
ö 
i o-°o 
- 
i 
ö 
i 
cM+ 
i 
8 N 00 Irr Oý ä 
NSRrI O O O M - ei M 
M 
SIQ I i 
N 
i 
C' 
i 
O 
N 
i 
M 
n 
M 
b °I-° - 
rn 
C 
N 
ä 
00 
0 di O N Ö O D V _ fi 
pp N 
v1 r 
Ö 
C' 
vlý N - C 
O. LM O O 2 
o 
V 
N p 
O 
N M 
N 
i 
tß'1 
i " 
pp8 C NV M 00 4 N O N 
000 
. 
I.. I. Q. 7dýI O O "-. i 
M 
i 
- 
i 
N 
i 
22 
i 
00 eý 0 " - w tý 
p 
O tß"1 
%0 00 
le 
ý N _ 
M r 
ein N 
.Mi 
0 
Oy 
4r 
,0 r, 00 _ 0 
Ö Ö N 
vI1 vI1 In I 00 O 00 
50 T 
f^'ý1 
. 
I. IIIDVýI O O 
v1 
R 
SO 
ýO 
O N. 
O 
O N 
M 
v1 
O 
'D 
O 
N N 
t'1 
N 
N1 
N. 
N O 
O 
Ö 
N 
N 
w1 
N 
O' 
ýt 
N 
O 
M 
00 
N 
N 
N 
N 
50 
00 
g 
C' 
In 
O 
'0 
00 O, 
00 u 
IM N M M Ö Ö N 
N Ö Ö S 
O rar 
O 
O 
ý' v1 
O 
O 
ýzr N 
O 
O' 
N 
N 
eh 
Q' r- 
'. 00 N 
00 
N 
00 
M 
O N . 
00 
. 
LN3. LVdlI Ö pý O 
N R tý 
et 
Ö Ö 
"N ý 
fn Ö 
N O 
O 
'V 
ý 
'V 
00 
O N N 
O 
00 00 
V1 
ýo 
t- 
V 
. ". 
M 
O 
+ 
O> 
ý/ 
tf' 
ýO 
- 1- V 
V 
1- 
1II01I O 
rr 
G1 
O 
O 
i 
C' T 
O 
O 
O 
i 
N N 
N 
) 
In 
OO 
1 
Z 
e 1 
O 
N 
1 
O 
i 
O 
i 
O 
i 
R 
O 
l Oý 
N 
- 
y 
r 
In 
O 
00 
5O 
N 
00 
M 
V1 
V1 
M 
N 
In 
- I 
M 
O 
N O ' _ 
N 
C' 
SO 
C 
O' 
GG 
5ý 
b 
ddQ. 7ýI O 
M v1 
h 
50 
N 
5O 
ýt 
M 
et 
N 
M 
O 
N 
A rS 
O 1ý 
00 
O 
N 
Ile: 
N 
-i 
N 
vi 
M 
v1 
N 
N u 
O 
O 
O 
N N 
"-ý 
h 
"+ 
M 
O 
vý 
O 
N 
M 
Oý 
10 
O1 
N 
Oý N 
M 10 
O 2 
O 
M 
CO 
00 
M 0 C 
00 
In 
O 
0 IQ3I o ö 
O 
N O o 
Oý 
O 
$ Ö N Ö 
týý1 O O 
Ö 
M 
C) 
C1. 
W F F 
12 p, a a H m o 0 y ýn &- ý d 
" 
u 
V. 
Ü ä F- 
2 
d 
[= 
d ý A. A ä a°.. W 
y 
w O> Z ä 
i a a a Q a w+ U a a a a a a a a r0 
00 
7.2.2 Results and discussion of Model Two 
The discussion is structured as follows: First, the results for the full time period under 
investigation and all countries (1991-2003) are discussed (Table 7.6). Second, the findings for 
several sub-samples are compared and discussed: (i) The above discussions and results in 
Section 7.1 suggest that Chinese ODI might be influenced by a changing national institutional 
framework over time. This is considered by comparing the results for the full country sample 
for the two periods 1991 to 1998 and 1999 to 2003. To identify (ii) the influence of the level of 
economic development of the host country on Chinese ODI, results depending on OECD 
membership status of the host country (member versus non-member), are discussed separately. 
(iii) The above mentioned time break in 1999 is re-applied to both country sub-samples and the 
findings compared. 
Findings for the full time period and all countries 
For the full time period the variables relative market size (LGDPP), WTO membership status of 
the host country (WTO), and cultural proximity (CP) have significance with the expected sign. 
Thus, Hypotheses H7, H13 and H14 are supported. The policy dummy (TD94) is significant 
though signed contrary to expectation and thus H10 is not supported. The variables testing the 
other hypotheses do not obtain significance for the full time period. 
Concerning the traditional determinants of FDI, the results indicate that Chinese MNEs 
preferentially direct their investment to developing countries as a body of literature on 
developing country MNE proposes (e. g. Lall, 1983; Lecraw, 1977; Monkiewicz, 1986; Lecraw, 
1993). One interpretation is that market-seeking Chinese firms seek investment opportunities in 
countries that are at a similar stage of development and institutional environment to China and 
where they enjoy a competitive advantage over local and foreign firms. The competitive 
advantage may derive from the firms' ability to combine and adopt technologies to local 
conditions and a reflection of home country embeddedness (see Section 2.2.8). 
Formal and informal exogenous elements of the Chinese ODIR are partially found to influence 
the decision-making of Chinese firms. Of the formal element, host country membership of the 
WTO is found to be positively associated with greater inflows of Chinese ODI (confirming 
H13). This is attributed in part to the locational advantages derived from compliance of the host 
country to international trade and investment rules and frameworks that are attractive to Chinese 
MNEs. Market-seeking Chinese firms that engage in export-platform FDI to serve third 
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markets may also benefit from tariff reductions and GATT-imposed trade regimes by investing 
in a WTO member state. Some support is also established for the role played by the informal 
exogenous element of the Chinese ODIR: the existence of international business and social 
networks (cf. `guanxi relationships') which is proxied by cultural proximity (CP). The presence 
of an appreciable Chinese population in a host country is positively associated to inbound 
Chinese ODI flows perhaps because such networks provide Chinese firms with wider 
networking possibilities. This finding suggests strongly that relational assets are important to 
the internationalization of Chinese firms. This finding is robust and supports the earlier findings 
on CP in Section 7.1 where a different dataset for the dependent variable was employed. Given 
that Chinese MNEs in the period under study were almost entirely state-owned, this finding 
might be regarded as surprising. However, it is clear from this and other studies (e. g. Erdener 
and Shapiro 2005; Dunning 2002; Costin and Herker, 2006) that relational assets are an 
enduring source of competitive advantage for Chinese firms irrespective of ownership type. 
The time dummy for the measure of the formal endogenous element of the Chinese ODIR, 
namely the relaxation of foreign currency controls in 1994 (TD94), is statistically significant but 
with a sign contrary to expectation. Thus, H10 is not supported. Chinese ODI is found to be 
negatively associated with the liberalization of foreign exchange controls in 1994. This result is 
surprising but may provide some evidence of an idiosyncratic approach to decision-taking on 
international business matters by Chinese MNEs. As discussed in Section 7.1, Chinese MNEs 
seem to have a perverse attitude towards risk (by comparison to industrialised country firms) in 
that they reveal a propensity to invest in higher risk countries (as measured using a country risk 
index developed in industrialised countries) (Buckley et al., 2007a). This phenomenon is 
argued to be related to domestic capital market imperfections enjoyed by Chinese MNEs (see 
Section 4.2.1). In line with this argument, one interpretation for the negative association of 
Chinese ODI and the 1994 foreign exchange liberalization is that the policy change created 
market imperfections which gave Chinese firms greater access to hard currencies from domestic 
sources and reduced their need to invest abroad to retain earnings in hard currency (Tan, 1999). 
Nevertheless, it is revealed in Model Two that endogenous institutional factors do seem to have 
had a determinant effect on FDI outflow from China. 
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Of the remaining main variables, no significant relationship with Chinese ODI is found. 
Traditional variables proxying FDI motivation, such as host country's exports of oil and NLG 
(LOLL) and patents granted (LPATENT), and variables proxying exogenous institutions, such as 
the conclusion of a BIT or a DTT with China (BIT and DTT, respectively) or the signalling 
effect of total BTTs and DTTs concluded by a country (LACBIT and L4 CWT, respectively) and 
geographic distance from Beijing, all fail to gain statistical significance. Thus, Hypotheses H8, 
H9, Hlla, H 11 b, H 12a, H 12b and H 15 are not supported. 
With respect to the FDI motivations of Chinese firms, no evidence is found to support either 
natural-resources seeking or asset-seeking behaviour by Chinese MNEs. The finding that the 
proxy for natural-resources FDI is not significant offers support to the contention held by Ma 
and Andrew-Speed (2006) that the internationalization of Chinese national oil companies 
(NOCs) was at an infancy stage in the, mid-1990s and were only recently pushed to `Go Global' 
(Meidan, 2006). Although there is anecdotal support for the empirical finding, it contrasts to 
that of Buckley et al. (2006,2007a) and the earlier findings presented in Section 7.1. There, a 
positive association for resource endowments with Chinese ODI is found the period 1992 to 
2001. This finding is supported by Cross et al. (2007) for Chinese ODI to developed countries. 
The different findings are most probably caused by new natural resource endowment proxy 
employed in the current study, i. e. LOLL instead of LORE, and different data source for the 
dependent variable, that is MOFCOM data instead of SAFE data. 
The lack of significance for strategic-asset seeking FDI concurs with the finding of Buckley et 
al. (2007a). It supports the view that Chinese MNEs have only recently begun their 
international quest for improved access to foreign-held knowledge, technology and skills and 
that the internationalisation of R&D by Chinese firms is small in number and scale (see also 
Buckley et al., 2006; von Zedtwitz, 2005). 
In respect to the Chinese ODIR-related variables, no evidence is found to support the view that 
formal supranational agreements have influenced the volume and direction of Chinese ODI. Of 
itself, this does not necessarily discount the fact that the institutional regime has an effect, but 
rather that Chinese firms may have responded to the ODI facilitation characteristics associated 
with employed exogenous variables in an idiosyncratic way. In other words, Chinese firms may 
not place much importance on the investment and financial risk-reducing features of 
international treaties such as BITs and DTTs. There are a number of explanations. The first 
explanation derives from earlier discussion in Chapter 4 and Section 7.1.2. Domestic capital 
market imperfections in China may give rise to perverse attitudes towards risk and profit 
maximization (Buckley et al., 2007a). Hence, Chinese companies enjoying access to cheap 
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capital in China may disregard the benefits associated with international trade and investment 
agreements or consider them to be irrelevant. Second, bilateral treaties might be concluded by 
the Chinese government as a sign of friendship and political support for host countries in 
question, but do little to attract Chinese MNEs (Buckley et al., 2007b). Third, the proxies 
employed for bilateral treaties measure only the existence of a treaty but lack a qualitative 
assessment. The proxies may therefore fail to account for the direction of impact of each treaty 
as countries with higher bargaining power may impose a treaty which secures unilateral 
investment protection rights and enforcement. It could therefore be the case that some of the 
bilateral treaties concluded by China provide greater access and protection of foreign 
investments in China than of Chinese ODI elsewhere. 
Finally, the finding for geographic distance is also not significant for the full country sample 
and the full time period. Again, this is in contrast to the work of Buckley et al. (2007a, 2007b) 
who report a significant and negative association between distance and Chinese ODI volumes. 
Findings for the time period 1991 to 1998 and all countries 
This section is concerned with the effect of an introduced structural break on these key findings. 
For the period 1991 to 1998, prior to the instigation of the `Go Global' policy, no change in the 
results is found for market-seeking FDI behaviour (H7), the policy time dummy for 1994 (H10) 
and cultural proximity (H14) after the introduction of the structural break. Thus Hypotheses H1, 
H4 and H8 are supported for this time period as well. However, the result for WTO 
membership (H13) is no longer significant. By contrast, geographic distance now attains 
significance and has a positive coefficient, supporting HIS. This finding suggest that some 
aspects of the internationalization of Chinese firms is predictable by general theory, which 
asserts that firms substitute FDI for exports when serving more distant markets (Buckley and 
Casson, 1981) (see Section 2.2.1). 
Findings for the time period 1999 to 2003 and all countries 
For the second time period (1999 to 2003), a number of differences compared to the findings of 
the full sample are detectable. In particular, the coefficient for crude oil and natural liquefied 
gas exports (LOLL) of the host country is now significant and with the expected positive sign. 
This supports H8 in the latter time period. This finding is not surprising as China's national oil 
companies (NOC) are explicitly encouraged by the Chinese government to expand 
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internationally to secure access of energy sources (Meidan, 2006) as was described in Section 
3.3.5. The significance of this variable for the latter period only lends further weight to the 
contention of Ma and Andrews-Speed (2006) that the internationalization of China's NOCs 
accelerated in the late 1990s. In contrast, the measures of cultural proximity (CP) and 
geographic distance (LDIS) lose their significance. Viewed together, the findings for cultural 
proximity across the two sub-periods may reflect growing confidence in the ability of state- 
owned Chinese MNEs to conduct international business independently of local ethnic and social 
business networks. However, the advantages of cultural proximity may become significant 
again in the future, as greater amounts of Chinese FDI are accounted for by private, and non 
state-owned, Chinese MNEs (MOFCOM, 2004b; CAITEC and WDA, 2005). The finding for 
geographic distance may reflect a wider spatial distribution of Chinese ODI in more recent years 
(see also Table 3.5). This might be in response to government policy (Buckley et al., 2006) or 
to greater influence of market forces and discretionary decision-taking by Chinese MNEs. 
Findings for the full time period and split by OCED and non-OECD countries 
In order to assess whether or not the level of economic development of the host country 
influences the investment behaviour of Chinese MNEs, the model was run separately for OECD 
and non-OECD member countries. Continued support for H7 (relative market size, LGDPPC) 
is found, but for the non-OECD country sub-sample only. Hypotheses 13 (WTO) and H 14 (CP) 
are no longer supported when individual country sub-samples are considered. This suggests 
that there is greater variance for these two variables between rather than within country 
groupings. The measure used to test H10 (TD94) continues to be significant and is negatively 
signed, but only for the OECD country sub-sample: no support is found for H10 when the non- 
OECD country sub-sample is examined separately. The variable LPATENT, however, attains 
significance for the non-OECD countries alone, but with a negatively signed coefficient, 
contrary to expectation for the full sample. LPA TENT is the proxy that captures strategic-asset 
seeking behaviour of Chinese MNEs under H9. This finding reveals a propensity for Chinese 
MNEs to invest in countries with relatively lower technology asset stocks, but only when non- 
OECD countries are concerned. This may reflect improved competitiveness of Chinese MNEs 
in such contexts as well as complementarities between their offering and local demand 
conditions similarly to the ones identified for other developing country MNEs (e. g. Lall, 1983; 
Lecraw, 1993). 
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Findings for OECD countries for the two sub-time periods 
When re-invoking the structural break for 1999 for the OECD countries alone, the measurement 
for the resources endowments of the host country (LOLL) attains significance for the later but 
not the earlier sub period, and has the expected positive sign. Thus, evidence is found to 
support H8 for OECD countries, but only for more recent years. This finding seems to capture 
the growth in natural resources-seeking behaviour by Chinese MNEs observed in the full 
sample (Ma and Andrews-Speed, 2006; Meidan, 2006), which is increasingly being directed to 
the industrialized countries. Similarly, the finding for LPA TENT in the earlier period (1991 to 
1998), which is significant and positively signed (as expected), provides the only support for 119 
in Model Two. This finding indicates that Chinese MNEs have been attracted to countries with 
higher levels of technology stocks, but only when that country is an industrialized country and 
only in the earlier period of international expansion of Chinese ODI under study. This finding 
is at odds with some aspects of the received wisdom concerning the internationalization of 
Chinese firms in the 1990s, which indicates that information-gathering and support of the export 
process were key drivers for Chinese ODI and that technology-seeking motivations have only 
become significant in more recent years. Examination of the sub periods for OECD countries 
only reveals statistical significance of LACBIT, one of the measures of the formal exogenous 
component to the Chinese ODIR, for the period 1991 to 1998. However, the negative sign on 
the coefficient is contrary to expectation. This finding reveals that Chinese MNEs preferentially 
invest in OECD countries that have concluded fewer numbers of BIT agreements. One 
interpretation is that Chinese MNEs are discouraged by the positive signalling effects that a 
country's conclusion of BITs agreements might have on their decision-taking. 
Findings for non-OECD countries for the two sub-time periods 
Re-invoking the structural break for 1999 for the non-OECD countries sub-sample, the 
measures of relative market size (LGDPP), cultural proximity (CP) and geographic distance 
(LDIS) are significant and with the expected sign, as they have been for the full sample. While 
LGDPP is significant for both sub-periods, the latter variables gain significance for the period 
1991 to 1998 only. This provides partial support for H14 and H15, and therefore for the 
informal exogenous institutional elements of the Chinese ODIR. 
The proxies for natural resources-seeking (H8) and strategic asset-seeking (H9) FDI are not 
significant and the hypotheses thus not supported. Likewise, the remaining endogenous and 
exogenous elements of the Chinese ODIR do not achieve significance for the non-OECD 
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country sub-sample in both sub-periods. The hypotheses H10, Hl la, H11b, 126a, H12b, and 
H13 are therefore not supported for this sub-set. 
7.3 Comparison and discussion of econometric Models One and Two 
The empirical analyses of Chinese ODI with respect to the institutional framework put forward 
in Chapter 4 have revealed some interesting findings. As Models One and Two are based on 
different datasets it is important to compare the findings, relate them to the Chinese ODIR 
framework advanced in Figure 4.1 and to findings with those of other studies. The latter aspect 
is constrained to studies on other countries as there exists no such empirical study on Chinese 
ODI. 
Concerning the traditional determinants of FDI, both Models One and Two indicate that the 
market seeking motive is a major driver of Chinese ODI (RQ2). Interpretations differ, however. 
Model One focuses on the absolute market size as a proxy for market seeking FDI and therefore 
generally on investments in developed countries. The finding is in line with a number of studies 
on industrialised country ODI (e. g. Clegg and Scott-Green, 1998; Loree and Guisinger, 1995). 
It rejects the proposition that developing country firms cannot invest in developed countries 
because of limited firm-specific capabilities (e. g. Hymer, 1960). Model Two employs a relative 
market size variable to investigate the attraction of Chinese investment to developing countries, 
to test the proposition of studies by Lecraw (1993) and others. The positive result for both 
models is probably a consequence of the different time periods under investigation. Model One 
goes seven years further back in time than does Model Two. Model One therefore catches more 
Chinese ODI into developed countries around the Pacific Rim as described in Chapter 3. This 
reveals that both models reflect Chinese ODI well. 
China's surge for natural resources is growing and driving ODI (RQ3). Anecdotal evidence for 
this phenomenon is ample (e. g. Ma and Andrew-Speed, 2006). For the first time it is also 
confirmed by an econometric study. Models One and Two show a significant association 
between the natural resource proxy (as a measure of natural resource-endowments of a host 
country) and Chinese ODI, but for the latter periods only - 1992 to 2001 and 1999 to 2003, 
respectively. 
The modelling also reveals that country risk perception and classification may be different 
among Chinese firms compared to industrialised country firms. Model One indicates that 
Chinese firms preferentially direct investments to riskier countries. This finding runs contrary 
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to empirical work on FDI from industrialised countries (Delios and Henisz, 2003a; Biswas, 
2002). However, it can be explained by the domestic capital market imperfections argument, as 
discussed before (RQ10a). 
The novel dimensions of the Chinese ODIR advanced in Figure 4.1 are only partially supported. 
Great consistency is found for the proxy of psychic distance. The influence of the Overseas 
Chinese on the decision-making of Chinese firms is positive in Model One and also for all 
countries and developing countries in Model Two (RQ9). This finding supports the notion that 
networks are important in Chinese international business and especially that Chinese businesses 
may be influenced to invest in countries because of `guanxi' networks (e. g. Ferrantino, 1992). 
Mixed support is provided for the input of policy liberalisation on Chinese MNE decision- 
taking. While the 1992 liberalisation had a positive affect on Chinese ODI (Model One) and the 
1999 liberalisation caused an increase as well (Model Two), the 1994 reform is found to have 
had a negative effect on Chinese ODI (Model Two). Less support is identified for the 
exogenous elements of the ODIR (RQ10b). Bilateral investment treaties and double taxation 
treaties found not to effect levels of Chinese ODI to particular countries. The same is true for 
WTO membership status of a host country. The explanation for these findings is that Chinese 
firms are more concerned about market opportunities than safeguarding their investment (in the 
long-term). This supports the earlier reported finding concerning the investment risk perception 
of Chinese firms and that this might be a consequence of capital market imperfections they 
enjoy in China. 
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8 Conclusions 
The objectives of this research were to identify the determinants of Chinese ODI; to identify the 
international investment strategies pursued by Chinese MNEs, and evaluate the effect of the 
domestic and international institutional environment on the determinants, investment strategies 
and behaviour of Chinese MNEs. The role of international business and social networks has 
been given particular emphasis. These objectives were addressed in eleven separate research 
questions. In this chapter, each of these research questions are re-stated and answered with 
reference to analyses presented in Chapters 6 and 7. This is done by testing the model advanced 
in Chapter 4 of the Chinese outward direct investment regime or Chinese ODIR (see Figure 4.1). 
In this concluding chapter, the contributions made by this research are highlighted. This is 
followed by a brief statement of the limitations of the research and suggestions for further work 
to address them. 
8.1 Main findings 
In this section, the key research findings are presented under each individual research question. 
RQl - What are the determinants of Chinese ODI? 
Econometric testing of the Chinese ODIR in Chapter 7 reveals a number of determinants of 
Chinese ODI which are also found in similar work on developed country ODI. However, it is 
also found here that the significance of these determinants is itself dependent upon the level of 
development of the host country. In particular, absolute market size is a determinant of Chinese 
investments in OECD countries while it is lower relative market size (GDP per capita) for non- 
OECD countries. This finding suggests that some Chinese firms see increasing market potential 
with increasing market size. This might be a niche market strategy, as exemplified by Haier's 
investment in the micro-refrigerator market in the USA, or to support the export function when 
servicing developed country markets from a distance. This latter point is confirmed by the 
positive and significant finding for exports to the host country from China, which is another 
important driver of Chinese ODI revealed in the econometric modelling. The fact that Chinese 
ODI is associated with countries with relatively low GDP per capita levels suggests that some 
Chinese firms demonstrate a propensity to serve less economically advanced markets, perhaps 
because they are able to exploit there their home country-embeddedness and where their firm- 
specific advantages are best utilised, because of their ability to adapt to market conditions 
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similar to their home market, or for other reasons. In this sense, Chinese MNEs also behave 
like other developing country firms (e. g. Lecraw, 1993). Thus, there some evidence to suggest 
that a dualism is emerging in the character of Chinese MNEs, with some possessing features of 
developed country firms and others resembling more developing country firms in respect to 
international decision-taking. However, since some FDI to the developed countries may have 
been motivated by non-market related considerations (natural resources seeking or as listening 
posts), this type of assertion cannot be made without reflecting on the investment strategies of 
Chinese MNEs. 
Very interesting is the finding which relates to host country risk as a determinant of Chinese 
ODI. In studies on the investment behaviour of developed country firms, this variable is 
normally found to be negatively associated with FDI inflows to a country (Buckley and Casson, 
1976; Oetzel et al., 2001). Chinese firms, however, are revealed to demonstrate a propensity to 
invest in more risky host countries. Arguably, such idiosyncratic investment behaviour is 
encouraged by aspects of the Chinese ODIR, in particular, the endogenous element which 
derives from special features of China's institutional environment. This, it is asserted here, has 
created capital market imperfections which mean that Chinese firms do not receive commercial 
risk in the way that is expected of profit-maximising firms that answer to shareholders. These 
capital market imperfections derive from soft budget constraints, the low cost of capital, internal 
funding deriving from the corporate structure of Chinese conglomerate firms (which now often 
incorporate a Chinese financial institution), participation of the State in corporate governance, 
and the inefficient Chinese banking system, amongst other things. Consequently, many Chinese 
MNEs may be investing with less concern for lost sunk investment. Such companies may know 
that their core operation is not under threat from a risky foreign venture. This is a key finding 
for this research, and, as has been argued in Buckley et al. (2007a), suggests strongly that 
capital market imperfections constitute a special application of the internalisation theory. 
As was discussed in Section 7.1, however, the finding for country risk also highlights a possible 
shortcoming of country risk measures commonly used in econometric work of this type (i. e. the 
problem of native categories). Existing measures have been devised from the perspective of 
profit-maximising industrialised country firms. Such measures may be poor at capturing the 
investment decision-taking process and risk perceptions of developing country firms. This 
suggests that country risk measures may need to be revisited to explain the growing 
phenomenon of ODI from developing source countries. 
Of the Chinese ODIR advanced in Chapter 4, little evidence is found to support the determinant 
role of the formal exogenous elements, namely bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double 
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taxation agreements (DTTs). However, this finding does not necessarily mean that these factors 
should not be included in our model. Three explanations are envisaged for the lack of 
significance of these variables in the econometric model: one, the finding supports the work of 
Hallward-Driemeier (2003), Banga (2006) and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) who all argue, 
somewhat contentiously, that BTTs have no effect on the internalisation behaviour of firms in 
general; two, that Chinese firms do not respond to the signalling effect of these agreements 
(because of capital market imperfections in China or for other reasons), and (iii) that the 
measures used in the econometric models do not capture the full effect (perhaps because of 
qualitative differences contained in individual agreements). Only limited support is found for 
WTO membership status of the host country, which is another formal, exogenous element of the 
Chinese ODIR. Other elements of the Chinese ODIR are discussed below in the context of 
more specific research questions. 
RQ2 -To what extent is Chinese ODI driven by market-seeking motivations? 
It is clear from both the primary data collected during interview and a survey of UK affiliates of 
Chinese firms (and analysed in Chapter 6), and the secondary SAFE and MOFCOM FDI data 
analysed econometrically in Chapter 7, that market-seeking motives underpin a significant 
amount of Chinese ODI. This finding provides the first robust, empirical confirmation of the 
assertions made by a number of scholars writing on Chinese ODI, such as Deng (2003,2004), 
Wang (2002) and others. 
RQ3 - To what extent is Chinese ODI driven by natural resource-seeking motivations? 
The motivation to internalise natural resources across borders is observed to be an important 
driver of Chinese ODI, especially in recent years. The analysis in Chapter 7 reveals that access 
to oil, natural liquefied gas, ore and minerals is one driver of Chinese investments across both 
developed and developing host countries. This finding concurs with Ma and Andrew-Speed's 
(2006) description of the investment behaviour of natural resources-oriented Chinese MNEs. 
These authors report that these types of Chinese MNE only began actively pursue foreign 
investments of significant magnitude in the late 1990s. Again, this is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first robust, empirical evidence of this change in behaviour. 
RQ4 - To what extent is Chinese ODI driven by the objective of accessing advanced technology? 
Econometric modelling reveals that Chinese firms tend to invest in OECD countries to access 
more advanced and state-of-the-art technology (as measured by the proxy of patenting intensity). 
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Older extant work on the international expansion of Chinese MNEs places little importance on 
this aspect of their investment strategies (e. g. Zhan, 1995) but confirms anecdotal evidence 
presented in more recent work, for example by Child and Rodrigues (2005) and Zhang (2003). 
Viewed collectively, this body of evidence suggest that investment motives of Chinese firms 
have shifted away from supporting the export function of domestic state-owned enterprise and 
gathering information on industrialised country markets towards the acquisition of foreign- 
owned capabilities and intangible assets. This hints to the fact that, in some aspects, some 
Chinese firms are adopting features of industrialised country firms in this respect. However, 
this finding may also be capturing that part of Chinese ODI that is asset augmenting: that is, 
investment that is made to acquire ownership advantages that previously were absent or only 
poorly developed. 
A further duality in the character of Chinese ODI is detected in the primary data collected for 
this project. The questionnaire survey of Chinese affiliates in the UK (presented in Section 6.2) 
reveal that especially the early entrant places little importance on accessing technology and 
know-how. These firms have mainly been established to develop markets in the UK and, in 
some cases, Europe. Likewise, the majority of the firms interviewed in China report that their 
prime objective for FDI is to gain market access. Technology-seeking FDI was important for 
only two of the ten companies interviewed and, in both cases, this was sought through 
acquisition and the purchase an established brand name. Other forms of asset acquisition were 
not detected in the primary data collection phases. 
RQ5 - To what extent is Chinese ODI driven by the objective of accessing strategic assets? 
This research question is addressed mainly through interview with Chinese parent MNEs. 
Despite detailed probing, no evidence was found to indicate that the firms interviewed had 
internationalised for asset-seeking reasons. This finding is supported in the questionnaire 
survey of Chinese affiliates in the UK. The affiliates placed very low importance on the 
objective of acquiring a British brand when entering the UK. Thus, no confirmation is found 
for the work of Deng (2004) and Buckley et al. (2006), for example, who asserts that this type 
of investment behaviour is on the increase among Chinese firms. Caution must be extended to 
the generalizability of this finding, however, given the small sample size of firms that 
participated in both phases of the primary data collection. 
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RQ6 - Have the determinants of Chinese ODI changed over time? 
There is some indication that the determinants of Chinese ODI have indeed changed over time 
and that this is in response to policy changes in China; that is, to changes to the formal, 
endogenous element of the Chinese ODIR. This is evident in the results of the econometric 
testing of the Chinese ODIR framework. Model One in Section 7.1 employs a time-break in 
1992 to capture liberalisation effects. Findings reveal that, for the later period, the natural 
resources (ores and minerals) seeking motive is a significant investment driver, while the 
propensity of Chinese firms to invest in large (OECD) countries decreased. Model Two of 
Section 7.2 also employs a structural break, this time to detect the effect of ODI encouragement 
as articulated by China's `Go Global' policy and the respective Five Year Plans. Again, the 
importance of natural resources (oil and natural liquefied gas) as an FDI determinant is revealed 
to have grown after 1999. Viewed together, these findings may reflect government policy 
changes, which, since the mid 1990s have sought to promote security in the supply of natural 
resources and to encourage FDI flows to the developing countries as part of China's South- 
South foreign policy (discussed in Section 3.3.5). They also confirm the inclusion of home 
country policy as a formal, endogenous element of the Chinese ODIR as advanced in Figure 4.1. 
Analysis of the survey data on Chinese affiliates in the UK also reveal changes to the 
investment strategies of Chinese firms over time. It is found that Chinese firms which invested 
in the UK before 2000 (that is, before the instigation of the latest liberalisation measures) sought 
to gain market information best accessible through a local affiliate and to support the export 
function of the parent company. This behaviour changed for firms that entered the UK after this 
date. These firms are shown to be more actively exploiting the local market and, but to a lesser 
extent, to access technology. In context of this aspect to the work, partial confirmation is 
provided for Buckley et al. 's (2006) historic-emergent investment strategy framework. 
RQ7 -Do Chinese firms follow a gradualistic approach to internationalisation? 
The research sought to discover whether or not Chinese ODI behaviour could be explained by 
the Stages theory (Uppsala approach) of internationalisation. Cursory examination of official 
aggregate approved Chinese ODI statistics published by MOFCOM shows that Chinese firms 
did invest in psychically distant countries in the early 1980s (in project value terms). This 
confirmed in Model Two of the econometric modelling in Chapter 7 (which takes MOFCOM 
FDI data as the dependent variable). This suggests a departure from the Stages theory 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). However, the nature of 
the data means that it is not possible to identify if the companies gradually increased their 
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commitment in host countries - the second part of the Uppsala model. In this research, it is 
found in both the interviews in China as well as the survey of Chinese affiliates in the UK that 
respondent firms tended to export to a host country or agree on business cooperation before 
committing themselves fully to a particular host market. There is also some evidence to suggest 
that sequence of countries targeted by respondent firms is predicted by the Stages model. Most 
respondent firms were found to direct their first foreign investment to a developing country that, 
more often than not, was geographically close to China. Perhaps surprisingly, the Stages Model 
has not been applied to explain Chinese ODI in extent research, so far as we know. This 
research provides tentative findings that the Stages theory may have at least some explanatory 
power. 
RQ8 - Do Chinese firms conduct FDI shortly after establishment? 
Despite some support of the stages theory, other aspects of Chinese firm behaviour detected in 
this research are not explained by it, and the International New Ventures theory seems to have 
greater explanatory power (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994,2005). In particular, it is found in 
interviews with Chinese MNEs that smaller Chinese firms directed their first investment to a 
psychic distant market shortly after being established. These firms have only modest levels of 
national and international business experience and a poor domestic economic base. These firms 
are found to have business models that are not constrained to the domestic market but are rather 
shaped for specific customers. The firms interviewed exploited business opportunities as and 
when they were detected. This is the first time such behaviour is reported in international 
business literature for Chinese firms, so far as it is know. 
RQ9 - To what extent do the Overseas Chinese people influence the international investment 
behaviour of Chinese firms? 
The importance of international networks in the investment decision-making of Chinese firms is 
evident in Models One and Two, which find strong support for the notion that Overseas Chinese 
are a driving force behind Chinese ODI. One interpretation is that access to such networks 
reduces transaction costs associated with gaining local market knowledge and understanding of 
business opportunities. Given that both models mainly capture FDI conducted by state-owned 
firms, this finding is arguably counter-intuitive. One might expect such types of firms to place 
little importance on relational capital as a source of ownership advantage. However, the 
strength of the finding for the proxy used to capture the relationship between ODI and the 
percentage of the host country population that is ethnically Chinese suggests that relational 
capital is indeed an important influence on the decision-taking of these types of firms. This 
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finding confirms that of Bräutigam (2002), who reports that Chinese ODI to east Africa is also 
supported by access to Chinese business and social networks. However, this study is the first to 
provide statistical evidence of this phenomenon. 
The analysis of primary data, however, does not fully support this notion. The Chinese firms 
interviewed acknowledged that they are interested in recruiting Overseas Chinese as employees 
because they help to mitigate the effects of psychic distance. But these firms see no benefit in 
including Overseas Chinese in the investment decision-making process. Instead, these firms 
generally use some sort of broker, especially foreign investment promotion agencies in China. 
Such agencies are either used to enter a foreign market because they provide immediate access 
to local expertise and business contacts or contacts with the agency are maintained by the 
Chinese firm to identify useful business professionals (such as lawyers and accountants) as the 
foreign affiliate expands. The firms identified as candidate Chinese international new ventures 
in particular benefited from this type of resource. 
RQIOa - To what extent does the domestic institutional framework in China support the 
international investment strategies of Chinese firms? 
It is found that the endogenous institutional environment in the Chinese ODIR has a mixed 
effect on international investments by domestic firms. Model One concentrates on testing the 
role of domestic capital market imperfections, and policy changes and liberalisations evident in 
the years 1992,1994 and 1999, on the internationalisation of Chinese MNEs. Results indicate 
that the influence of domestic capital market imperfections and the confidence gained following 
the reforms and liberalisation policies in 1992 were positive (Buckley et al., 2007a). As 
mentioned above, support is therefore found for inclusion of institutional factors in the analysis 
of Chinese ODI (as encapsulated in the Chinese ODIR framework advanced in Chapter 4). The 
foreign exchange liberalisation step in 1994, however, had a detrimental effect on aggregate 
Chinese ODI levels. One interpretation is that Chinese firms had fewer incentives to invest 
abroad to secure hard currency as a consequence. Further support for the influence of 
institutional factors on Chinese MNE behaviour have already been discussed above in the 
context of research questions RQI and RQ6, in particular. 
Interview data obtained from MNEs in China allows more fine-grained analysis. It is found that 
small Chinese MNEs and private Chinese firms experienced a constraining effect exerted by the 
domestic institutional framework. This was evidenced by the transfer of investment funds and 
aspects of co-ordination of international activities to the British Virgin Islands to circumvent 
restrictive investment approval procedures at home. These firms therefore responded to other 
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market imperfections not related to capital markets. The institutional environment has 
constrained the international development of these types of firms until quite recently. It is likely 
that recent changes to the regulatory framework (and, in particular, to the simplification and 
streamlining of the approval process and the shift from formal approval to simple registration) 
may encourage these types of firms to expand abroad more frequently. 
RQ10b - To what extent does the international institutional framework support the 
international investment strategies of Chinese firms? 
The research finds little support for the proposition that the international institutional 
environment impacts appreciably on the investment decision-making of Chinese firms. This is 
revealed in Model Two (Section 7.2) using proxies for the number of BITs and DTTs concluded 
by China and host country membership status of the WTO. The proxies fail to show any 
significant association between these international institution-related factors and Chinese ODI. 
Possible explanations are provided above in relation to research question RQI. The only time 
that a proxy for an exogenous institutional factor attains statistical significance is in Model Two 
for OECD countries in the period 1991 to 1998, and then the co-efficient is negatively signed. 
This indicates that Chinese firms show a propensity not to invest in developed countries when 
these demonstrate high levels of investment security. This finding is interpreted to be a 
reflection of capital market imperfections again in that Chinese firms avoid investing in markets 
that offer a predictable and transparent investment regime, perhaps because of lower risk- 
adjusted returns on investment. A second interpretation is that the ownership advantages 
Chinese MNEs derive from their home-country embeddedness are reduced in such situations. 
Extant work on the role of institutional factors such as BITS and DTTs mainly examine FDI 
flows from developed to developing countries and the results are inconclusive (Banga, 2006; 
Hallward-Driemeier, 2003). This study is the first to explore the impact of these types of 
institutional factors on Chinese ODI. It is likely that the increase in the volume of developing 
country ODI, particularly when directed to other developing countries, will see the effect of 
BITs and DTTS become clearer in research. Currently, extant work suggests that such 
agreements have little or no effect on the internationalisation of developing country firms. This 
study finds a similar result for Chinese MNEs. Given the amount of effort by UNCTAD and 
other agencies to see these types of agreements concluded, this is a contentious finding. 
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RQJ1- Do the determinants of Chinese ODI vary by ownership type? 
Issues concerning the moderating effect of ownership type on the internationalisation of 
Chinese firms were investigated primarily through interview. As Section 6.1 demonstrates, no 
major difference is detected in the investment behaviour across ownership types (that is, 
between state-owned and privately-owned firms). Differences are only detectable for the 
perceived impact of endogenous institutional factors as discussed above under research question 
RQIOa. The issue of perception was found to be important in interviews with government 
officials, several of whom pointed out that they felt that the approval process did not prejudice 
against any particular ownership type. This is despite the fact that privately-owned firms were 
prevented from investing abroad legally prior to 2004. For medium and smaller-sized Chinese 
firms, the managers interviewed did feel constrained by the institutional environment, in 
contrast to what the interviewed government officials said. Lack of transparency in the relevant 
regulations and procedures is likely to be one explanation for this difference in opinion. 
8.2 Contributions of the research 
This research makes a number of important contributions. 
First, this thesis advances a framework that seeks to explain the institutional environment within 
which Chinese ODI takes place. While this model is likely to benefit from subsequent 
refinement and improvement, it represents an important contribution to the understanding of 
Chinese ODI by bringing to the fore the importance of the institutional framework within which 
Chinese firm decision-taking happens. It also has the potential to advance understanding of 
ODI from other developing countries, where institutions also affect greatly the growth of 
domestic firms. Implicit to the design of the Chinese ODIR is the notion that explanations of 
ODI from other developing countries should also take into account the institutional framework 
and other features of the home country in a way that extant work on the subject often fails to do. 
This is likely to necessitate further special application of the core theory of international 
business to developing country ODI. 
Second, and it follow from the previous point, in this thesis internalisation theory is advanced 
with a special application. It is argued in Chapter 4 and shown in Chapter 7 that Chinese firms 
have ventured abroad by exploiting imperfect domestic capital markets. This is revealed by the 
propensity of Chinese firms to invest in risky countries. This conclusion makes a major 
contribution to the understanding of historical trends in Chinese ODI, and this is reflected in the 
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fact that key findings are presented in a forthcoming article in the Journal of International 
Business Studies (Buckley et al., 2007a). 
Third, this research is the first to attempt to gain insight on the Chinese ODI phenomenon using 
econometric techniques, certainly insofar as it is known of English-language sources. In so 
doing, proxies are developed that have not been used before to identify determinants. This 
includes the use of structural breaks and time dummies to capture the effects of policy changes 
and changes to firm behaviour. The determinant role of the Chinese diaspora on patterns of 
Chinese ODI is also modelled formally for the first time. This necessitated the design of a new 
proxy not used previously in work of this type. This proxy attains statistical significance across 
several specifications of the econometric models used here, and this provides strong indication 
of the importance of the Overseas Chinese to the internationalisation of Chinese MNEs, even 
state-owned ones. This is a novel finding. 
Fourth, a variety of international business theories, in addition to the core theory, are applied to 
inform the analysis, namely New Institutional Theory, the Stages Theory and the New 
International Venture theory. Some evidence is found that these theories have the power to 
explain at least a part of Chinese ODI and that this depends very much upon firm size. The 
application of such theories to the understanding of Chinese ODI has not been made previously. 
8.3 Limitations and suggestions for further work 
Despite its contributions, there remains scope for improving the research methods and 
approaches adopted in this research. First, the incorporation of institutional theory has proved 
to be a major step forward in understanding Chinese ODI. The proxies employed here could be 
refined, however. The effects of political events on firm behaviour are only poorly captured 
using binary dummy variables. Instead, they may merely indicate a trend. Thus, the 
development of more robust, sophisticated and sensitive proxies is necessary. This is true for 
any investigation on the role of institutions in international business. Ideally, new proxies 
should have greater universal application and cross-country comparability so that they can be 
employed in studies on ODI from other developing countries as well. Second, future analysis of 
the influence of business and social networks on the internationalisation of Chinese firms is 
needed, and this., should attempt to achieve the following. Dyadic interviews should be 
conducted with the headquarters and (i) its affiliates and (ii) the brokers that have been found to 
facilitate the decision-making of those Chinese firms that took part in this research. This is 
likely to deliver more in-depth knowledge about the mechanisms and utilisation of such 
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networks from multiple perspectives than was possible here. Information gained could be used 
in other econometric models to investigate nuances and subtleties that were not possible to 
detect with the research methods used in this study. Third, although the identification of 
domestic capital market imperfections as a determinant of Chinese ODI is a contribution, 
measurement could be better refined. Though ambitious, proxies for the four types of 
imperfections as identified in Chapter 4 should be developed to measure their effect on Chinese 
ODI more accurately. This would be facilitated by better quality Chinese ODI data for use as 
dependent variables in econometric work. Besides time-series data, ideally data would ideally 
include a break-down by home province and industry to capture more detailed home country 
effects. Fourth, research findings suggest that fresh approaches to the application of 
international business theory to the understanding of Chinese ODI have the potential to be 
fruitful. Extant work generally applies Dunning's OLI framework only, with little consideration 
of other contributions to international business theorizing, in particular, the New Institutional 
Theory, the Stages Theory and the International New Ventures Theory. Although tentative, this 
study suggests that these theories can also help to explain Chinese ODI. Future analysis should 
also take account of emergent strategies in ODI behaviour, especially of efficiency seeking FDI 
which is not investigated in this study. As Chinese firms continue to expand their geographic 
reach and range of international operations it is likely that efficiency seeking FDI will become 
more commonplace as they rationalise and re-organise their international supply chains in 
response to greater regional integration and other influences. Finally, the Chinese ODIR 
framework which constitutes a central part of this research and one of its major contributions 
would benefit from refinement and improvement. Although the importance of elements of it 
has been confirmed in empirical testing, other parts have not. This raises the question as to 
whether or not this is because of weaknesses in the proxies employed or shortcoming in 
underpinning theory. Application of this framework to other developing countries would shed 
light on this issue. 
202 
References 
Adler, NJ., Campbell, N., and Laurent, A. (1989) `In search of appropriate methodology: from 
outside the People's Republic of China looking inside', Journal of International 
Business Studies 20(1): 61-74. 
Agarwal, J. P. (1980) `Determinants of foreign direct investment', Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv/Review of World Economics 116: 739-773. 
Aggarwal, R. and Agmon, T. (1990) `The international success of developing country firms: 
Role of government-directed comparative advantage', Management International 
Review 30(6): 163-180. 
Aharoni, Y. (1999) `The foreign investment decision process', in P. J. Buckley and P. Ghauri 
(eds. ) The Internationalisation of the Firm: a Reader, 2°° ed., IPT: London, pp. 3-13. 
Al-Laham, A. and Amburgey, T. L. (2005) `Knowledge sourcing in foreign direct investments: 
an empirical examination of target profiles', Management International Review 
45(3): 247-275. 
Aliber, R. Z. (1971) `The transnational enterprise in a multi currency world', in J. H. Dunning 
(ed. ) The Transnational Enterprise, Allen and Unwin: London, pp. 14-34. 
Anand, J, and Delios, A. (2002) `Absolute and relative resources as determinants of 
international acquisitions', Strategic Management Journal 23: 119-134. 
Andersen, O. (1997) `Internationalization and market entry mode: A review of theories and 
conceptual frameworks', Management International Review 37(SPI/2): 27-42. 
Andersen, O. (1993) 'On the internationalization process of firms: A critical analysis', Journal 
of International Business Studies 24(2): 209-231. 
Ang, S. H. (1998) `Chinese consumers' perception of alpha-numeric brand names', Journal of 
Consumer Marketing 14(3): 220-233. 
Antkiewicz, A. and Whalley, J. (2006) `Recent Chinese buyout activities and the implications 
for global architecture', National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working 
Paper 12072, NBER: Cambridge, MA. 
Asiedu, E. (2006) `Foreign direct investment in Africa: The role of natural resources, market 
size, government policy, institutions and political instability', The World Economy 
29(1): 63-77. 
Atkin, J. (1970) `Official regulation of British overseas investment, 1914-1931', Economic 
History Review 23(2): 324-335. 
Bae, S. C. and Hwang, S. (1997) `An empirical analysis of outward foreign direct investment of 
Korea and Japan', Multinational Business Review 5(2): 71-80. 
Bailey, M. (1975) `Tanzania and China', African Afairs 74(294): 39-50. 
Bajo-Rubio, O. and Sosvilla-Rivero, S. (1994) `An Econometric Analysis of Foreign Direct 
Investment in Spain, 1964-89', Southern Economic Journal 61(1): 104-120. 
203 
Balfour, F. (2005) `The state's long apron strings', Business Week 22(29 August): 52-54. 
Banga, R. (2006) `Do investment agreements matter? ', Journal of Economic Integration 
21(1): 40-63. 
Barale, L. A. and Jones, T. E. (1994) `Getting strict with foreign exchange', China Business 
Review 21(5): 52-56. 
Barney, S. R. and Tolbert, P. S. (1997) `Institutionalization and structuration: Studying the links 
between action and institution', Organization Studies 18(1): 93-117. 
Bartlett, C. and Goshal, S. (2000) `Going global: Lessons from late movers', Harvard Business 
Review 78(2): 132-142. 
Beebe, A. (2006) Going global: Prospects and challenges for Chinese companies on the world 
stage, IBM Business Consulting Services: Beijing. 
Bell, J. and Young, S. (1998) `Towards an integrative framework of the internationalization of 
the firm', in G. R. Hooley, R. Loveridge and D. Wilson (eds. ) Internationalization: 
Process, Context and Markets, Macmillan: London, pp. 5-28. 
Benassy-Quere, A., Coupet, M. and Mayer, T. (2007) `Institutional determinants of foreign 
direct investment', The World Economy 30(5): 764-7 82. 
Billington, N. (1999) `The location of foreign direct investment: an empirical analysis', Applied 
Economics 31: 63-76. 
Biswas, R. (2002) `Determinants of foreign direct investment', Review of Development 
Economics 6(3): 492-504. 
Blonigen, B. A. (2005) `A review of the empirical literature on FDI determinants', Atlantic 
Economic Journal 33: 3 83-403. 
Blonigen, B. A. and Davies, R. B. (2004) `The effects of bilateral tax treaties on U. S. FDI 
activity', International Tax and Public Finance 11: 601-622. 
Boddewyn, J. J. and Brewer, T. L. (1994) `International-business political behavior: new 
theoretical directions', Academy of Management Review 19(1): 119-143. 
Boisot, M. and Child, J. (1996) `From fiefs to clans and network capitalism: explaining China's 
emerging economic order', Administrative Science Quarterly 41(4): 600-628. 
Boisot, M. and Child, J. (1988) `The iron law of fiefs: bureaucratic failure and the problem of 
governance in the Chinese economic reforms', Administrative Science Quarterly 
33(4): 507-527. 
Boyreau-Debray, G. and Wei, S. -J. (2005) `Pitfalls of a state-dominated financial system: The 
case of China', National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Papers 11214, 
NBER: Cambridge, MA. 
Branstetter, L. and Lardy (2006) `China's embrace of globalization', National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 12373, NBER: Cambridge, MA. 
Bräutigam, D. (2003) `Close encounters: Chinese business networks as industrial catalysts in 
Sub-Saharan Africa', African Affairs jars 102(408): 447-467. 
204 
Brewer, T. L. (1993) `Government policies, market imperfections, and foreign direct 
investments', Journal of International Business Studies 24(1): 101-120. 
Broadman, H. G. (2007) Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier, World 
Bank: Washington D. C.. 
Broadman, H. G. (2001) `The Business(es) of the Chinese state', The World Economy 
24(7): 849-875. 
Buch, C. M., Kleinert, J., Lipponer, A. and Toubal, F. (2005) `Determinants and effects of 
foreign direct investment: evidence from German firm-level data', Economic Policy 
20(41): 51-110. 
Buckley, P. J. (2004) `Asian network firms - an analytical framework', Asia-Pacific Business 
Review 10(3-4): 254-271. 
Buckley, P. J. (1993) `Contemporary theories of international direct-investment', Revue 
Economique 44(4): 725-736. 
Buckley, P. J. (1990) `Problems and developments in the core theory of international business', 
Journal of International Business Studies 21(4): 657-665. 
Buckley, P. J. (1988) `The limits of explanation: testing the internalization theory of the 
multinational enterprise', Journal of International Business Studies 19(2): 181-193. 
Buckley, P. J. and Casson, M. C. (1999) `A theory of international operations', in P. J. Buckley 
and P. N. Ghauri (eds. ) The Internationalization Process of the Firm: a Reader, 2°d ed., 
International Business Thomson: London, pp. 55-60. 
Buckley, P. J. and Casson, M. C. (1981) `The optimal timing of a foreign direct investment', 
Economic Journal 91(361): 75-87. 
Buckley, P. J. and Casson, M. C. (1976) The Future of the Multinational Enterprise, Palgrave: 
Houndsmill. 
Buckley, P. J. and Chapman, M. (1996) `Theory and method in international business research', 
International Business Review 5(3): 233-245. 
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, L. J., Cross, A. R., Liu, X., Voss, H. and Zheng, P. (2007a) `The 
determinants of Chinese outbound foreign direct investment', Journal of International 
Business Studies 38(4), advanced online publication [www document] 
doi: 10.1057/palgravejibs. 8400277 (accessed 27 May 2007). 
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, L. J., Cross, A. R., Voss, H., Rhodes, M. and Zheng, P. (2007b) `Explaining 
China's outbound FDI: an institutional perspective', forthcoming in K. Sauvant (ed. ) 
title and publisher tbc. 
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, J. and Wang, C. (2002) `The impact of inward FDI on the performance of 
Chinese manufacturing firms', Journal of International Business Studies 33(4): 637-655. 
Buckley, P. J., Cross, A. R., Tan, H., Liu, X. and Voss, H. (2006) `An examination of recent 
trends in Chinese outbound direct investment', CIBUL Working Paper, Centre for 
International Business Studies University of Leeds: Leeds. 
205 
Buckley, P. J. and Mirza, H. (1999) `The strategy of Pacific Asian multinationals', in P. J. 
Buckley and P. N. Ghauri (eds. ) The global challenge for multinational enterprises: 
managing increasing interdependence, Pergamon: Amsterdam et al., pp. 318-338. 
Business Week (2006) Business Week's Global 1000, [www document] (accessed 7 May 2007). 
Business Week (2004) `Kelon: "We Are a Multibrand Company" - Chairman Gu Chujun 
explains the $4 billion refrigerator and air conditioner maker's three-pronged strategy', 
Business Week Online Extra 8 November 2004 [www document] 
http: //www. businessweek. com/print/magazine/content/04_45/b3907 009. htm? chan=mz 
(accessed 16 May 2007). 
Business Week (2001) The Top 200 Emerging-Markets Companies, 9 July, pp. 79-8 1. 
Bulatov, A. S. (2001) `Russian direct investment abroad: history, motives, finance, control and 
planning', Economics of Planning 34(3): 179-194. 
Bumgarner, M. K. and Prime, P. B. (2000) `Capital mobility and investor confidence: the case of 
Hong Kong's reversion to China's sovereignty', Pacific Economic Review 
5(2): 263-278. 
Cai, C. (2006) `Outward foreign direct investment protection and the effectiveness of Chinese 
BIT Practise', Journal of World Investment and Trade 7(5): 621-652. 
Cai, K. G. (1999) `Outward foreign direct investment: a novel dimension of China's integration 
into the regional and global economy', China Quarterly 160(December): 856-880. 
Campos, N. F. and Kinoshita, Y. (2003) `Why does FDI go where it goes? New evidence from 
the transition economies', IMF Working Paper WP/031228, IlViF: Washington D. C. 
Cantwell, J. A. (1995) `The globalization of technology: what remains of the product cycle 
model', Cambridge Journal of Economics 19(1): 155-174. 
Cantwell, J. A., Dunning, J. H. and Janne, O. E. M. (2004) `Towards a technology-seeking 
explanation of U. S. direct investment in the United Kingdom', Journal of International 
Management 10: 5-20. 
Casson, M. C. (1997) `Entrepreneurial networks in international business', Business and 
Economic History 26: 811-823. 
Chai, T. R. (1979) `Chinese policy toward the Third World and the superpowers in the UN 
General Assembly 1971-1977: A voting analysis', International Organization 
33(3): 391-403. 
Chakrabarti, A. (2001) `The determinants of foreign direct investment: sensitivity analyses of 
cross-country regressions', Kyklos 54(1): 89-114. 
Chang, S. J. (1995) `International expansion strategy of Japanese firms: capability building 
through sequential entry', Academy of Management Journal 38(2): 383-407. 
Chang, V. (1989) `The new look of China's banks', China Business Review 16(3): 20-22. 
Chen, H. (2006) 'China-ASEAN investment agreement negotiations', Frontiers of Law in 
China 1(3): 423-431. 
206 
Chen, H. and Chen, T. -J (1998) `Network linkages and location choice in foreign direct 
investment', Journal of International Business Studies 29(3): 445-468. 
Chen, J. (2006) `Implementing the strategy of Going Global to speed up the pace of foreign 
economic cooperation', in MOFCOM, China Commerce Yearbook, Beijing, pp. 406- 
408. 
Chen, J. and Jiang, J. (2003) `The internationalization of R&D of Chinese firms: a case of HW 
Ltd. ', presented at the Portland International Conference on Management of 
Engineering and Technology 2003: Technology Management for reshaping the world, 
Portland (Oregon, USA), 20-24 July 2003 [www document] www. cata. ca/files/PDF/R 
esource Centres/china/IntRandDChinese. pdf (accessed 27 March 2007). 
Chen, S., Zheng, S. and Wang, Y. (2002) 'Evidence from China on whether harmonized 
accounting standards harmonize accounting practices', Accounting Horizons 
16(3): 183-197. 
Chen, T: J. (2003) `Network resources for internationalization: the case of Taiwan's electronics 
firms', Journal of Management Studies 40(5): 1107-1130. 
Child, J. (1994) Management in China during the Age of Reform, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Child, J., Ng, S. H. and Wong, C. (2003) `Psychic distance and internationalisation - evidence 
from Hong Kong firms', International Studies of Management and Organization 
32(1): 36-56. 
Child, J. and Rodrigues, S. B. (2005) `The internationalization of Chinese firms: a case for 
theoretical extension? ', Management and Organization Review 1(3): 381-410. 
Child, J. and Tse, D. K. (2001) `China's transition and its implications for international business', 
Journal of International Business Studies 32(1): 5-21. 
China Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC) of the Ministry of 
Commerce and The Welsh Development Agency (WDA) (2005) Chinese Enterprises' 
Expansion into European and North American Markets, Beijing. 
China Development Gate (2005) `Lower benchmark for private enterprises to do foreign trade', 
China Development Gate [www document] chinagate. com. cn/english/170. htm 
(accessed 14 February 2005). 
China Economic Net (2004) `SAIC takes on Ssangyong Motors', China Economic Net , 
29 
October 2004 [www document] en. ce. cn/auto/200410/29/t20041029 _2126167. 
htm 
(accessed 25 November 2004). 
China Law & Practice (2006) `Outbound FDI increases by 123%', October 2006: 1. 
China Law and Practise (2005) `Ministry of Commerce and State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, Reporting system for offshore merger and acquisition matters at the 
preliminary stage by enterprises 2100/05.03.31', September 2005 
Chinn, M. D. (2005) `A primer on real effective exchange rates: determinants, overvaluation, 
trade flows and competitive devaluation', National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Working Paper 11521, NBER: Cambridge, MA. 
207 
Chinn, M. D. (2002) `The measurement of real effective exchange rates: a survey and 
applications to East Asia', Economics Department Working Paper, University of 
California Santa Cruz. 
CIBUL (2007) CIBUL China M&A Database, disclosed database at the Centre for International 
Business University of Leeds (CIBUL): Leeds. 
Clarke, D. C. (2005) `How do we know when an enterprise exists? Unanswerable questions and 
legal polycentricity in China', Columbia Journal ofAsian Law 19(1): 50-71. 
Clarke, D. C. (2003) `Corporate governance in China: an overview', China Economic Review 
14: 494-507. 
Clegg, L. J., Kamall, S. and Leung, M. (1996) `European multinational activity in 
telecommunications services in the Peoples Republic of China: firm strategy and 
government policy', Management International Review 36(1): 111-137. 
Clegg, L. J. and Scott-Green, S. (1999) `The determinants of new FDI flows into the EC: A 
statistical comparison of the US and Japan', Journal of Common Market Studies 37(4): 
597-616. 
Clegg, L. J. and Scott-Green, S. (1998) `The determinants of Japanese foreign direct investment 
flows to the European Community, 1963-1990', in J: L. Mucchielli (ed. ) Multinational 
Location Strategy, JAI Press: Greenwich, Conn., p. 29-49. 
Co., C. Y. and List, J. A. (2004) `Is foreign direct investment attracted to `knowledge creators'? ', 
Applied Economics 36: 1143-1149. 
Cornelissen, S. and Taylor, I. (2000) `The political economy of China and Japan's relationship 
with Africa: a comparative perspective', The Pacific Review 13(4): 615-633. 
Cosset, J. -C., Siskos, Y. and Zopounidis, C. (1992) `Evaluating country risk: a decision support 
approach', Global Finance Journal 3(1): 79-95. 
Costin, H. and Herken, J. C. (2006) "'Third World" multinationals revisited', Journal of 
Transnational Management 11(4): 63-78. 
Coviello, N. E. (2006) `The network dynamics of international new ventures', Journal of 
International Business Studies 37(5): 713-731. 
Cross, A. R., Buckley, P. J., Clegg, L. J., Voss, H., Zheng, P., Rhodes, M. and Liu, X. (2007) `An 
econometric investigation of Chinese outward direct investment', forthcoming in J. H. 
Dunning and T: M. Lin (eds. ) Multinational Enterprises and Emerging Challenge of the 
21s` Century, Edward Elgar. Cheltenham, Chapter 5. 
Cross, A. R. and Tan, H. (2004) `The impact of China's WTO accession on Southeast Asian 
foreign direct investment: trends and prospects', in N. Freeman and F. L. Bartels (eds. ) 
(2003) The Future of Foreign Investment in Southeast Asia, RoutledgeCurzon: London, 
pp. 125-154. 
Cross, A. R. and Voss, H. (2007) `Chinese direct investment in the United Kingdom: An 
assessment of motivations and competitiveness', paper presented at the international 
conferences Four Decades of International Business at Reading: Looking to the Future, 
208 
University of Reading (UK), 16-17 April 2007 and Internationalisation of Indian and 
Chinese firms, Brunel Business School (UK), 18-19 April 2007. 
Culem, C. G. (1988) `The locational determinants of direct investments among industrialized 
countries', European Economic Review 32: 885-905. 
Cushman, D. O. (1985) `Real exchange rate risk, expectations, and the level of foreign direct 
investment', The Review of Economics and Statistics 67(2): 297-308. 
Davies, RB. (2004) `Tax treaties and foreign direct investment: Potential versus performance', 
International Tax and Public Finance 11(6): 775-802. 
De Melo, M., Denizer, C., Gelb, A. and Tenev, S. (1997) `Circumstance and choice: the role of 
initial conditions policies in transition economies', World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 1866, World Bank: Washington. 
Delios, A. and Henisz, W. J. (2003a) `Policy uncertainty and the sequence of entry by Japanese 
firms, 1980-1998', Journal of International Business Studies 34(3): 227-241. 
Delios, A. and Henisz, W. J. (2003b) `Political hazards, experience and sequential entry 
strategies: the international expansion of Japanese firms, 1980-1998', Strategic 
Management Journal 24(11): 1153-1164. 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2006) Teaming to win: Technology Fast 500 Asia Pacific Ranking 
and CEO Survey 2006, [www document] (accessed 7 May 2007). 
Deng, P. (2004) `Outward investment by Chinese MNCs: motivations and implications', 
Business Horizons 47(3): 8-16. 
Deng, P. (2003) `Foreign direct investment by transnationals from emerging countries: the case 
of China', Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies 10(2): 113-124. 
Deutsche Bank Research (2006) China's Commodity Hunger, Deutsche Bank Research China 
Special 13 June 2006, Deutsche Bank Research: Frankfurt a. M. 
Deschandol, J: M. and Luckock, T. (2005) `Tips for foreign vendors in Chinese M&A', 
International Financial Law Review 24(1): 31-32. 
Dhume, S. and Lawrence, S. V. (2002) `Buying fast into Southeast Asia', Far Eastern Economic 
Review 28 March: 30-33. 
Dicken, P. (2003) Global shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 215 Century, 4th 
edition, Sage: London. 
Ding, X. L. (2000a) `Informal privatization through internationalization: the rise of 
nomenklatura capitalism in China's offshore business', British Journal of Political 
Science 30(1): 121-146. 
Ding, X. L. (2000b) `The illicit asset stripping of Chinese state firms', The China Journal 
43: 1-28. 
Dow, D. and Karunaratna, A. (2006) `Developing a multidimensional instrument to measure 
psychic distance stimuli', Journal of International Business Studies 37: 578-602. 
209 
Du, Y. (2003a) `A challenge to traditional stage models of internationalization - An empirical 
research on a Chinese company's successful internationalizing process', paper 
presented at the EAMSA 20`h Annual Conference, Stockholm University School of 
Business, 22-25 October 2003. 
Du, Y. (2003b) `Haier's survival strategy to compete with world giants', Journal of Chinese 
Economic and Business Studies 1(2): 259-266. 
Duan, Y. (1995) Chinese Firms' Transnational Operations and Strategies, Chinese 
Development Press: Beijing. 
Dunning, J. H. (2006a) `Towards a new paradigm of development: implications for the 
determinants of international business', Transnational Corporation 15(1): 173-227 
Dunning, J. H. (2006b) `Comment on dragon multinationals: new players in 21st century 
globalization', Asia Pacific Journal of Management 23(2): 139-141. 
Dunning, J. H. (2002) `Relational assets, networks, and international business activities', in F. J. 
Contractor and P. Lorange (eds. ) Cooperative Strategies and Alliances, Pergamon: 
Amsterdam, pp. 569-593. 
Dunning, J. H. (2001) `The eclectic (OLI) paradigm of international production: past, present 
and future', International Journal of the Economics ofBusiness 8(2): 173-190. 
Dunning, J. H. (2000) `The eclectic paradigm as an envelope for economic and business theories 
of NNE activity', International Business Review 9(2): 163-190. 
Dunning, J. H. (1999) `Trade, location of economic activity and the transnational enterprise: A 
search for an eclectic approach', in P. J. Buckley and P. N. Ghauri (eds. ) The 
Internationalization and the Firm, International Thomson Business: London, pp. 61-79. 
Dunning, J. H. (1998) `Location and the multinational enterprise: A neglected factor? ', Journal 
of International Business Studies 29: 45-66. 
Dunning, J. H. (1997) `The European internal market programme and inbound foreign direct 
investment', Journal of Common Market Studies 35(2): 189-223. 
Dunning, J. H. (1996) `The geographical sources of competitiveness of firms: some results of a 
new Survey', Transnational Corporations 5(3): 1-30. 
Dunning, J. H. (1995) `Reappraising the eclectic paradigm in the age of alliance capitalism', 
Journal of International Business Studies 26(3): 461-491. 
Dunning, J. H. (1993) Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Addison Wesley: 
Wokingham. 
Dunning, J. H. (1988) `The eclectic paradigm of international production: a restatement and 
some possible extensions', Journal of International Business Studies 19: 1-31. 
Dunning, J. H. (1980) `Toward an eclectic theory of international production: some empirical 
tests', Journal of International Business Studies 11: 9-31. 
Dunning, J. H. (1977) `Trade, location of economic activity and the MNE: a search for an 
eclectic approach, ' in B. Ohlin, P. O. Hesselborn and P. M. Wijkmon (eds. ) The 
International Location of Economic Activity, Macmillan: London, pp. 395-418. 
210 
Dunning, J. H., van Hoesel, R. and Narula, R. (1998) `Third World Multinationals revisited: 
New developments and theoretical implications', in J. H. Dunning (ed. ) Globalization, 
trade, and foreign direct investment, Elsevier: Amsterdam and Oxford, pp. 255-285. 
Dunning, J. H. and Narula, R. (1996) `The in development path revisited: some 
emerging issues', in J. H. Dunning and R. Narula (eds. ) Foreign Direct Investment and 
Governments: Catalysts for Economic Restructuring, Routledge: London and New 
York, pp. 1-41. 
Duran, J. J. and Ubeda, F. (2001) `The investment development path: a new empirical approach 
and some theoretical issues', Transnational Corporations 10(2): 1-34. 
Earley, P. C. (2006) `Leading cultural research in the future: a matter of paradigms and taste', 
Journal of International Business Studies 37(6): 922-931. 
Easterby-Smith, W., Thorpe, R. and Lowe, A. (2002) Management Research, 2od Edition, Sage: 
London. 
Eaton, J., Gersovitz, M. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1986) `The pure theory of country risk', European 
Economic Review 30: 481-513. 
Eckhardt, G. M. (2004) `The role of culture in conducting trustworthy and credible qualitative 
business research in China', in R. Marschan-Piekkari and C. Welch (eds. ) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research Methods for International Business, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 
pp. 402-420. 
Edwards, S. (1990) `Capital flows, foreign direct investment, and debt-equity swaps in 
developing countries', National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 
3497, NBER: Cambridge, MA. 
Egger, P., Larch, M., Pfaffermayr, M. and Winner, H. (2006) `The impact of endogenous tax 
treaties on foreign direct investment: theory and evidence', Canadian Journal of 
Economics/Revue canadienne d'economique 39(3): 901-931. 
Egger, P. and Pfaffermayer, M. (2004) `The impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign 
direct investment', Journal of Comparative Economics 32(4): 788-804. 
EIU ViewsWire (2004) `China finance: Chinese firms encouraged to invest abroad', 
25 October 2004. 
Eggertsson, T. (1997) `The old theory of economic policy and the new institutionalism', World 
Development 25(8): 1187-1203. 
E1U and CPII (2006) World Investment Prospects to 2010: Boom or Backlash?, Special Edition, 
Economist Intelligence Unit and Columbia Program on International Investment: 
London and New York. 
Erdener, C. and Shapiro, D. M. (2005) `The internationalization of Chinese family enterprises 
and Dunning's eclectic MNE paradigm', Management and Organization Review 1(3): 
411-436. 
Eriksson, K., Johanson, J., Majkgaard, A. and Sharma, D. D. (1997) `Experiential knowledge 
and cost in the internationalization process', Journal of International Business Studies 
28(2): 337-360. 
211 
Erramilli, M. K., Srivastava, R. and Kim, S. -S. (1999) `Internationalization theory and Korean 
multinationals', Asia Pacific Journal of Management 16(1): 29-46. 
Eurostat (2007) `Concepts and Definitions - Kleine und mittlere Unternehmen', [www 
document] http: /ec. europa. eu/eurostat/ramon/nomenclatures/index. cfm? TargetUrl=DS 
P_ GLOSSARY_NOM_DTL_VIEW&StrNom=CODED2&StrLanguageCode=DE&1nt 
Key=17399050&RdoSearch=BEGIN&TxtSearch=unternehmen&CboTheme=&IntCurr 
entPage=1 (accessed 16 May 2007). 
Ferrantino, M. (1992) `Transaction costs and the expansion of Third-World multinationals', 
Economical Letters 38(4): 451-456. 
Filippaios, F., Papanastassiou, M. and Pearce, R. (2003) `The evolution of US outward foreign 
direct investment in the pacific rim: a cross-time and country analysis, Applied 
Economics 35: 1779-1787. 
Fischer, D. (2001) `Eigene Dolmetscher sind mehr als Übersetzer', China Contact 
March: 38-40. 
Fosfuri, A. and Motta, M. (1999) `Multinationals without advantages', Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics 101(4): 617-630. 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2006) `Forex purchase quotas lifted', China Notes July 2006: 4. 
Froot, K. A. and Stein, J. C. (1991) Exchange rates and foreign direct investment: an imperfect 
capital market approach', Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4): 1191-1217. 
Frost, S. (2005) `Chinese outward direct investment in Southeast Asia: how big are the flows 
and what does it mean for the region? ', The Pacific Review 17(3): 323-340 
Frynas, J. G. and Paulo, M. (2006) `A new scramble for African oil? Historical, political, and 
business perspectives', African Affairs, doi: 10.1093/afraf/ad1042 (accessed 16 March 
2007). 
FT (2007a) `Chrysler may be step too far for 
players but are thought not to have 
Financial Times 1 March 2007, p. 27. 
Chinese China's carmakers want to be global 
deep enough pockets for the US company', 
FT (2007b) `Rover versus Rover on streets of China', Financial Times 24 March 2007: 6. 
FT (2007c) `Low-profile Huawei technologies has already outgrown its roots in the People's 
Liberation Army', Financial Times 3 January: 20. 
FT (2006a) `China loans `create new wave of Africa debt", Financial Times 8 December 2006: 
11. 
FT (2006b) `The China Factor: The new drive is drawing increased attention and raising 
eyebrows in western circles', Financial Times 21 November 2006, FT Report - African 
Infrastructure: 2. 
FT (2006c) `MG owner Nanjing to lease Longbridge', Financial Times 22 February 2006: 1. 
FT (2006d) `The trillion dollar question: China is grappling with how to deploy its foreign 
exchange riches', Financial Times 25 September 2006: 15. 
212 
FT (2006e) 'ICBC set for Indonesia move', Financial Times 28 September 2006: 27. 
FT (2006f) `TCL forced to close units in Europe', Financial Times 1 November 2006, p. 23. 
FT (2005a) `Nanjing wins Rover for £50m', Financial Times 23/24 July 2005: 1. 
FT (2005b) `China leads the way, building on ties that go back 30 years', Financial Times 14 
February 2005: 6. 
FT (2005c) 'CNOOC scraps move for Unocal', Financial Times 3 August 2005: 1. 
FT (2005d) `Global brand strategy key for Lenovo', Financial Times 13 August 2005 
(USA Edition): 8. 
FT (2004) `China eases control on overseas investment', Financial Times, 12 October 2004. 
Forbes (2007) Special Report: The Global 2000,29 March 2007 [www document] www. forbes. 
com/lists2007/18/biz_07forbes2000_The-Global-2000-China_IORank. html (accessed 7 
May 2007). 
Fortune (2007) Fortune Global 500 - Countries: China 2005 and 2006 [www document] 
http: //money. cnn. com/magazines/fortune/global500/2006/full_list/ (accessed 7 May 
2007). 
Gaba, V., Pan, Y. and Ungson, G. R. (2002) `Timing of entry in international market: an 
empirical study of U. S. fortune 500 firms in China', Journal of International Business 
Studies 33(1): 39-55. 
Gao, T. (2003) `Ethnic Chinese networks and international investment: evidence from inward 
FDI in China', Journal ofAsian Economics 14(4): 611-629. 
GFW (2004) Chinesische Firmen in NR W, GFW: Duesseldorf. 
Ghymn, K. -I. (1980) `Multinational enterprises from the Third World', Journal of International 
Business Studies 11(2): 118-122. 
Gibb, A. and Li, J. (2003) `Organizing for enterprise in China: what can we learn from the 
Chinese micro, small, and medium enterprise development experience', Futures 
35(4): 403-421. 
Giddy, I. H. and Young, S. (1982) `Conventional theory and unconventional multinationals: do 
new forms of multinational enterprise require new theories? ', in A. M. Rugman (ed. ) 
New Theories of the Multinational Enterprise, Croom Helm: London, pp. 55-78. 
Gillham, B. (2005) Research Interviewing: the range of techniques, Open University Press: 
Maidenhead. 
Ginsberg, T. (2005) `International substitutes for domestic institutions: bilateral investment 
treaties and governance', International Review of Law and Economics 25(March): 
107-123. 
GLAEconomics (2004) Enter the Dragon: An Analysis of Chinese FDI into London, GLA: 
London. 
213 
Globerman, S. and Shapiro, D. (2003) `Governance infrastructure and US foreign direct 
investment', Journal of International Business Studies 34(1): 19-39. 
Globerman, S. and Shapiro, D. (2002) `Global foreign direct investment flows: The role of 
governance infrastructure', World Development 30(11): 1899-1919. 
Goldberger, M. A. (1972) `The determinants of U. S. direct investment in the E. E. C.: Comment', 
American Economic Review 62(4): 692-699. 
Goldstein, A. (1991) From Bandwagon to Balance-of-Power Politics: Structural Constraints 
and Politics in China, 1949-19 78, Stanford University Press: Stanford. 
Gomez, E. T. (2004) `Intra-ethnic cooperation in transitional perspective: Malaysian Chinese 
investments in the United Kingdom', in E. T. Gomez and H. -H. M. Hsiao (eds. ) Chinese 
Enterprises, Transnationalism, and Identity, RoutledgeCurzon: London and New York, 
pp. 109-147. 
Gould, D. M. (1994) `Immigrant links to the home country: empirical evidence from U. S. 
bilateral trade flows', The Review of Economics and Statistics 76(2): 302-316. 
Graham, E. M. and Marchick, D. M. (2006) US National Security and Foreign Direct Investment, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics: Washington D. C.. 
Granovetter, M. (2005) `Business groups and social organization', in N. J. Smelser and R. 
Swedberg (eds. ) The Handbook of Economic Sociology, 2"d edition, Princeton 
University Press: Princeton and Oxford, pp. 429-450. 
Granovetter, M. (1985) `Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness', 
American Journal of Sociology 91(3): 481-5 10. 
Granovetter, M. (1983) `The strength of weak ties: a network theory revisited', Sociological 
Theory 1: 201-233. 
Granovetter, M. (1973) `The strength of weak ties', American Journal of Sociology 
78(May): 1360-1380. 
Griliches, Z. (1990) `Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey', Journal of Economic 
Literature 28(4): 1661-1707. 
Groombridge, M. A. (2001) `Capital account liberalization in China: prospects, prerequisites, 
and pitfalls', Cato Journal 21(1): 119-13 1. 
Grosse, R. and Behrman, J. N. (1992) `Theory in international business', Transnational 
Corporations 1(1): 93-126. 
Grosse, R. and Trevino, L. J. (2005) `New Institutional Economics and FDI location in Central 
and Eastern Europe', Management International Review 45(Second Quarter): 123-145. 
Grosse, R. and Trevino, L. J. (1996) `Foreign direct investment in the United States: an analysis 
by country of origin', Journal of International Business Studies 27(1): 139-155. 
Gunter, F. R. (2004) `Capital flight from China: 1984-2001' China Economic Review 
15(1): 63-85. 
214 
Guo, H. (1984) `On establishment of joint ventures abroad', in Editorial Board of the Almanac 
of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (eds. ) Almanac of China's Foreign 
Economic Relations And Trade, China Economical Publishing House: Beijing, 
pp. 652-654. 
Guo, J. and Han, S. (2004) `Reforms of China's foreign exchange regime and RMB exchange- 
rate behaviour', The Chinese Economy 37(2): 76-101. 
Gutherie, D. (1997) `Between markets and politics: organizational responses to reforms in 
China', American Journal of Sociology 102(5): 1258-1304. 
Habib, M. and Zurawicki, L. (2002) `Corruption and foreign direct investment', Journal of 
International Business Studies 33(2): 291-308. 
Hall, B. H., Griliches, Z. and Hausman, J. A. (1986) `Patents and R and D: is there a lag? ', 
International Economic Review 27(2): 265-283. 
Hall, T. (2004) `Controlling for risk: An analysis of China's system of foreign exchange and 
exchange rate management', Columbia Journal ofAsian Law 17: 433-481. 
Hallward-Driemeier, M. (2003) `Do bilateral investment treaties attract FDI? Only a bit... and 
they could bite', World Bank Policy Research Paper WPS 3121, World Bank: 
Washington D. C.. 
Hampden-Turner, C. and Trompenaars, F. (1997) `Response to Geert Hofstede', International 
Journal of Intercultural Relations 21(1): 149-159. 
Hassard, J., Morris, J. and Sheehan, J. (2002) `The elusive market: Privatization, politics and 
state-enterprise reform in China', British Journal of Management 13(3): 221-231. 
Heberer, T. (2003) Private Entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam: Social and Political 
Functioning of Strategic Groups, Brill: Leiden and Boston. 
Heenan, D. A. and Keegan, W. J. (1979) `The rise of third world multinationals', Harvard 
Business Review 57(1-2): 101-109. 
Hejazi, W. and Safarian, A. E. (2001) `The complementarity between U. S. foreign direct 
investment stock and trade', Atlantic Economic Journal 29(4): 420-437. 
Hemscott (2005) Hemscott Company Guru, Hemscott Group Limited: London. 
Henisz, W. J. (2004) `The institutional environment for international business', in P. J. Buckley 
(ed. ) What is International Business?, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, pp. 85-109. 
Henley, J., Kirkpatrick, C. and Wilde, G. (1999) `Foreign direct investment in China: recent 
trends and current policy issues', The World Economy 22(2): 223-243. 
Hennart, J. F. (2001) `Theories of the multinational enterprise', in A. M. Rugman and T. L. 
Brewer (eds. ) The Oxford Handbook of International Business, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, pp. 127-150. 
Hofstede, G. (2006) `What did GLOBE really measure? Researchers' minds versus respondents' 
minds', Journal of International Business Studies 37(6): 882-896. 
215 
Hofstede, G. (1996) `Riding the waves of commerce: a test of Trompenaars' "model" of national 
culture differences', International Journal of Intercultural Relations 20(2): 189-198. 
Hofstede, G. (1983) `The cultural relativity of organizational practices and theories', Journal of 
International Business Studies 14(2): 75-89. 
Hofstede, G. (1980) Cultures Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values, 
Sage Publications: Newbury Park, CA. 
Holz, C. A. (2004) `Deconstructing China's ' GDP statistics', China Economic Review 
15(2): 164-202. 
Holz, C. A. (2003) China's industrial state-owned enterprises between profitability and 
bankruptcy, World Scientific: Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Hong, E. and Sun, L. (2006) `Dynamics of internationalization and outward investment: 
Chinese corporations' strategies', China Quarterly 187(September): 610-634. 
Horsley, J. P. (1990) `P. R. C. tightens control of overseas investment by Chinese companies', 
East Asian Executive Reports October: 8-12. 
Hsu, R. C. (1991) Economic Theories in China, 1979-1988, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Huang, A. and Ma, R. (2001) Accounting in China in Transition, 1949-2000, World Scientific: 
River Edge, N. J. and London. 
Huang, X. (2005) `Administration of investment overseas by PRC domestic individuals', Kin & 
Wood China Bulletin September 2005. 
Hymer, S. (1960) The International Operations of National Firms: a Study of Direct Investment, 
PhD thesis, MIT Press: Cambridge (Mass. ). 
Ibeh, K., Johnson, J. E, Dimitratos, P. and Slow, J. (2004) `Micromultinationals: some 
preliminary evidence on an emergent `star' of the international entrepreneurship field', 
Journal of International Entrepreneurship 2(4): 289-303. 
ICC (2005a) ICC Information Plum, London: ICC. 
ICC (2005b) ICC Information Juniper, London: ICC. 
IFC (International Finance Corporation) (2000) China's Emerging Private Enterprises: 
Prospects for the New Century, IFC: Washington D. C.. 
Inkpen, A. C. (2000) `Learning through joint ventures: a framework of knowledge acquisition', 
Journal of Management Studies 37(7): 1019-1043. 
International Energy Agency (lEA) (2006) Oil Information 2006 (with 2005 data), ESDS 
International, (MIMAS) University of Manchester (accessed 12 March 2007). 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2006) World Economic Outlook Database, April 2005, 
[www document] http: //www. imf. org/extemal/pubs/ft/weo/2005/01/data/index. htm 
(accessed 13 October 2006). 
216 
Invest in France Agency (IFA) (2006) Investments from large Developing Economies in France 
and Europe, IFA Research Papers 2006/11. 
Itaki, M. (1991) `A critical-assessment of the eclectic theory of the multinational-enterprise', 
Journal of International Business Studies 22(3): 445-460. 
Iwasa, T. and Odagiri, H. (2004) `Overseas R&D, knowledge sourcing, and patenting: an 
empirical study of Japanese R&D investment in the US', Research Policy 33: 807-828. 
Javidan, M., House, R. J., Dorfman, P. W., Hanges, P. J. and de Luque, M. S. (2006) 
`Conceptualizing and measuring cultures and their consequences: a comparative review 
of GLOBE's and Hofstede's approaches', Journal of International Business Studies 
37(6): 897-914. 
Jaumotte, F. (2004) `Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade Agreements: The Market 
Size Effect Revisited', IMF Working Paper WP/04/206, IMF: Washington D. C. 
Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J: E. (2006) `Commitment and opportunity development in the 
internationalization process: a note on the Uppsala Internationalization Process Model', 
Management International Review 46(2): 165-178. 
Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J. -E. (2003) `Business relationship learning and commitment in the 
internationalisation process', Journal of International Entrepreneurship 1(1): 83-101. 
Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J: E. (1977) `The internationalization process of the firm -a model of 
knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitment', Journal of 
International Business Studies 8(1): 23-32. 
Johanson, J. and Wiedersheim-Paul, F. (1975) `The internationalization of the firm: four 
Swedish case studies', Journal of Management Studies 12(3): 305-322. 
Johnson, A. (2006) `FDI inflows to the transition economies in Eastern Europe: magnitude and 
determinates', Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies (CESIS) 
Working Paper 59. 
Kaartemo, V. (2007) `The Motives of Chinese Foreign Investments in the Baltic Sea Region', 
PanEuropean Institute Working Paper 7/2007, Turku School of Economics. 
Kanamori, T. and Zhao, Z. (2004) Private Sector Development in the People's Republic of 
China, Asian Development Bank Institute: Tokyo. 
Karlsen, T., Silseth, P. R., Benito, G. R. G. and Welch, L. S. (2003) `Knowledge, 
internationalization of the firm, and inward-outward connections', Industrial Marketing 
Management 32(5): 385-396. 
Kent, R. B. (2003) `A Diaspora of Chinese settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean', in 
L. J. C. Ma and C. Cartier (eds. ) The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and 
Identity, Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, pp. 117-138. 
Khanna, T., Gulati, R. and Nohria, N. (1998) `The dynamics of learning alliances', Strategic 
Management Journal 19: 193-2 10. 
Khanna, T. and Rivkin, J. W. (2001) `Estimating the performance effects of business groups in 
emerging markets', Strategic Management Journal 22(1): 45-74. 
217 
Kim, L. (1980) `Stages of development of industrial technology in a developing country: a 
model', Research Policy 9: 254-277. 
Kimura, Y. and Lee, H. K. (1998) `Korean direct investment in manufacturing: Its patterns and 
determinants - an empirical analysis', Journal of International Management 
4(2): 109-127 
Kincaid, H. V. and Bright, M. (1957) `Interviewing the business elite', American Journal of 
Sociology 63(3): 304-311. 
Kirkman, B. L., Lowe, K. B. and Gibson, C. B. (2006) `A quarter century of culture's 
consequences: a review of empirical research incorporating Hofstede's cultural values 
framework', Journal of International Business Studies 37(3): 285-320. 
Knickerbocker, F. T. (1973) Oligopolistic Reaction and the Transnational Enterprise, Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge (Mass). 
Kogut, B. and Singh, H. (1988) `The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode', 
Journal of International Business Studies 19(3): 411-432. 
Kogut, B. and Zander, U. (1993) `Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the 
multinational corporation', Journal of International Business Studies 24(4): 625-645. 
Kohlhagen, S. W. (1977) `Exchange rate changes, profitability, and direct foreign investment', 
The Southern Economic Journal 44: 43-52. 
Kornai, J. (1986) `The soft budget constrain', Kyklos 39: 1-30. 
Kornai, J., Masink, E. and Roland, G. (2003) `Understanding the soft budget constrain', Journal 
of Economic Literature 41(December): 1096-1136. 
Kravis and Lipsey (1982) `The location of overseas production and production of export by U. S. 
multinational firms', Journal of International Economics 12: 201-223. 
Kuemmerle, W. (1999) `The drivers of foreign direct investment into research and development: 
an empirical investigation', Journalfor International Business Studies 30(1): 1-24. 
Kumar, K. (1982) `Third World multinationals: a growing force in international relations', 
International Studies Quarterly 26(3): 397-424. 
Kumar, K. and Kim, K. Y. (1984) `The Korean manufacturing multinationals', Journal of 
International Business Studies, 15(1): 45-61. 
Kwon, Y: C. (2002) `Korean multinationals' foreign direct investment projects: variability in 
the micro- and macro-level determinants', The International Trade Journal 
16(2): 203- 229. 
Lall, R. B. (1986) Transnationals from the Third World: Indian Firms Investing Abroad, Oxford 
University Press: Delhi and Oxford. 
Lall, S. (1983a) `The theoretical background', in S. Lall (ed. ) The New Multinationals: The 
Spread of Third World Multinationals, Wiley: Chichester, pp. 1-20. 
Lall, S. (1983b) `The rise of multinationals from the Third World', Third World Quarterly 
5: 618-626. 
218 
Lall, S. (1982) `The emergence of Third World Transnationals: Indian joint ventures overseas', 
World Development 10(2): 127-146. 
Lardy, N. (1998) China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, Brookings Institution: Washington 
D. C.. 
Lardy, N. R. (1992) Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China 1978-1990, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Lau, H: F. (2003) `Industry evolution and internationalization processes of firms from a newly 
industrialized economy', Journal of Business Research 56(10): 847-852. 
Lau, H. -F. (1992) `Internationalization, internalization, or a new theory for small, low- 
technology multinational enterprise? ', European Journal of Marketing 26(10): 17-31. 
Lavie, D. (2006) `The competitive advantage of interconnected firms: an extension of the 
resource-based view', Academy of Management Review 31(3): 638-658. 
Lecraw, D. J. (1993) `Outward direct investment by Indonesian firms: motivation and effects', 
Journal of International Business Studies 24(3): 5 89-600. 
Lecraw, D. J. (1977) `Direct investment by firms from less developed countries', Oxford 
Economic Papers 29(3): 442-457. 
Lee, B: H. (2002) FDI from Developing Countries: A Vector for Trade and Development, 
OECD: Paris. 
Lee, J. -R. and Chen, J: S. (2003) `Internationalization, local adaptation, and subsidiary's 
entrepreneurship: an exploratory study on Taiwanese manufacturing firms in Indonesia 
and Malaysia', Asia Pacific Journal of Management 20(March): 5 1-72. 
Li, C. (2006) `China's telecom industry on the move: Domestic competition, global ambition, 
and leadership transition', China Leadership Monitor No 19, Hoover Institute Stanford 
University. 
Li, P. P. (2003) `Toward a geocentric theory of multinational evolution: the implications from 
the Asian MNEs as latecomers', Asia Pacific Journal of Management 20(2): 217-242. 
Li, S. (2004) `Why is property right protection lacking in China? An institutional explanation', 
California Management Review 46(3): 100-115. 
Liew, L. H. (2004) `Policy elites in the political economy of China's exchange rate 
policymaking', Journal of Contemporary China 13(38): 21-51. 
Lim, S. -H. and Moon, H: C. (2001) `Effects of outward foreign direct investment on home 
country exports: the case of Korean firms', Multinational Business Review 9(1): 42-49. 
Lin, G. and Schramm, R. M. (2004) `China's progression toward currency convertibility', The 
Chinese Economy 37(4): 78-100. 
Lin, G. and Schramm, R. M. (2003) `China's foreign exchange policies since 1979: A review of 
developments and an assessment', China Economic Review 14(3): 246-280. 
219 
Liu, H. (2000) `Globalization, institutionalization and the social foundation of Chinese business 
networks', in H. W. -C. Yeung and K. Olds (eds. ) Globalization of Chinese Business 
Firms, Maclmillan: Basingstoke, pp. 105-125. 
Liu, H. and Li, K. (2002) `Strategic implications of emerging Chinese multinationals: the Haier 
case study', European Management Journal 20(6): 699-706. 
Liu, L. (2001) `Lasting Sino-African friendship', Africa Insight 31(2): 35-37. 
Liu, S. (2004) `The Sino-British economic and trade relationship: achievement, problems and 
prospects', China & World Economy 12(5): 101-111. 
Liu, X., Buck, T. and Shu, C. (2005) `Chinese economic development, next stage: outward 
FDI? ', International Business Review 14(1): 97-115. 
Liu, X. and White, S. (2001) `Comparing innovation systems: a framework and application to 
China's transitional context', Research Policy 30(7): 1091-1114. 
Long, G. (2002) `A study of policies on encouraging investment abroad', China Development 
Review 4(3): 61-73. 
Loree, D. W. and Guisinger, S. E. (1995) `Policy and non-policy determinants of U. S. equity 
foreign direct investment', Journal of International Business Studies 26(2): 281-299. 
Love, J. H. (2003) `Technology sourcing versus technology exploitation: an analysis of US 
foreign direct investment flows', Applied Economics 35: 1667-1678. 
Love, J. H. and Lage-Hidalgo, F. (2000) `Analysing the determinants of US direct investment in 
Mexico', Applied Economics 32: 1259-1267. 
Lunn, J. (1983) `Determinants of U. S. direct investment in the E. E. C.: revisited again', 
European Economic Review 21: 391-393. 
Lunn, J. (1980) `Determinants of U. S. direct investment in the E. E. C.: further evidence', 
European Economic Review 13: 93-101. 
Ma, LJ. C. (2003) `Space, place, and transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora', in L. J. C. Ma 
and C. Cartier (eds. ) The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity, 
Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, pp. 1-4. 
Ma, X. and Andrew-Speed, P. (2006) `The overseas activities of China's national oil companies: 
rationale and outlook', Minerals and Energy 21(1): 17-30. 
Makino, S., Lau, C: M. and Yeh, R: S. (2002) `Asset-exploitation versus asset-seeking: 
implications for location choice of foreign direct investment from newly industrialized 
economies', Journal of International Business Studies 33(3): 403-422. 
Mallampally, P. and Sauvant, K. P. (1999) `Foreign direct investment in developing countries', 
Finance and Development 36(March), [www document] http: //www. imf. orglexternal/ 
pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/mallampa. htm (accessed 3 October 2006). 
Marchick, D., Plotkin, M. and Fagan, D. (2005) `National security regulation of foreign 
investments and Acquisitions in the United States', China Law & Practice 19(5): 23-26. 
220 
Markusen, A. (2003) `Fuzzy concepts, scanty evidence, policy distance: The case for rigour and 
policy relevance in critical Regional Studies', Regional Studies 37(6-7): 701-717. 
Mazzolini, R. (1980) `The international strategy of state-owned firms: an organizational process 
and politics perspective', Strategic Management Journal 1(2): 101-118. 
Meidan, M. (2006) `China's Africa policy: business now, politics later', Asian Perspective 
30(4): 69-93. 
McDougall P. P., Shane S. and Oviatt B. M. (1994) `Explaining the formation of International 
New Ventures - the limits of theories from international-business research', Journal of 
Business Venturing 9(6): 469-487. 
Meyer, K. E. (2004) `Perspectives on multinational enterprises in emerging economies', Journal 
of International Business Studies 35(4): 259-277. 
MOFCOM (various years) Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 
Zhongguo shehui chubanshe: Beijing. 
MOFCOM (various years) China Commerce Yearbook, China Commerce and Trade Press: 
Beijing. 
MOFCOM (2007) `Amended edition of statistical system of direct overseas investment', 
MOFCOM Common News, 8 January 2007, [www document] english. mofcom. gov. cn/ 
aarticle/newsrelease/commonnews/200701/20070104235540. html (accessed 14 January 
2007). 
MOFCOM (2006a) `Statistical Bulletin on Direct Overseas Investment of China 2005 jointly 
issued by MOFCOM and NBS', 6 September 2006, [www document] 
http: //english. mofcom. gov. cn/aarticle/newsrelease/significantnews/200609/2006090307 
2019. html (accessed 2 October 2006). 
MOFCOM (2006b) `China Eximbank supports private companies going global', 29 December 
2006 [www document] http: //preview. english. mofcom. gov. cn/aarticle/newsrelease/com 
monnews/200612/20061204177465. html (accessed 28 May 2007). 
MOFCOM (2006c) `Urgent circular of the Ministry of Commerce on strengthening the 
statistical work of China's outward foreign direct investment', Shanghehan No 66. 
MOFCOM (2006d) `Minister warns of overseas investment risk', MOFCOM News 13 
December 2006 [www document] http: //english. mofcom. gov. cn/aarticle/newsrelease/si 
gnificantnews/200612/20061204012475. html (accessed 14 January 2007). 
MOFCOM (2005) `Detailed rules for the examination and approval of investments to open and 
operate enterprises abroad', Shanghefa No 527,17 October 2005 [www document] 
www. fdi. gov. cn/pub/FDI EN/Laws/InvestmentDirection/RegionalGuidance/t20060620 
_51287. 
jsp (accessed 5 April 2007). 
MOFCOM (2004a) `Provisions on the examination and approval of investment to run 
enterprises abroad', Order of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of 
China No 16,1 October 2004 [www document] http: //www. fdi. gov. cn/pub/FDI-EN/La 
ws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/MinisterialRulings/t20060620_51139 jsp (accessed 5 
April 2007). 
221 
MOFCOM (2004b) '2004 [Statistical Bulletin of China's 
foreign direct investment 2004], [www document] hzs. mofcom. gov. cn/table/2004090 
9. pdf (accessed 19 March 2007). 
MOFCOM and NBS (2002) `The Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation and the National Bureau of Statistics on printing and issuing Statistical 
system of direct overseas investment', Weijing maohe fa No 549, December 4,2002. 
Monkiewicz, J. (1986) `Multinational enterprises of developing countries: some emerging 
characteristics', Management International Review 26(Third Quarter): 67-79. 
Mueller, M. and Lovelock, P. (2000) `The WTO and China's ban on foreign investment in 
telecommunication services: a game-theoretic analysis', Telecommunications Policy 
24(8-9): 731-759. 
Munro, S. and Yan, S. (2003) `Recent government reorganization in China', China Law & 
Policy -Newsflash, O'Melveny & Myers LLP. 
Murtha, T. P. and Lenway, S. A. (1994) `Country capabilities and the strategic state: How 
national political institutions affect multinational corporations' strategies', Strategic 
Management Journal 15: 113-129. 
Nachum, L. and Zaheer, S. (2005) `The persistence of distance? The impact of technology on 
MNE motivations for foreign investment', Strategic Management Journal 
26(8): 747-767. 
National Bureau of Statistics (various years) China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistical Press: 
Beijing. 
Naughton, B. (2007) The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, MIT Press: Cambridge 
(Mass. ). 
Naugthon, B. (2006) `Top-down control: SASAC and the persistence of state ownership in 
China', Paper presented at the conference on "China and the World Economy" 
Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy, University of 
Nottingham (UK), 23 June 2006. 
Naughton, B. (2003) `The State Asset Commission: a powerful new government body', China 
Leadership Monitor No. 8, Hoover Institute Stanford University. 
Naughton, B. (1995) Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993, 
Cambridge University Press: New York. 
Naughton, B. (1993) `Deng Xiaoping: the economist', China Quarterly 135(Special Issue, 
September): 491-514. 
Naughton, B. (1988) `The Third Front: defense industrialization in the Chinese interior', China 
Quarterly 115(Autumn): 351-386. 
NDRC (2004) `The Interim Measures for the Administration of Examination and Approval of 
the Overseas Investment Projects, 9 October. 
Nebus, J. (2006) `Building collegial information networks: a theory of advice network 
generation', Academy of Management Review 31(3): 615-637. 
222 
Neumayer, E. and Spess, L. (2005) `Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct 
investment to developing countries? ', World Development 33(10): 1567-1585. 
Ng, L. F. Y. and Tuan, C. (2002) `Building a favourable investment environment: evidence for 
the facilitation of FDI in China', The World Economy 25(8): 1095-1114. 
Nolan, P. (2002) `China and the global business revolution', Cambridge Journal of Economics 
26(1): 119-137. 
Nolan, P. and Zhang, J. (2002) `The challenge of globalisation for large Chinese firms', World 
Development 30(12): 2089-2107. 
Nordal, K. B. (2001) `Country risk, country risk indices and valuation of FDI: a real options 
approach', Emerging Markets Review 2(3): 197-217. 
North, D. C. (2005) Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University Press: 
Princeton. 
North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Norton Rose (2005) `New regulations encouraging investment overseas by Chinese enterprises', 
Norton Rose, September 2005 [www document] www. nortonrose. com/html-Pubs/view. 
asp? id=4397 (accessed 21 February 2007). 
O'Brien, P. (1980) `The new multinationals: developing-country firms in international markets', 
Futures 12(4): 303-316. 
O'Grady, S. and Lane, H. W. (1996) `The psychic distance paradox', Journal of International 
Business Studies 27(2): 309-333. 
Odendahl, T. and Shaw, A. M. (2001) `Interviewing elites', in J. F. Gubrium and J. A. Holstein 
(eds. ) Handbook Interview Research: Context and Method, Sage: Thousand Oaks, 
pp. 299-316. 
OECD (2005a) OECD Handbookfor Economic Globalisation Indicators, OECD: Paris. 
OECD (2005b) Economic Surveys - China, OECD: Paris. 
OECD (2002) China in the World Economy: The Domestic Policy Challenges, OECD: Paris. 
OECD (1996) OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, Third Edition, 
OECD: Paris. 
Ohio University (2006) Distribution of the ethnic Chinese population around the world, 
University Libraries, Ohio University [www document] http: //cicdatabank. 
library. ohiou. edu/opac/population. php (accessed 17 May 2006). 
Onyeiwu, S. and Shrestha, H. (2004) `Determinants of foreign direct investment in Africa', 
Journal of Developing Societies 20(1-2): 89-106. 
Oetzel. J. M., Bettis, R. A. and Zenner, M. (2001) `Country Risk Measures: How Risky Are 
They? ', Journal of World Business 36(2): 128-145. 
223 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (1998) Huaqiao jingji nianjian [Overseas Chinese 
economy yearbook], Qiao wu wei yuan hui: Taipei. 
Oviatt, B. M. and McDougall, P. P. (2005) `Defining international entrepreneurship and 
modeling the speed of internationalization', Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 
29(5): 537-553. 
Oviatt, B. M. and McDougall, P. P. (1994) `Toward a theory of international new ventures', 
Journal of International Business Studies 25(1): 45-64. 
Ozawa, T. (1992) `Foreign direct investment and economic development', Transnational 
Corporation 1(1): 27-54. 
Pack, H. and Saggi, K. (1997) `Inflows of foreign technology and indigenous technological 
development', Review of Development Economics 1(1): 81-98. 
Parkhe, A., Wassermann, S. and Ralston, D. A. (2006) `New frontiers in network theory 
development', Academy ofManageinent Review 31(3): 560-568. 
Pearson, M. M. (2005) `The business of governing business in China: institutions and norms of 
the emerging regulatory state', World Politics 57(January): 296-322. 
Peng, M. W. (2002) `Towards an institution-based view of business strategy', Asia Pacific 
Journal of Management 19(2): 251-267. 
Peng, M. W. and Heath, P. S. (1996) `The growth of the firm in planned economies in transition: 
Institutions, organizations, and strategic choice', Academy of Management Review 
21(2): 492-528. 
Peng, M. W., Tan, J. and Tong, T. W. (2004) `Ownership types and strategic groups in an 
emerging economy, Journal of Management Studies 41(7): 1105-1129. 
Penrose, E. (1995) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, 3`d edition, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
People's Daily (2002) `China to micro-monitor overseas operations of its firms', People's Daily 
Online, 16 December 2002, [www document] http: //english. people. com. cn/200212/16/ 
eng20021216_108528. shtml (accessed 4 April 2007). 
Pettis, M. (2005) `Buy abroad, benefit at home', Far Eastern Economic Review 168(7): 27-29. 
Pheng, L. S. and Hongbin, J. (2003) `Internationalization of Chinese construction enterprises', 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 129(6): 589-598. 
Pistoresi, B. (2000) `Investimenti diretti esteri e fattori di localizzione: L'America Latina e il 
Sud East asiatico', Rivista di Politica Economica 90: 27-44. 
Political Risk Services (PRS) (2005) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), [www 
document] http: //www. prsgroup. com/icrg/icrg. html (accessed April 2005). 
Poston, D. L. Jr., Mao, M. X. and Yi, M. -Y. (1994) `The global distribution of overseas Chinese 
around 1990', Population and Development Review 20(3): 631-645. 
Pournarakis, M. and Varsakelis, N. (2004) `Institutions, internationalization and FDI: the case 
of economies in transition', Transnational Corporations 13(2): 77-94. 
224 
Pradhan, J. P. (2004) `The determinants of outward foreign direct investment: a firm-level 
analysis of Indian manufacturing', Oxford Development Studies 32(4): 619-639. 
Pradhan, J. P. (2003) `Outward foreign direct investment from India: recent trends and patterns', 
Jawaharlal Nehru University Working Paper. 
Prasad, E. and Wei, S: J. (2005) `The Chinese approach to capital inflows: patterns and possible 
explanations', IMF Working Paper WP/05, Research Department, IMF: Washington 
D. C.. 
Qin, C. (2004) `Private firms encouraged to invest overseas' China Daily 07 July 2004 [www 
document] www. Chinadaily. com. cn/english/doc/2004-07/07content_346017. htm 
(accessed 14 February 2005). 
Ralston, D. A., Terstra-Tong, J., Terpstra, R. H., Wang, X. and Egri, C. (2006) `Today's state- 
owned enterprises of China: Are they dying dinosaurs or dynamic dynamos? ', Strategic 
Management Journal 27: 825-843. 
Ramamurti, R. (2001) "The obsolescing 'bargaining model? ' MNC-host developing country 
relations revisited', Journal of International Business Studies 32(1): 23-39. 
Rammal, H. G. and Zurbruegg, R. (2006) `The impact of regulatory quality on intra-foreign 
direct investment flows in the ASEAN markets', International Business Review 
15(4): 401-414. 
Rauch, J. E. and Trinidad, V. (2002) `Ethnic Chinese networks in international trade', The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 84(1): 116-130. 
Rawski, T. G. (2002) `How fast is China's economy really growing? ', China Economic Review 
29(2): 40-43. 
Redding, G. (2002) `The capitalist business system of China and its rationale', Asia Pacific 
Management Journal 19(2/3): 221-249. 
Reinert, Y. and Altrichter, S. (2004) China goes West - Eine Chance für die deutsche Wirtschaft, 
Bain & Company Kompass, Bain: Munich. 
Reinhart, C. M. and Reinhart, V. R. (2001) `What hurts most? G-3 exchange rate or interest rate 
volatility', NBER Working Paper Series 8535, National Bureau of Economic Research: 
Cambridge (MA. ). 
Ring, P. S., Bigley, G. A., D'Aunno, T. and Khanna, T. (2005) `Perspectives on how institutions 
matter', Academy of Management Review 30(2): 306-320. 
Roberts, I. and Tyers, R. (2003) `China's exchange rate policy: the case for greater flexibility', 
Asian Economic Journal 17(21): 155-184. 
Robertson, C. J. and Watson, A. (2004) `Corruption and change: the impact of foreign direct 
investment', Strategic Management Journal 25(4): 385-396. 
Ronen, S. and Shenkar, 0. (1985) `Clustering countries on attitudinal dimensions: a review and 
synthesis', Academy of Management Review 10(3): 435-454. 
Roy, A., Walters, P. G. P. and Luk, S. T. K. (2001) `Chinese puzzles and paradoxes conducting 
business research in China', Journal of Business Research 52(2): 203-210. 
225 
Ruefli, T. W., Collins, J. W. and Lacugna, J. R. (1999) `Risk measures in strategic management 
research: Auld Lang Syne? ', Strategic Management Journal 20: 167-194. 
SAFE (State Administration for Foreign Exchange) (2005) Outward FDI Database, undisclosed 
database at the Centre for International Business University of Leeds (CIBUL). 
Saich, T. (2004) Governance and Politics in China, 2°d edition, Palgrave Macmillan: 
Basingstoke. 
Salacuse, J. W. and Sullivan, N. P. (2005) `Do BITs really work? An evaluation of bilateral 
investment treaties and their grand bargain', Harvard International Law Journal 
46: 67-130. 
Sapienza, H., Autio, E., George, G. and Zahra, S. A. (2006) `A capabilities perspective on the 
effects of early internationalization on firm survival and growth', Academy of 
Management Review 31(4): 914-933. 
Sarno, L. and Taylor, M. P. (2002) `Purchasing power parity and the real exchange rate', IMF 
Staff Paper 49(1): 65-105. 
Sauvant, K. (2005) `New sources of FDI: the BRICs. Outward FDI from Brazil, Russia, India 
and China', Journal of World Investment and Trade 6(October): 639-709. 
Scaperlanda, A. E. and Balough, R. S. (1983) `The Determinants of U. S. Direct Investment in the 
E. E. C.: Revisited', European Economic Review 21: 381-390. 
Scaperlanda, A. E. and Mauer, L. J. (1972) `The Determinants of U. S. Direct Investment in the 
E. E. C.: Reply', American Economic Review 62(4): 700-704. 
Scaperlanda, A. E. and Mauer, L. J. (1969) `The Determinants of U. S. Direct Investment in the 
E. E. C. ', American Economic Review 59(4): 558-568. 
Schmitz, A. and Bieri, J. (1972) `EEC tariffs and U. S. direct investment', European Economic 
Review 3: 259-270. 
Schollhammer, H. (1994) `Strategies and methodologies in international business and 
comparative management research', Management International Review 34(1): 5-20. 
Schwartz, A. J. (2005) `Dealing with exchange rate protectionism', Cato Journal 25(1): 97-106. 
Scott, W. R. (2002) `The changing world of Chinese enterprises: An institutional perspective', in 
A. S. Tsui and C. -M. Lau (eds. ) Management of Enterprises in the People's Republic of 
China, Kluwer Academic Press: Boston, pp. 59-78. 
Scott, W. R. (1987) `The adolescence of institutional theory', Administrative Science Quarterly 
32: 493-511. 
Seo, J. S. and Suh, C: S. (2006) `An analysis of home country trade effects of outward foreign 
direct investment: The Korean experience with ASEAN, 1987-2002', ASEAN Economic 
Bulletin 23(2): 160-170. 
Sethi, D., Guisinger, S. E., Phelan, S. E. and Berg, D. M. (2003) `Trends in foreign direct 
investment flows: a theoretical and empirical analysis', Journal of International 
Business Studies 34(4): 315-326. 
226 
Shan, W. (1989) `Reforms of China's foreign trade system', China Economic Review 
1(1): 33-55. 
Shenkar, 0. (2005) `Can China Create Global Companies? ', Chief Executive 213: 12. 
Shenkar, 0. (2001) `Cultural distance revisited: Towards a more rigorous conceptualization and 
measurement of cultural differences', Journal of International Business Studies 32(3): 
519-535. 
Shenkar, O. (1994) `The People's Republic of China: raising the bamboo screen through 
international management research', International Studies of Management and 
Organization 24(1-2): 9-34. 
Shi, S. and Gelb, C. (1998) `PRC government restructuring continues', China Business Review 
25(5): 52. 
Si, S. X., Amin, R., and Cullen, J. B. (2003) `Cultural influence, questionnaire formation and 
manager response in Sino-American international joint venture', Journal of Chinese 
Economic and Business Studies 1(3): 319-325. 
Sigurdson, J. (2005) Technological Superpower China, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham. 
Sim, A. B. (2006) `Internationalization strategies of emerging Asian MNEs - case study 
evidence on Singaporean and Malaysian Firms', Asia Pacific Business Review 
12(October): 487-505. 
Sim, A. B. and Pandian, J. R. (2002) `Internationalization strategies of emerging Asian MNEs: 
cases study evidence on Taiwanese firms', Journal ofAsian Business 18(1): 67-80. 
Singleton, R. A. Jr. and Straits, B. C. (2001) `Survey interviewing', in J. F. Gubrium and J. A. 
Holstein (eds. ) Handbook Interview Research: Context and Method, Sage: Thousand 
Oaks, pp. 59-82. 
Sinton, J. E. (2001) `Accuracy and reliability of China's energy statistics', China Economic 
Review 12(4): 373-383. 
SinoCast China Business Daily News (2005) `TCL to expand overseas market with CNY8bn 
loans from CDB', 9 August 2005, p. 1. 
Sirkoski, D. and Menkhoff, T. (2000) `Internationalisation of Asian business', Singapore 
Management Review 22(1): 1-17. 
Sornarajah, M. (2004) The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2°d revised edition, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Standifird, S. S. and Marshall, S. R. (2000) `The transaction cost advantage of guanxi-based 
business practices', Journal of World Business 35(1): 21-42. 
State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2006) `All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001', [www 
document] http: //www. ukrcensus. gov. ua/eng/ (accessed 12 March 2007). 
Steinfeld, E. (1998) Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-Owned Industry, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
227 
Stender, N. A., Yin, X., Sheets, N. and Cui, L. (2006) `PRC outward direct investment: 
liberalization momentum consolidated', China Law & Practise 20(6): 25-27. 
Stephan, M. and Pfaffmann, E. (2001) `Detecting the pitfalls of data on foreign direct 
investment: Scope and limits of FDI data', Management International Review 
41(2): 189-218. 
Stone, I. (1998) `East Asian FDI and the UK periphery', Asia Pacific Business Review 
5(2): 59-94. 
Stremersch, S. and Tellis, G. J. (2004) `Understanding and managing international growth of 
new products', International Journal of Research in Marketing 21: 421-438. 
Sun, Q., Tong, W. and Yu, Q. (2002) `Determinants of foreign direct investment across China', 
Journal of International Money and Finance 21: 79-113. 
Sung, Y. -W. (1996) `Chinese outward investment in Hong Kong: Trends, prospects and policy 
implications', OECD Development Centre Technical Papers No 113, OECD: Paris. 
Tallman, S. B. and Shenkar, O. (1990) `International cooperative venture strategies: outward 
investment and small firms from NICs', Management International Review 30(Fourth 
Quarter): 299-315. 
Tan, R. (1999) `Foreign direct investments flows to and from China', PASCNDiscussion Paper 
No. 99-21, PASCAN: Makati City. 
Tang, Y. (2000) `Bumpy road leading to internationalization: a review of accounting 
development China', Accounting Horizons 14(1): 93-102. 
Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. (1998) Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches, Sage: London. 
Taylor, R. (2002) `Globalization strategies of Chinese companies: current developments and 
future prospects', Asian Business and Management 1(2): 209-225. 
TCDC Update (2006) `China's African Policy', TDC Update, issue 1 in 2006 [www document] 
www. ecdc. net. cn/events/tcdc06Ol/en/tcdc9. htm (accessed 30 March 2007). 
TCDC Update (2005) `The launch of "China Africa Business Chamber"', TDC Update, issue 2 
in 2005 [www document] www. ecdc. net. cn/events/tcdc0502/en/tcdc 2. htm (accessed 30 
March 2007). 
Teng, B. S. (2004) `The WTO and entry modes in China', Thunderbird International Business 
Review 46(4): 381-400. 
Terpstra, V. and Yu, C. M. (1988) `Determinants of foreign investment of US advertising 
agencies', Journal of International Business Studies 19(1): 33-46. 
Thomas, R. J. (1993) `Interviewing important people in big companies', Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography 22(1): 80-96. 
Tobin, J. and Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005) `Foreign direct investment and the business 
environment in developing countries: the impact of bilateral investment treaties', 
Economics and Public Policy Research Paper No. 293, Yale Law School: Yale. 
228 
Tong, S. Y. (2003) `Ethnic Chinese networking in cross-border investment: the impact of 
economic and institutional development', HIEBS Working Papers No 1024, The 
University of Hong Kong: Hong Kong. 
Tong, V. and Groffman, N. (2000) `Overseas investment by Chinese companies', Topics in 
Chinese Law, O'Melveny & Myers LLP. 
Tseng, C. -S. and Mak, S. K. M. (1996) `Strategy and motivation for PRC outward direct 
investments with particular reference to enterprises from the Pearl River Delta', in S. 
MacPherson, J. Y. S. Cheng and Y. -S. Cheng (eds. ) Economic and Social Development 
in South China, Edward Elgar: London, pp. 140-161. 
UKTI (2006) UK companies drive into Chinese markets', UKTI Investment Newsroom, 24 
October 2006 [www document] http: //www. newsroom. uktradeinvest. gov. uk/ 
index. asp? PageID=50&PressReleaseID=825 (accessed 31 January 2007). 
UNCTAD (2007a) FDI database (WIR 2006 data), [www document] http: //stats. unctad. org/FDI 
(accessed 16 January 2007). 
UNCTAD (2007b) Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of 
Cooperation among Developing Countries, United Nations: New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2006) World Investment Report 2006 - FDI from Developing and Transition 
Economies: Implications for Development, United Nations: New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2005a) Prospects for Foreign Direct Investment and the Strategies of Transnational 
Corporations: 2005-2008, UN: New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2005b) South-South Cooperation in International Investment Arrangements, UN: 
New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2004a) Prospects for Foreign Direct Investment and the Strategies of Transnational 
Corporations: 2004-2007, UN: New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2004b) World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services, UN: New York 
and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2002) World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export 
Competitiveness, United Nations: New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (2000) Bilateral investment treaties 1959-1999, UN: New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (1998) World Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants, United Nations: 
New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (1996) Sharing Asia's Dynamism: Asian Direct Investment in the European Union, 
United Nations: New York and Geneva. 
UNCTAD (1995) World Investment Report 1995: Transnational Corporations and 
Competitiveness, United Nations: New York and Geneva. 
UNIDO (2006) Africa Foreign Investor Survey 2005: Understanding the contribution of 
different investor categories to development - Implications for targeting strategies, 
UNIDO: Vienna. 
229 
Van den Bulcke, D. and Zhang, H. (2006) China as a Global Investor: Can Belgium Benefit?, 
Report commissioned by Federation of Enterprises in Belgium-VBO/FEB. 
Vandevelde, K. J. (1998) `The political economy of a bilateral investment treaty', The American 
Journal of International Law 92(4): 621-641. 
Vernon, R. (1966) `International investment and international trade in the product cycle', 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 80: 190-207. 
Villela, A. (1983) `Multinationals from Brazil', in S. Lall (ed. ) The New Multinationals: The 
Spread of Third World Enterprises, John Wiley and Sons: New York, pp. 220-249. 
Von Keller, E. and Zhou, W. (2003) From Middle Kingdom to Global Market: Expansion 
Strategies and Success Factors for China's Emerging Multinationals, Roland Berger 
Strategy Consultants: Munich. 
von Zedtwitz, M. (2005) `International R&D strategies of TNCs from developing countries: the 
case of China', in UNCTAD (ed. ) Globalization of R&D and Developing Ccountries, 
Proceedings of the Expert Meeting, Geneva 24-26 January 2005, UN: New York and 
Geneva, pp. 117-140. 
Voss, H. (2004) Eine Analyse des Zusammenhangs von Infrastruktur und 
Wirtschaftsentwicklung ausgewählter Regionen der VR China mittels der Theorie der 
Verfügungsrechte, unpublished Diplomarbeit at the University of Duisburg-Essen. 
Voss, J. (1982) `The protection and promotion of foreign direct investment in developing 
countries: interests, interdependencies, intricacies', International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 31: 686-708. 
Voyer, P. A. and Beamish, P. W. (2004) `The effect of corruption on Japanese foreign direct 
investment', Journal of Business Ethics 50(3): 211-224. 
Wall, D. (1999) `China's overseas investment', in S. Daniel, P. Arestis and J. Grahi (eds. ) 
Regulation Strategies and Economic Policies, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, pp. 153-173. 
Wall, D. (1997) `Outflows of capital from China', OECD Development Centre Technical Paper 
No. 123, OECD: Paris. 
Wall Street Journal (2005) `PetroKazakhstan Inc.: Canadian Court Approves China National 
Takeover', Wall Street Journal 27 October 2005: A12. 
Wang, H. (2001) `Implementing vigorously the opening strategy of "going global"', in Almanac 
of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 2001, MOFCOM: Beijing, pp. 94-95. 
Wang, J. (2004) `China's regional trade agreements: the law, geopolitics, and impact on the 
multilateral trading system', Singapore Yearbook of International Law 8: 119-147. 
Wang, M. Y. (2002) `The motivations behind Chinese government-initiated industrial 
investments overseas', Pacific Affairs 75(2): 187-206. 
Wang, Z. (2006a) `Thoughts on implementation of economic and trade cooperation between 
China and the developing countries', TCDC Update, Issue 1 in 2006, [www document] 
http: //www. ecdc. net. cn/events/tcdc0601/en/tcdclO. htm (accessed 30 March 2007). 
230 
Wang, Z. (2006b) `The growth of China's private sector: a case study of Zhejiang province', 
China & World Economy 14(3): 109-120. 
Warner, M., Hong, N. S. and Xu, X. (2004) `Late development experience and the evolution of 
transnational firms in the People's Republic of China', Asia Pacific Business Review 
10(3/4): 324-345. 
Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge University. 
Weatherley, R. (2006) Politics in China since 1949: Legitimizing Authoritarian rule, Routledge: 
London. 
Welch, L. S. and Luostarinen, R. (1993) `Inward-outward connections in internationalization', 
Journal of International Marketing 1(1): 44-56. 
Welch, L. S. and Luostarinen, R. (1988) `Internationalization: evolution of a concept', Journal 
of General Management 14(2): 34-55. 
Wells, L. T. (1983) Third World Multinationals: The Rise of Foreign Investment from 
Developing Countries, MIT Press: Cambridge (Mass. ). 
Wei, Y., Liu, X., Parker, D. and Vaidya, K. (1999) `The regional distribution of foreign direct 
investment in China', Regional Studies 33(9): 857-867. 
Weiss, J. (2004) `People's Republic of China and Its Neighbors: Partners or Competitors for 
Trade and Investment? ', ABDI Institute Discussion Paper No. 13, August. 
Wezel, T. (2003) `Determinants of German foreign direct investment in Latin American and 
Asian emerging markets in the 1990s', Discussion Paper 11/03, Economic Research 
Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsche Bank: Frankfurt a. M.. 
Wheeler, D. and Mody, A. (1992) `International investment location decisions: the case for U. S. 
firms', Journal of International Economics 33: 57-76. 
Williamson, O. E. (2000) `The New Institutional Economics: Taking stock, looking ahead', 
Journal of Economic Literature 38(3): 595-613. 
Wong, J. and Chan, S. (2003) `China's outward direct investment: expanding worldwide', 
China: An International Journal 1(2): 273-30 1. 
Wong, S. M. L., Opper, S. and Hu, R. (2004) `Shareholding structure, depoliticization and firm 
performance', Economics of Transition 12: 29-66. 
World Bank (2007) `Indicators of Governance and Institutional Quality', [www document] 
http: //siteresources. worldbank. org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/IndicatorsGovernan 
ceandlnstitutionalQuality. pdf (accessed 12 March 2007). 
World Bank (2006a) World Development Indicators (WDI), April 2005 and April 2006, ESDS 
International, (MIMAS) University of Manchester (accessed 12 March 2007). 
World Bank (2006b) Global Development Finance 2006: The Development Potential of Surging 
Capital Flows, World Bank: Washington D. C.. 
231 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) (2006) Patents and PCT statistics, [www 
document] http: //www. wipo. int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/ (accessed 26 September 
2006). 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) (2006) Understanding the WTO: The Organization - 
Members and Observers, [www document] http: //www. wto. org/english/thewto_e/what 
is e/tif e/org6_e. htm (accessed 12 March 2007). 
Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., Hoskisson, R. E. and Peng, M. W. (2005) `Strategy research in 
emerging economies: challenging the conventional wisdom', Journal of Management 
Studies 42(1): 1-33. 
Wu, F. and Sia, Y. H. (2002) `China's rising investment in Southeast Asia: Trends and outlook', 
Journal of Asian Business 18(2): 41-61. 
Wu, H: L. and Chen, C. -H. (2001) An assessment of outward foreign direct investment from 
China's transitional economy', Europe-Asia Studies 53(8): 1235-1254. 
Xiao, J. and Sun, F. (2005) `The challenges facing outbound Chinese M&A', International 
Financial Law Review 24(12): 44-46. 
Xu, X. (2004) `China's gross domestic product estimation', China Economic Review 
15(3): 302-322. 
Yahuda, M. (1993) `Deng Xiaoping: the statesman', China Quarterly 135(Special Issue, 
September): 551-572. 
Yamin, M. and Sinkovics, R. (2006) `Online internationalisation, psychic distance reduction 
and the virtuality trap', International Business Review 15(4): 339-360. 
Yang, D. (2005) China's Offshore Investments: A Network Approach, Edward Elgar: 
Cheltenham. 
Ye, G. (1992) `Chinese transnational corporations', Transnational Corporations 1(2): 125-133. 
Yeaple, S. R. (2003) `The role of skill endowments in the structure of U. S. outward foreign 
direct investment', Review of Economics and Statistics 85(3): 726-734. 
Yeung, A. and DeWoskin, K. (1998) `From survival to success: the journey of corporate 
transformation at Haier', William Davidson Institute Working Paper 207, University of 
Michigan Business School. 
Yeung, H. W. -C. (1999) `The internationalisation of ethnics Chinese business firms from 
Southeast Asia: strategies, processes and competitive advantages', International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23(1): 103-127. 
Yeung, H. W. C. (1998) `The political economy of transnational corporations: a study of the 
regionalization of Singaporean firms', Political Geography 17(4): 389-416. 
Yeung, H. W. -C. (1995) `Qualitative personal interviews in international business research: 
some lessons from a study of Hong Kong transnational corporations', International 
Business Review 4(3): 313-339. 
Yeung, H. W. C. (1994a) `Third World Multinationals revisited: a research critique and future 
agenda', Third World Quarterly 15(2): 297-317. 
232 
Yeung, H. W. -C. (1994b) `Transnational corporations from Asian developing countries: Their 
characteristics and competitive edge', Journal ofAsian Business 10(4): 17-60. 
Yin, X., Stender, N. and Song, J. (2003) `PRC outward investment: liberalization momentum 
builds', China Law & Practice 17(10): 75. 
Yoshino, M. Y. (1974) `The transnational spread of Japanese manufacturing investment since 
World War II', Business History Review 48(3): 357-381. 
Young, S., Hood, N. and Lu, T. (1998) `International development by Chinese enterprises: key 
issues for the future', Long Range Planning 31(6): 886-893. 
Young, S., Huang, C. H. and McDermott, M. (1996) `Internationalization and competitive catch- 
up processes: case study evidence on Chinese multinational enterprises', Management 
International Review 36(4): 295-314. 
Yu, A. and Hwang, B. (2005) `Chinese companies on the global M&A stage - domestic 
regulatory issues', China Law & Practice 19(September). 
Yu, A., Hwang, B. and Dorf, M. (2005) `Outbound investments by Chinese Companies: the 
Chinese government approval regime', O'Melveny &Myers LLP Research Report, 
November 2005. 
Zaheer, S. (1995) `Overcoming the liability of foreignness', Academy of Management Journal 
38(2): 341-363. 
Zahra, S. A. (2005) `A theory of international new ventures: a decade of research', Journal of 
International Business Studies 36: 20-28. 
Zahra, S. A., Irelane, RD. and Hitt, M. A (2000) `International expansion by New Venture Firms: 
international diversity, mode of market entry, technological learning, and performance', 
Academy of Management Journal 43(5): 925-950. 
Zeng, M. and Williamson, P. J. (2003) `The hidden dragons', Harvard Business Review 
81(10): 92-99. 
Zhan, J. X. (1995) `Transnationalization and outward investment: the case of Chinese firms', 
Transnational Corporations 4(3): 67-100. 
Zhang, H. and van den Bulcke, D. (2000) `Internationalisation of ethnic Chinese-owned 
enterprises: A network approach', in H. W. -C. Yeung and K. Olds (eds. ) Globalization 
of Chinese Business Firms, Macmillan: Basingstoke, pp. 126-149. 
Zhang, H. and van den Bulcke, D. (1996) `International management strategies of Chinese 
multinational firms', in J. Child (ed. ) Management Issues for China in the 1990s: 
International Enterprises, Routledge: London, pp. 141-164. 
Zhang, K. (2005) Going Global: The Why, When, Where and How of Chinese Companies' 
Outward Investment Intentions, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada: Vancouver. 
Zhang, L., Nathan, A. J. and Link, P. (2001) The Tiananmen Papers, Public Affairs: New York. 
Zhang, P. G. (2004) Chinese yuan (Renminbi) Derivative Products, World Scientific Publishing: 
Singapore. 
233 
Zhang, Y. (2003) China's Emerging Global Businesses: Political Economy and Institutional 
Investigations, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Zhang, Y. (1998) China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond, Macmillan 
Press: Basingstoke. 
Zhang, Z. (2006) `Capital controls in China: recent developments and reform prospects', 
International Center for Finance at the Yale School of Management - China Initiative 
[www document] http: //icfsom. yale. edu/research/china/newpage/en/essay_en/market/ 
capital%20controls%20in%20china. pdf (accessed 1 April 2007). 
Zhang, Z. (1999) `Foreign exchange rate reform, the balance of trade and economic growth: an 
empirical analysis for China', Journal of Economic Development 24(2): 143-162. 
Zhao, C. (2000) `Developing overseas investments with overseas processing trade as the new 
starting point', in Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 2000, 
MOFCOM: Beijing, pp. 45-46. 
Zhao, H. (2003) `Country factor differentials as determinants of FDI flow to China', 
Thunderbird International Business Review 45(2): 149-169. 
Zhao, M. (2006) `External liberalization and the evolution of China's exchange system: an 
empirical approach', World Bank China Office Research Paper No. 4, World Bank: 
Beijing [www document] http: //siteresources. worldbank. org/INTCHIINDGLOECO/ 
Resources/externalliberalizationand exchange_control. pdf (accessed 2 April 2007). 
Zhao, Y. (ed. -in-chief) (2007) `China's South-South Cooperation (TCDC/ECDC) Development 
Strategy', [www document] http: //www. ecdc. net. cn/newindex/english/page/south_south 
/index. htm (accessed 30 March 2007). 
Zhou, Y. and Lall, S. (2005) `The impact of China's FDI surge on FDI in South-East Asia: 
panel data analysis for 1986-2001', Transnational Corporations 14(1): 41-65. 
Zhu, R. (2001) `Report on the outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development (Excerpts)', in Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade 2001, MOFCOM: Beijing, pp. 31-44. 
Zin, R. H. M. (1999) `Malaysian reverse investments: trends and strategies', Asia Pacific Journal 
of Management 16(3): 469-496. 
Zweig, D. and Bi, J. (2005) `China's global hunt for energy', Foreign Affairs 84(5): 25-38. 
234 
Appendices 
Appendix A. 1 Country classification 
Developed economies 
North America Bermuda, Canada, United States of America 
Asia Israel, Japan 
Europe Austria, Belgium, Belgium-Luxembourg, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia 
(former), Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Oceania Australia, New Zealand 
Develonin' economies 
Arica 
Eastern Africa Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Somalia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Middle Africa Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao 
Tome and Principe 
Northern Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia 
Southern Africa Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland 
Western Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint 
Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
Latin America 
Caribbean Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British 
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands 
Central America Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama 
South America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas), Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela 
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Asia 
Eastern Asia China, Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR, Taiwan, Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (North Korea), Republic of Korea (South Korea), 
Mongolia 
Southern Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
South-Eastern Asia Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Dem. Republic, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, 
Viet Nam 
Western Asia Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestinian territory, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen 
Oceania Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Palau (former Pacific Islands, also known as 
Belau), Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna Islands 
Transition economies 
Asia Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Republic of Moldova, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turlanenistan, 
Europe Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, TFYR Macedonia, 
Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Yugoslavia, SFR (former) 
Source: UNCTAD (2007a). 
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Appendix A. 2 Invitation facsimile to Chinese headquarters 
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Appendix A. 3 Interview question guideline: Chinese firms 
Background information 
Please describe briefly your role and duties in your firm. 
Could you please describe the business activities of your company in mainland China. 
Could you please describe the current legal ownership arrangement of you company. 
Based on your description, would your say company is a state-owned enterprise, a collective- 
owned enterprise, a private-owned enterprise or a foreign-invested company? 
Does your company have an export and import license? 
In which year did your company receive an export and import licence? 
In which year did your company first export? 
Does your company have any assets in countries outside of mainland China? 
Why does your company make equity investments outside of mainland China? 
Are there any domestic reasons which pushed your company to invest in a foreign country? 
Please describe briefly how decisions to invest abroad are taken in your company. 
When did your company invest in a foreign country for the first time? 
How many foreign countries has your company currently invested in? 
Could you please list the countries. 
Does your company pursue the same business activities in all countries? 
Approximately, in the last completed financial year what percentage of your company's total 
turnover can be attributed to foreign activities outside of mainland China? 
Approximately, in the last completed financial year what percentage of your company's total 
assets is located outside of mainland China? 
Approximately, in the last completed financial year what percentage of your company's total 
workforce is employed outside of mainland China? 
Which foreign investment is the most important for your company? 
Why is the investment in ... the most important for your company? 
When did you invest in ....? 
What was the single most important motivation for your company to carry out this investment? 
All further questions will focus on the most important foreign venture of your company 
Before investing in country X, did your company have any trade relations with this country? 
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Before investing in country X, did your company have a joint venture with a company from X 
in China? 
Before investing in country X, was your company a customer or supplier of a company from X 
in China? 
How important were these links and contacts in the decision to set up the subsidiary? 
Did any of the just mentioned business relationships assist your company in the foreign 
investment? 
During the actual process? 
Have these business links and contacts proved important to the overall success of the subsidiary? 
Did you ask them for advice or did they offer advice to your company? 
Could you company have carried out the investment without the advise of these linkages and 
contacts? 
How important are international ethnic relationship, i. e. with other Chinese, for your company's 
international business activities? 
What personal contacts to Overseas Chinese or to Chinese networks did your company have 
in ... prior your 
investment in ...? 
Did this personal network assist your company to decide where to invest? 
What kind of assistance did your company receive? 
Did you ask these personal contacts for advice or did they offer advice to your company? 
Have these personal contacts and networks proved important to the overall success of the 
subsidiary? 
Did your company receive any assistance from any Chinese institutions while investing in a 
foreign country? 
If your company received assistance from different actors, which one was the most important 
for your company? 
Competitive advantage (existence, strengthening) 
What do you think makes your company successful in mainland China? 
It is argued among researchers that a company has to have a competitive advantage over its 
competitors when it is investing in a foreign country. What do you think makes your 
company successful in country X? Is it the same competitive advantage as in mainland 
China? 
Do you think your company in mainland China benefits from the existence of foreign firms in 
mainland China? 
Do you think your company's domestic business operation benefit from your company's foreign 
venture? 
239 
What was the single most serious challenge faced by your company when setting up the foreign 
business operation? 
What was the second most serious challenge faced by your company when setting up the 
foreign business operation? 
What is the single most important challenge for your company's foreign operation today? 
What is the second most important challenge for your company's foreign operation today? 
The domestic institutional framework 
How would you describe the Chinese government's attitude towards international investments 
by Chinese firms? 
Is it any different on provincial or municipal level? 
Is any Chinese state authority responsible for advising, monitoring and regulating your firm's 
foreign investments? 
Did any state authority have any influence on your company's foreign investment decision? 
Did any state authority have any influence on your company's investment scale? 
Did any state authority have any influence on your company's foreign location selection or all 
of them? 
Do you think the activities and behaviour of any state authority influences the speed of your 
company's foreign business development? 
Has the influence of government authorities on your investment decisions changed over the last 
years? E. g., shifted from one authority to another or in magnitude? 
Is your company required to obtain an investment approval from the Chinese government before 
making an investment in a foreign country? 
Could you please describe the investment approval process that your firm is required to follow. 
If you are not involved in the approval process, could you please introduce me to the person 
in charge? 
Do you think the approval process influences the speed of your company's foreign business 
development? 
Has any foreign investment application by your company ever been rejected by Chinese state 
authorities? 
What consequences did the rejection cause for your company? 
Do you plan to expand your foreign business operations within the next five years? 
Do you plan to invest (or to expand your) within the European Union? 
Could you think of any issue I have not asked you that is important and should be discussed as 
well? 
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Appendix A. 4 Interview question guideline: Chinese government officials 
Background information 
We start with some questions concerning your and your organisation's background 
Could you please describe briefly your role and duties in your organisation. 
Could you please describe the activities and responsibilities of your organisation. 
Where is your organisation located in the Chinese administrative system? 
Has your organisation a mandate to deal with Chinese investments abroad? 
For how long has your organisation this mandate? 
How does this mandate look like? 
Has the mandate of your organisation changed since your organisation received it? 
How many people in your organisation are working in the area of Chinese outbound investment? 
Are there any further governmental bodies in China which also have a mandate to deal with 
Chinese investments abroad? 
To what extent differs there mandate from yours? 
Are there any overlapping responsibilities and duties between your and any other government 
organisation towards Chinese investments abroad? 
How is your organisation dealing with overlapping responsibilities and duties? 
How would you describe the relationship between your organisation and each of these 
organisations? 
Is there a final decision taker inside or outside your organisation how can rule over all 
governmental organisations in case your objectives and operations differ? 
Do you know anybody in any of the other organisations we should talk to? 
The following questions deal with Chinese firms which would like to invest in a foreign country 
Are all Chinese enterprises allowed to invest overseas? 
Has this always been the case? 
Are there any industry sectors in which Chinese firms are encouraged to invest abroad? 
Are there any industry sectors in which Chinese firms are not allowed to invest abroad? 
Has this industry sector policy always been in place like this? 
Are there any countries in which a Chinese firm is encouraged to invest in? 
Are there any countries in which a Chinese firm is not allowed to invest in? 
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Are Chinese firms required to obtain an investment approval from your organisation before 
making an investment in a foreign country? 
Could you please describe in detail the formal ODI approval process from your organisation's 
perspective. 
What kind of documents has an applying company to provide? 
How long does the approval process takes normally? 
Is any documentation available that sets out the formal approval process? 
Have there been any changes in the approval system during the past five years? 
Does a Chinese firm have to apply for every foreign investment project? 
Does a Chinese firm have to apply for an investment approval when it is using money earned in 
the host country? 
Does a Chinese firm have to apply for an investment approval when it has secured external 
funding from a source outside of China? 
Once a Chinese firms has invested in a foreign country, are there any duties the firm has to fulfil? 
Is there any government organisation which supports Chinese firms during their investment 
location screening process? 
Is there any government organisation which supports Chinese firms during their investment 
scale decision process? 
Is there any government organisation which supports Chinese firms during their entry mode 
decision process? 
Is there any government organisation which supports Chinese firms during their approval 
process? 
Are these supportive activities available to state-owned as well as privately-owned firms? 
Which Chinese government institution do you think have the greatest effect on ODI by Chinese 
firms? 
Are you aware of any sub-national policy or activity which contradicts policies and regulations 
on national level? 
Are you aware of any Chinese firms which invested without any official approval outside of 
mainland China? 
In your opinion, what is the single most important motivation for Chinese firms investing 
outside of China? 
In your opinion, what is the second most important motivation for Chinese firms investing 
outside of China? 
In your opinion, what is the single most important challenge for Chinese firms investing outside 
of China? 
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In your opinion, what is the second most important challenge for Chinese firms investing 
outside of China? 
Have these motivations changed over the last five year? 
Does your organisation have any data on Chinese outbound investment? 
How do you explain the recent surge in Chinese outbound investment? 
Does your organisation have any data on the success rate of Chinese foreign ventures? 
Is there anything we should have talked about but I did not ask you? 
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Appendix A. 5 Interview question guideline: Other stakeholders 
Background information 
We start with some questions concerning your and your organisations' background 
Could you please describe briefly your role and duties in your organisation. 
Could you please describe the activities of your organisation. 
Does your organisation deal with Chinese investments abroad? 
Since when is your organisation dealing with outbound investment from China? 
Has the scope of your organisation toward outbound investment from China changed since your 
organisation deals with it? 
How many people in your organisation are working in the area of Chinese outbound investment? 
The following questions deal with Chinese firms which would like to invest in a foreign country 
Are all Chinese enterprises allowed to invest overseas? 
Has this always been the case? 
Are there any industry sectors in which Chinese firms are encouraged to invest abroad? 
Are there any industry sectors in which Chinese firms are not allowed to invest abroad? 
Has this industry sector policy always been in place like this? 
Are there any countries in which a Chinese firm is encouraged to invest in? 
Are there any countries in which a Chinese firm is not allowed to invest in? 
Are Chinese firms required to obtain an investment approval from your organisation before 
making an investment in a foreign country? 
Could you please describe in detail the formal outward investment approval process. 
What kind of documents has an applying company to provide? 
How long does the approval process takes normally? 
Have there been any changes in the approval system during the past five years? 
Does a Chinese firm have to apply for every foreign investment project? 
Does a Chinese firm have to apply for an investment approval when it is using money earned in 
the host country? 
Does a Chinese firm have to apply for an investment approval when it has secured external 
funding from a source outside of China? 
Once a Chinese firm has invested in a foreign country, are there any duties the firm has to fulfil? 
244 
Does the Chinese national government supports outward investment by Chinese firms? 
Does the Chinese provincial/municipal government (local level) supports outward investment 
by Chinese firms? 
Is there any government organisation which supports Chinese firms during their investment 
location screening process? 
Is there any government organisation which supports Chinese firms during their investment 
scale decision process? 
Is there any government organisation which supports Chinese firms during their entry mode 
decision process? 
Is there any government organisation which supports Chinese firms during their approval 
process? 
Are these supportive activities available to state-owned as well as privately-owned firms? 
To what extent is the outward investment by Chinese firms influenced by the Chinese 
government's policy? 
Does the Chinese government impede outward investment by private Chinese enterprises? 
Which Chinese government institution do you think have the greatest effect on outward 
investments by Chinese firms? 
Are you aware of any sub-national policy or activity which contradicts policies and regulations 
on national level? 
Are you aware of any Chinese firms which invested without any official approval outside of 
mainland China? 
In your opinion, what is the single most important motivation for Chinese firms investing 
outside of China? 
In your opinion, what is the second most important motivation for Chinese firms investing 
outside of China? 
Have these motivations changed over the last five year? 
Are there any domestic factors which might push Chinese firms to invest overseas? 
How do you explain the recent surge in Chinese outbound investment? 
In your opinion, what is the single most important challenge for Chinese firms investing outside 
of China? 
In your opinion, what is the second most important challenge for Chinese firms investing 
outside of China? 
Where do Chinese firms tend to invest? 
Do Chinese firms have established business contacts to the host country prior their investment? 
245 
Do Chinese firms receive any support through established business contacts when they invest 
overseas? 
Do Chinese firms have established personal contacts to ethnic Chinese in the host country prior 
their investment? 
Do Chinese firms receive any support from the personal contacts to ethnic Chinese when they 
invest overseas? 
Does your organisation have any data on Chinese outbound investment? 
Does your organisation have any data on the success rate of Chinese foreign ventures? 
Does your organisation has any direct contact to outward investing Chinese firms? 
Could your organisation support me in getting access to these Chinese firms for a research 
interview? 
Is there anything we should have talked about but I did not ask you? 
Do you know anybody in any of the other organisations we should talk to? 
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Appendix A. 6 Cover letter to Chinese affiliates in the UK 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
Re: `Chinese firms in United Kingdom' Survey 
Leeds, xxxx, 200x 
We write to invite your participation in a major research project on Chinese firms in the UK 
which we are conducting here at the University of Leeds. Chinese firms like yours have been 
active in the UK for many years. However, very little is known about the reasons why the UK 
was chosen as an investment location by Chinese firms and what the perceptions are of the UK 
as a place to do business. This survey is an important step in improving our knowledge about 
Chinese firms in the UK. 
The study is being carried out by researchers from the Centre for Chinese Business and 
Development (CCBD) and the Centre for International Business at the University of Leeds 
(CIBUL). Together, these Centres represent one of the leading British research Institutions on 
international business and contemporary Chinese business studies. (You can find more 
information about us at the following websites: http: //www. leeds. ac. uk/ccbd and 
http: //lubswww. leeds. ac. uk/cibul). The study is being led by myself and is part of a much larger 
project on Chinese multinational firms that we are doing here at Leeds. 
We would be very grateful if you could take a few minutes of your time to complete the enclosed 
questionnaire and return it to us in the prepaid envelope provided. The questionnaire does not 
ask you to give any commercially sensitive information. We can assure you that all the 
information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence and will not be passed on to any 
third party. It will be impossible to identify individual companies or people In our analysis or 
report. This is an independent piece of academic research and we are not being sponsored by 
or in any way supported by another company or organisation. 
Your participation in our survey will have a number of benefits. 
Benefits to us: This is the first large scale survey of Chinese firms ever conducted in 
Europe. Your participation will help us to better appreciate the challenges and 
opportunities which the UK presents to Chinese firms. 
Benefit to you: Through our close relationship with the Department of Trade and 
Industry and other government bodies, our research will help inform policy that will 
ultimately enhance the investment environment for you and other Chinese firms in the 
U K. 
If you have any questions about this survey, please direct them to me at bushv@leeds. ac. uk. If 
you would like more information about any aspect of our work on China, please direct your 
enquiries to Adam Cross, Director of CCBD, at arc@lubs. leeds. ac. uk or by mail at the address 
above. 
We look forward to receiving your response and thank you in advance for your participation in 
our research. 
Yours sincerely, 
Hinrich Voss 
Doctoral Researcher 
Centre for International Business 
University of Leeds 
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Appendix A. 7 Survey questionnaire to Chinese affiliates in the UK 
LEEDS UNIVERSITY BUSINESS SCHOOL 
Centre for International Business. University of Leeds 
A survey of Chinese firms in the UK 
Section One: Background Information 
About you 
1) What position do you have in your company? 
2) In what year did you first join your current employer in China? 
Please select one answer 
2003-2005 O 1999-2002 O 1995-1998 O 
1980-1994 O Before 1980 O 
3) How many years have you worked for your company in the UK? 
Please select one answer 
1-3 0 7-10 0 20+ O 
4-6 0 11-20 O 
About your parent company in China 
4) In what year was your parent company first established in China? 
5) How many employees does your parent company employ worldwide (including China)? 
Please select one answer 
Less than 49 O 1000-4999 0 
50-249 O 5000+ 0 
250-999 0 Don't know 
6) Which of the following best describes the legal organisation of your parent company in 
China? 
Please select one answer 
A state-owned enterprise under the administration of the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) O 
A state-owned enterprise under the control of a ministry 0 
A state-owned enterprise under the control of a provincial government O 
A state-owned enterprise under the control of a municipal government O 
A township/collective enterprise p 
A firm that is privately owned 0 
A corporation that is listed on a Chinese stock exchange O 
Other, please specify: 
Don't know 13 
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7) In what year did your parent company in China first invest in an international market outside 
of mainland China? 
8) How many countries does your parent company in China oper, 
Please select one answer 
The UK only 
2-5 countries outside of mainland China (including the UK) 
6-10 countries outside of mainland China (including the UK) 
11-20 countries outside of mainland China (including the UK) 
20+ countries outside of mainland China (including the UK) 
Don't know 
About your company in the UK 
ate in, including the UK. 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
9) In which year was your company first established in the UK? 
10) Which of the following best describes your company's present organisational form and 
activities in the UK? Please select all boxes which apply 
" Representative office 0 
" Importing with local sales operation 11 
" Importing with local warehousing operation 0 
" Importing with local servicing operation 13 
" Exporting operation D 
" Assembly (importing plus local processing or assembly 0 
operation) 
" Local company-owned manufacturing or production: 
oa wholly-owned greenfield entry 0 
0a wholly-owned entry made via an acquisition 
o an equity joint venture entry (both minority and majority) 0 
" Other, please specify: 
11) Please indicate the industry your UK company is mainly active in. 
Please select one answer 
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry O Construction 
Fishing Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Oil, Mining And Quarrying O Hotels and Restaurants 
Manufacturing 13 Transport, Storage and Communication 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 13 Financial Services 
Education 
Real Estate, Renting and 
Business Activities 
Other Community, Social and 
Personal Service Activities 
Other, please specify 
O Health and Social Work 
13 Public Administration and Defence 
13 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
12) How many employees does your company have in the UK? 
Please select one answer 
1O 26-49 O 200-499 O 
2-9 O 50-99 O 500+ O 
10-25 0 100-199 O 
13) Who has overall control of your company in the UK (control means making major decisions 
concerning the company's present and future direction and strategy)? 
Please select one answer 
The managing director or general manager in the UK O 
The board of directors of your parent company in mainland China O 
The principle Chinese bank with which your parent company deals O 
A Chinese government ministry or agency (municipal, provincial, or national? ) O 
A family in China 0' 
Individual owners of your parent company in China O 
A company group in the UK (in a conglomerate situation) 
A regional headquarters outside of the UK 
Other, please specify: 
Don't know 13 
250 
Section Two: Investment Motivation 
14) Thinking about your company's first investment in the UK, how important were the following 
factors in your company's decision to invest in the UK. 
Please select for each factor one box that matches your view most closely, as follows: 
Of utmost Very Of moderate Of little Of no Don't know 
importance important importance importance importance 
QQQQQ Q 
In response to growing competitive pressure in Chinese markets 
QQQQ n 
To develop new markets outside of China through direct investment 
71 QQQQ n 
To obtain access to raw materials not available readily in China 
QQQQQ Q 
To benefit from Chinese government incentives (e. g. in taxation, foreign exchange) to invest 
overseas 
QQQQn Q 
To increase corporate profits 
QQQQn n 
Because your parent company's markets are becoming saturated in China 
QQQQQ n 
To comply with Chinese government's policy statements 
71 0QQQ n 
In response to growing international competition 
71 173 QQ l=1 71 
To gain access to intermediate products not readily available in Chin a 
QQQQQ n 
To carry out research and/or product development in the UK 
QQQQQ 71 
To be closer to your British suppliers 
QQQQQ n 
To support your company's export activities in the UK 
-71 QQQ n 
Because you were invited to invest by a British customer or supplier 
QQQQQ n 
To collect information and gain knowledge about European markets 
71 oQQQ n 
To be closer to your important customers 
QQQQQ n 
To gain better access to new management know-how and ideas 
QQQQQ Cl 
To benefit from lower production costs in the UK compared to China 
QQQQQ f7 
To spread the risks associated with producing internationally 
QQQQQ n 
To defend existing market share in the British market by investing locally 
QQoQQ Q 
To support export activities in the European Union 
73 QQQ 73 rl 
To gain access to new technology 
QQQQ n 
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Of utmost Very Of moderate Of little Of no Don't know 
importance important importance importance importance 
71 . 71 aoa n 
To improve access to sources of cheaper external finance 
oao0o n 
To overcome tariff and non-tariff barriers to your company's trade wi th the UK and the 
European Union 
aa0oa n 
To improve the competitiveness of your company's export activities 
71 ooa El n 
To purchase a known British brand 
73 71 El O C] rl 
To take advantage of investment incentives in the UK 
. 71 ao0o n 
To establish a headquarters for your firms' European operations 
aoaoo n 
To raise the profile of your company in Europe 
71 o0o 11 n 
15) If there were important factors that influenced your company's decision to invest in the UK 
that are not listed under question 14), please state these here. 
Section Three: The UK as a business location 
16) Thinking about your company's current business, how important are the following factors 
in influencing your company's decision to locate in the UK? 
Please select for each factor one box that matches your view most closely, as follows: 
Of utmost Very Of moderate Of little Of no Don't know 
importance important importance importance importance 
a 71 Ei El 0 El 
Availability of low cost land, compared to other industrialised countries 
OOOO O El 
Tax concessions and incentives in the UK 
71 OOO El r7 
Size and potential of the British market 
O El OO O O 
Political stability in the UK 
OOOO O O 
Because of the support provided by a regional investment promotion agency in the UK 
O 71 10 O O 
Ease at which profits are repatriated to China 
71 o0 El n n 
Efficient local government in the UK 
OOO0 O f7 
Chinese business and family connections in Britain 
0o00 0 0 
Good transportation infrastructure 
O 71 OO O O 
Availability of technical and skilled workforce 
O 71 OO O O 
Of utmost Very Of moderate Of little Of no Don't know 
importance important importance importance importance 
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71 73 71 O 71 rJ 
Availability of low cost labour, compared to other industrialised count ries 
OO O 
Proximity of the UK to large, third markets for exports 
O 73 0OO O 
Because the UK is a signatory country to international trade and investment treaties with China 
o 71 ooa o 
Reliable communication networks 
O 71 OO Cl 
Ready availability of finance capital in the UK and European Union 
71 71 OOO O 
Absence of foreign exchange controls 
71 ooa a 
Cultural similarity of the UK with China 
aooao 0 
Ease of exporting to the industrialised countries from the British loca tion 
71 71 o0o n 
Because the UK is a member of the European Union 
71 71 OOO O 
The UK provides a good base for further investment in Europe 
73 71 OO0 O 
The location was recommended by a business associate 
70oa a 
Enforceable intellectual property right laws in Europe 
71 71 OOO O 
Because of the presence of ethnic Chinese-owned suppliers and customers in the UK and Europe 
71 0OOO O 
Because the UK is not a Eurozone state member 
73 Eo00 0 
In response to promotion in China by a regional investment promotion agency in the UK 
71 OOO O 
Because family members live in Great Britain 
>>OOO O 
Because your firm is allowed to reinvest earnings in the European U nion 
OOOOO O 
Clear and flexible labour laws in the UK 
O 71 OOO O 
Transparent and straightforward accounting laws in the UK to international norms (i. e. ISA) 
O 71 0OO O 
Because the UK is an English-speaking country 
71 O7O Cl 
Strength of your company's brand in the UK 
00 El o0 0 
The ease at which a business can be established in the UK 
71 71 OOO O 
Because the UK is highly open to international business 
OEOOO O 
To help obtain business license or other approvals for your products in Europe 
71 '] OO 71 173 
Other, please specify 
253 
Section Four: difficulties 
17) To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following factors have negatively affected 
the ability of your company to develop its business in the UK? 
Please select for each factor one box that matches your view most closely, as follows: 
Strongly Mildly Neither agree Mildly Strongly Don't know 
agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree 
71 71 QQQQ 
Delays in obtaining international investment approval from the Chinese authorities 
71 71 71 71 13 71 
Visa restrictions in China that hinder the movement of staff 
>>>oon 
Weak support from the Chinese government (e. g. concerning market research, country 
information, international trade fairs) 
o0 0a 71 71 
Difficulty in raising investment finance in China 
71 71 71 17 OO 
Inadequate tax exemptions for the export of equipment, raw materials and/or 
intermediate products from China to the UK 
71 El 71 71 0 71 
Lack of international experience within your parent firm in China 
71 71 71 aao 
Problems arising from cultural differences between the UK and China 
71 71 71 71 O 71 
Insufficient understanding of the UK business environment in your Chinese parent 
company 
71 7 71 71 71 n 
Low level of technological capability in your parent company 
71 71 71 71 71 71 
Difficulties in obtaining work visas from the British authorities 
71 71 71 71 71 171 
Your company is not well known in the UK 
71 71 . 13 Ei 13 
Other, please specify 
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. `ý'ý i °t 'w e-: minarts of 
Success 
18) In your opinion how important have the following factors been in contributing to your 
company s success in the UK? 
Please select for each factor one box that matches your view most closely, as follows: 
Of utmost Very Of moderate Of little Of no Don't know 
importance important importance importance importance 
71 71 71 71 O 
High levels of relevant business skills in your UK management team 
71 73 o0on 
Technological dominance of your company's products 
71 71 7) oon 
You have British nationals on your management team in the UK 
El !7OOOO 
Demand for your company's products and/ or services is strong 
71 71 1OO 71 
Internationally experienced management team in your UK company 
a 71 o000 
High level of marketing know-how in your British company 
71 71 71 OO 71 
Your firm has good access to a widespread distribution network outside of the UK 
OO0OOO 
Strong support from your Chinese parent company 
71 71 rJ OOO 
Internationally-educated management team in your UK company 
71 71 71 ooa 
Your management team in the UK is made up of ethnic Chinese people 
1 71 71 71 71 11 
Other, please specify: 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION ! 
Would you like to receive a FREE copy of the research findings? 
NO 
YES. Please give your Email address 
fax number 
or postal address 
255 
